Power over life from Agamben to Foucault: an examination of the question of sovereignty by Lallement, Maxime Thadee Rene
	
	
	
POWER	OVER	LIFE	
FROM	AGAMBEN	TO	FOUCAULT:	
AN	EXAMINATION	OF	THE	QUESTION	
OF	SOVEREIGNTY	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
M	T	R	LALLEMENT	
			PhD	 	 	 						2015	
	
POWER	OVER	LIFE	
FROM	AGAMBEN	TO	FOUCAULT:	AN	
EXAMINATION	OF	THE	QUESTION	OF	
SOVEREIGNTY	
	
	
MAXIME	THADÉE	RENÉ	LALLEMENT	
	
A	thesis	submitted	in	partial	fulfilment	
of	the	requirements	of	theManchester	
Metropolitan	University	for	the	degree	
of	Doctor	of	Philosophy	
	
	
Department	of	History,	Politics	&	
Philosophy
the	Manchester	Metropolitan	
University	
2015
Abstract	
	
This	thesis	starts	by	studying	the	specificity	of	Michel	Foucault’s	account	of	the	
emergence	of	bio-power	 in	contrast	to	that	developed	by	Giorgio	Agamben.	 It	
focuses	on	the	mutation	of	jurisdiction	Foucault	describes	in	the	first	volume	of	
the	History	 of	 Sexuality,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 law	 of	 the	
sovereign	to	that	of	the	norm.	Challenging	the	idea	that	the	concept	of	biological	
life	can	be	spontaneously	used	to	understand	the	type	of	relationship	which	links	
modern	 political	 power	 and	 life,	 this	 thesis	 questions	 the	 epistemological	
implications	of	this	concept	by	inscribing	it	within	Foucault’s	wider	description	of	
the	 emergence	 of	 anthropological	 knowledge.	 Instead	 of	 understanding	
biopolitical	modernity	as	the	expression	of	the	power	of	the	sovereign,	this	thesis	
demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 persistence	 of	 sovereign	 power	 but	 its	
transformation	which	allows	to	think	the	meaning	of	the	concept	of	life	targeted	
by	 human	 sciences.	 This	 thesis	 inscribes	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	
anthropological	knowledge	within	Foucault’s	wider	study	of	the	Western	history	
of	 subjectivity.	 It	 claims	 that	 it	 is	 the	postulate	of	anthropological	 truth	which	
provides	a	basis	 to	 the	concept	of	norm.	 It	demonstrates	 that	anthropological	
knowledge	 is	 itself	 based	 upon	 an	 epistemological	 concept	 of	 truth	 which	
Foucault	historicizes.	This	thesis	argues	that	the	concept	of	sovereignty	can	be	
used	to	problematize	the	relationship	between	the	lives	of	individuals	and	their	
emergence	as	objects	of	knowledge.	It	shows	that	Foucault’s	account	of	life	as	
bios	and	aesthetics	of	existence	provides	a	sense	of	the	ethical	sovereignty	of	the	
self	which	gets	obliterated	within	the	logic	of	the	modern	episteme.	 	
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Introduction	
	
	
Over	the	last	forty	years,	the	concepts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics,	first	explicitly	
introduced	 by	 Foucault	 in	 1976	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 his	History	 of	 Sexuality	
(Foucault:	 1998d),	 have	 had	 a	 considerable	 impact	 on	 the	 understanding	 and	
analysis	of	the	relationship	between	modern	political	power	and	life.	In	very	clear	
terms,	what	Foucault	described	was	first	of	all	a	historical	mutation	of	political	
jurisdiction.	The	power	of	the	sovereign,	which	was	the	power	“to	take	life	or	let	
live”,	 became	 the	 power	 “to	 foster	 life	 or	 disallow	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 death”	
(Foucault:	1998d,	138).	According	to	Foucault,	this	new	form	of	political	power	
over	 life	 did	 not	 correspond	 to	 the	 persistence	 of	 sovereign	 power.	 On	 the	
contrary,	it	corresponded	to	the	historical	diagnosis	of	the	progressive	decline	of	
the	power	associated	with	political	sovereignty	(i.e.	the	power	of	the	King	over	
his	territory	and	subjects	up	until	the	end	of	what	Foucault	calls	the	Classical	Age).	
The	 historical	 decline	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	 political	 sovereign	 also	 entails	 the	
decline	of	the	law	as	expression	of	his	will.	With	bio-power,	Foucault	tells	us,	“the	
law	operates	more	and	more	as	a	norm”	(Foucault:	1998d,	144).	The	historical	
emergence	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	needs	to	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	
mutation	of	the	law	in	favour	of	a	political	power	whose	logic	becomes	centred	
on	the	concept	of	norm.		
	
Curiously,	an	 impressive	number	of	 scholars	and	commentators	 seem	to	have	
failed	to	take	these	simple	remarks	into	consideration	when	providing	their	own	
 6 
account	of	the	meaning	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics.	In	the	late	1990s	and	early	
2000s,	some	of	the	Italian	reception	of	Foucault	has	provided	a	reading	of	bio-
power	 and	 biopolitics	 relying	 upon	 a	 survival	 of	 the	metaphysical	 framework	
implied	by	sovereign	power.	It	ignored	the	specificities	of	the	historical	forms	that	
the	relations	between	political	power	over	life	take.	For	instance,	in	Empire,	Hardt	
and	Negri	reduce	biopolitics	to	the	persistence	of	a	monolithic	and	coherent	form	
of	domination	when	 they	claim	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	a	 “control	 that	extends	
throughout	 the	depths	of	 the	consciousnesses	and	bodies	of	 the	populations”	
(Hardt	 &	 Negri:	 2000,	 24).	 The	 problem	 with	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 fails	 to	
understand	 that	 power,	 for	 Foucault,	 describes	 concrete	 relationships	 whose	
forms	vary	historically.	It	is	precisely	as	a	consequence	of	historical	variations	that	
the	power	of	the	sovereign	which	expressed	the	law	(by	establishing	an	agonistic	
and	deadly	relationship	with	the	subject	who	breached	it)	is	replaced	by	norms	
which	provide	the	basis	upon	which	modern	power	can	“incite,	reinforce,	control,	
monitor,	optimize,	and	organize”	the	forces	over	which	it	 is	exerted	(Foucault:	
1998d,	136).	
	
Giorgio	 Agamben	 is	 not	 exempt	 from	 such	 an	 ontologization	 of	 power.	 In	 his	
Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	he	produces	an	interesting	variation	
of	 the	 de-historicization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 power	 and	 life.	
Whilst	 the	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 becomes	 an	 ahistorical	 entity	 within	
Agamben’s	conceptual	framework,	the	concept	of	life	also	becomes	an	ahistorical	
given.	Not	only	does	he	claim	that	“the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body	is	the	
original	activity	of	 sovereign	power”	 (Agamben:	1998,	11),	but	he	also	affirms	
 7 
that	with	bio-power	“the	realm	of	bare	life	[…]	gradually	begins	to	coincide	with	
the	political	realm”	(Agamben:	1998,	12).	In	other	words,	Agamben	chooses	to	
essentialize	 sovereign	 power,	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 their	
relationship.	According	to	him,	the	only	specificity	of	modern	biopolitical	power	
is	that	it	inverts	the	logic	of	the	relationship	which	links	sovereign	power	to	bare	
life.	Instead	of	being	exerted	over	the	bare	life	of	homo	sacer	(a	political	figure	
whose	 sacred	 character	 is	 defined	 by	 its	 ostracization	 from	 the	 lawful	 order),	
modern	biopolitical	power	sees	the	integration	of	the	bare	life	of	homo	sacer	into	
the	political	sphere.	This	 is	 the	reason	why	the	paradigm	of	the	concentration	
camp	constitutes	the	matrix	of	modern	biopolitical	power:	since	the	sovereign	
power	 to	 kill	 can	 be	 exerted	 upon	 anyone,	 every	 member	 of	 the	 camp	 is	 a	
potential	homo	sacer	whose	death	cannot	be	condemned	by	the	law.		
	
Although	 Agamben	 attempts	 to	 retrieve	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 historical	 specificity	
proper	 to	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics,	 he	 fails	 to	 see	 that	 his	 account	 actually	
reinforces	 the	 relationship	 between	 sovereign	 power	 and	 life	 that	 Foucault’s	
concept	of	bio-power	puts	into	historical	perspective.	As	Judith	Revel	puts	it	in	
her	essay	“Identity,	Nature,	Life:	Three	Biopolitical	Deconstructions”:		
In	Italian	readings	of	Foucault	[…]	the	transition	through	a	state	of	being	
without	 qualities	 […],	 through	 the	 impersonal,	 or	 through	 the	 pre-
individual,	obeys	nothing	but	a	logical	necessity,	which	in	turn	rests	on	a	
mistake.	This	logic	runs	as	follows:	by	de-subjectivizing	singularity,	one	
believes	that	one	is	able	to	return	to	the	common	which	is	taken	as	the	
basis	of	all	shared	resistance.	(Revel:	2014,	118)		
	
The	“common”	Revel	refers	to	corresponds	to	an	essentialization	of	the	shared	
existence	 of	 the	 individuals	 become	 the	 objects	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics.	
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However,	the	gesture	which	consists	in	essentializing	the	singular	(the	immanent	
and	 concrete	 existence	 of	 individuals)	 prevents	 a	 proper	 understanding	 and	
criticism	 of	 bio-power	 as	 a	 strictly	 historical	 phenomenon.	 If	 bare	 life	 is	 the	
ontological	determination	of	existence,	and	if	sovereign	power	over	bare	life	is	
the	ontological	determination	of	politics,	then	the	diagnosis	of	the	emergence	of	
bio-power	and	biopolitics	serve	no	purpose.	 It	becomes	nothing	more	than	an	
intellectual	 exercise	 producing	 a	 metaphysical	 exegesis	 disconnected	 from	
experience.	 It	 constitutes	 the	 antithesis	 to	 the	 Foucauldian	 idea	 according	 to	
which	“power	comes	from	below”	(Foucault:	1998d,	94).		
	
This	misleading	appropriation	of	the	concepts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	has	
been	 studied	and	 criticized	 in	 the	past	 fifteen	 years.	 In	 2004,	 Jacques	Derrida	
stressed	 Agamben’s	 problematic	 attempt	 to	 historicize	 bio-power	 whilst	 still	
arguing	in	favour	of	its	ahistorical	and	foundational	status.	He	writes:	
What	surprises	me	most,	incidentally,	and	constantly	disconcerts	me	in	
Agamben’s	 argumentation	 and	 rhetoric,	 is	 that	 he	 clearly	 recognizes	
what	I	have	just	said,	namely	that	biopolitics	is	an	arch-ancient	thing	and	
bound	up	with	the	very	idea	of	sovereignty.	But	then,	if	one	recognizes	
this,	why	all	the	effort	to	pretend	to	wake	politics	up	to	something	that	
is	supposedly,	I	quote,	“the	decisive	event	of	modernity”	[sic.	Agamben:	
1998,	10]?	In	truth,	Agamben,	giving	nothing	up,	like	the	unconscious,	
wants	to	be	twice	first,	the	first	to	see	and	announce,	and	the	first	to	
remind:	he	wants	both	to	be	the	first	 to	announce	an	unprecedented	
and	new	thing,	what	he	calls	this	“decisive	event	of	modernity”,	and	also	
to	be	the	first	to	recall	that	in	fact	it’s	always	been	like	that,	from	time	
immemorial.	(Derrida:	2009,	330)	
	
Even	though	Derrida	carefully	identifies	the	flaws	of	Agamben’s	argumentation,	
he	seems	to	make	the	same	mistake	when	he	later	claims	that	bio-power	needs	
not	be	thought	in	terms	of	the	relationship	between	sovereign	power	and	human	
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life	but	in	terms	of	the	threshold	between	human	life	and	animality.	According	to	
him,	 “what	 matters	 to	 us”	 is	 “sovereign	 power,	 life	 and	 death,	 animality”	
(Derrida:	 2009,	 331).	 In	 other	words,	Derrida	 criticizes	Agamben’s	 paradoxical	
historicization	 of	 bio-power	 not	 by	 providing	 a	 more	 suitable	 one	 but	 by	
transferring	 it	 to	 other	 concepts:	 bio-power	would	 therefore	 not	 concern	 the	
threshold	between	the	power	of	the	sovereign	and	the	life	of	men	but	rather	the	
threshold	 between	 the	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 and	 what	 he	 briefly	 calls	
“animality”.	 Consequently,	 Derrida’s	 critique	 fails	 to	 identify	 the	 historical	
mutation	which	corresponds	to	the	move	from	the	sovereign	 law	to	the	norm	
and	misses	the	crucial	point	of	Foucault’s	argument	which	concerns	the	historical	
move	from	the	sovereign	law	to	the	natural	rule.	This	natural	rule,	as	Foucault	
claims	 in	 Society	 Must	 Be	 Defended	 (Foucault:	 2003b,	 38),	 provides	 the	
conceptual	basis	upon	which	the	norm	operates:	it	implies	that	the	lives	of	man	
can	be	understood	as	the	immanent	manifestation	of	the	rule	expressing	their	
nature.		
	
In	 2002,	 Jean-Luc	 Nancy	 also	 provided	 a	 commentary	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
biopolitics.	In	a	short	essay	entitled	“A	Note	on	the	Term:	Biopolitics”,	he	argued	
that	life	was	too	vague	a	concept	to	constitute	the	object	of	modern	politics.	He	
writes:	
I	believe	it	necessary,	however,	to	ask	if	“life”	truly	constitutes	the	object	
(real	or	imaginary,	is	not	the	issue	now)	of	these	powers,	or	if	it	is	not	
rather	a	destinal	figure	(“race”	or	“the	human	worker”)	that	comes	to	
substitute	for	the	classical	figures	of	sovereignty.	The	reduction	of	these	
figures	 to	“life”	 is	not	sufficient	 to	ground	their	political	and	affective	
power.	(Nancy:	2007,	94)	
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Nancy’s	reflection	is	correct	and	interesting	in	two	respects.	Firstly,	it	is	indeed	
necessary	to	ask	what	this	concept	of	life	which	becomes	the	object	of	bio-power	
and	biopolitics	corresponds	to.	Nothing	 indicates,	 in	Foucault’s	1976	text,	 that	
the	life	which	becomes	the	object	of	the	strategies	of	political	modernity	can	be	
superimposed	with	the	life	of	the	subject	of	the	King.	Secondly,	Nancy’s	remark	
according	 to	which	 the	concept	of	 life	designates	a	“destinal	 figure”	 seems	 to	
better	 correspond	 with	 Foucault’s	 description.	 Still	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	
History	of	Sexuality,	the	latter	tells	us	that	the	concept	of	bio-power	is	divided	
into	 two	 sub-categories:	 “the	 disciplines:	 an	 anatomo-politics	 of	 the	 human	
body”	and	“regulatory	controls:	a	biopolitics	of	the	population”	(Foucault:	1998d,	
139).	The	concept	of	population,	understood	as	a	phenomenon	which	keeps	on	
evolving	 and	 is	 never	 finite,	 is	 close	 to	 that	 idea	 of	 “destinal	 figure”	 Nancy	
describes.1	Because	it	does	not	refer	to	a	fixed	and	limited	reality,	this	concept	
targets	the	irreducible	temporality	of	human	existence.		
	
As	Luca	Paltrinieri	puts	it	in	his	essay	“Gouverner	le	choix	procréatif:	biopolitique,	
libéralisme,	normalisation”,	“in	its	very	emergence,	the	population	is	a	fictitious	
entity”2	(Paltrinieri:	2010,	57).	It	does	not	mean	that	the	concept	of	population	
targeted	by	biopolitics	has	no	object,	but	that	this	object	is	not	a	finished	reality.	
It	 is	a	phenomenon	whose	tendencies	overtake	the	concrete	dimension	of	the	
                                                
1	Even	though	Nancy	seems	to	capture	the	goal	bio-power	and	biopolitics	target,	reducing	it	to	
the	idea	of	a	“destinal	figure”	is	still	problematic.	If	it	is	true	that	the	purity	of	race	can	correspond	
to	the	virtual	projection	of	a	destinal	figure,	the	concept	of	population	and	the	oingoing	evolution	
it	 implies	 challenges	 this	 eschatological	 idea.	 What	 appears	 to	 have	 become	 rather	
transcendental	than	“destinal”,	within	the	epistemological	framework	of	political	modernity,	is	
the	postulate	that	the	lives	of	men	express	the	natural	rule	norms	imply.	
2	“dans	son	emergence	même,	la	population	est	une	entité	fictive.” 
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lives	it	concerns.	The	concept	of	population	refers	to	birth	rates,	death	rates	or	
to	 the	 evolution	 of	 diseases	 amongst	 a	 specific	 group	 of	 individuals.	
Consequently,	 biopolitical	 governmentality	 targets	 non-finite	 objects	 and	
attempts	to	deal	with	their	potential	evolution.	As	Olivier	Razac	remarks	in	his	
Avec	Foucault,	après	Foucault,	modern	governmentality	deals	with	the	natural	
character	of	populations,	it	“applies	to	things	in	their	natural	dimension,	that	is	
to	 say	 at	 the	 level	 of	 their	 spontaneous	 processes,	 below	 any	 juridical	 link	 of	
sovereignty”3	(Razac:	2008,	35).		
	
It	is	that	very	dimension	which	Nancy	has	tried	to	identify	and	it	is	the	reason	why	
he	considered	the	term	“biopolitics”	was	not	suitable	to	describe	the	phenomena	
targeted	by	such	politics.	Because	biopolitics	seems	to	operate	without	teleology	
and	 because	 the	 object	 of	 biopolitics	 seems	 to	 be	 nothing	 more	 than	 “its	
reproduction	and	 its	maintenance	through	finalities	that	remain	the	secrets	of	
power”	 (Nancy:	 	 2007,	 94),	 Nancy	 rightfully	 stresses	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
incompatible	with	the	old	idea	of	sovereign	power.	Whilst	the	logic	of	political	
sovereignty	 aims	 at	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 lawful	 order	 of	 the	 Kingdom,	 the	
finality	 of	 biopolitics	 seems	 to	 escape	 possible	 formalization.	 For	 this	 reason,	
Nancy	thinks	that	calling	it	“ecotechnology”	would	provide	a	way	to	overcome	
this	difficulty:	such	a	technology	would	designate	the	management	of	“natural	
life”	 in	 general	 (whether	 animal,	 vegetal	 or	 human).	 Ecotechnology	 therefore	
                                                
3	“s’applique	aux	choses	dans	ce	qu’elles	ont	de	naturel,	c’est-à-dire	au	niveau	de	leurs	processus	
spontanés,	en	deçà	de	tout	lien	juridique	de	souveraineté.”	
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corresponds	to	the	technique	which	aims	at	managing	the	natural	world	and	not	
simply	“life”.		
	
Nancy’s	reading	is	helpful	because	it	clearly	identifies	the	fact	that	the	modern	
form	 of	 political	 power	 over	 life	 concerns	 a	 concept	 of	 life	 which	 is	 radically	
different	 from	 that	of	 the	 subject	of	 the	King.	 It	 is	 also	helpful	 inasmuch	as	 it	
identifies	the	fact	that	biopolitics,	because	it	ultimately	concerns	the	unfinished	
processes	that	populations	represent,	engages	more	than	the	lives	of	the	ones	it	
targets.	As	Paltrinieri	argues:	
The	emergence	of	a	normalizing	technology	acting	upon	the	population	
understood	as	“biological	whole”	implies	the	deployment	of	a	series	of	
mechanisms	aiming	at	the	regulation,	that	is	to	say	the	establishment	of	
an	homeostatic	equilibrium	between	the	“species-body”	and	its	milieu.4	
(Paltrinieri:	2010,	65)	
	
As	Paltrinieri	remarks,	and	as	Foucault	already	wrote	in	the	last	section	of	the	first	
volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	the	biopolitical	model	of	power	concerns	the	
encounter	of	the	“natural	 life”	of	the	species	with	the	milieu	 it	 lives	 in.	 In	this	
respect,	it	is	radically	different	from	the	King’s	right	of	death	over	his	subjects.	It	
does	not	aim	at	punishing	the	subject	who	breaches	the	sovereign	law	by	putting	
him	or	her	to	death.	It	aims	at	promoting	and	regulating	the	lives	of	individuals	
and	populations	whose	“natural”	character	both	 influences	and	depends	upon	
the	milieu	in	which	they	live.	However,	the	naturalness	of	life	that	bio-power	and	
biopolitics	target	should	not	be	understood	as	a	mere	ontological	determination	
of	 individuals	 understood	 as	 living	 beings.	 Unlike	 Agamben,	 who	 claims	 that	
                                                
4	“L’émergence	d’une	technologie	normalisatrice	agissant	sur	la	population	entendue	comme	un	
“tout	biologique”	 implique	 la	mise	en	oeuvre	d’une	 série	de	mécanismes	visant	 la	 regulation,	
c’est-à-dire	l’étabissement	d’un	équilibre	homéostatique	entre	le	“corps-espèce”	et	son	milieu.”	
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biopolitical	 modernity	 corresponds	 to	 the	 generalization	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	
sovereign	over	bare	life,	it	is	important	to	remember	that	the	integration	of	the	
so-called	“natural	life”	of	individuals	within	political	strategies	corresponds	to	a	
specific	historical	configuration	which	finds	its	theoretical	basis	in	the	concept	of	
the	norm.	It	does	not	merely	concern	our	modern	understanding	of	biological	life	
but	more	generally	the	existence	of	individuals	understood	as	conducts	inscribed	
within	a	certain	temporality.	
	
As	Foucault	tells	us	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	the	regulation	
of	 the	 population	works	 “on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 norm,	 knowledge,	 life,	meaning”	
(Foucault:	1998d,	148).	This	is	a	crucial	point	that	all	the	commentators	of	bio-
power	and	biopolitics	 I	have	 just	 cited	 seem	to	have	 forgotten	or	overlooked.	
What	the	historical	emergence	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	first	describes	is	the	
inscription	of	the	lives	of	individuals	(either	at	the	individual	level	or	at	the	level	
of	the	population)	into	the	field	of	anthropological	knowledge.	It	is	only	because	
modernity	sees	the	emergence	of	the	lives	of	populations	as	possible	objects	of	
knowledge	that	 these	 lives	are	understood	as	a	“natural”	manifestation	which	
can	 be	 observed,	 predicted,	 regulated	 or	 encouraged.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 on	 the	
emergence	of	nature	as	an	object	of	knowledge	within	Foucault’s	work	that	this	
thesis	focuses	on.	
	
This	thesis	does	not	study	how	norms	and	normalization	concretely	operate	in	
political	modernity.	A	very	detailed	and	exhaustive	account	of	the	question	has	
already	 been	 provided	 by	 Stéphane	 Legrand	 in	 his	 Les	 Normes	 chez	 Foucault	
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(Legrand:	 2007).	 Neither	 does	 this	 thesis	 study	 how	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	
normativity	 still	 coexists	 with	 legal	 jurisdiction.	 François	 Ewald,	 in	 his	 essay	
“Norms,	Discipline	and	the	Law”	(Ewald:	1990)	and	Ben	Golder	&	Peter	Fitzpatrick	
in	 their	 Foucault’s	 Law	 (Golder	 &	 Fitzpatrick:	 2011),	 provide	 a	 very	 detailed	
reading	 of	 this	 question.	 Instead,	 this	 thesis	 is	 concerned	with	 identifying	 the	
epistemological	and	ethical	implications	of	the	modern	integration	of	the	lives	of	
men	into	the	field	of	anthropological	knowledge.	Following	the	works	of	Etienne	
Balibar	 in	 his	 Citoyen	 Sujet	 et	 Autres	 Essais	 d’Anthropologie	 Philosophique	
(Balibar:	2001),	Pierre	Macherey	in	his	De	Canguilhem	à	Foucault:	La	Force	des	
Normes	(Macherey:	2009)	and	Judith	Revel	in	her	recent	Foucault	avec	Merleau-
Ponty:	 Ontologie	 Politique,	 Présentisme	 et	 Histoire	 (Revel:	 2015),	 this	 thesis	
studies	the	 importance	of	Foucault’s	description	of	anthropological	knowledge	
and	man’s	finitude	in	relation	to	the	historical	emergence	of	political	power	over	
life.	This	approach	implies	that	the	concept	of	biological	life,	so	readily	used	in	
many	 disciplines	 to	 characterize	 the	 forms	 taken	 by	 bio-power	 nowadays,	 be	
subjected	to	a	genealogical	 investigation	which	 takes	 the	 internal	evolution	of	
Foucault’s	own	work	as	primary	object	of	study.		
	
My	approach	is	simple	and	starts	from	a	general	observation.	The	first	volume	of	
the	History	of	Sexuality,	published	in	1976,	is	subtitled	“The	Will	to	Knowledge”.	
Before	its	last	section,	which	introduces	the	historical	diagnosis	of	the	shift	from	
sovereign	power	to	bio-power,	Foucault	studies	how	the	nineteenth	century	has	
seen	the	emergence	of	a	hermeneutics	of	the	desires	of	the	modern	subject.	It	
presupposes	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 natural	 truth	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 subject’s	
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confession	of	his	desires.		This	natural	truth,	which	provides	the	rationality	that	
enables	the	comprehension	of	both	the	causes	and	the	meaning	of	the	subject’s	
inclinations,	is	performed	according	to	the	postulate	of	an	intrinsic	relationship	
between	the	words	of	the	subject	and	the	transcendental	truth	which	precedes	
them.	 The	 knowledge	of	 the	natural	 truth	of	 the	modern	 subject	 is	 therefore	
made	possible	on	the	basis	of	that	symbolic	disjunction	between	the	subject’s	
speech	and	the	 logos	which	speaks	in	it.	 It	 is	the	pre-existence	of	such	a	 logos	
which	explains	the	confessions	of	the	subject,	but	reciprocally	it	is	the	confession	
of	the	subject	which	indicates	the	pre-existence	of	this	truth.	In	other	words,	the	
anthropological	 truth	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 is	 built	 upon	 a	 fundamental	
disjunction	characteristic	of	the	modern	episteme	that	Foucault	described	in	The	
Order	 of	 Things:	 the	 impossible	 presence	 of	 the	 subject	 within	 the	 space	 of	
representation,	both	become	subject	and	object	of	its	own	knowledge.	
	
Interestingly,	 the	 recent	 publication	 of	 Foucault’s	 first	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	
Collège	de	France	reveals	that	the	phrase	“will	to	knowledge”	does	not	appear	
for	the	first	time	in	1976.	Entitled	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	 to	Know,	 the	1970-
1971	 lecture	 course	examines	 a	 similar	 characterization	of	 the	morphology	of	
truth.	Foucault	describes	how	the	concept	of	epistemological	truth	derived	from	
the	observation	and	knowledge	of	nature	emerged	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	
as	a	consequence	of	the	dismantling	of	the	political	sovereign	power	of	the	time.	
Whereas	truth	was	the	privilege	of	the	sovereign	(gods,	oracles,	emperors	and	
kings)	 who	 realized	 it	 through	 acts	 of	 power,	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	
epistemological	knowledge	with	Classical	Greece	and	the	advent	of	philosophy	
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sees	what	Foucault,	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	calls	the	dismantlement	of	the	
“union	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge”	 (Foucault:	 2000c,	 32).	 This	 dismantlement	
refers	to	the	impossibility,	for	the	political	ruler,	to	continue	being	at	the	same	
time	the	man	in	power	and	the	man	of	knowledge.		
	
However,	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	Foucault	does	not	limit	his	study	to	
the	dismantlement	of	a	 form	of	political	power	which	was	at	 the	same	time	a	
performance	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth.	 In	 addition,	 he	 studies	 how	 this	
dismantlement	constitutes	the	condition	of	possibility	for	the	emergence	of	the	
epistemological	knowledge	of	nature,	which	depends	on	the	disjunction	between	
what	is	observed	and	what	is	expressed	within	the	positivity	of	understanding.	
According	to	Foucault,	after	Archaic	Greece,	it	is	no	longer	the	case	that	sovereign	
jurisdiction	 (the	 act	 in	 which	 the	 sovereign’s	 judicial	 decision	 and	 his	 or	 her	
performance	 of	 truth	 coincide)	 produces	 the	 truth	 of	 nature.	 Rather,	 the	
epistemological	 truth	 of	 nature	 starts	 to	 constitute	 a	 logos	 which	 may	 be	
retrieved	through	the	exercise	of	knowledge	as	a	specific	human	technique.	This	
technique	 works	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 inquiry	 which	 establishes	 the	 truth	 of	
facticity:	it	is	when	what	is	seen	can	be	linked	to	the	discourse	which	attests	to	
its	truth	that	the	validity	of	facticity	is	established.	
	
The	Foucauldian	description	of	the	historical	emergence	of	epistemological	truth	
appears	 to	 be	 very	 fruitful	 as	 it	 operates	 upon	 the	 same	 disjunction	 as	 the	
anthropological	truth	which	emerges	after	the	dismantling	of	political	sovereign	
power	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age.	The	truth	grounding	the	anthropological	
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nature	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 also	 works	 upon	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 disjunction	
between	the	seen	and	the	said:	the	immanence	of	the	subject’s	existence	(the	
seen)	 is	 known,	 validated,	 informed	 and	 encouraged	 by	 a	 scientific	 discourse	
which	takes	it	as	an	object	of	knowledge.		
	
In	other	words,	the	concept	of	nature	implied	by	the	norms	grounding	the	logic	
of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	is	too	often	taken	for	granted	and	understood	as	the	
mere	description	of	an	ontological	given.	What	many	of	Foucault’s	commentators	
on	the	question	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	have	failed	to	see	is	that	this	concept	
of	 nature	 is	 itself	 a	 historical	 construction	 whose	 emergence	 implies	 the	
problematization	of	the	relationship	between	sovereignty,	truth,	knowledge	and	
power.	The	 fact	 that	 the	anthropological	knowledge	which	grounds	bio-power	
and	 biopolitics	 emerged	 following	 the	 dismantling	 of	 the	 political	 sovereign	
power	 of	 the	 Classical	 Age	 is	 itself	 very	 striking.	 The	 Medieval	 and	 Classical	
sovereign	power	of	the	King	also	established	jurisdiction	through	acts	of	power:	
the	 King’s	 power	 to	 kill	 was	 the	 ritualistic	 manifestation	 of	 an	 act	 which	
reaffirmed	 the	 order	 of	 things	 linked	 to	 the	 cosmology	 of	 the	 Kingdom.	 Even	
though	Foucault	does	not	himself	establish	the	connection,	I	claim	that	the	theme	
of	the	disjunction	between	power	and	knowledge	also	constitutes	a	framework	
which	allows	us	to	understand	the	historical	emergence	of	anthropological	truth	
with	the	advent	of	political	modernity.	Therefore,	my	thesis	proposes	to	study	
the	connections	between	the	mutations	of	jurisdiction	Foucault	describes	at	the	
end	of	Archaic	Greece	and	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age	in	order	to	examine	
how	 they	 relate	 at	 the	 same	 to	 a	 reconfiguration	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 to	 the	
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emergence	of	the	concept	of	epistemological	truth	either	applied	to	the	nature	
of	things	or	to	the	nature	of	men	treated	as	a	knowable	thing	amongst	others.	
	
This	approach	leads	me	to	observe	that	the	theme	of	sovereignty,	which	appears	
in	a	fragmented	manner	throughout	the	whole	of	Foucault’s	work,	is	not	only	a	
historical	issue,	but	also	an	epistemological	and	ethical	one.	It	not	only	concerns	
the	union	of	the	knowledge	and	power	of	political	sovereigns,	which	disappears	
historically,	but	also	the	emergence	of	an	intrinsic	link	between	epistemological	
discourse	and	the	facticity	it	describes.	Within	the	structure	of	epistemological	
knowledge	and	truth,	it	is	the	emergence	of	an	ontological	coincidence	between	
what	exists	immanently	and	the	knowledge	describing	it	which	reconstitutes	the	
coincidence	between	power	and	knowledge	proper	to	the	logic	of	sovereignty.	
Similarly,	the	anthropological	knowledge	of	the	nineteenth	century	does	not	only	
concern	the	disappearance	of	the	political	sovereign	but	the	emergence	of	the	
modern	 subject.	 The	 latter	 represents	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 impossible	
superimposition	of	the	immanence	of	its	existence	and	its	representation	within	
the	field	of	knowledge.	The	sovereignty	of	the	modern	subject,	which	appears	to	
be	always	already	alienated	within	the	structure	of	fragmented	representation,	
is	also	related	to	the	question	of	the	coincidence	between	power	and	knowledge.	
The	immanence	of	its	existence	(which	corresponds	to	the	level	of	strict	power)	
cannot	 coincide	 with	 the	 apparition	 of	 this	 existence	 within	 the	 field	 of	
anthropological	 positivity.	 It	 is	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 “empirico-transcendental”	
doublet	 described	 in	 chapter	 9	 of	 The	Order	 of	 Things	 which	 is	 almost	 never	
mentioned	 by	 contemporary	 readers	 of	 Foucault	 working	 on	 the	 question	 of	
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political	 modernity.	 Only	Michael	 Dillon,	 in	 his	 essay	 “Specters	 of	 Biopolitics:	
Finitude,	 Eschaton	 and	 Katechon”	 has	 thought	 of	 linking	 the	 emergence	 of	
finitude	 within	 the	 field	 of	 positive	 knowledge	 with	 biopolitical	 modernity	
(Michael	Dillon:	2011).	However,	he	too	fails	to	see	that	these	two	aspects	find	a	
common	basis	in	the	question	of	the	mutation	of	sovereign	jurisdiction	both	at	
the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	and	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age.	
	
This	is	the	reason	why	this	thesis	redefines	the	concept	of	life	which	constitutes	
the	 object	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics.	 Instead	 of	 understanding	 life	 as	 an	
ahistorical	 concept	 corresponding	 to	 biological	 determinations,	 I	 propose	 to	
study	how	 the	concept	of	 life	which	emerges	with	anthropological	 knowledge	
constitutes	an	abstraction	which	severs	the	subject	from	its	immanent	power	to	
act	 outside	 the	 natural	 determinations	 imposed	 by	 truth	 and	 knowledge.	
Therefore,	 I	propose	to	redefine	the	opposition	between	 life	and	death	not	 in	
relation	to	the	sovereign	power	to	kill	but	 in	relation	to	the	emergence	of	the	
concept	of	 life	as	 the	positivity	of	man’s	 finitude.	The	point	 is	 to	examine	 the	
relationship	between	different	but	complementary	occurrences	of	the	concept	
of	sovereignty	within	Foucault’s	work	 in	order	to	determine	how	this	concept,	
understood	 as	 the	 coincidence	 between	 power,	 knowledge	 and	 truth,	 may	
explain	both	the	form	of	the	modern	subject’s	alienation	and	the	possibility	of	an	
ethical	resistance.	
	
In	the	first	chapter	of	the	thesis	I	examine	the	contrast	between	Foucault’s	and	
Agamben’s	 accounts	 of	 biopolitical	 modernity.	 Such	 a	 contrast	 reveals	 that	
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Agamben	has	ignored	the	specific	historicity	of	the	concepts	of	life	and	sovereign	
power	 Foucault	 refers	 to	when	 he	 introduces	 the	 concepts	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	History	 of	 Sexuality.	Because	 Agamben’s	
reading	relies	upon	the	concepts	of	life	and	sovereign	power,	it	allows	me	to	show	
by	contrast	how	these	concepts	are	also	studied	and	problematized	within	the	
scope	 of	 Foucault’s	 work.	 However,	 I	 demonstrate	 how	 Foucault,	 instead	 of	
falling	back	upon	ahistorical	concepts,	produces	a	radical	historicization	of	them.	
I	 use	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 mutation	 of	 the	 sovereign	 power	 and	 the	
emergence	of	the	government	of	population	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	
Sexuality,	 in	 Security	 Territory	 Population,	 and	 in	 Society	 Must	 Be	 Defended	
(Foucault:	 1998d,	 2009c,	 2003b)	 to	 show	 that	 Foucault’s	 understanding	 of	
Medieval	and	Classical	sovereign	power,	inspired	by	Ernst	Kantorowicz’s	work5,	
does	not	imply	a	concern	for	the	fostering	of	biological	life	but	the	persistence	of	
a	territory	which	relies	upon	a	different	concept	of	finitude.	I	then	argue	that	this	
is	 the	modern	specificity	of	 the	concept	of	man,	 seeing	 the	emergence	of	 the	
question	 of	 finitude	 in	 its	 positivity,	 which	 allows	 us	 to	 understand	 the	
abstraction	that	affects	the	anthropological	concept	of	life.	
	
In	the	second	chapter,	I	study	how	Agamben’s	account	of	biopolitical	jurisdiction	
offers	a	problematization	of	the	relationship	between	the	law	of	the	sovereign	
and	the	expression	of	its	immediate	power	over	life.	The	exposition	of	his	account	
of	the	persistence	of	sovereign	jurisdiction	within	biopolitical	modernity	allows	
                                                
5	Ernst	Kantorowicz,	The	Kings’	Two	Bodies	(Kantorowicz:	1997).	
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me	 to	 show	 that	 Foucault	 also	 studies	 the	question	of	 jurisdiction	before	and	
after	 the	 emergence	 of	 bio-power.	 However,	 I	 argue	 that	 his	 account	 of	
biopolitical	 jurisdiction	 does	 not	 concern	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 law	 of	 the	
sovereign	but	the	emergence	of	the	concept	of	natural	truth	which	supposes	the	
equivalence	between	the	existence	of	man	and	the	possibility	of	its	knowledge.	
In	order	to	grasp	Foucault’s	understanding	of	sovereignty,	 I	provide	a	detailed	
reading	 of	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 epistemological	 truth	 and	
knowledge	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Archaic	 Greece.	 I	 show	 that	 Foucault	 borrows	 from	
Marcel	Détienne	and	Jean-Pierre	Vernant	a	concept	of	pre-epistemological	truth	
which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 performance	 of	 an	 immanent	 act	 of	 power	 and	
coincides	 with	 Foucault’s	 description	 of	 political	 sovereignty	 in	 “Truth	 and	
Juridical	Forms”.	I	then	study	how	Foucault,	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	
Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants	and	Wrong-Doing,	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	
Avowal	 in	 Justice	 (Foucault:	 2013,	2012a,	2014b)	presents	 Sophocles’	Oedipus	
Rex	as	the	epitome	of	the	historical	emergence	of	epistemological	truth.	It	relies	
upon	the	use	of	knowledge	as	a	specific	tekhne,	which	implies	that	the	truth	of	
facticity	becomes	what	grounds	a	knowledge	of	nature	which	predetermines	the	
meaning	of	 immanence.	This	allows	me	to	argue	that	it	 is	this	mutation	of	the	
relationship	 between	 epistemological	 truth	 and	 facticity	 which,	 in	 Foucault,	
allows	us	to	understand	the	paradigm	of	liberal	political	power.	The	theoretical	
framework	 of	 norms	 implies	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	
corresponds	 to	 the	 immediate	 expression	 of	 this	 nature.	 Therefore,	 the	
relationship	 between	 bio-power	 and	 life	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 case	 of	
alienation	 of	 the	 subject’s	 sovereignty:	 the	 rationality	 which	 grounds	 the	
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understanding	of	its	actions	is	always	already	determined	by	the	postulate	of	a	
natural	truth	which	precedes	and	determines	them.	
	
Finally,	 the	 third	 chapter	 proves	 that	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 biopolitical	
jurisdiction	does	not	integrate	the	political	figure	of	the	sovereign	but	does	not	
dismiss	the	question	of	sovereignty	either.	I	argue	that	the	figure	of	the	sovereign	
does	 not	 completely	 disappear	 from	 Foucault’s	 concerns:	 his	 analysis	 of	
anthropological	knowledge	he	develops	in	chapters	8	and	9	of	The	Order	of	Things	
(Foucault:	2001e,	272-374)	reproduces	the	dismantling	of	political	sovereignty	on	
the	level	of	the	modern	concept	of	life	covering	the	strict	immanence	of	men’s	
existence.	 	 This	 leads	 me	 to	 examine	 the	 ethical	 aspect	 of	 the	 question	 of	
sovereignty	which	interests	Foucault	after	1976.	When	he	comes	back	to	Greek	
and	Roman	Antiquity	in	the	second	and	third	volumes	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	
he	questions	the	ways	in	which	the	ethical	practice	of	the	self	does	not	depend	
upon	a	set	body	of	knowledge	grounded	upon	hermeneutics	but	upon	a	reflexive	
relationship	 between	 the	 self	 and	 its	 own	 ethical	 practice.	 This	 leads	 me	 to	
consider	how	Foucault	also	problematizes	 the	question	of	ethical	 sovereignty,	
understood	as	the	possibility	for	an	individual	to	determine	the	rationality	of	its	
own	 actions	 in	 the	 world.	 In	 this	 respect,	 I	 attempt	 to	 trace	 how	 Foucault’s	
definition	of	life	as	bios	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject	(Foucault:	2006,	477-
487)	might	be	understood	as	a	possibility	of	exerting	this	sovereignty.	It	does	not	
rely	upon	the	self’s	knowledge	of	its	own	nature	but	the	self’s	ability	to	constantly	
redefine	the	form	its	actions	take	towards	others	and	towards	the	world.		
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From	a	methodological	point	of	view,	it	is	necessary	to	determine	where	Foucault	
questions	sovereign	power	for	the	first	time.	It	is	not,	as	it	is	commonly	believed,	
in	the	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	(Foucault:	1998d,	
135-159)	but	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	a	series	of	lectures	delivered	at	the	
Catholic	University	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	May	1973.	During	these	lectures,	Foucault	
traces	the	disappearance	of	political	sovereign	power	back	to	the	emergence	of	
Classical	Greek	thought	in	the	5th	century	BC.	This	occurs	when	the	power	and	
knowledge	of	gods	and	prophets	is	replaced	by	the	use	of	human	reason	and	the	
emergence	of	philosophical	thought.	Foucault	mentions	“the	dismantling	of	that	
great	unity	of	political	power	that	was,	at	the	same	time,	a	knowledge”	(Foucault:	
2000c,	31).		
	
In	order	to	properly	understand	the	implications	of	such	a	change,	it	is	necessary	
to	follow	Foucault	and	carefully	study	the	texts	which,	according	to	him,	illustrate	
this	historical,	political	and	epistemological	mutation:	Oedipus	Rex	by	Sophocles	
and	Song	XXIII	in	Homer’s	Illiad.	Foucault	sees	in	the	former	the	clearest	example	
of	the	shift	from	sovereign	power	and	knowledge	to	the	knowledge	of	men.	This	
new	 relationship	 to	 knowledge	 corresponds	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	
epistemological	link	between	the	said	and	the	seen	(or	between	discourse	and	
facts),	which	allows	a	new	form	of	truth	to	appear.	The	theoretical	truth	of	facts	
replaces	the	powerful	truth	of	the	political	sovereign.	Contrary	to	Oedipus	Rex,	
the	latter	provides	an	example	of	Classical	Greek	literature	in	which	the	way	truth	
is	produced	corresponds	to	the	former	paradigm	of	sovereign	power.	In	this	case,	
it	is	not	the	truth	derived	from	human	inquiry	that	matters	but	the	manifestation	
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of	a	ritualistic	truth.	This	truth	does	not	rely	upon	the	positivity	of	facts	but	upon	
the	 respect	of	a	predetermined	 rule.	 I	 choose	not	 to	 focus	on	a	 strictly	 literal	
commentary	of	the	texts	but	on	the	dramatic	elements	which	allow	to	identify	
the	type	of	knowledge	and	truth	that	those	texts	involve	or	produce	in	order	to		
follow	Foucault’s	argument	properly.	I	attempt	to	provide	a	detailed	analysis	of	
the	forms	of	knowledge	and	truth	at	stake	in	those	plays.	This	type	of	analysis	
aims	 at	 providing	 a	 reflection	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 concepts	 of	
“veridiction”	 and	 “jurisdiction”	 Foucault	 introduces	 in	 Wrong-Doing,	 Truth-
Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	Justice.	It	implies	to	question	the	relationship	
between	 truth	 as	 a	 spontaneous	 act	 and	 truth	 as	 the	 result	 of	 an	 essential	
relationship	between	what	is	seen	and	said.6	
	
I	choose	to	follow	Foucault	and	argue	in	favour	of	a	heterogeneity	between	the	
level	of	discourse	and	the	 level	of	experience.	A	direct	consequence	of	such	a	
claim	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 reflection	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
immanence	of	one’s	acts	and	the	epistemic	discourses	which	take	them	as	their	
objects.	 It	 provides	 the	 space	 for	 a	 problematization	 of	 one’s	 sovereignty	 as	
individual	and	allows	us	to	ask	whether	the	truth	about	oneself	lies	in	a	rationality	
which	 claims	 to	 understand	 one’s	 acts	 in	 scientific	 terms	 or	 whether	 this	
rationality	constitutes	a	heterogenous	act	which	bears	no	essential	relationship	
with	 the	 acts	 it	 takes	 as	 its	 objects.	 Instead	 of	 reading	 Oedipus	 Rex	 in	
                                                
6	A	detailed	reflection	on	this	question	is	found	in	the	22nd	April	1981	lecture	(Foucault:	2014,	27-
55)	and	in	the	fourth	section	of	the	second	chapter	of	this	thesis	(pp.	148-167).	It	concerns	the	
move	through	which	the	production	of	truth	through	an	immanent	act	gets	replaced	by	the	truth	
of	a	discourse	which	takes	this	act	as	object.	
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psychoanalytic	terms	as	Sigmund	Freud	does,7	Foucault	insists	on	a	reading	which	
follows	 the	 emergence	 of	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 “mechanism	 of	 the	 sumbolon”	
(Foucault:	 2000c,	 24).	 This	 mechanism	 shows	 how,	 throughout	 the	 play,	
theoretical	 truth	 emerges	 via	 the	 progressive	 reunion	 of	 different	 parts	 of	
knowledge	and	finally	leads	to	the	testimony	of	the	shepherd	(a	visual	witness	
who	is	able	to	reveal	Oedipus’	true	identity).	Foucault,	 inspired	by	the	work	of	
historians	belonging	to	the	Paris	School	(Marcel	Détienne,	Jean-Pierre	Vernant	
and	 Pierre	 Vidal-Naquet),	 shows	 the	mechanism	 by	which	 an	 epistemological	
form	of	truth	emerges	through	the	reunion	of	immanence	and	discourse.8	This	
thesis	chooses	to	follow	the	multiple	occurences	of	Foucault’s	analysis	of	Oedipus	
Rex	 (both	 in	 the	 lecture	 courses	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France	 and	 in	 other	
conferences)	as	a	way	to	examine	how	he	sees	this	structure	of	theoretical	truth		
at	work	in	other	political	and	epistemological	aspects	of	our	modernity.9			
                                                
7	Freud	famously	theorizes	the	“Oedipus	Complex”	in	“The	Dissolution	of	the	Oedipus	Complex”	
and	explains	that	the	little	boy,	at	the	phallic	stage,	wants	to	replace	his	father	and	attract	the	
attention	of	his	mother	(Freud:	1959,	173-179).	In	this	case,	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex	constitues	a	
metaphor	of	the	suppressed	desires	of	the	little	boy’s	developing	libido.	Instead	of	accepting	this	
psychoanalytical	reading,	which	implies	the	existence	of	unspoken	desires	that	provide	a	way	to	
understand	human	desires	from	a	scientific	point	of	view,	Foucault	takes	the	opposite	stance	and	
chooses	to	use	this	text	to	produce	the	genealogy	of	the	type	of	truth	which	implies	an	essential	
link	between	facts	and	the	epistemic	discourse	which	takes	them	as	objects.	To	do	so,	Foucault	
focuses	on	the	way	in	which	the	text	moves	from	a	divine	and	prophetic	truth	to	a	truth	which	
relies	on	 the	corespodnence	between	discourse	and	 facts	and	 is	discovered	by	men.	Foucault	
makes	 it	 clear	 in	 “Truth	and	 Juridical	 Forms”:	 “It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 there	 really	 is	 an	Oedipus	
complex	 in	 our	 civilization.	 But	 it	 does	 not	 involve	 our	 unconscious	 and	 our	 desire,	 nor	 the	
relations	between	desire	and	the	unconscious.	If	there	is	an	Oedipus	complex,	it	operates	not	at	
the	individual	level	but	at	the	collective	level;	not	in	connection	with	desire	and	the	unconscious	
but	in	connection	with	power	and	knowledge.”	(Foucault:	2000c,	17)	
8	In	the	play,	it	corresponds	to	establishing	the	truth	of	Oedipus’	identity	through	the	reunion	of	
various	memories	with	 the	one	of	 the	 shepherd	who	gave	Oedipus	 to	Patroclus,	his	 adoptive	
father.	More	details	about	this	passage	can	be	found	in	scene	7	in	the	original	text	(Sophocles:	
2015,	48-57).	
9	This	thesis	argues	that	the	morphology	of	knowledge	and	truth,	which	Foucault	sees	emerging	
in	Classical	Greece,	constitutes	the	epistemological	framework	according	to	which	anthropology	
and	human	sciences	still	function	today.	Foucault	says	It	clearly	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”:	
“What	was	 invented	 in	 law	during	this	period	was	a	particular	way	of	knowing,	a	condition	of	
possibility	of	knowledge	whose	destiny	was	 to	be	crucial	 in	 the	Western	world.	That	mode	of	
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In	other	words,	 this	 thesis	demonstrates	 that	 the	question	of	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 seen	 and	 the	 said	 (or	 between	 act	 and	 discourse)	 constitutes	 a	
guiding	thread	throughout	Foucault’s	work	and	can	be	used	to	characterize	the	
status	of	the	modern	subject,	whose	power	to	act	and	speak	gets	determined	by	
the	theoretical	truth	of	modern	anthropology	and	human	sciences.	I	claim	that	
the	 relationship	 between	 knowledge	 and	 truth,	 which	 emerges	 in	 Classical	
Greece	 and	which	Oedipus	 Rex	 illustrates,	 is	 still	 the	 one	 according	 to	 which	
modern	subjectivity	is	understood	and	deciphered.	The	truth	of	the	subject	who	
speaks	and	acts	does	not	stand	in	its	own	right	but	is	determined	by	a	rationality	
which	conditions	the	understanding	of	these	discourses	and	acts.	This	rationality	
is	defined	by	the	epistemological	structure	of	anthropology	and	human	sciences	
and	 works,	 like	 Sophocles’	 Oedipus	 Rex,	 according	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 the	
sumbolon.	Human	sciences,	by	making	what	the	subject	says	or	does	correspond	
to	a	heterogenous	discourse	which	speaks	its	truth	(as	the	discourse	of	medicine	
does),	deprive	the	subject’s	acts	of	their	immanent	value	and	the	subject	of	his	
sovereignty.	These	acts	are	no	longer	the	spontaneous	expression	of	a	power	to	
act	but	the	expression	of	a	natural	 truth.	They	become	the	manifestation	of	a	
truth	 always	 already	 understood	 as	 the	 manifestation	 of	 human	 nature	 and	
thought	to	correspond	to	anthropological	norms.	If,	as	Foucault	claims	in	the	last	
section	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	“the	law	operates	more	and	more	as	a	norm”	
(Foucault:	1998d,	144),	it	is	because	the	modern	rationality	applied	to	subjectivity	
                                                
knowledge	was	the	inquiry,	which	appeared	for	the	first	time	in	Greece	and	which,	after	the	fall	
of	the	Roman	Empire,	remained	hidden	for	several	centuries.”	(Foucault:	2000c,	40)		
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implies	that	the	way	the	subject	lives	corresponds	to	a	nature	that	manifests	itself	
through	 the	 subject’s	 speech	 and	 acts.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 of	 the	 truth	 of	
sexuality	which,	as	scientific	and	anthropological	discourse	emerging	in	the	19th	
century,	 relies	 upon	 the	 postulate	 of	 the	manifestation	 of	 a	 nature.	 Foucault	
writes:	
Situated	at	the	point	of	intersection	of	a	technique	of	confession	and	a	
scientific	 discursivitity,	 where	 certain	 major	 mechanisms	 had	 to	 be	
found	 for	adapting	 them	to	one	another	 (the	 listening	 technique,	 the	
postulate	of	causality,	the	principle	of	latency,	the	rule	of	interpretation,	
the	 imperative	of	medicalization),	 sexuality,	was	defined	as	being	“by	
nature”:	a	domain	susceptible	to	pathological	processes,	and	hence	one	
calling	for	therapeutic	or	normalizing	interventions;	a	field	of	meanings	
to	decipher;	the	site	of	processes	concealed	by	specific	mechanisms,	a	
focus	of	indefinite	causal	relations;	and	an	obscure	speech	that	had	to	
be	ferreted	out	and	listened	to.	(Foucault:	1998d,	68)	
	
This	manifestation	is	made	possible	by	the	postulate	that	the	subject’s	acts	carry	
a	truth	which	needs	to	be	deciphered	in	order	to	reveal	the	truth	of	his	nature.	
This	nature	becomes	the	concept	from	which	anthropology	and	human	sciences	
will	develop:	it	is	that	which	allows	the	subject’s	life	to	be	given	a	rational	and	
scientific	signification.	It	is	the	emergence	of	the	postulate	of	such	a	concept	that	
this	thesis	analyses.	
	
This	analysis	seeks	to	go	beyond	a	spontaneous	use	of	the	concept	of	norm	and	
questions	what	it	is	that	grounds	its	condition	of	epistemological	validity.	It	aims	
to	study	the	epistemological	configuration	which	allows	us	to	see	in	a	fact	and	in	
the	scientific	discourse	which	describes	it	the	expression	of	the	same	truth.	To	do	
so,	Canguilhem’s	conclusions	regarding	the	normativity	of	life	are	partially	helpful	
but	fail	to	provide	a	satisfying	account	of	the	relationship	between	discourse	and	
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truth.	It	is	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	the	normal	as	biological	ideal	
posited	by	medicine	and	the	normative	activity	of	 life	 itself	which	he	asks.	He	
rightfully	argues	 in	favour	of	the	recognition	of	the	normative	activity	of	 living	
organisms	and	shows	that	so-called	“pathologies”	are	no	less	normative	than	the	
cases	 medicine	 takes	 to	 be	 normal	 (or	 to	 represent	 and	 ideal	 of	 health).	
Canguilhem	stresses	that	“[i]f	what	is	normal	here	can	be	pathological	there,	it	is	
tempting	 to	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 no	boundary	between	 the	normal	 and	 the	
pathological”	(Canguilhem:	2008	130).		
	
Helpful	as	these	conclusions	may	be,	the	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	tackle	a	different	
problem.	The	genealogy	of	 the	postulate	of	 the	 truth	of	nature	 Foucault	 sees	
emerging	in	Classical	Greece	and	reappearing	in	modernity	does	not	concern	the	
power	 of	 life	 to	 produce	 new	 regularities.	 It	 addresses	 the	 unquestioned	
postulate	according	to	which	the	regularities	observed	in	experience	obey	an	a	
priori	truth	which	can	be	retrieved	by	the	use	of	a	specific	epistemic	technique.	
In	other	words,	Canguilhem’s	conclusions	are	satisfactory	inasmuch	as	they	lead	
to	 recognize	 that	 the	 values	 observed	 in	 life,	 understood	 as	 immanent	
experience,	 precede	 the	 truth	 that	 scientific	 discourse	 produce	 about	 them.	
However,	they	do	not	target	the	historical	and	political	conditions	which	allow	
epistemological	discourse	to	acquire	the	founding	role	of	an	a	priori	truth	that	
links	 the	 seen	 and	 the	 said	 (or	 makes	 existence	 correspond	 to	 the	 truth	 of	
anthropological	 discourse).	 In	 Canguilhem	 et	 les	 normes,	 Guillaume	 Le	 Blanc	
explains:	
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[…]	social	rules	are	exterior	to	their	object	whereas	vital	rules	and	the	
organic	 parts	 they	 adjust	 are	 immanent	 to	 each	 other.	 […]	 Vital	
regulation	is	intrinsically	organic	whereas	social	regulation	only	appears	
as	the	end	targeted	by	the	organization	itself.10	(Le	Blanc:	2007,	87)	
	
This	study	does	not	argue	in	favour	of	or	against	the	intrinsic	normativity	of	life	
as	a	series	of	organic	or	biological	functions,	but	questions	the	historical,	political	
and	epistemological	basis	upon	which	modern	anthropology	has	been	able	 to	
start	and	speak	the	truth	about	individual	lives	and	make	social	norms	the	criteria	
of	their	validity.	This	perspective	is	closer	to	Le	Blanc’s	analysis	which	measures	
the	 distance	 between	 Canguilhem’s	 and	 Foucault’s	 problematization	 of	 the	
concept	of	norm.	He	writes:	
Canguilhem	moves	away	from	Foucault’s	thought,	which	privileges	the	
efficacy	 of	 social	 norms	 over	 the	 normative	 responses	 produced	 by	
human	beings.	Social	norms,	inasmuch	as	they	demand	the	adhesion	of	
individuals	to	the	rules	they	enunciate	constitute	a	dispositive,	a	diagram	
through	which	individuals,	measured	and	evaluated,	are	subjected.11	(Le	
Blanc:	2010,	255)	
	
This	thesis	does	not	target	the	power	of	normativity	inherent	to	individual	lives	
but	rather	the	emergence	of	the	epistemological	configuration	which	allows	the	
correspondence	between	the	truth	expressed	by	anthropological	norms	and	the	
truth	expressed	and	experienced	on	the	level	of	immanent	existence.		
	
                                                
10	“[…]	les	règles	sociales	sont	extérieures	à	leur	objet	alors	que	les	règles	vitales	d’ajustement	
des	 parties	 organiques	 sont	 immanentes	 les	 unes	 aux	 autres.	 […]	 La	 régulation	 vitale	 est	
intrinsèquement	organique	tandis	que	la	régulation	sociale	n’apparaît	que	comme	terme	visé	par	
l’organisation.”		
11	“Canguihem	s’éloigne	de	la	pensée	de	Foucault	qui	privilégie	l’efficacité	des	normes	sociales	
aux	réponses	normatives	produites	par	les	êtres	humains.	Les	normes	sociales,	en	tant	qu’elles	
sollicitent	 l’adhésion	 des	 individus	 aux	 règles	 qu’elles	 énoncent,	 constituent	 un	 dispositif,	 un	
diagramme	par	lequel	les	individus,	mesurés,	évalués,	sont	assujettis.”	
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It	is	from	this	perspective	that	I	challenge	the	recent	readings	of	the	concepts	of	
bio-power	and	biopolitics	and	specifically	Agamben’s	in	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	
Power	 and	 Bare	 Life	 (Agamben:	 1998).	 He	 fails	 to	 see	 that	 the	 historical	
emergence	of	 these	concepts	corresponds	 to	an	epistemological	configuration	
which	is	a	direct	consequence	of	theoretical	truth	derived	from	the	postulate	of	
the	 correspondence	 between	 scientific	 discourse	 and	 immanent	 existence.	
Agamben	leaves	unquestioned	the	equation	between	nature	and	biological	life,	
which	 is	a	product	of	modern	epistemology	and	 relies	on	 the	correspondence	
between	the	seen	and	the	said	(or	between	experience	and	the	true	discourse	
produced	about	it).	This	is	the	reason	why	Agamben’s	reading	of	the	relationship	
between	sovereign	power	and	bio-power	constitutes	a	point	of	departure	in	this	
thesis:	 it	provides	a	place	to	start	and	tackle	 the	problem	but	also	reveals	 the	
need	to	move	away	from	the	conclusions	that	it	reaches).	It	illustrates	the	kind	of	
reading	which	takes	the	concept	of	sovereign	power	for	an	ahistorical	given	and	
becomes	insufficient	to	question	the	epistemological	foundations	of	the	concept	
of	norm	Foucault	introduces	in	the	first	volume	of	The	History	of	Sexuality.	It	is	
therefore	Foucault’s	genealogy	of	those	epistemological	foundations	which	this	
thesis	 studies.	 It	 is	 the	movement	 through	which	 the	 truth	manifested	 by	 an	
individual	who	spontaneously	acts	and	speaks	is	replaced	by	the	postulate	of	a	
true	discourse	which	determines	it.	
	
This	 thesis	 endeavours	 to	 read	 Foucault’s	works	which	 target	 the	 question	 of	
modern	anthropology	and	human	sciences	alongside	the	courses	which	develop	
his	analyses	further.	This	allows	provision	of	a	more	accurate	understanding	of	
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the	problems	and	concepts	that	Foucault	addresses	in	his	primary	written	works.	
For	 instance,	 the	 question	 of	 the	 shift	 from	 ritualistic	 sovereign	 power	 and	
knowledge	to	modern	anthropology	is	first	studied	in	Discipline	and	Punish	but	
this	 analysis	 is	 taken	 further	 in	Security,	 Territory,	 Population	 (Foucault:	 1995,	
2009c).	 In	 a	 similar	 way,	 the	 question	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 truth	
spoken	by	medical	and	anthropological	sciences	and	the	lives	of	men	they	take	
as	 their	objects	 is	studied	 in	The	Birth	of	 the	Clinic	and	 in	The	Order	of	Things	
(Foucault:	2003a,	2001e)	but	is	developed	further	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	
Know	 and	 in	 Wrong-Doing,	 Truth-Telling:	 the	 Function	 of	 Avowal	 in	 Justice	
(Foucault,	2013,	2014b).	The	question	of	the	relationship	between	the	subject’s	
speech	 and	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 a	 hermeneutics	 of	 desires	 is	 first	
mentioned	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	History	 of	 Sexuality	 but	 also	 developed	
further	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject	(Foucault:	1998d,	2006).	Finally,	the	
question	of	anthropological	normalization	is	introduced	in	the	first	volume	of	the	
History	of	Sexuality	but	 largely	enriched	when	Foucault	studies	the	role	of	the	
physiocrats	towards	the	development	of	modern	governmentality	in	The	Birth	of	
Biopolitics	(Foucault:	1998d,	2008b).	
	
On	 a	 broader	 level,	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 rethink	 the	 commonly	 accepted	
distrubtion	of	 Foucault’s	works	between	archaeology,	 genealogy	and	ethics	 in	
order	 to	 show	that	Foucault’s	analysis	of	 the	mutation	of	political	 sovereignty	
bears	epistemological,	political	and	ethical	implications	appearing	throughout	his	
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work.12	It	is	indeed	more	accurate	to	claim	that	the	relation	to	historically	specific	
forms	of	knowledge	and	truth	have	produced	different	ways	of	governing	one’s	
life	as	well	as	the	lives	of	others.	I	show	that	Foucault	develops	throughout	his	
work	an	analysis	of	the	correspondence	between	forms	of	knowledge,	forms	of	
power	and	forms	of	governmentality.	This	appears	very	clearly	throughout	the	
last	two	lecture	courses	at	the	Collège	de	France	(Foucault:	2010,	2011b)	where	
the	analysis	of	the	Classical	Greek	notion	of	parrhesia	shows	a	way	of	acting	that	
allows	 to	 reflect	 on	one’s	 conduct,	 to	manifest	 a	 form	of	 truth	 and	 to	 trigger	
political	change	without	the	need	for	epistemological	validation.	In	other	words,	
this	thesis	shows	that	thinking	epistemology,	politics	and	ethics	at	the	same	time	
when	 reading	 Foucault’s	 work	 provides	 a	 better	 means	 to	 understand	 the	
dynamics	at	stake	when	he	introduces	the	concepts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics.	
The	problem	is	not	the	persistence	of	the	will	of	a	sovereign	expressing	his	power	
over	bare	life	(as	Agamben	claims)	but	the	unnoticed	conflation	of	ways	of	life	
and	forms	of	conducts	with	the	epistemological	foundation	that	the	discourse	of	
human	sciences	provides.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	analysis	of	the	relationship	
between	forms	of	knowledge	and	truth	developed	in	the	second	chapter	of	this	
thesis	 concludes	with	 the	 study	 of	 the	 question	 of	 ethical	 conduct	 in	 the	 last	
chapter.	
                                                
12 	Foucault’s	 scholarship	 usually	 divides	 his	 work	 in	 three	 main	 categories:	 whereas	 the	
“archaeological”	period	refers	to	his	works	up	to	the	1970s,	the	“geneaological”	period	refers	to	
his	works	from	the	1970s	up	to	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality.	The	latter	inaugurates	
the	 “ethical”	 period	 that	 runs	 until	 Foucault’s	 death.	 For	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 about	 this	
distribution,	 see	 Judith	 Revel’s	 Le	 Vocabulaire	 de	 Foucault	 and	 more	 specifically	 the	 entries	
“archéologie”,	“généalogie”	and	“éthique”	(Revel:	2002,	7-8,	37-38,	28-30).	This	thesis	argues	in	
favour	 of	 a	 more	 nuanced	 distribution	 and	 shows	 that	 the	 questions	 of	 the	 historicity	 of	
epistemology,	political	power	and	aesthetics	of	existence	(which	constitute	respectively	the	main	
objects	 of	 archaeology,	 genealogy	 and	 ethics)	 are	 intertwined	 throughout	 Foucault’s	 body	 of	
work.	
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Chapter	One:	From	Agamben’s	“bare	life”	to	Foucault’s	“norm”:	a	
reading	of	the	epistemological	implications	of	the	concept	of	life	as	
object	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	
	
	
Introduction	
 
The	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	1976	History	of	Sexuality:	The	Will	to	
Knowledge,	describes	a	decisive	historical	 and	political	 shift	 in	 the	nature	and	
exercise	of	political	power.	The	section,	entitled	“Right	of	Death	and	Power	over	
Life”,	describes	the	disappearance	of	political	sovereign	power	–	the	power	to	
“take	life	or	let	live”	exerted	by	the	King	–	in	favour	of	what	Foucault	chooses	to	
call	bio-power	and	biopolitics,	a	regime	deriving	from	the	power	“to	foster	life	or	
disallow	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 death.”	 (Foucault:	 1998d,	 136,	 138).	 Foucault’s	
description	of	this	historical	shift	stresses	a	paradox:	whilst	the	King’s	right	to	kill	
has	been	replaced	by	a	power	supposed	to	support	the	development	of	life,	wars	
and	genocides	have	not	disappeared	from	the	political	scene.	This	paradox	has	
been	 stressed	 and	 used	 by	 Giorgio	 Agamben	who,	 in	Homo	 Sacer:	 Sovereign	
Power	and	Bare	 Life	 (Agamben:	1998),	 sees	 in	 it	 the	opportunity	 to	define	an	
ontology	of	sovereign	power:	the	sovereign	right	to	kill	would	be	linked	to	the	
transcendental	and	ahistorical	relationship	between	the	political	function	of	the	
sovereign	and	a	concept	of	life	Agamben	calls	“bare”.	The	sovereign	right	to	kill	
corresponds	to	its	essential	ability	to	decide	upon	the	threshold	between	natural	
and	 political	 life	 and	 therefore	 to	 reveal	 the	 bare	 life	 which	 always	 already	
precedes	the	existence	of	the	political	sphere.		
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However,	 this	 interpretation	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 is	
problematic	inasmuch	as	it	contradicts	the	very	point	Foucault	is	making	in	the	
first	volume	of	The	History	of	Sexuality	(Foucault:	1998d).	The	disappearance	of	
sovereign	power	implies	that	bio-power	and	biopolitics	rely	upon	a	concept	of	
life	which	 is	 specifically	modern,	 deriving	 from	Foucault’s	 attempt	 to	 radically	
historicize	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 power	 and	 life.	 The	 concept	 of	
nature	is	what	grounds	the	rationality	of	the	concept	of	norm	according	to	which	
biopolitical	modernity	operates.	It	relies	upon	an	ahistorical	understanding	of	life	
which	Foucault	historicizes.	Unlike	Agamben,	who	posits	an	a	priori	unchanging	
relationship	between	the	power	of	the	sovereign	and	bare	life,	Foucault’s	analysis	
of	 the	 shift	 from	 sovereign	 power	 to	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 implies	 the	
historicization	of	sovereign	power	and	 life.	The	concept	of	anthropological	 life	
that	becomes	the	target	of	nineteenth	century	biology	indicates	the	emergence	
of	 a	 relationship	 between	 anthropological	 knowledge	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 life	
produced	by	the	positivity	of	this	knowledge.	The	reason	for	the	persistence	of	
death	within	biopolitical	modernity	needs	 to	be	 found	elsewhere:	 rather	 than	
claiming	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	 the	 essential	 expression	 of	 an	 ahistorical	
sovereign	 power,	 I	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 found	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
population	to	which	corresponds	an	epistemological	concept	of	nature	which	is	
politically	 protected,	 preserved	 or	 influenced.	 This	 epistemological	 concept	 of	
anthropological	 nature,	 which	 constitutes	 the	 specificity	 of	 Foucault’s	
understanding	of	political	modernity,	is	antithetical	to	the	idea	of	an	ahistorical	
concept	of	bare	life	that	would	be	the	condition	of	possibility	of	politics.	
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This	is	the	reason	why	the	first	two	sections	of	this	chapter	demonstrate	that	the	
type	of	political	sovereign	power	Foucault	contrasts	with	bio-power	is	radically	
different	 from	 it.	 The	 sovereign	 power	 of	 the	 King,	 which	 is	 described	 in	 the	
opening	pages	of	Discipline	and	Punish,	corresponds,	to	what	Foucault	calls	“the	
spectacle	of	the	scaffold”,	(Foucault:	1995:	32):	a	manifestation	of	power	through	
which	the	body	of	the	condemned	–	the	body	of	the	individual	who	has	breached	
the	sovereign	law	–	gets	torn	to	pieces.	The	spectacle	of	the	scaffold	is	a	ritual:	it	
is	the	public	manifestation	of	a	battle	opposing	the	sovereign	to	a	subject	who	
has	 contested	his	 power.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 scene	of	 torture	 is	 a	 performance	
designed	 to	 reaffirm	 a	 world	 order	 that	 has	 been	 threatened.	Discipline	 and	
Punish,	published	one	year	before	The	Will	to	Knowledge,	gives	a	genealogy	of	
the	prison	that	 is	already	ordered	around	the	shift	 from	sovereign	power	to	a	
form	of	political	power	which	emerges	in	the	nineteenth	century.	It	is	a	form	of	
power	which	no	longer	affirms	and	reaffirms	itself	through	the	violence	of	its	law	
(which,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 sovereign	 power,	 form	 the	 same	 reality),	 but	 which	 is	
apparently	gentler,	and	which	presents	itself	as	an	administrative	and	regulatory	
form	 of	 power.	 Contra	 Agamben,	 my	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 sovereign	 power	
Foucault	describes	when	he	introduces	the	concepts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	
in	the	first	volume	of	The	History	of	Sexuality	does	not	deal	with	a	concept	of	
natural	life	but	with	the	persistence	of	an	imperium	ordered	by	the	will	and	law	
of	the	sovereign.		
	
Consequently,	the	third	section	of	this	chapter	examines	the	cause	of	Agamben’s	
failure	to	perceive	the	specific	modernity	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics.	Agamben	
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misses	the	new	articulation	between	political	power	and	life	which	emerges	with	
the	nineteenth	century.	This	mutation,	I	argue,	implies	the	radical	historicization	
of	the	concept	of	life,	a	historicization	Agamben’s	project	prevents	and	which	it	
replaces	 by	 an	 essential	 and	 ahistorical	 characterization	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	sovereign	power	and	bare	life.	Such	a	historicization	leads	us	to	discover	
that	the	concept	of	the	norm,	which	replaces	the	will	of	the	sovereign,	operates	
according	 to	 an	 epistemic	 configuration	 that	 implies	 a	 reciprocal	 relationship	
between	 political	 and	 anthropological	 knowledge.	 The	 anthropological	
knowledge	of	man	by	the	modern	subject	 implies	a	positive	abstraction	of	the	
concept	of	life.	
	
It	 is	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 positive	 abstraction	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 within	 the	
epistemic	 configuration	 of	 anthropological	 knowledge	 that	 the	 persistence	 of	
killing	as	an	operative	mode	of	political	power	can	be	understood.	It	relies	upon	
the	concept	of	natural	rule	that	provides	a	criterion	for	the	preservation	of	life	as	
positive	 abstraction.	 This	 abstraction	 is	what	 characterizes	 the	morphology	 of	
modern	 political	 power:	 it	 attempts	 at	 preserving,	 through	 the	 positive	
representation	of	the	lives	of	man	within	the	field	of	anthropological	knowledge,	
the	coincidence	between	words	and	things	that	the	law	of	the	sovereign	used	to	
perform.	However,	the	historical	emergence	of	anthropological	positivity	masks	
the	alienation	of	life	from	the	concrete	and	immanent	existence	of	men	to	the	
knowledge	of	life	as	a	form	of	man’s	positive	finitude.	It	 is	the	epistemological	
roots	of	such	an	alienation	that	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	describes.	
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1.	Putting	to	death	and	fostering	life		
 
When,	at	the	end	of	the	first	volume	of	The	History	of	Sexuality,	Foucault	makes	
the	relationship	between	the	concepts	of	sovereignty	and	life	explicit,	he	first	of	
all	describes	the	political	shift	from	the	Classical	Age	to	modernity	by	the	move	
from	a	power	to	“take	 life	or	 let	 live”	 in	 favour	of	 the	power	to	“foster	 life	or	
disallow	it	to	the	point	of	death”	(Foucault:	1998d,	136,	138).	Up	until	the	end	of	
the	Classical	Age,	the	sovereign	had	the	right	to	exert	his	power	in	the	name	and	
for	the	sake	of	the	Kingdom	or	himself.	When	threatened	by	enemies,	he	takes	
hold	of	 the	 lives	of	his	 subjects	by	 requesting	defence	until	 death	 in	order	 to	
address	the	external	threat	menacing	himself,	or	the	Kingdom	and	the	political	
order	corresponding	to	it.	According	to	the	same	principle,	the	right	to	kill	one	of	
his	subjects	in	the	case	of	an	internal	threat	to	his	authority	is	also	an	expression	
of	his	 sovereignty,	 just	as	 is	his	ability	 to	 raise	 taxes	and	use	 the	 labour	 force	
provided	by	his	subjects.	In	all	cases,	sovereign	power	appears	as	a	relationship	
of	deduction	by	way	of	which	the	sovereign	affirms	a	right	of	withdrawal	from	his	
people	–	either	the	withdrawal	of	their	lives	or	the	withdrawal	of	the	products	of	
their	labour.		
	
When	Foucault	describes	the	shift	affecting	political	power	at	the	end	of	the	18th	
century,	a	shift	identified	with	the	emergence	of	what	he	calls	“bio-power”,	it	is	
first	of	all	to	this	power	of	deduction	that	he	refers,	and	he	describes	its	retreat.	
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In	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	The	History	 of	 Sexuality.	 The	Will	 to	
Knowledge,	he	writes:	
“Deduction”	has	 tended	 to	be	no	 longer	 the	major	 form	of	power	but	
merely	one	element	among	others,	working	to	incite,	reinforce,	control,	
monitor,	 optimize,	 and	 organize	 the	 forces	 under	 it:	 a	 power	 bent	 on	
generating	forces,	making	them	grow,	and	ordering	them,	rather	than	one	
dedicated	to	 impeding	them,	making	them	submit,	or	destroying	them.	
(Foucault:	1998d,	136)	
	
Foucault	 describes	 the	move	by	which	 the	power	exerted	over	 the	 life	of	 the	
subject	is	no	longer	the	punctual	intervention	of	the	monarch	in	a	strictly	vertical	
and	negative	fashion:	political	power	becomes	that	through	which	the	force	of	
individuals	is	controlled,	managed	and	optimized.	Whilst	the	sword	falling	on	the	
lives	of	individuals	as	a	divine	sentence	symbolizes	“sovereign	power”,	bio-power	
is	 no	 longer	 articulated	 through	 the	 ritualized	 expression	 of	 power	 of	 the	
sovereign.	Rather,	it	corresponds	to	a	form	of	power	concerned	with	life	in	and	
throughout	its	duration	as	it	 is	expected	to	“incite,	reinforce,	control,	monitor,	
optimize	the	forces	under	it.”		
	
However,	defining	the	shift	from	sovereign	power	to	bio-power	by	the	move	from	
deduction	 (of	 life	 and	 labour	 force)	 to	 promotion	 (of	 life)	 through	 political	
administration	is	not	sufficient	to	give	a	comprehensive	account	of	the	political	
mutation	affecting	the	power	of	the	sovereign	marked	by	the	decline	of	feudal	
power	at	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century.	Until	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age	it	
was	 the	 imbalance	 of	 power	 between	 the	 sovereign	 and	 the	 subject	 that	
characterized	 their	 relationship.	 Accordingly,	 the	 body	 of	 the	 condemned	
constituted	the	sole	basis	for	the	exertion	of	sovereign	power	as	well	as	its	very	
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limit	and	took	part	in	the	ritualistic	economy	of	the	execution.	In	Discipline	and	
Punish,	Foucault	writes:	
As	 a	 ritual	 of	 armed	 law,	 in	 which	 the	 prince	 showed	 himself,	
indissociably,	 both	 as	 head	 of	 justice	 and	 head	 of	 war,	 the	 public	
execution	 had	 two	 aspects:	 one	 of	 victory,	 the	 other	 of	 struggle.	 It	
brought	to	a	solemn	end	a	war,	the	outcome	of	which	was	decided	in	
advance,	between	the	criminal	and	the	sovereign;	it	had	to	manifest	the	
disproportion	 of	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 over	 those	 whom	 he	 had	
reduced	to	impotence.	The	dissymmetry,	the	irreversible	imbalance	of	
forces,	 were	 an	 essential	 element	 in	 the	 public	 execution.	 A	 body	
effaced,	 reduced	 to	dust	 and	 thrown	 to	 the	winds,	 a	 body	destroyed	
piece	by	piece	by	the	infinite	power	of	the	sovereign	constituted	not	only	
the	ideal,	but	the	real	limit	of	punishment.	(Foucault:	1995,	50)	
	
Public	 executions	 were	 the	 scene	 of	 a	 predetermined	 confrontation	 that	
disclosed	 the	 order	 of	 a	 world	 within	 which	 the	 life	 of	 the	 condemned	 was	
exposed	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 physicality	 of	 his	 body.	 Every	 blow,	 every	 act	 of	
torture,	 took	 place	 within	 a	 rigorous	 economy	 of	 pain,	 and	 thus	 a	 rigorous	
economy	of	the	corporal,	whereby	the	hierarchy	between	the	sovereign	and	the	
condemned	is	given	expression.	The	description	of	the	torture	of	Robert-François	
Damiens	with	which	Foucault	famously	opens	Discipline	and	Punish	describes	the	
case	of	a	regicide:	Damiens	attempted	to	assassinate	Louis	XV	of	France	in	1757,	
a	 crime	 that	 constitutes	 an	 example	 of	 disruption	 of	 the	 sovereign	 order	par	
excellence.	 In	 response	 to	 this	 crime,	 the	 measured	 and	 ritualized	 torture	
performed	in	the	name	of	the	King	corresponds	to	the	defence	and	restoration	
of	the	sovereign	order.		
	
However,	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	tells	us	that	the	spectacle	of	
death	 no	 longer	 occupies	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 public	 scene.	 Instead,	 Foucault	
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describes	a	transformation	through	which	death	becomes	the	very	limit	of	power	
and	the	most	discrete	part	of	existence:	
One	might	say	that	the	ancient	right	to	take	life	or	let	live	was	replaced	
by	 a	 power	 to	 foster	 life	 or	disallow	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 death.	 This	 is	
perhaps	what	 explains	 the	 disqualification	 of	 death	which	marks	 the	
recent	wane	of	the	rituals	that	accompanied	it.	That	death	is	so	carefully	
evaded	is	linked	less	to	a	new	anxiety	that	makes	death	unbearable	for	
our	 societies	 than	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	procedures	of	power	have	not	
ceased	to	turn	away	from	death.	In	the	passage	from	this	world	to	the	
other,	 death	 was	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 a	 terrestrial	 sovereignty	 was	
relieved	 by	 another,	 singularly	 more	 powerful	 sovereignty;	 the	
pageantry	that	surrounded	it	was	in	the	category	of	political	ceremony.	
Now	it	is	over	life,	throughout	its	unfolding,	that	power	establishes	its	
domination;	death	is	power's	limit,	the	moment	that	escapes	it,	death	
becomes	 the	 most	 secret	 aspect	 of	 existence,	 the	 most	 "private".	
(Foucault:	1998d,	138)	
	
As	 Foucault	 underlines,	 it	 is	 not	 because	 the	 reality	 of	 death	 has	 become	
unbearable	 to	 modern	 societies	 that	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 witnessed	 the	
decrease	 of	 the	 expression	 of	 sovereign	 power	 under	 the	 form	 of	 ritualized	
torture	and	executions.	 It	 is	 rather	with	 the	emergence	of	 a	new	economy	of	
power	that	the	violence	exerted	upon	life	disappears	from	public	view.	Whereas	
the	execution	marked,	within	the	logic	of	sovereign	power,	a	passage	from	the	
sovereignty	of	 the	King	 to	 the	 sovereignty	of	God	 (and	 therefore	 a	 continuity	
within	 the	 logic	of	 sovereignty	 itself),	with	bio-power	death	becomes	the	very	
limit	of	the	grasp	of	political	power.	Whilst	sentencing	a	subject	to	death	was	the	
paroxysmal	 expression	 of	 sovereign	 power	 under	 a	 ritual	 form	 whereby	 the	
power	of	the	King	was	exerted	and	expressed	through	each	carefully	measured	
act	 of	 torture,	 bio-power	 operates	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 individuals	 and	 a	
population	as	a	group	of	living	beings.	
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If,	 however,	 executions	 disappear	 from	 the	public	 scene,	 and	 if	 the	 sovereign	
right	 of	 death	 no	 longer	 constitutes	 the	manifestation	 of	 political	 power,	 the	
emergence	 of	 bio-power	 does	 not	 mean	 the	 complete	 disappearance	 of	 the	
relationship	between	political	power	and	death.	 In	 the	 last	 section	of	 the	 first	
volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	Foucault	famously	underlines	the	paradoxical	
subsistence	of	mass-death	in	the	modern	age	with	the	occurrence	of	wars	and	
genocides.	Giorgio	Agamben,	who	provides	one	of	the	most	influential	accounts	
of	 the	 relationship	between	 sovereign	power	 and	biopower,	 has	 not	 failed	 to	
stress	the	importance	of	such	a	paradox	which	reappears	in	Foucault’s	Security,	
Territory,	 Population	 and	 The	 Birth	 of	 Biopolitics.13	In	Homo	 Sacer:	 Sovereign	
Power	and	Bare	Life,	Agamben	writes:	
	 After	1977,	the	courses	at	the	Collège	de	France	start	to	focus	on	the	
passage	from	the	“territorial	State”	to	the	“State	of	population”	and	on	
the	 resulting	 increase	 in	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 nation’s	 health	 and	
biological	life	as	a	problem	of	sovereign	power,	which	is	then	gradually	
transformed	into	a	“government	of	men”	(Dits	et	écrits,	3:	719).	“What	
follows	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 bestialization	 of	man	 achieved	 through	 the	most	
sophisticated	 political	 techniques.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 history,	 the	
possibilities	 of	 the	 social	 sciences	 are	 made	 known,	 and	 at	 once	 it	
becomes	 possible	 both	 to	 protect	 life	 and	 to	 authorize	 a	 holocaust.”	
(Agamben:	1998,	10)	
	
However,	contrary	to	what	Agamben	claims	in	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	
Bare	 Life,	 the	emergence	of	bio-power,	which	 sees	a	growing	 concern	 for	 the	
political	management	and	government	of	populations,	does	not	correspond	to	
the	 persistence	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign.	 The	 compatibility	 between	
sovereign	power	and	a	concern	for	“biological	life”	and	the	“nation’s	health”	is	
                                                
13	On	the	passage	from	the	territorial	State	of	sovereign	power	to	the	management	of	population,	
see	the	25th	January,	the	1st	February	1978	lectures	(Foucault:	2009c,	55-114)	as	well	as	the	10th	
January	1979	and	17th	January	1979	lectures	(Foucault:	2008b,	1-50).		
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not	self-evident	and	both	paradigms	are	not	homogenous.	If	one	reads	the	last	
section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	 History	 of	 Sexuality	 carefully,	 it	 becomes	
apparent	 that	 sovereign	 power	 is,	 according	 to	 Foucault,	 a	 historical	 form	 of	
political	power	linked	to	the	symbolic	order	of	blood.14	This	is	why,	according	to	
Foucault,	the	sovereign	power	of	the	King	corresponded	to:	
a	society	of	blood	[…]	where	power	spoke	through	blood:	the	honour	of	
war,	 the	 fear	of	 famine,	 the	 triumph	of	death,	 the	 sovereign	with	his	
sword,	executioners	and	tortures;	blood	was	a	reality	with	a	symbolic	
function	(Foucault:	1998d,	147).		
	
The	 symbolic	 order	 of	 blood	 establishes	 a	 link	 between	 the	 violence	 either	
provoked	or	allowed	by	 the	power	of	 the	 sovereign	who	defends	 the	political	
order	 of	 the	Kingdom	 (either	 through	 the	 execution	of	 the	 subject	who	 steps	
outside	the	lawful	order,	or	through	the	request	of	his	life	when	waging	a	war).	
In	this	case,	the	bloody	violence	of	the	sovereign	is	not	the	limit	of	political	power,	
but	the	reality	of	its	existence	and	the	possibility	and	condition	of	its	expression.	
As	Foucault	notes:	
For	 a	 society	 in	 which	 famine,	 epidemics,	 and	 violence	 made	 death	
imminent,	blood	constituted	one	of	the	fundamental	values.	It	owed	its	
high	value	at	the	same	time	to	its	instrumental	role	(the	ability	to	shed	
blood),	to	the	way	it	functioned	in	the	order	of	signs	(to	have	a	certain	
blood,	to	be	of	the	same	blood,	to	be	prepared	to	risk	one’s	blood),	and	
also	 its	precariousness	(easily	spilled,	subject	to	drying	up,	too	readily	
mixed,	capable	of	being	quickly	corrupted).	(Foucault:	1998d,	147)	
	
The	preservation	of	the	purity	of	blood	was,	at	the	time	of	sovereign	power,	a	
correlate	of	the	preservation	of	the	integrity	and	the	purity	of	the	Kingdom	and	
                                                
14	As	Maurice	 Blanchot	 claims	 in	 his	 essay	 “Michel	 Foucault	 as	 I	 Imagine	 Him”:	 “sexuality,	 as	
[Foucault]	understood	it	or	at	least	the	quibbling	importance	attributed	to	it	today	(a	today	that	
goes	 back	 quite	 far),	 marks	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 society	 of	 blood,	 or	 characterized	 by	 the	
symbolics	of	blood,	to	a	society	of	knowledge,	norm	and	discipline.”	(Foucault	&	Blanchot:	1989,	
96).	
 43 
of	 sovereign	 power.	However,	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 purity	 of	 the	 Kingdom,	
linked	 to	 a	 people	 over	 which	 the	 King	 exerts	 a	 power	 of	 deduction,	 is	 very	
different	from	the	notion	of	population	that	emerges	at	the	beginning	of	the	19th	
century.		
	
The	problem	with	Agamben’s	 reading	of	Foucault’s	description	of	 the	passage	
from	the	logic	of	sovereign	power	to	the	one	of	bio-power	consists	in	its	erasure	
of	Foucault’s	radical	historicization	of	the	relationship	between	political	power	
and	life.	As	a	consequence,	Agamben	believes	that	the	growing	concern	for	the	
nation’s	health	and	biological	life	corresponds	to	a	problem	of	sovereign	power.	
However,	as	Foucault	clearly	notes	in	the	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	
History	of	Sexuality,	wars	waged	after	the	18th	century	are	no	longer	related	to	
the	 defence	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 but	 fought	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	
population.	Foucault	writes:	
Wars	are	no	longer	waged	in	the	name	of	the	sovereign	who	must	be	
defended;	they	are	waged	on	behalf	of	the	existence	of	everyone;	entire	
populations	are	mobilized	for	the	purpose	of	wholesale	slaughter	in	the	
name	of	life	necessity:	massacres	have	become	vital.	It	is	as	managers	of	
life	and	survival,	of	bodies	and	the	race,	that	so	many	regimes	have	been	
able	 to	 wage	 so	many	wars,	 causing	 so	many	men	 to	 be	 killed.	 And	
through	 a	 turn	 that	 closes	 the	 circle,	 as	 the	 technology	 of	 wars	 has	
caused	 them	 to	 tend	 increasingly	 toward	 all-out	 destruction,	 the	
decision	that	initiates	them	and	the	one	that	terminates	them	are	in	fact	
increasingly	 informed	 by	 the	 naked	 question	 of	 survival.	 The	 atomic	
situation	is	now	at	the	end	point	of	this	process:	the	power	to	expose	a	
whole	population	to	death	is	the	underside	of	the	power	to	guarantee	
an	individual’s	continued	existence.	The	principle	underlying	the	tactics	
of	battle	–	that	one	has	to	be	capable	of	killing	in	order	to	go	on	living	–	
has	 become	 the	 principle	 that	 defines	 the	 strategy	 of	 states.	 But	 the	
existence	in	question	is	no	longer	the	juridical	existence	of	sovereignty;	
at	stake	is	the	biological	existence	of	a	population.	If	genocide	is	indeed	
the	dream	of	modern	powers,	this	is	not	because	of	a	recent	return	of	
the	ancient	right	to	kill,	it	is	because	power	is	situated	and	exercised	at	
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the	level	of	life,	the	species,	the	race,	and	the	large-scale	phenomena	of	
population.	(Foucault:	1998d,	137)	
	
Foucault	 tells	 us	 that	 the	 persistence	 of	 killing	 in	 modernity	 is	 no	 longer	 a	
manifestation	of	the	sovereign’s	right	to	kill.	It	is	no	longer	an	expression	of	the	
power	of	the	sovereign	who	puts	his	subjects	to	death	in	favour	of	the	political	
order.	Instead,	wars	and	genocides	take	place	in	the	name	and	for	the	sake	of	life	
itself,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 biological	 existence	 of	 the	
population	as	a	biological	concept	and	reality.	It	is	therefore	the	link	between	life	
as	 epistemological	 concept	 and	 political	 power	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 examined	 in	
order	 to	 be	 faithful	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 Foucault’s	 attempt	 to	 historicize	 the	
relationship	 between	 power	 and	 life.	 It	 is	 therefore	 a	 radical	 reduction	 of	
Foucault’s	 philosophical	 enterprise	 to	 claim,	 as	 Agamben	 does,	 that	 the	
bestialization	 of	 man	 to	 which	 Foucault	 refers	 corresponds	 to	 the	 logic	 of	
sovereign	power	and	the	symbolic	function	of	blood	attached	to	it.	The	question	
of	 the	 bestialization	 of	 man	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 biological	
understanding	of	 life,	an	understanding	that	emerges	historically	at	the	end	of	
the	Classical	Age	with	the	development	of	human	sciences.	It	is	in	relation	to	the	
protection	 and	 fostering	 of	 life,	 whose	 paroxysmal	 manifestation	 lets	 the	
question	 of	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 population	 appear,	 that	 bio-power	 emerges	 in	
contrast	 to	 sovereign	 power.	 Instead	 of	 grasping	 the	 importance	 of	 such	 an	
historicization,	which	 questions	 the	 historical	 forms	 taken	 by	 the	 relationship	
between	power	and	knowledge,	Agamben	simply	produces	an	ontologization	of	
the	concept	of	sovereign	power:	it	becomes	an	ahistorical	concept	which	always	
already	prevents	the	possibility	of	political	critique.		
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2.	From	Medieval	sovereign	power	to	bio-power:	the	perpetuation	of	the	
imperium	against	the	management	of	the	population	 	
	
In	order	 to	grasp	 the	kind	of	political	power	emerging	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	
nineteenth	century	after	the	decline	of	royalty,	we	need	to	bear	in	mind	that	the	
shift	from	sovereign	power	to	bio-power	–	defined	by	Foucault	as	the	shift	from	
the	power	to	“take	life	or	let	live”	in	favour	of	the	power	to	“foster	life	or	disallow	
it	to	the	point	of	death”	(Foucault:	1998d,	136,	138)	–	does	not	only	correspond	
to	 a	 change	 of	 object	 over	 which	 political	 power	 is	 exerted.	 An	 entire	
cosmological	 understanding	 is	 also	 at	 stake	 in	 this	 shift	 which,	 if	 we	 follow	
Foucault,	is	not	only	political	but	also	epistemic.	The	target	of	political	power	is	
no	longer	the	continuity	within	the	structure	of	sovereignty	in	relation	to	which	
death	 marks	 “the	 manner	 in	 which	 a	 terrestrial	 sovereignty	 was	 relieved	 by	
another”	(Foucault:	1998d,	138).	Just	as	the	body	loses	its	central	place	within	
the	procedure	of	punishment,	the	immediate	relationship	to	death	established	
during	 ritual	 torture	 undergoes	 the	 same	 sort	 of	 disqualification,	 as	 Foucault	
argues	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality:		 	
As	soon	as	power	gave	itself	the	function	of	administering	life,	its	reason	
for	being	and	the	logic	of	its	exercise	[…]	made	it	more	and	more	difficult	
to	 apply	 the	 death	 penalty.	 How	 could	 power	 exercise	 its	 highest	
prerogatives	 by	 putting	 people	 to	 death,	 when	 its	 main	 role	 was	 to	
ensure,	 sustain,	 and	multiply	 life,	 to	 put	 this	 life	 in	 order?	 (Foucault:	
1998d,	138)	
	
The	progressive	 disappearance	of	 the	 public	 torture	 and	 executions	Discipline	
and	Punish	describes	does	not	echo	 the	mere	development	or	propagation	of	
altruistic	ideas	and	concerns.	If	capital	punishment	progressively	disappears	from	
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the	centre	of	the	public	space,	it	is	because	we	no	longer	deal	with	the	life	of	the	
subjects	of	the	King	that	threaten	the	integrity	of	the	Kingdom	and	get	torn	to	
pieces	according	to	the	correct	ritual	 in	order	to	make	symbolic	reparation	for	
their	offence,	but	rather	with	the	preservation	of	the	population	as	a	new	political	
and	epistemological	reality.	
	
Whereas	the	imbalance	of	forces	between	the	infinite	power	of	the	King	and	the	
body	 of	 the	 condemned	 was	 a	 mark	 of	 the	 cosmological	 order	 attached	 to	
sovereignty	 affirming	 its	 persistence,	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 will	 see	
emergence	of	the	persistence	of	the	population	as	the	main	concern	of	political	
power.	In	Discipline	and	Punish,	Foucault	does	not	fail	to	underline	the	distinction	
between	the	 infinite	 force	of	the	King	and	the	 infinitely	subjected	body	of	the	
condemned.	As	he	tells	us,	the	public	display	of	force	and	violence	was	not	only	
a	means	of	deterrence	directed	towards	the	Kingdom’s	enemies,	but	it	is	also	the	
efficient	manifestation	of	sovereign	power	itself,	actualised	through	the	ritual	of	
torture.	 The	 sovereign	 law	 could	 not	 be	 distinguished	 from	 its	 force	 and	
expression.	In	the	first	chapter	of	Discipline	and	Punish,	Foucault	writes:	
The	justice	of	the	king	was	shown	to	be	an	armed	justice.	The	sword	
that	punished	the	guilty	was	also	the	sword	that	destroyed	enemies.	
A	 whole	 military	 machine	 surrounded	 the	 scaffold:	 cavalry	 of	 the	
watch,	archers,	guardsmen,	soldiers.	This	was	intended,	of	course,	to	
prevent	 any	 escape	 or	 show	 of	 force;	 it	 was	 also	 to	 prevent	 any	
outburst	of	sympathy	or	anger	on	the	part	of	the	people,	any	attempt	
to	save	the	condemned	or	to	have	them	immediately	put	to	death;	but	
it	 was	 also	 a	 reminder	 that	 every	 crime	 constituted	 as	 it	 were	 a	
rebellion	against	the	law	and	that	the	criminal	was	an	enemy	of	the	
prince.	All	these	reasons	–	whether	a	matter	of	precaution	in	particular	
circumstances	or	a	functional	element	in	the	performance	of	the	ritual	
–	made	 the	 public	 execution	more	 than	 an	 act	 of	 justice;	 it	 was	 a	
manifestation	of	force,	or	rather,	it	was	justice	as	the	physical,	material	
and	awesome	force	of	the	sovereign	deployed	there.	The	ceremony	of	
 47 
the	public	 torture	 and	execution	displayed	 for	 all	 to	 see	 the	power	
relation	that	gave	his	force	to	the	law.	(Foucault:	1995,	50)	
	
The	 ritualized	manifestation	of	 power	 that	 corresponded	 to	 public	 executions	
was	a	way	to	actualise	the	power	of	the	King	as	well	as	to	reaffirm	this	power’s	
ability	to	destroy	enemies,	either	internal	or	external	to	the	Kingdom.	Sovereign	
power	was	directed	towards	the	continuity	and	stability	of	a	cosmological	order	
that	needed	to	be	preserved.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	model	of	war	and	battle	
was	 directed	 towards	 the	 traitor	 as	well	 as	 towards	 the	 potential	 conqueror.	
Thus,	 the	 tenet	 “rex	 qui	 nunquam	 moritur”	 [“the	 king	 who	 cannot	 die”],	
mentioned	by	Ernst	Kantorowicz	 in	The	King’s	Two	Bodies	 (Kantorowicz:	1997,	
316),15	finds	its	counterpart	in	“populus	non	moritur”	[“the	people	does	not	die”]	
(Kantorowicz:	 1997,	 295).	 It	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that,	 in	 Kantorowicz’	 words,	 the	
abstract	 entity	which	 represents	 kingship	 perpetuates	 the	mortal	 body	 of	 the	
King.	This	means	that	the	persistence	of	the	imperium	(through	the	persistence	
of	the	King	and	of	the	people)	constitutes	the	political	and	cosmological	structure	
of	Medieval	sovereignty.	This	structure	shows	that	the	power	of	the	sovereign	
and	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 imperium	 is	 that	 which	 constitutes	 the	 object	 of	
political	power	at	the	time.	This	 is	 the	reason	why	 it	 is	 impossible	to	claim,	as	
Agamben	does,	that	“the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body	is	the	original	activity	
of	sovereign	power”	(Agamben:	1998,	11).	The	example	of	Medieval	sovereignty	
                                                
15Ernst	 Kantorowicz’s	 The	 King’s	 Two	 Bodies	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 sources	 Foucault	 uses	 in	 his	
characterization	of	political	sovereign	power	in	Discipline	and	Punish.	Kantorowicz	has	argued	the	
continuity	of	the	order	of	Medieval	political	sovereignty	in	spite	and	beyond	the	temporal	and	
mortal	existence	of	the	King	and	his	people.	His	theorization	of	the	meaning	of	political	sovereign	
power	beyond	the	finitude	of	human	existence	allows	us	to	understand	how	the	Empire,	as	an	
atemporal	entity	which	links	a	people	to	a	territory,	targets	its	own	persistence	through	the	ritual	
enforcement	and	defence	of	the	sovereign	law.	
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proves	that	the	sovereignty	of	the	King	does	not	target	the	life	of	a	population	as	
biological	reality	but	rather	the	cosmological	order	linked	to	the	preservation	of	
a	territory.	As	Kantorowicz	puts	it:		
Baldus16 	[…]	 assumed	 a	 relatively	 permanent	 duration	 of	 the	 world	
which	 lasted	 “forever”	 although	 its	 dispositions	 changed	 and	 were	
subject	 to	 corruption	and	generation.	 In	 this	 case,	Baldus	applied	 the	
doctrine	of	permanent	duration	to	the	imperium	quod	semper	est;	but	
he	used	the	same	argument	also	with	regard	to	commonwealth	and	fisc	
in	 general	 when	 he	 said	 that	 “they	 cannot	 die”,	 that	 both	 were	
“something	 eternal	 and	 perpetual	with	 regard	 to	 their	 essence,	 even	
though	the	dispositions	change	frequently”.	His	formulations	were	even	
slightly	bolder	when	talking	about	the	perpetuity	of	kingdoms	and	the	
peoples.	(Kantorowicz:	1997,	299)	
	
The	permanence	of	 the	relation	between	the	King	and	the	people	defines	 the	
possibility	of	a	common	space,	the	imperium,	which	targets	its	own	perpetuation.	
This	 idea	 of	 territorial	 perpetuation	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 role	 of	
sovereignty	during	the	Middle	Ages.	The	King	is	sovereign	in	relation	to	a	Kingdom	
to	which	corresponds	a	certain	cosmological	order.	This	 is	 the	reason	why	the	
power	exerted	by	the	sovereign	is	a	power	of	"deduction"	(Foucault:	1998d,	136):	
a	recurring	deduction	of	labour	force	for	the	exploitation	of	the	soil,	of	life	for	the	
defence	of	the	territory.	Foucault	confirms	this	analysis	during	the	1st	February	
1978	lecture	from	Security,	Territory,	Population:	
From	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 to	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 sovereignty	 is	 not	
exercised	on	things,	but	first	of	all	on	a	territory,	and	consequently	on	the	
subjects	who	inhabit	it.	In	this	sense	we	can	say	that	the	territory	really	is	
the	 fundamental	 element	 of	 both	Machiavelli’s	 principality	 and	 of	 the	
juridical	sovereignty	of	the	sovereign	as	defined	by	philosophers	and	legal	
theorists.	Obviously,	these	territories	may	be	fertile	or	barren,	they	may	
be	densely	or	sparsely	populated,	the	people	may	be	rich	or	poor,	active	
or	idle,	but	all	these	elements	are	only	variables	in	relation	to	the	territory	
that	 is	the	very	foundation	of	the	principality	of	sovereignty.	(Foucault:	
2009c,	96)	
                                                
16	Kantorowicz	refers	here	to	Badus	de	Ubaldis,	an	Italian	jurist	of	the	14th	century.	
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Within	the	paradigm	that	corresponds	to	the	sovereign	power	of	the	King,	it	is	
the	unity	of	the	Empire	that	allows	it	to	integrate	the	question	of	life	and	death	
within	the	continuity	of	the	Kingdom.	If	sentencing	to	death	occupied	the	centre	
of	the	public	space,	it	is	because	the	death	of	the	King’s	subjects,	or	that	of	the	
mortal	body	of	the	King	himself,	did	not	mean	the	end	of	the	imperium.		
	
The	 opposition	 between	 the	 King	 and	 his	 subjects	 had	 to	 be	 joined	 to	 the	
permanence	of	the	territory:	the	subjects	were,	in	the	feudal	structure,	merely	
the	 means	 for	 the	 exploitation	 of	 a	 unified	 Kingdom;	 they	 belonged	 to	 the	
sovereignty	of	the	King	just	as	his	territory	did.	The	need	for	a	King	and	a	people	
that	do	not	die	expresses	the	need	to	overcome	the	limit	imposed	by	death.	The	
prolongation	of	the	body	of	the	King	and	of	the	people	through	their	abstraction	
carried	the	promise	of	the	final	unity	of	the	spiritual	and	temporal	times	within	
an	eschatological	perspective.	In	this	respect,	when	the	King	dies,	God	governs	
until	a	new	King	is	invested.	Foucault’s	claim,	according	to	which	the	terrestrial	
sovereignty	of	the	King	is	subordinated	to	the	more	powerful	sovereignty	of	God,	
is	in	this	respect	indebted	to	Kantorowicz	who	explains	the	dynastic	continuity	in	
relation	 to	Christian	 theology	and	eschatology.	 It	 is	 the	 structure	of	 sovereign	
power	 and	 the	 cosmological	 order	 it	 produces	 which	 is	 preserved	 politically.	
Therefore,	the	preservation	of	the	imperium	goes	beyond	a	concern	for	biological	
existence.	In	fact,	it	has	nothing	to	do	with	biological	existence	at	all	but	targets	
a	cosmological	structure	within	which	the	sovereign,	as	entity,	must	preserve	its	
status	as	foundation	of	the	world.	This	is	the	reason	why,	as	Kantorowicz	explains,	
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the	possibility	of	an	 interregnum,	which	allows	 the	 transition	 from	 the	mortal	
body	of	the	King	to	the	immortal	sovereignty	of	God,	is	a	necessity.	Kantorowicz	
writes:	
In	the	earlier	Middle	Ages,	apparently	following	the	lead	of	the	Church,	
the	continuity	of	a	realm	during	an	 interregnum	had	been	sometimes	
preserved	 by	 a	 fiction:	 Christ	 stepped	 into	 the	 gap	 as	 interrex	 and	
secured,	 through	 his	 own	 eternity,	 the	 continuity	 of	 Kingship.	
(Kantorowicz:	1997,	334)	
	
Kantorowicz	 shows	us	 that	 the	problem	of	 the	 finitude	of	 life	 is	 resolved	at	 a	
structural	level.	This	explains	why	life	as	biological	and	immanent	reality	cannot	
be	understood	as	an	object	of	political	concern	before	the	nineteenth	century.	In	
Security,	Territory,	Population,	Foucault’s	point	 is	to	show	how	the	move	from	
the	 political	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 King	 to	 the	 political	 concern	 for	 the	 State	
introduces	 a	 new	 political	 rationality:	 it	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 population	 as	
immanent	and	natural	reality,	and	no	longer	the	salvation	of	the	imperium,	which	
becomes	the	main	political	concern.	This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault,	during	the	
15th	March	1978	lecture,	remarks:	
The	time	of	the	Middle	Ages	was	still	one	that,	at	a	certain	moment,	
had	to	become	unified	as	the	universal	time	of	an	Empire	in	which	all	
differences	would	be	effaced,	and	this	universal	Empire	will	herald	and	
be	 the	 theater	 of	 Christ's	 return.	 The	 Empire,	 the	 last	 Empire,	 the	
universal	Empire,	whether	of	Caesars	or	of	the	Church,	was	something	
that	haunted	the	medieval	perspective,	and	to	that	extent	there	was	
no	indefinite	government.	There	was	no	state	or	kingdom	destined	to	
the	indefinite	repetition	in	time.	(Foucault:	2009c,	260)	
	
The	temporality	of	the	Empire,	which	also	corresponds	to	the	time	of	sovereign	
power,	 therefore	appeared	 to	be	captured	within	 the	perspective	of	a	unified	
structure.	The	very	tension	opposing	persistence	of	the	imperium	to	the	mortal	
condition	of	individuals	gets	articulated	on	the	horizon	of	a	cosmological	entity	
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which	needed	to	be	preserved.	For	instance,	the	recurrence	of	taxation	carried	
the	 idea	 of	 a	 sovereign	 order	 perpetuating	 itself.	 The	 fact	 that	 such	 a	 power	
seemed	 to	be	 taken	within	 a	 ritualistic	 structure	 also	 conveys	 the	 idea	of	 the	
perpetuation	 of	 a	 fixed	 order	 of	 things.	 Under	 the	 paradigm	 of	 Medieval	
sovereignty,	the	perpetuation	of	the	Empire,	hence	of	the	existing	relationship	
between	 the	 sovereign	 and	 his	 subject,	 defines	 the	 intrinsic	 circularity	 of	
Medieval	 sovereignty.	 It	 is	 a	 circularity	 which	 concerns	 the	 persistence	 of	 a	
cosmological	 structure.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why,	 during	 the	 1st	 February	 1978	
lecture,	Foucault	claims:	
Now	 what	 does	 this	 common	 good,	 or	 this	 salvation	 of	 all,	 which	 is	
regularly	invoked	by	jurists	and	laid	down	as	the	very	end	of	sovereignty,	
comprise?	[…]	This	means	that	the	end	of	sovereignty	is	circular;	it	refers	
back	to	the	exercise	of	sovereignty.	The	good	is	obedience	to	the	law,	so	
that	the	good	proposed	by	sovereignty	is	that	people	obey	it.	There	is	an	
essential	 circularity	 that,	 whatever	 its	 theoretical	 structure,	 moral	
justification	or	practical	effects,	is	not	so	far	removed	from	Machiavelli	
saying	 that	 the	 Prince's	 main	 objective	 must	 be	 to	 preserve	 its	
principality,	 we	 always	 come	 back	 to	 this	 circular	 relationship	 of	
sovereignty,	or	the	principality,	to	itself.	(Foucault:	2009c,	98-99)	
	
The	 preservation	 of	 the	 territory	 is	 what	 guarantees	 the	 continuation	 of	
sovereign	power.	In	relation	to	Kantorowicz's	analysis,	it	is	a	series	of	abstractions	
(the	corpus	mysticum,	the	eternal	body	of	the	King	and	divine	authority	of	God),	
which	confers	the	cosmological	stability	to	the	Empire.	It	is	therefore	not	life	as	
the	 biological	 existence	 of	 individuals	 or	 of	 a	 population	 which	 defines	 the	
political	structure	of	Medieval	sovereign	power.	On	the	contrary,	what	matters	is	
the	 possibility	 of	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 Empire	 defined	 as	 a	 "universal	 Space"	
encompassing	"all	members	past	and	future,	actual	and	potential,	who	followed	
each	other	successively	in	a	universal	Time."	(Kantorowicz:	1997,	309).		
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As	I	have	shown	above,	the	sovereign	power	of	the	King,	to	which	corresponds	a	
cosmology	 which	 seeks	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 as	 a	 structural	 and	
territorial	entity,	does	not	manage	the	life	of	its	subjects.	The	power	of	deduction	
the	sovereign	exerts	over	his	subjects	is	a	withdrawal	that	serves	the	interests	of	
the	Kingdom,	and	the	violence	of	 the	sovereign	 is	either	directed	towards	 the	
wrong-doer	 who	 threatens	 the	 hierarchy	 corresponding	 to	 sovereignty	 or	
towards	enemies	threatening	the	integrity	of	the	Kingdom’s	territory.	According	
to	this	logic,	death	occurs	in	relation	to	the	manifestation	of	sovereign	violence,	
which	manifests	its	power	within	the	ritualized	act	of	the	execution	in	order	to	
reaffirm	the	strength	and	establishment	of	the	sovereign	hierarchy	that	has	been	
threatened.	The	sovereign	power,	which	manifests	a	“right	of	death”,	is	therefore	
not	a	power	exerted	over	life	for	its	own	sake.	It	is	always	a	battle	conducted	for	
the	 sake	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 against	 an	 enemy.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	do	not	concern	the	cosmological	horizon	of	the	Empire	but	the	reality	
of	 life	understood	as	 a	biological	 and	natural	 phenomenon.	 This	 new	political	
reality	implies	that	the	existence	and	preservation	becomes	what	guides	modern	
political	 objectives.	 As	 Foucault	 argues	 in	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 History	 of	
Sexuality,	 the	 concept	 of	 bio-power	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 sub-categories:	 “the	
disciplines:	an	anatomo-politics	of	the	human	body”	and	“regulatory	controls:	a	
biopolitics	of	the	population”	(Foucault:	1998d,	139).	Whereas	disciplines	target	
the	question	of	the	body	as	a	machine	and	attempt	to	optimize	its	performance	
and	forces,	biopolitics	broaden	their	object:	it	is	not	only	the	case	that	individual	
bodies	represent	a	sum	of	forces	that	can	be	used	as	labour	force	for	economic	
 53 
purposes,	it	 is	also	the	case	that	individuals	as	a	group	form	a	reality	which,	in	
itself,	both	depends	on	and	impels	specific	biological	tendencies.	As	Foucault	tells	
us,	the	"species	body"	is	a	body	"imbued	with	the	mechanics	of	life	and	serving	
as	 the	basis	of	 the	biological	processes:	propagation,	births	and	mortality,	 the	
level	 of	 health,	 life	 expectancy	 and	 longevity,	with	 all	 the	 conditions	 that	 can	
cause	these	to	vary"	(Foucault:	1998d,	139).	In	this	respect,	the	question	of	the	
"bestialization	of	man"	quoted	by	Agamben	in	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	
Bare	Life	(Agamben:	1998,	10)	sees	a	displacement	of	the	focus	of	political	power	
from	the	perpetuation	of	the	cosmological	order	of	the	Kingdom	(of	which	the	
subject	of	the	King	is	a	member)	to	the	population	as	a	group	of	living	individuals.	
The	population	corresponds	here	to	a	group	of	living	individuals	within	a	specific	
environment	 who	 constitute,	 as	 such,	 a	 phenomenon	 subjected	 to	 various	
fluctuations.	The	bestialization	of	man,	to	which	Agamben	refers	in	Homo	Sacer:	
Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life	(Agamben:	1998,	10),	is	not	merely	the	individual	
whose	body	 is	 disciplined	and	optimized,	 nor	 is	 it	 the	 individual	 sentenced	 to	
death	by	the	sovereign.	The	concept	of	population,	which	has	nothing	to	do	with	
the	people	belonging	to	a	Kingdom,	is	not	intrinsically	linked	to	a	territory	that	
needs	 to	 be	 preserved.	 Rather,	 it	 concerns	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 can	 be	
scientifically	observed	and	influenced.	The	question	of	the	government	of	men	
does	not	concern	the	retrieval	of	an	intrinsic	nature	that	would	be	the	essence	of	
man	as	a	living	being	but	is	always	already	at	the	crossroads	of	observation	and	
political	intervention.	Foucault	writes:	
One	 of	 the	 great	 innovations	 in	 the	 techniques	 of	 power	 in	 the	
eighteenth	century	was	the	emergence	of	“population”	as	an	economic	
and	political	problem:	population	as	wealth,	population	as	manpower	
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or	labor	capacity,	population	balanced	between	its	own	growth	and	the	
resources	 it	commanded.	Governments	perceived	that	they	were	not	
dealing	 simply	 with	 subjects,	 or	 even	 with	 a	 “people”,	 but	 with	 a	
“population”,	 with	 its	 specific	 phenomena	 and	 its	 peculiar	 variables:	
birth	 and	 death	 rates,	 life	 expectancy,	 state	 of	 health,	 frequency	 of	
illnesses,	 patterns	 of	 diet	 and	 habitation.	 All	 these	 variables	 were	
situated	at	the	point	where	the	characteristic	movements	of	life	and	the	
specific	effects	of	 institutions	intersected:	states	are	not	populated	in	
accordance	with	the	natural	progression	of	propagation,	but	by	virtue	
of	 their	 industry,	 their	 products,	 and	 their	 different	 institutions.	
(Foucault:	1998d,	25)	
	
It	is	a	specific	kind	of	relationship	between	political	power	and	individuals	which	
Foucault	 attempts	 to	 describe	 here:	 it	 no	 longer	 concerns	 the	 direct	 battle	
opposing	the	law	of	the	sovereign	to	the	subject	of	the	King	who	has	breached	it	
(as	 it	 is	 the	 case	with	public	 torture	 and	executions).	 It	 does	not	 concern	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 sovereign	 and	 his	 people	 either	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
extraction	of	labour	force	or	of	the	mobilisation	for	war	to	preserve	and	foster	
the	Kingdom).	It	concerns	the	way	in	which	political	power	both	regulates	and	
registers	 the	 fluctuations	 derived	 from	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 group	 of	 living	
people	to	which	the	population,	as	a	phenomenon,	corresponds.17	Foucault	calls	
it	 the	 “intersection”	 between	 “the	 characteristic	 movements	 of	 life	 and	 the	
specific	effects	of	institutions”.	At	this	intersection,	it	is	a	specific	concept	of	life	
that	is	defined:	no	longer	the	lives	of	the	feudal	subjects	which	are	only	seized	by	
sovereign	power	when	they	constitute	a	threat	for	the	Kingdom	nor	of	a	people	
belonging	to	the	King	within	the	symbolic	and	political	unity	of	the	Kingdom,	but	
                                                
17	As	Foucault	describes	in	Security,	Territory,	Population,	the	population	is	an	objective	and	not	
a	fixed	reality.	It	describes	a	tendency	that	a	group	of	individuals	taken	as	living	beings	and	object	
of	 scientific	 knowledge	 reveal	 (e.g.	 the	 increase	 or	 decrease	 of	 natality	 or	 mortality).	 The	
population	“is	pertinent	as	the	objective,	and	individuals,	the	series	of	individuals,	are	no	longer	
pertinent	 as	 the	 objective,	 but	 simply	 as	 the	 instrument,	 relay,	 or	 condition	 for	 obtaining	
something	at	the	level	of	the	population”	(Foucault:	2009c,	42).	Therefore,	the	population	is	not	
a	finished	reality	but	the	evaluation	of	an	evolution	understood	as	the	expression	of	a	natural	
phenomenon.		
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the	 life	 of	 a	 population	 defining	 a	 natural	 phenomenon	 fluctuating	 within	 a	
specific	milieu.18	Death	is	no	longer	the	occasion	of	the	immediate	manifestation	
of	 the	power	of	 the	 sovereign	 seizing	and	destroying	 the	 life	of	his	 subject,	 it	
becomes	 the	 aspect	 of	 existence	 which	 political	 power	 cannot	 embrace	 nor	
control	precisely	because	it	is	the	lives	of	people	as	living	beings	which	become	
the	very	object	of	political	power	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century.	As	
Foucault	 puts	 it:	 ‘Now	 it	 is	 over	 life,	 throughout	 its	 unfolding,	 that	 power	
establishes	 its	 dominion;	 death	 is	 power’s	 limit,	 the	moment	 that	 escapes	 it;	
death	 becomes	 the	 most	 secret	 aspect	 of	 existence,	 the	 most	 “private”.’	
(Foucault:	1998d,	138)	
	
Because	biopolitics	works	on	a	concept	of	life	which	corresponds	to	a	fluctuating	
reality	inscribed	within	a	specific	temporality	(and	not	the	mere	fact	of	being	alive	
in	 opposition	 to	 being	 dead),	 the	 focal	 point	 of	modern	 political	 power	 is	 no	
longer	 the	 bipartite	 opposition	 between	 life	 and	 death	 through	 which	 the	
sovereignty	of	the	King	strives	to	negate	the	finitude	of	the	subjects	composing	
its	Kingdom.	 Instead,	 it	 finds	 its	 focus	 in	 the	administration	of	a	phenomenon	
whose	 progression	 is	 located	 at	 the	 crossroads	 of	 natural	 progression	 and	
political	 intervention.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 we	 no	 longer	 deal	 with	 the	
persistence	 of	 the	 ritualized	 expression	 of	 sovereign	 power	 as	 a	 punctual	
sentence	exerted	upon	individuals	as	subjects	of	the	King	but	with	the	political	
                                                
18	As	 Katia	 Grenel	 puts	 it	 in	 her	 essay	 “Le	 biopouvoir	 chez	 Foucault	 et	 Agamben”,	 biopolitics	
targets	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 men	 as	 a	 global	 mass.	 The	 population	 is	 a	 “scientific	 and	 political	
problem”	[un	“problème	scientifique	et	politique”].	It	intervenes	on	a	series	of	processes	such	as	
birth,	death	and	diseases	(Grenel:	2004,	4).	
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management	of	populations.	Accordingly,	at	the	point	of	junction	between	the	
disciplined	 bodies	 and	 the	 regulation	 of	 populations,	 the	way	 political	 power	
operates	shifts.	It	moves	from	dealing	with	a	symbol	of	a	structural	entity	(the	
symbol	 of	 blood	 as	 part	 of	 what	 invigorates	 the	 Kingdom	 as	 a	 body)	 to	 the	
concept	of	sexuality	as	the	object	of	knowledge	which	allows	life	to	become	an	
object	of	political	control	and	intervention.	In	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	
Sexuality,	Foucault	writes:	
We,	on	the	other	hand,	are	in	a	society	of	“sex”,	or	rather	a	society	“with	
a	sexuality”:	the	mechanisms	of	power	are	addressed	to	the	body,	to	life,	
to	 what	 causes	 it	 to	 proliferate,	 to	 what	 reinforces	 the	 species,	 its	
stamina,	its	ability	to	dominate,	or	its	capacity	for	being	used.	Through	
the	themes	of	health,	progeny,	race,	the	future	of	the	species,	the	vitality	
of	the	social	body,	power	spoke	of	sexuality	and	to	sexuality;	the	latter	
was	not	a	mark	or	a	symbol,	it	was	an	object	and	a	target.	[…]	The	new	
procedures	 of	 power	 that	 were	 devised	 during	 the	 classical	 age	 and	
employed	in	the	nineteenth	century	were	what	caused	our	societies	to	
go	from	a	symbolics	of	blood	to	an	analytics	of	sexuality.	Clearly,	nothing	
was	more	on	the	side	of	the	law,	death,	transgression,	the	symbolic,	and	
sovereignty	than	blood;	 just	as	sexuality	was	on	the	side	of	the	norm,	
knowledge,	 life,	 meaning,	 the	 disciplines,	 and	 regulations.	 (Foucault:	
1998d,	147-148)	
	
The	 shift	 from	 a	 symbolic	 order	 of	 blood	 to	 an	 analytics	 of	 sexuality	 clearly	
illustrates	the	new	form	of	power	which	emerges	after	the	Classical	Age.	Rather	
than	 symbolizing	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 entity	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 through	 the	
violence	and	purity	 linked	to	blood,	 it	had	to	conceive	and	use	the	concept	of	
sexuality	as	a	natural	reality	that	would	permit	the	junction	between	atomised	
individuals	and	the	population	as	a	fluctuating	reality.	It	is	therefore	the	concept	
of	sexuality	that	permits	the	observation,	knowledge	and	influence	of	behaviours	
and	 habits	 that	 affects	 both	 the	 lives	 of	 individuals	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	
populations.		
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However,	 the	 concept	of	 sexuality	 is	 an	 epistemic	 construction	 that	 begins	 to	
operate	at	the	crossroads	of	the	development	of	medicine	and	social	prophylaxis:	
it	is	the	historical	product	of	the	encounter	between	medico-political	power	and	
the	existence	of	living	people	and	it	does	not	pre-exist	the	modern	subject	as	a	
transcendental	aspect	of	its	nature.	As	Foucault	puts	it	in	the	first	volume	of	the	
History	of	Sexuality:	
This	is	the	background	that	enables	us	to	understand	the	importance	
assumed	by	sex	as	a	political	issue.	It	was	at	the	pivot	of	the	two	axes	
along	which	developed	the	entire	political	 technology	of	 life.	On	the	
one	hand	 it	was	 tied	 to	 the	disciplines	 of	 the	body:	 the	harnessing,	
intensification,	 and	 distribution	 of	 forces,	 the	 adjustment	 and	
economy	 of	 energies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 was	 applied	 to	 the	
regulation	 of	 populations,	 through	 all	 the	 far-reaching	 effects	 of	 its	
activity.	 It	 fitted	 both	 categories	 at	 once,	 giving	 rise	 to	 infinitesimal	
surveillances,	permanent	controls,	extremely	meticulous	orderings	of	
space,	 indeterminate	 medical	 or	 psychological	 examinations,	 to	 an	
entire	micro-power	concerned	with	the	body.	But	it	gave	rise	as	well	to	
comprehensive	measures,	 statistical	 assessments,	 and	 interventions	
aimed	at	the	entire	social	body	or	at	groups	taken	as	a	whole.	Sex	was	
a	means	of	access	both	to	the	life	of	the	body	and	the	life	of	the	species.	
It	was	employed	as	 a	 standard	 for	 the	disciplines	 and	as	 a	basis	 for	
regulations.	This	is	why	in	the	nineteenth	century	sexuality	was	sought	
out	in	the	smallest	details	of	individual	existences;	it	was	tracked	down	
in	 behavior,	 pursued	 in	 dreams,	 it	 was	 suspected	 of	 underlying	 the	
least	follies,	it	was	traced	back	into	the	earliest	years	of	childhood;	it	
became	the	stamp	of	 individuality	–	at	 the	same	time	what	enabled	
one	to	analyze	the	latter	and	what	made	it	possible	to	master	it.	But	
one	also	sees	it	becoming	the	theme	of	political	operations,	economic	
interventions	 (through	 incitements	 to	 or	 curbs	 on	 procreation),	 and	
ideological	 campaigns	 for	 raising	 standards	 of	 morality	 and	
responsibility:	 it	 was	 put	 forward	 as	 an	 index	 of	 society’s	 strength,	
revealing	of	both	its	political	energy	and	its	biological	vigour.	(Foucault:	
1998d,	145-146)	
	
If	 sexuality	 allows	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 individual	 to	 the	 one	 of	
population,	it	is	because	bio-power	and	biopolitics	concern	a	concept	of	life	that	
gets	taken	into	strategies	embracing	political	knowledge	and	intervention.	This	is	
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the	reason	why	Foucault	uses	the	expression	“political	technology	of	life”.	On	the	
one	hand,	if	the	politics	applied	to	life	through	the	spectrum	of	bio-power	are	the	
products	of	a	technology,	it	means	that	the	object	they	produce	is	neither	natural	
nor	pre-given,	but	is	historically	constituted	as	an	object	through	political	power	
itself.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 fact	 that	 life	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 a	 political	
technology	shows	that,	unlike	sovereign	power	which	expresses	a	 right	 to	kill,	
bio-power	targets	and	influences	the	very	existence	of	individuals.		
	
Already	 in	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	History	 of	 Sexuality,	 the	
question	of	the	biologization	of	the	lives	of	men	cannot	be	understood	merely	as	
the	 expression	of	 a	 sovereign	 right	 of	 death	over	 individuals	 reduced	 to	 their	
utmost	existence	as	animals.	For	instance,	the	question	of	racism	–	examined	by	
Foucault	both	 in	 this	 text	and	 in	Society	Must	Be	Defended19	–	shows	that	 the	
fantasy	 of	 pure	 or	 superior	 blood	 held	 by	 Nazism	 is	 supported	 by	 a	 whole	
apparatus	 of	 disciplinary	 power,	 which	 does	 not	 solely	 work	 on	 the	 binary	
opposition	between	the	ally	and	the	enemy	of	the	Kingdom,	but	on	the	basis	of	
the	concept	of	the	pure	and	good	nature	of	the	population	which	needs	to	be	
preserved	and	defended.	When,	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	
Foucault	 mentions	 Nazism,	 he	 takes	 great	 care	 to	 underline	 the	 intricate	
relationship	existing	between	the	fantasy	of	superior	blood	–	which	continues	the	
symbolism	of	sovereign	power	–	and	the	disciplinary	 logic	at	the	basis	of	such	
politics.	He	writes:	
                                                
19	Foucault	examines	the	question	of	racism	in	the	17th	March	1976	lecture	(Foucault:	2003b,	239-
272).	
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Racism	 took	 shape	 at	 this	 point	 (racism	 in	 its	 modern,	 “biologizing”,	
statist	 form):	 it	 was	 then	 that	 a	 whole	 politics	 of	 settlement,	 family,	
marriage,	education,	social	hierarchization,	and	property,	accompanied	
by	 a	 long	 series	of	 permanent	 interventions	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	body,	
conduct,	 health,	 and	 everyday	 life,	 received	 their	 color	 and	 their	
justification	from	the	mythical	concern	with	protecting	the	purity	of	the	
blood	and	ensuring	the	triumph	of	the	race.	Nazism	was	doubtless	the	
most	cunning	and	the	most	naïve	(and	the	former	because	of	the	latter)	
combination	 of	 the	 fantasies	 of	 blood	 and	 the	 paroxysms	 of	 a	
disciplinary	power.	A	eugenic	ordering	of	society,	with	all	that	it	implied	
in	the	way	of	extension	and	intensification	of	micro-powers,	in	the	guise	
of	 an	 unrestricted	 state	 control,	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	 oneiric	
exaltation	of	 a	 superior	blood;	 the	 latter	 implied	both	 the	 systematic	
genocide	of	others	and	the	risk	of	exposing	oneself	to	a	total	sacrifice.	
(Foucault:	1998d,	149,	150)	
	
If	a	race	is	concerned	with	the	question	of	the	purity	of	blood,	it	is	not	because	
the	enemy	threatens	the	sovereign’s	ability	to	manifest	its	power	over	a	Kingdom	
or	a	territory	but	because	the	enemy	represents	a	threat	to	the	pure	nature	of	
the	race	that	 is	protected	and	preserved.	 It	 is	no	 longer	the	model	of	 the	war	
between	 Kingdoms	 or	 between	 races	 that	 serves	 to	 illustrate	 the	 logic	 of	
preservation	at	the	basis	of	political	power,	but	the	idea	that	it	is	the	good	nature	
of	the	population	itself,	the	good	race	that	might	get	corrupted	and	threatened.		
	
The	 modern	 racism	 Foucault	 describes	 does	 not	 deal	 with	 the	 paradigm	 of	
sovereign	power	ordering	an	imperium,	but	with	the	idea	of	life	as	true	nature	
that	 must	 resist	 corruption.	 If	 sovereign	 power	 survives	 under	 totalitarian	
regimes,	 it	 is	 thanks	 to	 a	 biologism	which,	 by	 preferring	 one	 population	 over	
another,	founds	its	validity	in	the	truth	of	the	pure	race.	This	is	the	reason	why	
Foucault	describes	the	modern	form	of	racism	as	a	form	of	counter-history:	20	a	
                                                
20	Foucault	provides	this	description	during	the	28th	January	1976	lecture	at	the	Collège	de	France	
from	Society	Must	Be	Defended.	
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history	 that	 no	 longer	 concerns	 the	 mythical	 and	 sempiternal	 story	 of	 the	
foundation	of	the	Empire	that	strives	to	maintain	itself,	but	a	history	which	has	
the	biologico-medical	nature	of	the	population	as	its	foundation.	Foucault	writes:	
The	history	of	the	revolutionary	project	and	of	revolutionary	practice	
is,	I	think,	indissociable	from	the	counter-history	that	broke	with	the	
Indo-European	form	of	historical	practices,	which	were	bound	up	with	
the	exercise	of	sovereignty;	it	is	indissociable	from	the	appearance	of	
the	 counterhistory	 of	 races	 and	 of	 the	 role	 played	 in	 the	West	 by	
clashes	between	races.	We	might,	in	a	word,	say	that	at	the	end	of	the	
Middle	Ages,	 in	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries,	we	left,	or	
began	to	 leave,	a	society	whose	historical	consciousness	was	still	of	
the	 Roman	 type,	 or	 which	 was	 still	 centered	 on	 the	 rituals	 of	
sovereignty	 and	 its	myths,	 and	 that	 we	 then	 entered	 a	 society	 […]	
whose	 historical	 consciousness	 centers	 not	 on	 sovereignty	 and	 the	
problem	 of	 its	 foundation,	 but	 on	 revolution,	 its	 promises,	 and	 its	
prophecies	 of	 future	 emancipation.	 […]	 And	 it	 was	 at	 the	moment	
when	a	counterhistory	of	the	revolutionary	type	was	taking	shape	that	
another	 counterhistory	 began	 to	 take	 shape	 –	 but	 it	 will	 be	 a	
counterhistory	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 adopts	 a	 biologico-medical	
perspective	and	crushes	the	historical	dimension	that	was	present	in	
this	discourse.	You	thus	see	the	appearance	of	what	will	become	actual	
racism.	This	racism	takes	over	and	reconverts	the	form	and	function	of	
the	 discourse	 of	 race	 struggle,	 but	 it	 distorts	 them,	 and	 it	 will	 be	
characterized	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	theme	of	historical	war	–	with	 its	
battles,	its	invasions,	its	looting,	its	victories,	and	its	defeats	–	will	be	
replaced	by	the	postrevolutionist	theme	of	the	struggle	for	existence.	
It	is	no	longer	a	battle	in	the	sense	that	a	warrior	would	understand	
the	term,	but	a	struggle	in	the	biological	sense:	the	differentiation	of	
species,	 natural	 selection,	 and	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 fittest	 species.	
Similarly,	 the	 theme	of	 the	binary	 society	which	 is	divided	 into	 two	
races	or	two	groups	with	different	languages,	laws,	and	so	on	will	be	
replaced	by	that	of	a	society	that	is,	in	contrast,	biologically	monist.	Its	
only	 problem	 is	 this:	 it	 is	 threatened	 by	 a	 certain	 number	 of	
heterogeneous	elements	which	are	not	essential	to	 it,	which	do	not	
divide	the	social	body,	or	the	living	body	of	society,	into	two	parts,	and	
which	are	in	a	sense	accidental.	Hence	the	idea	that	foreigners	have	
infiltrated	this	society,	the	theme	of	the	deviants	who	are	this	society’s	
by-products.	 The	 theme	 of	 the	 counterhistory	 of	 races	was,	 finally,	
that	 the	 State	 was	 necessarily	 unjust.	 It	 is	 now	 inverted	 into	 its	
opposite:	 the	 State	 is	 no	 longer	 an	 instrument	 that	 one	 race	 uses	
against	 another:	 the	 State	 is,	 and	 must	 be,	 the	 protector	 of	 the	
integrity,	the	superiority,	and	the	purity	of	the	race.	The	idea	of	racial	
purity,	with	all	its	monistic,	Statist,	and	biological	implications:	that	is	
what	replaces	the	idea	of	race	struggle.	I	think	that	racism	is	born	at	
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the	 point	 when	 the	 theme	 of	 racial	 purity	 replaces	 that	 of	 race	
struggle,	 and	 when	 counterhistory	 begins	 to	 be	 converted	 into	
biological	racism.	(Foucault:	2003b,	79-81)	
	
Whereas	 the	 foundation	of	 the	power	of	 the	sovereign	 is	 linked	 to	a	mythical	
truth	that	exists	outside	time	and	regardless	of	time,	the	biological	implications	
of	modern	racism	emerge	from	an	opposition	directed	towards	the	mythical	and	
timeless	 foundation	 of	 sovereign	 power.	 Parallel	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	
counterhistory	 that	 goes	 against	 the	 mythical	 and	 timeless	 foundation	 of	
sovereign	power,	Foucault	sees	the	emergence	of	a	historical	discourse	of	 the	
revolutionary	type	supposed	to	challenge	the	foundation	of	sovereign	power	in	
the	name	of	 the	 King	 or	 of	God.	However,	 the	model	 of	 the	battle	 or	 of	war	
opposing	the	ally	of	the	Kingdom	to	its	enemy	gets	replaced	by	the	war	between	
races	which,	instead	of	being	supported	by	the	over-arching	sovereignty	of	God,	
finds	 its	 ground	 in	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 pure	 and	 superior	 race.	 It	 is	 no	 longer	 the	
imperium	that	needs	to	be	protected	(an	imperium	whose	foundation	and	truth	
is	derived	from	the	eminence	of	the	power	of	the	sovereign	itself)	but	the	survival	
of	the	good	race.	This	 is	the	reason	why	Foucault	claims	that	the	“struggle	for	
existence”	 (at	 stake	 in	biological	 racism)	 replaces	 the	 theme	of	 the	 “historical	
war”	which	opposed	one	people	to	another.	In	the	same	fashion,	if	“the	State	is	
no	longer	an	instrument	that	one	uses	against	another”,	it	is	because	the	monism	
defined	by	the	unity	of	the	Kingdom	is	replaced	by	a	monism	which	advocates	
the	purity	of	the	race.	The	enemy	of	such	a	monism	and	integrity	 is	no	 longer	
found	in	the	other	State,	the	other	people,	or	the	other	Kingdom,	but	in	the	other	
who	has	infiltrated	the	purity	providing	the	foundation	to	the	race:	it	is	no	longer	
the	truth	proceeding	from	the	sovereignty	of	God	which	saves	the	structure	of	
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the	Kingdom	from	death,	it	is	the	concern	for	the	purity	of	the	race	which	founds	
the	pure	and	superior	race	in	truth	and	prevents	it	from	being	corrupted.		
	
The	modern	 enemy	 is	 therefore	 less	 the	 stranger	 outside	 of	 the	 State	 or	 the	
Kingdom	than	 the	“foreigner”,	 “deviant”	or	“by-product”	of	 the	society.	 If	 the	
modern	State’s	legitimacy	is	no	longer	founded	in	truth	by	the	sovereignty	of	the	
King	or	of	God	–	hence	by	a	structural	transcendence	–	the	question	that	remains	
concerns	the	basis	which	allows	one	to	discriminate	the	pure	from	the	impure,	
those	 who	 deserve	 to	 live	 or	 those	 who	 will,	 in	 Foucault’s	 own	 words,	 be	
“disallow[ed]	[…]	to	the	point	of	death”	(Foucault:	1998d,	138).21		What	does	not	
appear	in	full	clarity	in	1976	–	neither	in	the	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	
History	of	Sexuality,	nor	in	Society	Must	Be	Defended	–	is	the	fact	that	when	the	
paradigm	of	sovereign	power	disappears	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age,	it	is	also	
its	eminence	and	transcendence	that	disappears.	It	is	a	mutation	which	Etienne	
Balibar	clearly	identified	in	his	2011	Citoyen	sujet	et	autres	essais	d’anthropologie	
philosophique.	Balibar	insists	on	the	fact	that:	
The	 representation	 of	 sovereignty	 is	 in	 effect	 implied	 in	 the	 idea	 of	
eminence,	 and	 conversely	 the	 reality	 of	 finite	 things	 could	 not	 be	
understood	 outside	 the	 specific	 dependence	 “according	 to	 which	 all	
things	are	subjected	to	God”.22	(Balibar:	2011,	38)	
	
If	the	eminence	of	the	most	sovereign	(God)	is	what	grounds	the	existence	of	the	
feudal	 subject	 in	 the	 face	 of	 death	 (by	 including	 it	within	 the	 Kingdom	 as	 an	
                                                
21	As	Jean	Terrel	puts	it	in	his	essay	“Les	Figures	de	la	Souveraineté”,	killing	becomes	a	means	“to	
develop	the	vitality	of	the	race”	[“developper	la	vitalité	de	la	race”]	as	well	as	“to	purify	one’s	own	
race	by	exposing	it	to	death”	[“purifier	sa	propre	race	en	l’exposant	à	la	mort”]	(Terrel:	2003,	123).	
22 	“La	 représentation	 de	 la	 souveraineté	 est	 en	 effet	 impliquée	 dans	 l’idée	 d’éminence,	 et	
inversement	 la	 réalité	 des	 choses	 finies	 ne	 saurait	 se	 comprendre	 hors	 d’une	 dépendance	
spécifique	selon	laquelle	toutes	choses	sont	sujettes	à	Dieu.” 
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intrinsic	part	of	it),	the	modern	concept	of	race	finds	no	other	ground	than	that	
of	its	own	purity	and	it	therefore	unavoidably	carries	the	spectrum	of	death	from	
another	angle.	Killing	is	no	longer	that	which	concludes	the	violent	manifestation	
of	sovereign	power	and	allows	the	subject	of	the	King	to	pass	from	terrestrial	to	
divine	 sovereignty,	 it	 becomes	 a	 necessary	means	 for	 the	preservation	of	 the	
purity	of	a	population.	What	Foucault’s	take	on	racism	tells	us	is	that	the	apparent	
return	 of	 sovereign	 power	 under	 the	 form	 of	 totalitarianism	 cannot	 be	
superimposed	on	the	paradigm	of	sovereign	power	preceding	the	Classical	Age:	
putting	to	death	is	no	longer	the	act	through	which	the	sovereign	expresses	the	
infinitude	of	its	power	against	the	mortal	subject	for	the	sake	of	the	preservation	
of	the	Kingdom	but	becomes	a	means	to	preserve	the	existence	of	the	pure	race	
or,	to	put	it	differently,	of	the	population	which	deserves	to	live.		
	
	
3.	Agamben’s	misreading	of	the	meaning	of	the	“biological”	in	Foucault’s	first	
volume	of	The	History	of	Sexuality	
	
Agamben’s	definition	of	modern	biopolitical	power	is	founded	on	the	use	of	the	
concept	of	bare	life,	a	concept	that	relies	on	a	clear	distinction	between	zoe	and	
bios:	life	as	“bare”	biological	existence	in	opposition	to	political	life.	In	order	to	
reach	such	a	distinction,	Agamben	uses	the	Aristotelian	definition	of	man	as	zoon	
politikon	–	a	living	being	that	possesses	a	political	disposition	on	top	of	its	very	
existence	as	 living	being.23	It	 is	 the	conceptual	distinction	Agamben	 introduces	
                                                
23	Aristotle	defines	man	as	zoon	politikon	in	Politics,	Book	I,	1253a	1-15	(Aristotle:	1908,	28-29).	
 64 
between	the	concept	of	bare	life	belonging	to	nature	(phusis)24	in	opposition	to	
a	political	life	belonging	to	the	realm	of	law	(nomos)	which	allows	Agamben	to	
problematize	 the	 specificity	 of	 modern	 political	 power	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
overlapping	or	 the	 conflation	of	 the	 two	 concepts	of	 life	 (the	natural	 and	 the	
political	life).	According	to	him,	both	are	clearly	distinguished	in	Aristotle	but	yet	
not	distinguished	in	Foucault’s	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality.	It	is	on	the	
basis	of	such	an	emphasis	that	Agamben	writes:	
The	 Foucauldian	 thesis	 will	 then	 have	 to	 be	 corrected	 or,	 at	 least,	
completed,	in	the	sense	that	what	characterizes	modern	politics	is	not	
so	much	the	inclusion	of	zoē	in	the	polis	–	which	is,	in	itself,	absolutely	
ancient	–	nor	simply	the	fact	that	life	as	such	becomes	a	principal	object	
of	the	projections	and	calculations	of	State	power.	Instead	the	decisive	
fact	 is	 that,	 together	 with	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	 exception	
everywhere	becomes	the	rule,	the	realm	of	bare	life	–	which	is	originally	
situated	 at	 the	 margins	 of	 the	 political	 order	 –	 gradually	 begins	 to	
coincide	with	 the	political	 realm,	and	exclusion	and	 inclusion,	outside	
and	inside,	bios	and	zoē,	right	and	fact,	enter	into	a	zone	of	irreducible	
indistinction.	(Agamben:	1998,	12)	
	
According	to	Agamben,	the	modern	integration	of	life	into	political	calculations,	
which	characterizes	bio-power,	 is	merely	the	symptom	of	a	more	fundamental	
shift	unnoticed	by	Foucault:	the	modern	superimposition	of	zoe	and	bios,	that	is	
the	 superimposition	 of	 a	 so-called	 “natural”	 and	 political	 life	 originally	
heterogeneous	 in	Classical	Greek	antiquity.	According	 to	Agamben,	as	soon	as	
natural	 life	 (zoe)	 becomes	 conflated	with	 political	 life	 (bios),	 the	mere	 fact	 of	
being	alive	cannot	but	become	the	object	of	political	strategies	and	calculations.	
The	problem	with	Agamben’s	political	diagnostic	of	modernity	lies	in	the	fact	that	
                                                
24	This	word	is	either	transcribed	physis	 (in	Agamben’s	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	
Life)	or	phusis	(in	Foucault’s	texts).	For	the	sake	of	consistency,	I	have	chosen	to	spell	 it	phusis	
throughout	 the	 course	 of	 my	 argument.	 However,	 I	 have	 respected	 the	 spelling	 used	 in	 the	
original	texts. 
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it	 is	 built	 upon	 two	 criticizable	 assumptions	which	 amount	 to	 a	misreading	of	
Foucault’s	philosophical	enterprise.		
	
The	first	problematic	assumption	implied	by	Agamben’s	exposition	of	bio-power	
lies	 in	 the	 paradoxical	 historicization	 and	 dehistoricization	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
sovereign	power	he	provides.	On	the	one	hand,	“the	inclusion	of	zoe	in	the	polis”	
is	 “absolutely	 ancient”,	 yet,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 “the	 realm	 of	 bare	 life	 […]	
gradually	begins	to	coincide	with	the	political	realm,	[…]	bios	and	zoe,	right	and	
fact,	 enter	 into	 a	 zone	 of	 irreducible	 indistinction”.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	
contradiction	is	found	in	the	ontologicization	of	the	concept	of	sovereign	power,	
which	is	 itself	reliant	on	the	ahistoricality	of	Agamben’s	concept	of	bare	life	as	
natural	life.	Even	though	Agamben	appears	to	recognize	bio-power	as	a	modern	
political	reality,	this	apparent	historicity	ultimately	falls	back	upon	and	is	founded	
by	an	ontologization	of	bare	 life	as	the	 life	which	becomes	the	transcendental	
condition	 of	 the	 politics	 and	makes	 the	 political	 and	 lawful	 order	 possible.	 In	
Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	Agamben	writes:	
The	present	inquiry	concerns	precisely	this	hidden	point	of	intersection	
between	the	juridico-institutional	and	the	biopolitical	models	of	power.	
What	this	work	has	had	to	record	among	its	likely	conclusions	is	precisely	
that	the	two	analyses	cannot	be	separated,	and	that	the	inclusion	of	bare	
life	in	the	political	realm	constitutes	the	original	–	if	concealed	–	nucleus	
of	 sovereign	 power.	 It	 can	 even	 be	 said	 that	 the	 production	 of	 a	
biopolitical	body	is	the	original	activity	of	sovereign	power.	(Agamben:	
1998,	11)		
	
According	to	Agamben,	his	book	targets	a	“hidden	point	of	intersection	between	
the	 juridico-institutional	 and	 the	biopolitical	models	of	power”.	 Yet,	he	 claims	
that	“the	production	of	the	biopolitical	body	is	the	original	activity	of	sovereign	
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power”,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 sovereign	 power	 and	 biopolitics	 are	 always	 already	
coextensive.	The	conceptual	heterogeneity	between	sovereign	power	and	bio-
power,	which	 I	have	exposed	 in	 the	 first	 section	of	 this	chapter,	prevents	one	
from	arguing	that	sovereign	power	remains	the	basis	upon	which	the	 juridico-
insititutional	 and	 the	 biopolitical	models	 of	 power	 find	 their	 articulation.	 This	
gesture,	which	consists	in	reducing	the	historical	specificity	of	bio-power	to	the	
production	of	a	biopolitical	body	amounts	to	the	neglect	of	 the	very	historical	
dimension	of	political	power	and	the	mutation	of	jurisdiction	Foucault	diagnoses	
after	the	Classical	Age.	Transforming	the	historical	character	of	sovereign	power	
identified	 by	 Foucault	 in	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	of	 the	History	 of	
Sexuality	 into	 a	 transcendental	 and	 ahistorical	 pre-given	 concept	 allows	
Agamben	 to	 isolate	 a	 concept	 of	 life	 which	 is	 entirely	 dependent	 upon	 the	
sovereign	decision:	it	is	through	this	decision	that	the	limit	between	the	natural	
and	the	political	sphere	is	traced	and	that	bare	life	gets	included	in	the	political	
realm.	Therefore,	the	bare	life	Agamben	points	at	remains	a	product	of	sovereign	
power	and	is	radically	different	from	the	concept	of	life	Foucault	targets.	
	
Agamben’s	characterization	of	“the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body”	(Agamben:	
1998,	 11)	 as	 the	 “original	 activity”	 of	 sovereign	 power	 transforms	 Foucault’s	
historical	 critique	 of	 sovereign	 power	 into	 an	 ontology	 of	 sovereign	 power:	 it	
claims	to	identify	the	essential	characteristic	of	sovereign	power,	which	would	be	
“the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body”	at	all	times	of	history.	Agamben	continues	
by	establishing	a	clear	equivalence	between	bare	life	and	“biological	life”	as	if	the	
concepts	 of	 biological	 and	 “non-political”	 life	 could	 be	 superimposed	without	
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difficulty.	 It	 is	such	an	equation	that	allows	him	to	claim	that	biopolitics	 is	 the	
intrinsic	activity	of	sovereign	power.	He	writes:	
It	 can	even	be	 said	 that	 the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body	 is	 the	
original	activity	of	sovereign	power.	In	this	sense,	biopolitics	is	at	least	
as	old	as	the	sovereign	exception.	Placing	biological	life	at	the	centre	
of	its	calculations,	the	modern	State	therefore	does	nothing	other	than	
bring	 to	 light	 the	 secret	 tie	 uniting	 sovereign	 power	 and	 bare	 life,	
thereby	 reaffirming	 the	 bond	 (derived	 from	 a	 tenacious	
correspondence	 between	 the	 modern	 and	 the	 archaic	 which	 one	
encounters	in	the	most	diverse	spheres)	between	modern	power	and	
the	most	immemorial	of	the	arcana	imperii.	(Agamben:	1998,	11)	
	
The	“secret	tie	uniting	sovereign	power	and	bare	life”	Agamben	mentions	is	the	
conceptual	 gesture	 that	 prevents	 any	 historical	 critique.	 Because	 Agamben	
refuses	 to	 distinguish	 “the	modern	 power”	 and	 “the	most	 immemorial	 of	 the	
arcana	imperii”,	the	concepts	of	bare	life	and	sovereign	power	work	reciprocally	
and	the	“natural”	or	“biological”	life	Agamben	describes	always	already	implies	
the	sovereign	decision.	The	historical	specificity	Agamben	grants	to	biopolitical	
modernity	 seems	 therefore	 highly	 questionable	 as	 it	 merely	 lies	 upon	 a	
primordial	 sovereign	 decision	 related	 to	 an	 ahistorical	 concept	 of	 sovereign	
power.	
	
In	 the	1976	 first	 volume	 to	The	History	of	 Sexuality,	 Foucault	provides	a	 clear	
historicization	of	sovereign	power	and	consequently	opens	up	the	possibility	of	
its	mutation.	He	writes:	
For	millennia,	man	remained	what	he	was	for	Aristotle:	a	living	animal	
with	the	additional	capacity	for	a	political	existence,	modern	man	is	an	
animal	whose	politics	places	his	existence	as	a	living	being	in	question	
(Foucault:	1998d,	143)	
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When	Foucault	writes	that	“modern	man	is	an	animal	whose	politics	places	his	
existence	as	a	living	being	in	question”	[l’homme	moderne	est	un	animal	dans	la	
politique	duquel	 sa	 vie	d’être	 vivant	est	 en	question],	he	designates	a	political	
administration	of	life	which	does	not	essentially	coincide	with	an	understanding	
of	life	understood	in	biological	terms.	Life	may	indeed	be	qualified	as	“biological”	
only	 through	 the	 scope	 of	 an	 understanding	 of	 life	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	
modern	 episteme	within	which	 Foucault	 places	 his	 analysis	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics.	 This	 biological	 life	 is	 first	 of	 all	 the	 product	 of	 a	 representation	 of	
knowledge:	 it	 is	a	kind	of	discourse	which	has	no	 relevance	when	referring	 to	
Greek	antiquity.	Hence,	biological	life	cannot	be	superimposed	with	the	idea	of	
an	 unqualified	 nature	 that	 would	 ground	 political	 power	 and	 constitute	 the	
“hidden	 point	 of	 intersection	 between	 the	 juridico-institutional	 and	 the	
biopolitical	models	of	power”	(Agamben:	1998,	11)	for	the	concept	of	biological	
life	 emerging	 with	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 is	 in	 itself	 an	 intrinsic	 part	 of	 the	
biopolitical	model	of	power.	The	distinction	Aristotle	draws	between	zoe	and	bios	
in	his	Politics	cannot	therefore	be	used	to	qualify	the	nature	of	the	biological	life	
at	stake	with	bio-power	and	biopolitics.	
	
The	concept	of	bare	life	at	the	margin	of	the	polis,	and	his	account	of	modernity	
as	 the	 absorption	 of	 bios	 (the	 realm	 of	 political	 life)	 by	 zoe	 (animal	 life	 and	
biological	 persistence)	do	not	do	 justice	 to	 the	 actual	 problem	underlying	 the	
question	 of	 bio-power,	 namely	 the	 fact	 according	 to	which	 the	 law	 now	 gets	
articulated	with	the	concept	of	norm	(Foucault:	1998d,	144).	Whereas	Agamben	
understands	the	political	realm	of	the	law	to	be	the	one	of	the	norm	(in	contrast	
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to	nature	or	phusis),	Foucault	understands	the	concept	of	norm	as	resulting	from	
the	mutation	of	episteme	and	 jurisdiction.	 Indeed,	when	Agamben	 locates	 the	
sovereign	at	the	threshold	of	the	distinction	between	what	he	calls	"phusis"	and	
"nomos"	(the	natural	realm	versus	the	political	realm),	he	fails	to	account	for	the	
mutation	of	jurisdiction	that	Foucault	sees	in	the	shift	from	sovereign	power	to	
bio-power	and	biopolitics.	It	is	no	longer	the	case	that	the	law	corresponds	to	the	
judicial	rule	derived	from	sovereign	power.	If	the	judicial	edifice	of	power	does	
not	disappear	with	the	nineteenth	century,	it	nevertheless	no	longer	occupies	the	
centre	 of	 political	 power.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 now	 serves	 to	 regulate	 the	
emergence	 of	 the	 natural	 rule	 as	 a	 positivity,	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 that	
manifests	itself	through	the	code	of	normalization	defined	by	disciplines.25	This	
code	of	normalization,	which	determines	the	framework	within	which	the	natural	
rule	of	norms	gets	expressed,	 cannot	be	aligned	with	 the	concept	of	bare	 life	
whose	integration	into	the	political	sphere	Agamben	sees	as	the	distinctive	mark	
of	 political	 modernity.	 Instead,	 the	 fact	 according	 to	 which	 a	 “continuum	 of	
apparatuses”	follows	life	 in	 its	temporality	tells	us	more	about	the	meaning	of	
the	“biological”	which	is	the	target	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics.	Failure	to	grasp	
the	“biological”	as	the	logos	about	a	bios	(that	is	a	positive	discourse	about	the	
lives	of	the	individual	composing	the	population)	cannot	account	for	the	historical	
specificity	of	the	episteme	Foucault	describes.		
                                                
25	As	Blanchot	puts	it	in	his	essay	“Michel	Foucault	as	I	Imagine	Him”:	“when	power	renounces	its	
alliance	with	the	sole	prestige	of	blood	and	bloodlines	(under	the	influence	of	the	Church,	which	
would	 profit	 from	 it	 by	 overthrowing	 the	 rules	 of	 kinship	 –	 by	 suppressing	 the	 levirate,	 for	
example),	sexuality	takes	on	a	preponderance	that	no	longer	associates	it	with	the	Law	but	with	
the	norm,	no	longer	with	the	rights	of	masters,	but	with	the	future	of	the	species	–	life	–	under	
the	 control	 of	 a	 knowledge	 laying	 claim	 to	 determine	 and	 regulate	 everything.”	 (Foucault	 &	
Blanchot:	1989,	96-97).	
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It	is	precisely	because	Agamben	misses	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	
knowledge	and	life	that	he	cannot	escape	an	ontological	understanding	of	life	as	
bare	life	which	fails	to	go	beyond	the	modern	episteme	Foucault	first	describes	in	
The	 Order	 of	 Things:	 the	 fact	 according	 to	 which	 Life,	 Language	 and	 Labour	
emerge	as	quasi-transcendentals	according	to	which	modern	man	constitutes	a	
knowledge	of	himself	as	a	finite	epistemological	reality.	In	the	introduction	to	the	
second	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	Foucault	refers	to	the	“games	of	truth”	
according	 to	 which	 man	 “conceives	 of	 himself	 as	 a	 living,	 speaking,	 laboring	
being”	(Foucault:	1990,	7).	He	obviously	refers	to	chapter	8	of	The	Order	of	Things	
entitled	“Labour,	Life,	Language”	(Foucault:	2001e,	272-329)	where	he	writes:	
We	have	now	advanced	a	long	way	beyond	the	historical	event	we	were	
concerned	with	situating	–	a	long	way	beyond	the	chronological	edges	
of	the	rift	that	divides	in	depth	the	episteme	of	the	Western	world,	and	
isolates	 for	us	 the	beginning	of	 a	 certain	modern	manner	of	 knowing	
empiricities.	This	is	because	the	thought	that	is	contemporaneous	with	
us,	and	with	which,	willy-nilly,	we	think,	is	still	largely	dominated	by	the	
impossibility,	 brought	 to	 light	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 eighteenth	
century,	of	basing	syntheses	in	the	space	of	representation,	and	by	the	
correlative	obligation	–	 simultaneous	but	 immediately	divided	against	
itself	 –	 to	 open	 up	 the	 transcendental	 field	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 to	
constitute	 inversely,	 beyond	 the	 object,	 what	 are	 for	 us	 the	 “quasi-
transcendentals”	of	Life,	Labour	and	Language.	In	order	to	bring	about	
the	 emergence	 of	 this	 obligation	 and	 this	 impossibility	 in	 all	 the	
harshness	of	their	historical	irruption,	it	was	necessary	to	let	analysis	run	
right	through	the	thought	that	it	finds	its	source	in	such	a	chiasm;	it	was	
necessary	that	verbal	formulation	should	waste	no	time	in	traversing	the	
destiny	or	slope	of	modern	thought	in	order	to	reach	at	last	the	point	
where	 it	could	turn	back:	this	clarity	of	our	day,	still	pale	but	perhaps	
decisive,	that	enables	us,	if	not	to	avoid	entirely,	at	least	to	dominate	by	
fragments,	 and	 to	 master	 to	 some	 extent	 what,	 from	 that	 thought	
formed	on	the	threshold	of	the	modern	age,	still	reaches	us,	invests	us,	
and	serves	as	a	continuous	ground	for	our	discourse.	(Foucault:	2001e,	
272-273)	
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It	is	within	the	scope	of	“the	modern	manner	of	knowing	empiricities”	that	the	
relationship	 between	 life,	 discourse	 and	 language	 proper	 to	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	needs	to	be	understood.	The	fact	that	 life,	 labour	and	language	are	
described	by	Foucault	as	“quasi-transcendentals”	tells	us	that	the	transcendental	
dimension	(as	condition	of	possibility	for	the	political	space)	Agamben	grants	to	
life	misses	the	“quasi”	Foucault	underlines,	hence	the	irreducible	difficulty	there	
is	in	superimposing	knowledge	and	experience	within	the	scope	of	an	ontological	
discourse.	The	“quasi-transcendentals”	Foucault	refers	to	indicates	the	historical	
possibility	of	 identifying	such	a	mismatch	by	confronting	 the	modern	mode	of	
thinking	man’s	finitude	with	a	different	mode	of	thinking.	“The	impossibility	[…]	
of	 basing	 syntheses	 in	 the	 space	 of	 representation,	 and	 […]	 to	 open	 up	 the	
transcendental	 field	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 to	 constitute	 inversely,	 beyond	 the	
object,	what	are	for	us	the	“quasi-transcendentals”	of	Life,	Labour	and	Language”	
(Foucault:	 2001e,	 272)	 shows	 that	 it	 is,	 according	 to	 Foucault,	 impossible	 to	
constitute	 within	 the	 field	 of	 positive	 knowledge	 a	 discourse	 which	 folds	 the	
subject	of	knowledge	back	on	himself	as	an	object	of	this	very	knowledge.	As	a	
consequence	of	this	impossible	posture,	Foucault	describes	the	modern	concepts	
of	 Life,	 Labour	 and	Work	 as	 givens	 whose	 historical	 emergence	 is	 no	 longer	
questioned.	 It	 is,	 however,	 by	 questioning	 this	 emergence	 that	 the	 field	 of	
transcendentality	 may	 be	 identified	 and	 put	 into	 question.	 This	 field	 of	
transcendentality	determines	the	condition	of	possibility	as	well	as	the	finitude	
of	 the	 modern	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life.	 Human	 life	 becomes	 a	
concept	 understood	 and	 rationalized	 as	 the	 manifestation	 of	 a	 nature	 which	
precedes	and	conditions	its	manifestation.	
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Ignoring	Foucault’s	scattered	but	real	and	consistent	reflection	on	the	finitude	of	
man’s	knowledge,	Agamben	is	unable	to	 identify	the	modern	specificity	of	the	
mode	of	thought	Foucault	describes.	This	is	the	reason	why	he	concludes	Homo	
Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life	with	the	idea	that	in	the	syntagm	"bare	life",	
"bare"	 corresponds	 to	 the	 Greek	 haplos,	 which	 designates	 a	 "pure	 Being"	
(Agamben:	1998,	102).	He	writes:	
what	constitutes	man	as	a	thinking	animal	has	its	exact	counterpart	in	
what	constitutes	him	as	a	political	animal.	In	the	first	case,	the	problem	
is	to	isolate	pure	Being	(on	haplos)	from	the	many	meanings	of	the	term	
"Being"	[…];	in	the	second,	what	is	at	stake	is	the	separation	of	bare	life	
from	 the	many	 forms	of	 concrete	 life.	 Pure	being,	 bare	 life	 –	what	 is	
contained	 in	these	two	concepts,	such	that	both	the	metaphysics	and	
the	politics	of	the	West	find	their	foundation	and	sense	in	them	and	in	
them	alone?	What	is	the	link	between	the	two	constitutive	processes	by	
which	metaphysics	and	politics	seem,	in	isolating	their	proper	element,	
simultaneously	to	run	up	against	an	unthinkable	limit?	(Agamben:	1998,	
102)	
	
Agamben	 here	 not	 only	 claims	 to	 identify	 a	 correspondence	 between	 the	
metaphysical	 question	 and	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 political	 question,	 he	 also	
advocates	 the	 possibility	 of	 reaching	 their	 essence	 through	 the	 isolation	 of	 a	
"pure"	being	and	"pure"	life.	The	isolation	of	this	“pure	Being”	corresponds	to	the	
isolation	of	bare	life	as	a	concept:	an	“unthinkable	limit”	which	is	not	so	distant	
from	 Foucault’s	 impossible	 synthesis	 of	 subjective	 experience	 but	 is	 yet	 not	
thought	in	terms	of	the	question	about	the	possibility	of	the	knowledge	of	 life	
(i.e.	in	terms	of	the	impossibility	to	represent	man’s	finitude).	Isolating	life	as	a	
concept	 ultimately	 amounts	 to	 a	 dead-end,	 since	 –	 to	 follow	 Agamben's	
argument	until	 its	final	development	–	it	would	result	in	"a	bios	that	is	only	its	
own	zoe"	(Agamben:	1998,	105)	and	in	the	impossibility	for	"a	form	of	life	[to]	
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seize	hold	of	[its]	very	haplos"	(Agamben:	1998,	105).	This	reveals	that	Agamben	
fails	 to	 identify	 the	 problem	 targeted	 by	 Foucault	 when	 he	 questions	 the	
mutation	of	sovereign	power	after	the	Classical	Age	with	the	emergence	of	the	
modern	 episteme.	 Agamben	 remains	 committed	 to	 an	 ontological	 and	
metaphysical	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 which	 reaches	 its	
limits	when	confronted	by	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	knowledge	
and	 life	bio-power	describes.	 This	question	addresses	 the	 impossibility,	 for	 an	
individual,	to	represent	positively	the	essence	of	his	own	life.		
	
It	 is	 not	 by	 chance	 that	medicine	 comes	 first	 in	 Foucault’s	 list	 of	 apparatuses	
taking	part	 in	modern	 life’s	political	 administration.	One	must	 remember	 that	
when	 Foucault	 coins	 the	 term	 “biopolitics”	 for	 the	 first	 time,26	he	 is	 giving	 a	
lecture	on	social	medicine	at	 the	State	university	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 in	October	
1974	and	contextualizes	it	in	those	terms:	
What	I	maintain	is	that,	with	capitalism,	we	did	not	go	from	a	collective	
medicine	 to	 a	 private	 medicine.	 Exactly	 the	 opposite	 occurred:	
capitalism,	which	developed	from	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century	to	
the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 started	 by	 socializing	 a	 first	
object,	 the	 body,	 as	 a	 factor	 of	 productive	 force,	 of	 labor	 power.	
Society’s	 control	 over	 individuals	was	 accomplished	 not	 only	 through	
consciousness	or	ideology	but	also	in	the	body	and	with	the	body.	For	
capitalist	 society,	 it	 was	 biopolitics,	 the	 biological,	 the	 somatic,	 the	
corporal,	 that	 mattered	 more	 than	 anything	 else.	 The	 body	 is	 a	
biopolitical	reality,	medicine	is	a	biopolitical	strategy.	(Foucault:	2000b,	
136-137)		
	
                                                
26	According	to	Antonella	Cutro,	the	term	biopolitics	was	not	originally	coined	by	Foucault.	It	is	
first	found	in	Morley	Roberts’	Bio-politics.	An	essay	on	the	physiology,	pathology	and	politics	of	
social	and	somatic	organisms	and	designates	an	attempt	to	understand	how	biological	knowledge	
may	be	used	to	influence	and	act	upon	social	phenomena	(Cutro:	2010,	59).		
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This	 quotation	 shows	 that,	 from	 the	 earliest	 stage,	 the	 concept	 of	 biopolitics	
works	at	the	level	of	the	biological,	the	somatic	and	the	corporal.	However,	those	
three	terms	do	not	refer	to	natural	life	as	such	but	always	already	to	its	modern,	
scientific	and	positive	understanding.	Unlike	Catherine	Malabou,	who,	in	a	recent	
lecture,27	criticized	the	vagueness	of	such	a	lexical	alignment	as	a	failure	to	“go	
beyond”	 the	 political	 paradigm	 of	modernity,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 specific	 lexical	
choice	translates	the	presence	of	a	different	problem.	Between	the	“spectacle	of	
the	scaffold”	found	in	Discipline	and	Punish,	which	epitomizes	the	power	of	the	
King	over	the	body	of	the	condemned	and	over	the	body	as	“bio-political	reality”,	
my	claim	 is	 that	 the	biological	and	 the	somatic	point	 towards	another	kind	of	
power	over	bodies	than	the	one	at	stake	with	sovereign	power.	The	biological	
and	the	somatic,	as	products	of	modern	science,	medicine	and	psychoanalysis	are	
first	of	all	products	of	the	grasp	of	life	within	the	field	of	knowledge	whereby	the	
empirical	existence	of	men	as	 living	beings	 is	 turned	 into	 its	possible	scientific	
representation.	 I	 claim	 that	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 share	 a	 historical	
specificity:	they	find	themselves	within	the	modern	episteme	whereby,	to	use	a	
phrase	 from	The	Birth	of	 the	Clinic,	 the	 individual	becomes	both	 “subject	 and	
object	of	his	own	knowledge”	(Foucault:	2003a,	244).28	 	
                                                
27 This	 lecture	 is	 entitled	 “A	 Critique	 of	 Foucault”	 and	 is	 available	 at	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6OUbWHqXO2E	(accessed	on	29th	July	2015).	
28	As	Philippe	Hauser	puts	it	in	his	essay	“Anti-Humanisme	et	Mort	de	l’Homme	chez	le	Premier	
Foucault”:	“[i]n	his	Archaeology	of	human	sciences	(The	Order	of	Things,	1966),	Foucault	explores	
both	the	ground	on	which	lies	our	modern	culture	and	the	positive	knowledge	which	developed	
on	it,	whilst	posing	the	fundamental	problem	[…]	of	the	possibility	of	an	‘authentic’	knowledge	of	
man	 –	 whose	 impossibility	 he	 will	 precisely	 demonstrate	 […].”	 [“Dans	 son	 Archéologie	 des	
sciences	humaines	(Les	Mots	et	les	Chose,	1966)	Foucault	explore	à	la	fois	le	fond	sur	lequel	repose	
notre	 culture	 moderne	 et	 le	 savoir	 positif	 qui	 s’y	 est	 développé,	 tout	 en	 posant	 le	 problème	
fondamental	[…]	de	la	possibilité	d’une	connaissance	‘authentique’	de	l’homme	–	dont	il	montrera	
précisément	la	radicale	impossibilité	[…].”	(Hauser:	2005,	63).		
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In	contrast	to	Agamben’s	thesis,	 I	am	arguing	that	Foucault’s	concern	with	the	
mutation	 from	 sovereign	 power	 to	 bio-power	 is	 actually	 nourished	 by	 the	
underlying	question	of	 the	mutation	of	 jurisdiction.	This	question	 interrogates	
the	 historicity	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 truth	 which	 links	 the	 modern	 concept	 of	
“biological	life”	to	the	idea	of	a	true	nature.	This	question	of	jurisdiction,	which	
addresses	 the	historical	mutation	of	 the	 relationship	between	political	power,	
truth	and	knowledge,	 is	what	allows	one	 to	 identify	 the	rupture	 that	emerges	
after	the	Classical	episteme.	Such	a	rupture,	according	to	which	“the	law	operates	
more	and	more	as	a	norm”	 (Foucault:	1998d,	144),	disqualifies	 the	 law	of	 the	
sovereign	as	what	puts	the	world	into	order.	Rather,	it	is	the	concept	of	natural	
rule,	which	implies	an	epistemological	correspondence	between	the	immanent	
existence	of	the	modern	subject	and	the	positivity	of	scientific	knowledge,	which	
defines	the	framework	within	which	modern	politics	operate.29	As	François	Ewald	
clearly	argues	in	his	article	entitled	“Norms,	Discipline	and	the	Law”:	
Foucault	does	not	mean	to	suggest	here	that	the	development	of	bio-
power	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 decline	 of	 law.	 His	 further	 commentary	
makes	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 normalizing	 society	 in	 no	way	
diminished	the	power	of	law	or	caused	judicial	institutions	to	disappear.	
In	 fact,	 normalization	 tends	 to	 be	 accompanied	 by	 an	 astonishing	
proliferation	 of	 legislation.	 Practically	 speaking,	 legislators	 never	
expressed	 themselves	as	 freely	or	as	extensively	as	 in	 the	age	of	bio-
power.	The	norm,	then,	is	opposed	not	to	law	itself	but	to	what	Foucault	
would	call	“the	 juridical”:	 the	 institution	of	 law	as	the	expression	of	a	
sovereign’s	power.	 If,	as	Foucault	puts	 it,	“the	law	cannot	help	but	be	
armed”,	and	if	its	weapon	par	excellence	is	death,	this	equation	of	law	
and	death	does	not	derive	from	the	essential	character	of	the	law.	Law	
                                                
29 	As	 Mika	 Ojakangas	 puts	 it	 in	 his	 essay	 “Impossible	 Dialogue	 on	 Bio-power.	 Agamben	 and	
Foucault”:	“This	does	not	mean	that	the	law	has	faded	into	the	background	or	that	institutions	of	
justice	have	disappeared,	but	rather	that	the	law	operates	more	and	more	as	a	tool	of	bio-power,	
that	 is,	 as	a	 technique	 the	 task	of	which	 is	 to	 regulate	and	correct	 the	development	of	 life	 in	
general”	(Ojakangas:	2005,	15).	
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can	 also	 function	 by	 formulating	 norms,	 thus	 becoming	 part	 of	 a	
different	 sort	 of	 power	 that	 “has	 to	 qualify,	 measure,	 appraise,	 and	
hierarchize	rather	than	display	itself	in	its	murderous	splendor.”	In	the	
age	 of	 bio-power,	 the	 juridical,	which	 characterized	monarchical	 law,	
can	readily	be	opposed	to	the	normative,	which	comes	to	the	fore	most	
typically	in	constitutions,	legal	codes,	and	the	constant	and	clamorous	
activity	of	the	legislature.”	(Ewald:	1990,	138)	
	
If	the	judicial	does	not	disappear	from	the	economy	of	bio-power	and	if	death	is	
not	 an	 essential	 consequence	 of	 the	 law,	 then	 it	 means	 that	 law	 functions	
differently	in	modernity	than	“the	expression	of	a	sovereign’s	power”,	which	was	
essentially	deadly.	Ewald	brings	to	the	fore	the	shift	from	a	judicial	paradigm	of	
political	power,	which	coincides	with	the	sovereign’s	expression	of	the	law,	to	the	
normative	paradigm,	which	gets	articulated	upon	the	“continuum	of	apparatuses	
(medical,	 administrative,	 and	 so	 on)	 whose	 functions	 are	 for	 the	 most	 part	
regulatory”	and	“effects	distributions	around	the	norm”	(Foucault:	1998d,	144).	
This	distribution	is	however	only	possible	once	the	modern	subject	has	been	at	
the	same	time	abstracted	as	a	knowable	object	and	therefore	alienated	from	the	
strict	immanence	of	its	individual	existence.	Contrary	to	Agamben,	who	grounds	
his	account	of	biopolitical	power	upon	a	ready-to-use	concept	of	“biological	life”,	
my	aim	is	to	question	the	concepts	of	“natural”	and	“biological”	which	are	used	
in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	to	qualify	the	shift	from	sovereign	
power	to	bio-power.	This	shift	is	from	a	form	of	power	centred	on	the	law	of	the	
sovereign	that	puts	death	at	the	centre	of	its	manifestation,	to	a	form	of	power	
centred	 around	 the	 norm	 for	 which	 death	 corresponds	 to	 what	 escapes	 the	
possible	administration	of	life.		
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Agamben’s	failure	to	grasp	the	radical	historicization	of	sovereign	power	at	the	
basis	of	Foucault’s	diagnosis	of	the	emergence	of	biopolitical	modernity	 forces	
him	to	erect	the	main	concepts	which	allow	him	to	articulate	his	demonstration	
as	 transcendental	 conditions	 of	 politics:	 sovereign	 power	 and	 bare	 life.	
Agamben’s	reading	of	Foucault’s	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	
Sexuality	produces	a	conceptual	conflation	of	the	concepts	of	nature	and	biology.	
Whilst	 Agamben	 believes	 they	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 reality,	 Foucault	 clearly	
underlines	a	distinction	proceeding	from	the	specificity	of	the	modern	episteme.	
What	biology	means	since	the	nineteenth	century	corresponds	to	the	inclusion	of	
individuals	 in	 an	 epistemic	 configuration	 that	 turn	 them	 into	 objects	 of	
knowledge.	The	shift	from	life	understood	as	concrete	and	immanent	individual	
existence	to	political	strategies	regulating	and	policing	the	lives	of	populations	is	
the	crucial	distinction	Agamben	misses	when	he	links	sovereign	power	and	bare	
life	to	a	metaphysical	definition	of	politics	which	ignores	the	temporal	dimension	
of	life	itself	within	which	individual	existences	get	normalized.	It	is,	according	to	
Agamben,	the	sovereign	decision	which	produces	the	distinction	between	what	
he	calls	nomos	(the	space	within	which	life	is	subjected	to	the	sovereign	law)	and	
phusis	(a	so-called	“natural”	space	where	life	escapes	the	sovereign	law	and	is	left	
“bare”).	Bare	life	is	therefore	nothing	else	than	the	life	which	has	been	excluded	
from	the	sovereign	law,	but	the	originality	of	Agamben’s	argument	is	to	claim	that	
the	exclusion	of	bare	life	from	the	polis	corresponds	to	a	state	of	exception	which	
proceeds	from	the	sovereign	decision	(Agamben:	1998,	12).	He	writes:	
The	“sovereign”	structure	of	the	law,	its	peculiar	and	original	"force",	has	
the	 form	 of	 a	 state	 of	 exception	 in	 which	 fact	 and	 law	 are	
indistinguishable	(yet	must,	nevertheless,	be	decided	on).	Life,	which	is	
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thus	obliged,	can	in	the	last	instance	be	implicated	in	the	sphere	of	law	
only	 through	 the	 presupposition	 of	 its	 inclusive	 exclusion,	 only	 in	 an	
exceptio.	There	is	a	 limit-figure	of	 life,	a	threshold	in	which	life	is	both	
inside	and	outside	the	juridical	order,	and	the	threshold	is	the	place	of	
sovereignty.	(Agamben:	1998,	22)	
	
Agamben’s	distinction	between	zoe	and	bios	merely	constitutes	the	first	step	of	a	
logic	which	grants	bio-power	and	biopolitics	the	status	of	a	de-historicized	reality.	
Ultimately,	the	fact	according	to	which	the	emergence	of	bio-power	corresponds	
to	a	new	distribution	of	natural	and	political	life	(hence	the	incorporation	of	a	so-
called	“natural”	life	within	the	political	sphere)	only	serves	to	prove	the	grounding	
position	of	the	sovereign	who	decides	upon	the	inclusion	or	the	exclusion	of	bare	
life	in	or	from	the	polis.	The	concept	of	life	Agamben	designates	here	corresponds	
to	a	notion	of	“unqualified”	life	opposed	to	the	qualified	life	which	corresponds	
to	bios.	 In	 the	 introduction	of	Homo	Sacer:	 Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	he	
writes:	
The	Greeks	had	no	single	term	to	express	what	we	mean	by	the	word	
“life”.	 They	 used	 two	 terms	 that,	 although	 traceable	 to	 a	 common	
etymological	 root,	 are	 semantically	 and	morphologically	 distinct:	 zoe,	
which	 expressed	 the	 simple	 fact	 of	 living	 common	 to	 all	 living	 beings	
(animals,	men,	or	gods),	and	bios,	which	 indicated	the	form	or	way	of	
living	proper	 to	 an	 individual	 or	 a	 group.	When	Plato	mentions	 three	
kinds	 of	 life	 in	 the	 Philebus,	 and	 when	 Aristotle	 distinguishes	 the	
contemplative	life	of	the	philosopher	(bios	theoretikos)	from	the	life	of	
pleasure	 (bios	apolaustikos)	and	the	political	 life	 (bios	politikos)	 in	 the	
Nicomachean	Ethics,	neither	philosopher	would	ever	have	used	the	term	
zoe	 (which	 in	Greek,	 significantly	 enough,	 lacks	 a	 plural).	 This	 follows	
from	the	simple	fact	that	what	was	at	issue	for	both	thinkers	was	not	at	
all	simple	natural	life	but	rather	a	qualified	life,	a	particular	way	of	life.	
(Agamben:	1998,	9)	
	
Following	 Agamben’s	 argument,	 we	 see	 that	 the	 unqualified	 “bare”	 life	 he	
designates	corresponds	to	the	Greek	zoe,	expressing	in	his	words	“the	simple	fact	
of	living	common	to	all	living	beings”.	This	means	that	the	sovereign’s	ability	to	
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trace	the	threshold	between	bare	life	and	political	life	corresponds	to	his	ability	
to	 expose	 the	 fundamental	 zoe	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 any	 human	 being’s	 existence.	
However,	the	gesture	which	consists	in	positing	zoe	or	“natural	life”	as	the	basis	
over	which	an	ahistorical	form	of	sovereign	power	is	exerted	clearly	ignores	the	
historicization	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 present	 in	 Foucault’s	 description	 of	 the	
modern	episteme.	Judith	Revel	writes:	
As	for	bare	life,	the	concept	seems	to	allude	to	something	on	which	life	
understood	as	a	historico-social	construction	would	be	founded,	some	
sort	 of	 primal	 nucleus	or	 primordial	 stratum,	which	Agamben	defines	
exactly	as	the	reduction	of	bios	to	zoe.	Yet,	even	the	way	in	which	one	
attempts	 to	 think	biology	 –	 or	 “nature”	 in	 general	 –	 does	 not	 escape	
history,	that	is,	a	cultural	construction.	It	is	sufficient	to	recall	Foucault’s	
work	on	the	natural	sciences	in	the	1960s,	for	instance	in	The	Order	of	
Things,	or	to	more	recent	analyses	of	the	way	in	which	the	opposition	
between	nature	and	culture,	so	fundamental	in	anthropology,	is	in	fact	
ripe	 for	 an	 anthropological	 deconstruction.	 In	 short,	 the	 idea	 of	
“biological	life”	is	no	more	able	than	the	idea	of	“nature”	to	save	us	the	
trouble	 of	 a	 spatial,	 temporal,	 and	 cultural	 contextualization.	 (Revel:	
2014,	121)		
	
	As	she	rightly	claims,	the	postulate	which	claims	that	zoe,	nature,	and	biological	
life	refer	to	the	same	historical	reality	fails	to	grasp	the	epistemological	specificity	
of	anthropological	discourse.	The	historicity	of	the	relationship	between	power	
and	life	Foucault	identifies	throughout	his	work	forces	the	deconstruction	of	such	
concepts	and	implies	that	one	puts	into	question	the	epistemological	shift	which	
allows	 the	modern	superimposition	of	 concrete	 individual	existence,	biological	
life	and	human	nature.30	
	
                                                
30	As	Foucault	clearly	states	during	his	conversation	with	Noam	Chomsky	on	Dutch	television	in	
1971,	“the	notion	of	 life	 is	not	a	scientific	concept;	 it	has	been	an	epistemological	 indicator	of	
which	the	classifying,	delimiting,	and	other	functions	had	an	effect	on	scientific	discussions,	and	
not	on	what	they	were	talking	about”	(Chomsky	&	Foucault:	2006,	6).	This	means	that	the	concept	
of	life	can	never	refer	in	itself	to	an	immanent	and	concrete	reality	but	is	always	already	the	effect	
of	an	epistemological	construction.	Therefore,	there	can	be	“bare”	or	“natural”	life	as	such.		
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4.	The	natural	rule:	the	product	of	a	new	relationship	between	power	and	
knowledge	
	
The	 question	 brought	 forward	 by	 Foucault’s	 reflection	 on	 modern	 racism	 –	
expressed	 as	 the	 “battle	 for	 existence”	 no	 longer	 relies	 on	 the	 law	 of	 the	
sovereign	but	upon	the	nature	of	life	based	upon	the	concept	of	norm.	This	idea,	
already	expressed	by	Foucault	in	the	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	History	
of	 Sexuality,	 corresponds	 to	 the	 move	 from	 “the	 juridical	 existence	 of	
sovereignty”	to	“the	biological	existence	of	a	population”	(Foucault:	1998d,	137).	
As	Foucault	puts	it	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality:	
The	law	always	refers	to	the	sword.	But	a	power	whose	task	is	to	take	
charge	of	life	needs	continuous	regulatory	and	corrective	mechanisms.	
It	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 matter	 of	 bringing	 death	 into	 play	 in	 the	 field	 of	
sovereignty,	 but	 of	 distributing	 the	 living	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 value	 and	
utility.	Such	a	power	has	to	qualify,	measure,	appraise,	and	hierarchize,	
rather	than	display	itself	in	its	murderous	splendour;	it	does	not	have	to	
draw	 a	 line	 that	 separates	 the	 enemies	 of	 the	 sovereign	 from	 his	
obedient	 subjects;	 it	 effects	 distributions	 around	 the	 norm.	 I	 do	 not	
mean	 to	 say	 that	 the	 law	 fades	 into	 the	 background	 or	 that	 the	
institutions	of	justice	tend	to	disappear,	but	rather	that	the	law	operates	
more	and	more	as	a	norm,	and	that	the	judicial	institution	is	increasingly	
incorporated	into	a	continuum	of	apparatuses	(medical,	administrative,	
and	 so	 on)	 whose	 functions	 are	 for	 the	 most	 part	 regulatory.	 A	
normalizing	society	is	the	historical	outcome	of	a	technology	of	power	
centered	on	life.	(Foucault:	1998d,	144)	
	
Foucault’s	insistence	on	the	shift	from	a	power	based	upon	the	law,	to	a	power	
centred	on	the	norm	shows	that	as	soon	as	political	power	produces	a	technology	
which	 targets	 life	 (that	 is	 a	 technology	 aiming	 at	 the	 administration	 of	 the	
existence	of	individuals	and	the	evolution	of	the	population),	the	law	becomes	
secondary	and	gets	incorporated	within	a	form	of	power	which	“operates	more	
and	more	as	a	norm”.	This	means	that	as	soon	as	life	becomes	the	object	of	a	
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political	 technology,	 it	 is	 through	normalization	 that	 it	becomes	administrable	
and	regulated.	The	origin	of	such	a	regulation	is	no	longer	the	violent	expression	
of	the	law	of	the	sovereign	but	the	validity	of	the	normal	with	regard	to	scientific	
truth.	As	Judith	Revel	puts	it	in	her	essay	“Identity,	Nature,	Life.	Three	Biopolitical	
Deconstructions”:	
This	idea	of	norm	no	longer	corresponds	to	the	old	juridical	rule	as	the	
expression	of	a	sovereign	will,	but	to	a	natural	rule	(or	one	presumed	to	
be	natural)	applied	to	homogenous	groups,	which	are	in	turn	defined	on	
the	basis	of	several	common	traits	that	are	presented	as	“natural”,	and	
on	 the	basis	of	which	 it	 is	possible	 to	construct	a	social	 clinic.	 (Revel:	
2014,	115)	
	
Revel	 states	 the	 point	 clearly:	 in	 order	 for	 the	 norm	 to	 appear	 as	 a	 rule	 and	
replace	 the	 sovereign	will,	 it	must	 be	 based	 upon	 a	 concept	 of	 nature	which	
emerges	historically.	If	this	concept	is	“one	presumed	to	be	natural”,	it	is	because	
it	is	a	concept	which	implies	a	new	relationship	between	political	power	and	life.	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 paradigm	 of	 Medieval	 sovereign	 power	 which	 targets	 the	
persistence	of	the	cosmological	order	of	the	imperium,	the	“social	clinic”	which	
emerges	in	the	nineteenth	century	goes	hand-in-hand	with	the	emergence	of	the	
population	as	a	political	concern.	What	matters	is	no	longer	the	defence	of	the	
territory	but	 the	defence	of	 the	biological	nature	of	 the	population	which,	by	
extension,	may	serve	as	the	conceptual	basis	for	the	defence	of	the	true	race.	
The	concept	of	norm	which	implies	the	underlying	truth	of	nature	relies	upon	the	
anthropological	 objectification	 of	 the	 existence	 of	man	 into	 forms	 of	 positive	
scientific	knowledge.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	concept	of	norm	is,	for	Foucault,	
linked	 to	 a	 specific	 historical	 epoch	 and	 episteme	 and	 cannot	 be	 used,	 as	
Agamben	does	 in	chapter	7	of	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	 to	
 82 
designate	the	political	sphere	defined	by	the	sovereign	decision	(Agamben:	1998,	
95-101).	Although	it	is	Agamben’s	right	to	define	and	use	the	concept	of	norm	in	
his	own	way,	it	is	a	philosophical	and	hermeneutic	mistake	to	presuppose,	as	he	
does,	that	the	concept	of	nature	associated	with	bare	life	is	of	the	same	kind	as	
the	 concept	 of	 nature	 used	 by	 Foucault	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 The	 History	 of	
Sexuality.	For	Foucault,	there	 is	no	such	thing	as	“bare	 life”,	but	only	different	
relationships	between	political	power	and	life.		
	
In	this	respect,	Revel	tells	us	that	when	Foucault	starts	using	the	concept	of	norm	
in	1976,	it	does	not	describe	the	relationship	between	the	power	of	the	sovereign	
and	the	life	of	his	subject	which	persists	but	the	relationship	between	scientific	
knowledge	and	the	existence	of	individuals	which	emerges.	As	Revel	puts	it:		
Starting	in	the	1970s,	Foucault	develops	a	double	analysis	of	the	way	in	
which	men	and	women	are	simultaneously	“objectivized”	in	knowledges	
and	practices,	in	discourses	and	strategies,	which	is	to	say	everywhere	
and	 by	 all	 possible	 means	 assigned	 to	 an	 identity	 that	 proves	 their	
inclusion	in	the	system.	This	double	analysis	focuses,	on	one	side,	on	the	
governing	 of	 singularities	 through	 the	 production	 of	 the	 “individual”,	
and,	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 on	 the	 government	 of	 masses	 of	 such	
“individuals”	 through	 the	 production	 of	 equally	 objectivized	 and	
identitary	 “homogenous	 populations”.	 Beginning	 with	 Discipline	 and	
Punish,	this	analytic	division	of	labour	is	evident	–	I	refer,	for	example,	
to	the	extraordinary	pages	dedicated	to	the	functioning	of	the	maritime	
hospital,	 or	 more	 generally	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 “productive	 placement”	
(emplacement	productif).	Still,	in	Discipline	and	Punish	the	discourse	on	
“populations”	 is	 not	 pursued	 to	 its	 ultimate	 conclusions	 because	 it	 is	
missing	a	concept	that	would	be	able	to	account	for	both	the	production	
and	 the	 identification	 of	 a	 population	 as	 well	 as	 for	 its	 political	
management.	Foucault	is	still	lacking	the	concept	of	the	norm	as	a	new	
instrument	 of	 governmental	 technology	 which	 only	 makes	 its	
appearance	with	his	formulation	of	biopolitics.	(Revel:	2014,	115)	
	
The	 concept	 of	 norm	 allows	 Foucault	 to	 account	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	
governmental	 practices	 specifically	 linked	 to	 biopolitics,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 in	
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correlation	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 population	 that	 serves	 to	 account	 for	 the	
production,	identification	and	political	management	of	groups	of	individuals.	The	
use	of	these	terms	reveals	that	the	idea	according	to	which	a	group	of	people	
named	“population”	intrinsically	manifests	a	natural	rule	does	not	correspond	to	
a	pre-given	ontological	truth	but	is	the	product	of	the	evolution	of	governmental	
practices	 that	 Foucault	 attempts	 to	 describe.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Foucault’s	
characterization	of	biopolitics	in	the	14th	January	1976	lecture	from	Society	Must	
Be	Defended	makes	more	specific	Revel’s	account	of	the	difference	between	the	
law	 of	 the	 sovereign	 and	 the	 epistemological	 framework	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics.	He	says	that:	
The	discourse	of	discipline	 is	alien	to	that	of	the	 law;	 it	 is	alien	to	the	
discourse	that	makes	rules	a	product	of	the	will	of	the	sovereign.	The	
discourse	of	disciplines	is	about	a	rule:	not	a	juridical	rule	derived	from	
sovereignty,	but	a	discourse	about	a	natural	rule,	or	in	other	words,	a	
norm.	 Disciplines	 will	 define	 not	 a	 code	 of	 law,	 but	 a	 code	 of	
normalization,	 and	 they	will	 necessarily	 refer	 to	 a	 theoretical	 horizon	
that	is	not	the	edifice	of	the	law,	but	the	edifice	of	human	sciences.	And	
the	jurisprudence	of	these	disciplines	will	be	that	of	clinical	knowledge.	
(Foucault:	2003a,	38)	
	
According	 to	 this	quotation,	disciplines	are	already	 the	product	of	a	discourse	
heterogeneous	to	that	of	the	law:	they	are	not	the	expression	of	the	will	of	the	
sovereign.	The	“theoretical	horizon”	of	such	a	discourse	(its	foundation	in	truth)	
does	 not	 proceed	 from	 the	 timeless	 and	 transcendental	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
sovereign	 but	 from	 human	 sciences,	 hence	 from	 a	 historical	 change	 of	 the	
relationship	between	power	and	knowledge	which	emerges	 in	 the	nineteenth	
century.		
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Failure	to	acknowledge	the	mutation	of	the	relationship	between	political	power	
and	life	which	characterizes	the	shift	from	sovereign	power	to	bio-power	has	led	
Agamben	 to	 misconstrue	 Foucault’s	 problematization	 of	 the	 historical	
withdrawal	of	sovereign	power	and	the	emergence	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	
in	 such	 a	way	 that	 his	 conclusions	 end	 up	 at	 best	 contradicting	 and	 at	worst	
completely	 covering-up	 the	 originality	 of	 Foucault’s	 characterization	 of	 the	
modern	episteme	at	work	as	early	as	1966	in	The	Order	of	Things.31	The	Classical	
Age	introduces	a	gap	between	words	and	things	as	soon	as	discourse	no	longer	
corresponds	 to	 the	ordering	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	but	 to	 the	 knowledge	of	
men.	 Whereas	 the	 mythical	 language	 of	 cosmological	 foundations	 from	 the	
Middle	 Ages	 or	 the	 language	 of	 similitudes	 from	 the	 Renaissance	 did	 not	
disqualify	the	materiality	of	discourse	as	an	act	which	bears	the	concrete	reality	
of	the	world	in	its	very	expression,	the	kind	of	discourse	starting	with	the	Classical	
Age	 inaugurates	 signification:	 anthropological	 knowledge	 presupposes	 a	
rationality	which	pre-exists	 the	 strict	materiality	 of	 discourse.	 In	The	Order	 of	
Things,	 Foucault	 insists	 on	 a	 pre-Classical	 mode	 of	 thought	 which	 does	 not	
establish	a	strict	distribution	and	heterogeneity	between	“the	seen	and	the	read”	
or	“the	visible	and	the	expressible”	(Foucault:	2001e,	47).	The	absence	of	such	a	
distinction,	or	the	possibility	according	to	which	the	visible	and	the	expressible	
                                                
31	Jacques	Derrida	who,	 in	The	Beast	and	 the	Sovereign	 (Derrida:	2009,	305-334),	 attempts	 to	
provide	a	critique	of	Agamben’s	account	of	biopolitical	modernity	during	the	20th	March	2002	
lecture,	 also	 misses	 Foucault’s	 point.	 Even	 if	 he	 too	 recognizes	 a	 historical	 specificity	 and	
modernity	to	the	form	of	political	power	which	emerges	with	the	19th	century,	his	attempt	to	
bring	back	the	question	of	bio-power	to	the	political	status	of	animality	prevents	him	from	seeing	
that	the	anthropological	episteme,	because	it	concerns	the	move	by	which	the	modern	subject	
becomes	the	object	of	his	own	knowledge,	cannot	concern	the	concept	of	animality.	Referring	to	
the	 “animality”	 of	 individuals	 amounts	 to	 failing	 to	 notice	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 animality	 itself	
belongs	to	the	anthropological	paradigm	of	modern	science.		
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constitute	 the	 same	 experience	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 same	 cosmological	 order	
without	mutual	exclusion	made	it	impossible	to	infer	meaning	beyond	that	which	
appears,	hence	beyond	the	act	of	meaning	itself.	At	the	end	of	the	fifth	part	of	
the	second	chapter,	Foucault	writes:	
The	profound	kinship	of	language	with	the	world	was	thus	dissolved.	The	
primacy	of	the	written	word	went	into	abeyance.	And	that	uniform	layer,	
in	which	 the	seen	 and	 the	 read,	 the	visible	and	 the	expressible,	were	
endlessly	 interwoven,	 vanished	 too.	 Things	 and	 words	 were	 to	 be	
separated	from	one	another.	The	eye	was	thenceforth	destined	to	see	
and	only	to	see,	the	ear	to	hear	and	only	to	hear.	Discourse	was	still	to	
have	 the	 task	 of	 speaking	 that	 which	 is,	 but	 it	 was	 no	 longer	 to	 be	
anything	 more	 than	 what	 it	 said.	 This	 involved	 an	 immense	
reorganization	of	culture,	a	reorganization	of	which	the	Classical	age	was	
the	first	and	perhaps	the	most	important	stage,	since	it	was	responsible	
for	 the	new	arrangement	 in	which	we	are	still	caught	–	since	 it	 is	 the	
Classical	age	that	separates	us	from	a	culture	in	which	the	signification	
of	signs	did	not	exist,	because	it	was	reabsorbed	into	the	sovereignty	of	
the	 Like;	 but	 in	 which	 their	 enigmatic,	 monotonous,	 stubborn,	 and	
primitive	being	shone	in	an	endless	dispersion.	(Foucault:	2001e,	47-48)	
	
The	epistemic	mutation	Foucault	describes	with	 the	Classical	Age	reconfigures	
entirely	the	role	of	 language	and	discourse.	 It	 is	no	 longer	the	expression	of	a	
reality	 which	 manifests	 its	 possibility	 through	 the	 materiality	 of	 its	 very	
expression	 (in	 the	 same	 fashion	 as	 the	 violent	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 both	
manifests	itself	and	the	possibility	of	its	order	upon	the	body	of	the	condemned),	
it	becomes	a	discourse	disconnected	 from	 its	materiality	which	 fundamentally	
lacks,	but	at	the	same	time	is	intrinsically	dependent	on,	the	object	it	represents.		
	
If	 the	 seen	 and	 the	 read,	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 “were	 endlessly	
interwoven”,	 it	 is	 because	 they	 constituted	 the	 same	 fabric	 and	expressed	 an	
infinite	order	organised	through	and	by	a	sovereign	law	of	which	they	both	were	
the	expression.	When	in	the	first	two	parts	of	the	second	chapter	of	The	Order	of	
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Things	–	“The	Prose	of	the	World”	–	Foucault	describes	the	relationship	between	
words	 and	 things	 during	 the	 Renaissance	 through	 what	 he	 calls	 “the	 four	
similitudes”,	he	describes	a	cosmological	order	whose	continuity	is	organised	by	
and	gets	resolved	in	the	figure	of	God:	
The	world	is	simply	the	universal	“convenience”	of	things;	there	are	the	
same	 number	 of	 fishes	 in	 the	water	 as	 there	 are	 animals,	 or	 objects	
produced	by	nature	or	man,	on	the	land	[…];	the	same	number	of	beings	
in	the	water	and	on	the	surface	of	the	earth	as	there	are	in	the	sky,	the	
inhabitants	of	 the	 former	corresponding	with	 those	of	 the	 latter;	and	
lastly,	there	are	the	same	number	of	beings	in	the	whole	of	creation	as	
may	 be	 found	 eminently	 contained	 in	 God	 himself,	 “the	 Sower	 of	
Existence,	of	Power,	of	Knowledge	and	of	Love”.	Thus,	by	this	linking	of	
resemblance	 with	 space,	 this	 “convenience”	 that	 brings	 like	 things	
together	and	makes	adjacent	things	similar,	the	world	is	linked	together	
like	a	chain.	At	each	point	of	contact	there	begins	and	ends	a	link	that	
resembles	the	one	before	it	and	the	one	after	it;	and	from	circle	to	circle,	
these	 similitudes	 continue,	 holding	 the	 extremes	 apart	 (God	 and	
matter),	yet	bringing	them	together	 in	such	a	way	that	the	will	of	the	
Almighty	may	penetrate	into	the	most	unawakened	corners.	(Foucault:	
2001e,	21)	
	
The	whole	order	of	similitudes	Foucault	describes	corresponds	to	a	cosmology	
within	which	every	element	is	in	relationship	to	another	along	an	architectonic	
continuity	 that	 does	 not	 exclude	 but	 absorbs	 its	 components	 into	 the	 divine	
eminence.	In	the	same	fashion,	the	cosmological	unity	found	in	convenientia	is	
repeated	in	the	second	form	of	similitude	(aemulatio):	
There	is	something	in	emulation	of	the	reflection	and	the	mirror:	it	is	the	
means	whereby	things	scattered	through	the	universe	can	answer	one	
another.	The	human	face,	from	afar,	emulates	the	sky,	and	just	as	man’s	
intellect	is	an	imperfect	reflection	of	God’s	wisdom,	so	his	two	eyes,	with	
their	limited	brightness,	are	a	reflection	of	the	vast	illumination	spread	
across	 the	 sky	 by	 sun	 and	moon,	 the	 mouth	 is	 Venus,	 since	 it	 gives	
passage	 to	 kisses	 and	 words	 of	 love;	 the	 nose	 provides	 an	 image	 in	
miniature	 of	 Jove’s	 sceptre	 and	 Mercury’s	 staff.	 The	 relation	 of	
emulation	enables	things	to	 imitate	one	another	from	one	end	of	the	
universe	 to	 the	other	without	connection	or	proximity:	by	duplicating	
itself	in	a	mirror	the	world	abolishes	the	distance	proper	to	it;	in	this	way	
it	 overcomes	 the	 place	 allotted	 to	 each	 things.	 But	 which	 of	 these	
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reflections	coursing	through	space	are	the	original	images?	Which	is	the	
reality	 and	 which	 the	 projection?	 It	 is	 often	 not	 possible	 to	 say,	 for	
emulation	is	a	sort	of	natural	twinship	existing	in	things,	it	arises	from	a	
fold	in	being,	the	two	sides	of	which	stand	immediately	opposite	to	one	
another.	(Foucault:	2001e,	22)	
	
Both	 convenientia	 and	 aemulatio,	 within	 the	 epistemic	 structure	 of	 the	
Renaissance,	show	a	world	within	which	the	knowledge	and	power	of	God	are	
neither	separated	nor	divorced	from	one	another	and	the	things	in	the	world	that	
are	their	expression.	If	the	order	of	emulation	“abolishes	the	distance	proper	to	
it	[the	universe]”,	 it	 is	because	the	visible	and	the	expressible	are	one	and	the	
same	stable	reality	whose	logic	lacks	nothing	but	the	possibility	of	its	own	self-
perpetuation.	 In	 this	 sense,	between	 the	sovereignty	of	 the	King	whose	order	
establishes	and	maintains	the	possibility	of	the	continuity	of	the	imperium,	the	
order	of	knowledge	proper	to	the	Middle	Ages	and	to	the	Renaissance	manifests	
an	order	which,	in	the	same	fashion,	remains	identical	and	perpetuates	itself.	As	
Foucault	puts	it:	
The	whole	volume	of	the	world,	all	the	adjacencies	of	“convenience”,	all	
the	 echoes	 of	 emulation,	 all	 the	 linkages	 of	 analogy,	 are	 supported,	
maintained,	 and	 doubled	 by	 this	 space	 governed	 by	 sympathy	 and	
antipathy,	which	 are	 ceaselessly	 drawing	 things	 together	 and	 holding	
them	 apart.	 By	 means	 of	 this	 interplay,	 the	 world	 remains	 identical,	
resemblances	 continue	 to	 be	 what	 they	 are,	 and	 to	 resemble	 one	
another.	 The	 same	 remains	 the	 same,	 riveted	 onto	 itself.	 (Foucault:	
2001e,	28)	
	
The	cosmological	order	of	the	Renaissance	assigns	a	function	to	language	which	
is	different	from	the	discourse	of	anthropological	knowledge.	This	language	does	
not	establish	a	signifying	relationship	(and	rupture)	between	the	signifier	and	the	
signified:	it	is	not	a	discourse	which	signifies	what	the	world	is;	it	is	an	intrinsic	
part	of	 a	world	whose	harmony	passes	 through	 it	 as	 it	passes	 through	all	 the	
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things	subjected	to	the	divine	law.	As	Olivier	Dekens	clearly	puts	it	in	his	Michel	
Foucault:32	
Hence,	language	is	immediately	given	a	function	and	a	mission:	to	be	
the	 vehicle	 of	 the	 harmony	 of	 the	 world,	 which	 it	 says	 without	
accomplishing	it	but	which	reveals	itself	only	through	it.	It	[language]	
is	not	yet	this	this	homogenous	mirror	of	things,	this	arbitrary	system	
which	signifies	nothing	by	itself,	entirely	subjected	to	the	meaning	a	
thinking	subject	will	give	to	it.	The	discourse	of	man	is	always,	under	a	
form	 which	 remains	 mysterious	 and	 opaque,	 the	 discourse	 of	 God	
signing	his	oeuvre.	A	miraculous	configuration	where	works	and	things	
together	 speak	 the	 beauty	 of	 the	 world;	 a	 harmony	 which	 will	
disappear	in	the	seventeenth	century	[…](Dekens:	2011,	145)	
	
Whilst	 the	 logic	 of	 similitudes	 organising	 the	 epistemic	 configuration	 of	 the	
Renaissance	obey	a	 language	whose	expression	cannot	be	separated	from	the	
world	 and	 the	 divine	 order	 corresponding	 to	 it,	 the	 epistemic	 rupture	 the	
Classical	Age	introduces	asks	a	different	question.	Once	the	law	of	the	sovereign	
disappears	at	the	foundation	of	the	order	of	the	Kingdom,	once	the	law	of	the	
King	is	no	longer	a	mirror	of	the	divine	law	which	holds	the	world	within	the	order	
of	similitude,	or	once	the	divine	 law	 is	no	 longer	what	can	save	the	terrestrial	
sovereign	 order	 from	 the	 threat	 of	 disappearance,	 that	which	 constitutes	 the	
ground	of	experience	disappears	and	the	place	of	the	King	is	left	vacant.		
	
The	historical	emergence	of	a	distance	between	the	seen	and	the	said	or	–	to	put	
it	differently	–	the	emergence	of	language	as	an	object	that	intrinsically	lacks	its	
                                                
32	“Le	langage	est	donc	immédiatement	chargé	d’une	fonction	et	d’une	mission	:	être	le	véhicule	
de	l’harmonie	du	monde,	qu’il	dit	sans	faire,	mais	qui	ne	se	révèle	que	par	lui.	Il	n’est	pas	encore	
ce	miroir	homogène	des	choses,	ce	système	arbitraire	qui	ne	signifie	rien	en	lui-même,	tout	entier	
soumis	à	ce	qu’un	sujet	pensant	va	lui	donner	à	dire.	Le	discours	de	l’homme	est	toujours,	sous	
une	 forme	 demeurant	 mystérieuse	 et	 opaque,	 le	 discours	 de	 Dieu	 signant	 son	 oeuvre.	
Configuration	miraculeuse,	 où	 les	mots	 et	 les	 choses	 disent	 ensemble	 la	 beauté	 du	monde	 ;	
harmonie	qui	disparaît,	au	XVIIe	siècle	[…].”	
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object,	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 political	 sovereign	
power	 itself.	 The	 sovereign’s	 power	 to	 hold	 together	 the	 existence	 of	 things	
within	a	harmonious	and	stable	order,	an	order	within	which	God	is	“‘the	Sower	
of	Existence,	of	Power,	of	Knowledge	and	of	Love’”	(Foucault:	2001e,	21)	–	an	
order	where	what	exists	and	what	can	be	known	are	therefore	not	separated	–	
disappears	and	the	place	of	the	sovereign	becomes	vacant.	The	question	of	the	
vacancy	of	the	place	of	the	sovereign	constitutes	the	central	problem	that	occurs	
with	 the	 shift	 from	 sovereign	 power	 to	 bio-power:	 it	 is	 the	 question	 of	 the	
possibility	of	 articulating	 the	 lived	experience	of	 human	beings	 to	 a	discourse	
which	 attempts	 to	 grasp	 it	 scientifically. 33 	In	 this	 respect,	 the	 possibility	 of	
extracting	a	“natural	rule”	from	the	lives	of	individuals	asks	in	its	own	way	the	
question	of	 the	possible	correspondence	between	the	discourse	of	knowledge	
and	the	things	it	describes.34	It	is	not	by	accident	that	Judith	Revel	insists	on	the	
fact	that	the	natural	rule	is	“one	presumed	to	be	natural”	(Revel:	2014,	115).	To	
presume	that	it	is	possible	to	speak	a	discourse	targeting	the	nature	of	individuals	
amounts	to	bridging	the	gap	introduced	by	the	epistemic	rupture	of	the	Classical	
Age.	It	is	a	gap	which,	since	the	Cartesian	cogito,	confers	the	role	of	the	synthesis	
                                                
33	As	Philippe	Sabot	puts	it	in	Lire	Les	Mots	et	les	Choses	de	Michel	Foucault,	human	sciences	are	
“negative	 sciences”	 [“sciences	 négatives”]	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 negative	 theology	 [“théologie	
négative”]:	 they	 are	 sciences	without	 concrete	 object	 because	 the	 object	 which	 founds	 their	
positivity	(the	immanent	life	of	men)	cannot	be	positively	described	without	relying	upon	a	fixed	
form	of	finitude	which	is	in	itself	absent	from	immanent	experience	(Sabot:	2006,	155).	
34	As	Foucault	puts	it	in	chapter	4	of	The	Order	of	Things,	“[t]he	law	of	nature	is	constituted	by	the	
difference	 between	words	 and	 things	 –	 the	 vertical	 division	 between	 language	 and	 that	 lying	
beneath	 it	 which	 it	 is	 the	 task	 of	 language	 to	 designate”.	 This	 difference	 and	 heterogeneity	
between	words	and	things,	which	emerges	with	the	modern	episteme,	will	find	the	possibility	of	
a	 new	 synthesis	 in	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 modern	 subject.	 Anthropological	 knowledge	 therefore	
initiates	 a	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 from	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 sovereign	 to	 the	 one	of	 the	modern	
subject	become	object	of	knowledge	(Foucault:	2001e,	118).  
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of	 experience	 (the	 synthesis	 of	 what	 is	 perceived	 and	what	 is	 known)	 to	 the	
primacy	of	the	subject	of	knowledge.35	
	
Therefore,	my	claim	is	that	Agamben,	who	understands	the	concept	of	natural	
life	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 transcendental	 sovereign	 power	 has	 read	 Foucault	
partially	or	too	literally	and	has	neglected	to	distinguish	the	language	Foucault	
uses	from	the	historical	context	he	describes.	As	Revel	clearly	puts	it	in	her	essay:	
It	is	not	that	nature	in	itself	does	not	exist,	but,	in	his	investigation	of	the	
nineteenth	century,	Foucault	discovers	the	emergence	of	a	new	political	
use	 for	 this	 reference	 to	 the	 natural,	 which	 is	 in	 itself	 absolutely	
unnatural	 and	 whose	 genealogy	 must	 be	 established.	 In	 sum,	
“Everything	 in	 our	 knowledge	 which	 is	 suggested	 to	 us	 as	 being	
universally	 valid	 must	 be	 tested	 and	 analysed.” 36 	The	 vitalism	 that	
appears	 to	 have	 established	 biopolitics	 consequently	 needs	 to	 be	
considered	as	a	historical	product,	and	not	as	the	condition	of	possibility	
for	all	knowledge	about	human	beings:	“History	draws	these	sets	before	
erasing	them;	we	must	not	look	here	for	brute,	definite	biological	facts	
that	 would	 impose	 themselves	 on	 history	 from	 out	 of	 the	 depths	 of	
‘nature’.37	(Revel:	2014,	120)	
	
The	philosophical	gesture	that	attempts	to	question	the	relationship	between	the	
discourse	of	knowledge	and	the	existence	of	human	beings	is	of	the	same	kind	as	
the	 one	 attempting	 to	 retrieve	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 natural	 and	 the	
biological.	 Critiquing	 the	 vitalism	which	 proceeds	 from	biopolitics	 amounts	 to	
establishing	 a	 difference	 of	 level	 between	 the	 discourse	 of	 knowledge	 and	
                                                
35	As	 Jean	Terrel	puts	 it	 in	his	essay	“Les	Figures	de	 la	Souveraineté”,	 the	Foucauldian	critique	
targets	several	objects.	Amongst	them,	the	privilege	granted	to	the	consciousness	of	the	subject	
since	the	XVIIth	century	and	the	belief	in	the	impartiality	of	truth	explain	the	mutation	of	political	
sovereign	power	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age	(Terrel:	2003,	107).	It	is	the	encounter	of	those	
two	objects,	which	amounts	to	postulate	that	the	knowing	subject	is	able	to	reach	the	truth	of	his	
nature,	that	grounds	the	possibility	of	the	concept	of	anthropological	nature.	
36 	Foucault,	 “Foucault	 by	 Maurice	 Florence”,	 p.461	 [sic.	 Revel	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 precise	
reference	to	the	edition	she	used].	
37	Foucault,	“Bio-histoire	et	bio-politique”,	p.97	[sic.	Revel	does	not	provide	a	precise	reference	
to	the	edition	she	used]. 
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immanent	existence.	It	is	precisely	because	the	latter	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	
discourse	proceeding	from	the	natural	rule	–	hence	from	modern	biology	–	that	
bio-power	and	biopolitics	cannot	be	understood	as	the	mere	emergence	of	the	
nature	or	biological	existence	of	human	beings	as	a	political	concern.	This	abrupt	
analysis	which	Agamben	provides,	needs	to	be	confronted	to	the	mutation	of	the	
jurisdiction	which	corresponds	to	the	withdrawal	of	sovereign	power	at	the	end	
of	the	Classical	Age.	 It	 is	only	when	the	sovereign	law	no	longer	expresses	the	
order	 of	 a	 world	 that	 there	 is	 room	 for	 a	 natural	 rule	 sustaining	 the	 clinical	
knowledge	of	human	sciences	and	 the	 truth	of	biology.	 It	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 this	
mutation	within	the	paradigm	of	jurisdiction	(whereby	the	just	and	true	no	longer	
proceeds	 from	 the	 will	 of	 the	 sovereign	 but	 from	 the	 veracity	 of	 biological	
discourse)	that	life	and	death	acquire	a	new	meaning.	Death	no	longer	intervenes	
in	 the	 political	 sphere	 as	 a	manifestation	 of	 sovereign	 power	 eradicating	 the	
threats	to	its	law	and	reaffirming	its	order;	it	becomes	that	which	threatens	the	
concept	 of	 life	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 biological	 discourse	 emerging	with	 the	 19th	
century.	It	is	a	concept	which	cannot	be	identified	with	the	immediacy	of	the	lived	
experience	but	cannot	be	more	than	the	positivity	derived	from	the	knowledge	
and	regulation	of	 the	existence	of	 individuals.	 It	always	already	constitutes	an	
objectification	 which	 conceals	 the	 fundamental	 heterogeneity	 between	 the	
knowledge	of	science	and	the	reality	of	experience.	In	other	words,	the	life	the	
natural	rule	speaks	of	a	discourse	which,	because	it	relates	to	 its	object	which	
lacks,	produces	its	unavoidable	alienation.	It	is	upon	this	alienation	that	modern	
racism	 appears,	 sustained	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 good	 and	 true	 race	 as	 the	
manifestation	 of	 the	 true	 and	 good	 nature.	 It	 is	 also	 in	 the	 name	 of	 such	
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objectification	that	individuals	challenging	the	norms	appear	as	a	threat	to	the	
positive	law	of	nature.		
	
 
Conclusion	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	shown	how	the	account	Giorgio	Agamben	provides	of	bio-
power	and	biopolitics	presupposes	an	ahistorical	 concept	of	 sovereign	power.	
Because	 Agamben	 defines	 the	 intrinsic	 activity	 of	 sovereign	 power	 as	 the	
production	 of	 a	 biopolitical	 body	 (Agamben:	 1998,	 11),	 he	 fails	 to	 see	 the	
historical	critique	of	the	relationship	between	political	power	and	life	Foucault	
addresses	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 The	 History	 of	 Sexuality.	 As	 a	 consequence,	
Agamben	is	led	to	claim	that	bio-power	is	in	itself	a	transcendental	category	of	
politics.	This	claim	fails	to	grasp	the	fact	that	bio-power	and	biopolitics	do	not	
target	 the	 same	 political	 object	 than	 sovereign	 power	 did.	 Unlike	 Medieval	
sovereign	power,	which	was	concerned	with	the	persistence	of	the	cosmological	
order	 linked	 to	 the	 Kingdom	 and	 the	 return	 of	 the	 same	 eschatological	 time,	
biopolitics	 target	 an	 object	 which	 lacks	 a	 finite	 temporality:	 the	 concept	 of	
population	 implies	 the	evolution	 in	 time	of	a	natural	phenomenon	which	 is	 in	
itself	a	non-finite	process.	However,	 the	concepts	of	nature	and	biological	 life	
which	underpin	the	concept	of	norm	at	the	basis	of	Foucault’s	diagnosis	of	the	
mutation	 of	 sovereign	 power	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 population	 are	 not	
transcendental	categories	which	can	be	used	outside	their	historical	context.38	
                                                
38	As	Luca	Paltrinieri	explains	in	his	essay	“Gouverner	le	choix	procréatif:	biopolitique,	libéralisme,	
normalisation”:	“one	must	not	mistake	the	‘nature’	of	the	population	neither	for	the	‘naturalness’	
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In	 this	 respect,	 Foucault’s	 description	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	should	be	 linked	to	the	epistemic	shift	he	describes	 in	The	Order	of	
Things	 (Foucault:	 2001e).	 This	 shift,	which	 implies	 that	modernity	 sees	 a	 new	
relationship	 between	words	 and	 things,	 goes	 hand-in-hand	with	 the	historical	
mutation	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 political	 sovereign	 power.	 Whilst	 the	 sovereign	
expressed	 the	 return	 of	 a	 cosmological	 order	 through	 the	 powerful	 and	
immediate	 expression	 of	 his	 law,	 the	 epistemological	 postulate	 of	
anthropological	 nature	 presupposes	 a	 disjunction	 between	 discourse	 and	 the	
facticity	it	describes.	It	is	within	the	space	of	that	disjunction	that	the	concept	of	
nature	attached	to	the	life	of	the	modern	subject	acquires	a	positive	form	and	it	
is	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 that	 positivity,	 through	which	 the	modern	
subject	attempts	to	know	and	fix	the	form	of	its	finitude,	which	defines	the	logic	
of	bio-power	and	biopolitics.		
	
The	consequence	of	this	mutation	is	that	the	deadly	power	of	the	sovereign	who	
puts	 to	 death	–	 which	 was	 also	 the	 ritual	 expression	 of	 a	 hierarchized	 world	
order	–	cannot	function	any	longer.	As	soon	as	political	power	administers	life,	it	
expresses	an	order	derived	from	the	norm.	However,	the	norm	derived	from	the	
                                                
of	 biological	 life	 nor	 for	 a	 presumed	 ‘animal’	 naturalness	 preceding	 political	 action.	 […]	 The	
‘quantity’	 of	 life	 expressed	 by	 the	 ‘measure’	 of	 the	 population	 is	 not	 –	 never	 has	 been	 –	 an	
exclusively	biological	life:	the	‘regularities’	discovered	by	demography	must	be	put	in	relation	with	
a	 set	 of	 economic,	 technical,	 political	 and	 sociological	 human	 practices.”	 [“[…]	 il	 ne	 faut	 pas	
confondre	 la	 ‘nature’	 de	 la	 population	 avec	 une	 ‘naturalité’	 biologique	 de	 la	 vie,	 ni	 avec	 une	
présumée	naturalité	‘animale’	precedent	l’action	politique.	[…]	La	‘quantité’	de	vie	exprimée	par	
la	 ‘mesure’	de	 la	population,	n’est	pas	–	n’a	 jamais	été	–	une	vie	exclusivement	biologique:	 les	
régularités	‘découvertes’	par	la	démographie	doivent	être	mises	en	relation	avec	un	ensemble	de	
pratiques	humaines,	économiques,	techniques,	politiques,	sociologiques.”	(Paltrinieri:	2010,	66).	
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natural	 rule	 bears	 the	 marks	 of	 the	 dissolution	 of	 sovereignty:	 it	 neither	
expresses	nor	 realises	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 world	 without	 mediation	 (as	 the	
sovereign	does)	but	relates	to	an	absent	object	–	a	certain	idea	of	the	healthy	and	
normal	man	(on	the	side	of	disciplinarity)	and	a	certain	 idea	of	 the	race	to	be	
preserved	(on	the	side	of	the	population).	In	order	to	understand	the	persistence	
of	deadly	political	power	in	our	modern	societies,	which	allows	Agamben	to	rely	
upon	the	concept	of	bare	life,	it	is	crucial	to	be	aware	of	the	change	of	jurisdiction	
corresponding	 to	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 law	 and	will	 of	 the	 sovereign	 to	 the	 law	
expressed	by	the	natural	rule:	the	concept	of	life	bio-power	and	biopolitics	speak	
about	 is	 an	 objectified	 reality	 which	 produces	 an	 alienation	 of	 the	 concrete	
existence	 it	 targets.	 It	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 such	 an	 alienation	 that	 the	modern	
meaning	of	life	and	death	needs	to	be	understood	and	problematized:	life	and	
death	 cannot	be	merely	understood	as	 the	opposition	between	 sentencing	 to	
death	or	allowing	to	live	(as	did	the	sovereign)	but	as	the	opposition	between	the	
positivity	derived	from	biological	science	and	the	negation	of	this	positivity.	This	
is	 only	 according	 to	 this	 distinction	 that	 we	 can	 understand	 how	 the	 threat	
targeted	by	the	genocides	of	modern	racism	aim	at	the	deviant	or	the	danger	to	
good	race,	that	is	a	danger	to	the	positivity	derived	from	the	normal	rule.	
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Chapter	Two:	From	sovereign	jurisdiction	to	the	truth	of	nature:	
Foucault’s	account	of	the	mutation	of	truth	as	condition	of	
epistemological	knowledge	
	
	
Introduction	
	
In	spite	of	Agamben’s	missed	historicization	of	the	relationship	between	political	
power	 and	 life,	 his	 account	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 insists	 on	 a	modern	
specificity	 of	 political	 power	 over	 life.	 This	modern	 specificity	 relies	 upon	 the	
paradigm	of	the	concentration	camp,	which	reveals	the	relationship	between	the	
sovereign	 law	 (the	quaestio	 iuris)	 and	 the	 concrete	 and	 immanent	 reality	 this	
sovereign	 law	 produces	 (the	 quaestio	 facti).	 A	 careful	 reading	 of	 Agamben’s	
account	 of	 biopolitical	 jurisdiction	 offers	 an	 opportunity	 to	 better	 grasp	 the	
implications	of	Foucault’s	account	of	 the	mutation	of	 jurisdiction	which	occurs	
with	 the	 emergence	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics.	 However,	 unlike	 Agamben’s	
analysis,	Foucault’s	historicization	of	the	concept	of	life	and	of	the	form	taken	by	
political	power	reveals	that	the	modern	sovereign	has	become	a	blind	spot	within	
the	epistemological	structure	of	anthropological	knowledge:	because	the	judicial	
law	is	founded	on	the	concept	of	the	norm,	it	implies	the	postulate	of	a	truth	of	
anthropological	 nature	 (i.e.	 the	 truth	 the	 knowledge	 the	 modern	 subject	
produces	about	himself	as	an	epistemological	concept).39	As	the	last	section	of	
                                                
39	As	Arnold	Davidson	claims	in	his	essay	“La	Fin	de	l’Herméneutique	de	Soi”:	“if	we	want	to	be	
done	with	positive	figure	of	man	which	works	as	the	foundation	of	our	hermeneutics	of	the	self,	
we	must	question,	criticize	and	refuse	the	politics	of	truth	established	in	our	society:	a	regime	of	
scientific	truth	which	aims	at	governing	our	conduct,	for	in	this	political	regime	what	we	want	to	
do,	our	conduct,	is	subordinated	to	what	we	are,	to	the	truth	of	our	nature.”	[“Si	nous	voulons	en	
finir	 avec	 la	 figure	 positive	 de	 l’homme	 qui	 fonctionne	 comme	 fondement	 pour	 notre	
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the	 first	 chapter	 demonstrates, 40		the	 ninth	 chapter	 of	 The	 Order	 of	 Things	
(Foucault:	 2001e,	 330-374)	 reveals	 that	 it	 is	 the	 attempt	 to	 derive	 positive	
knowledge	about	the	modern	subject	as	a	 living	being	which	characterizes	the	
epistemic	 structure	 of	modern	 anthropology.	 As	 I	 have	 argued,	 this	 epistemic	
structure	 produces	 an	 impossible	 synthesis	 between	 the	 modern	 subject	 as	
empirical	reality	and	his	representation	as	an	object	of	positive	knowledge.	Since	
modern	man	 is	no	more	 than	an	epistemological	 abstraction,	 the	postulate	of	
anthropological	nature	is	what	allows	the	superimposition	of	man	as	a	concrete	
living	being	and	man	as	object	of	positive	knowledge.		
	
Therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	provide	an	account	of	the	epistemological	and	ethical	
implications	 of	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics.	 These	
implications	concern	the	alienation	which	unavoidably	underpins	the	attempt	to	
grasp	individuals	as	objects	of	positive	knowledge.	In	order	to	grasp	the	logic	of	
this	alienation,	it	is	necessary	to	reevaluate	the	development	of	the	concept	of	
sovereignty	within	the	larger	scope	of	Foucault’s	work.	It	is	indeed	not	only	the	
case	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 correspond	 to	 a	
disappearance	of	the	form	taken	by	political	sovereign	power	after	the	Classical	
Age,	it	is	also	the	sovereignty	of	the	modern	subject	(i.e.	the	possibility	for	this	
subject	to	determine	its	own	actions),	which	is	replaced	by	the	expression	of	the	
truth	 of	 its	 nature.	 Consequently,	 a	 thorough	 examination	 of	 the	 question	 of	
                                                
herméneutique	de	soi,	nous	devons	interroger,	critique	et	refuser	la	politique	de	la	vérité	établie	
dans	notre	société:	un	regime	de	la	vérité	scientifique	qui	vise	à	gouverner	notre	conduit,	car	dans	
ce	 regime	 politique	 ce	 que	 nous	 voulons	 faire,	 notre	 conduite,	 est	 subordonné	 à	 ce	 que	 nous	
sommes,	à	la	vérité	de	notre	nature.”]	(Davidson:	2013,	72).	
40	See	chapter	one,	pp.	75-82.	
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sovereignty	in	Foucault’s	work	must	take	into	account	the	way	in	which	Foucault	
problematizes	and	historicizes	the	relationship	between	knowledge	and	life.		
	
This	chapter	claims	 that	 this	historicization,	which	describes	 the	emergence	of	
anthropological	 knowledge	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 relies	
upon	the	concept	of	epistemological	truth	whose	emergence	Foucault	analyzes	
in	his	first	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	de	France	(Foucault:	2013)	as	well	as	in	a	
series	of	lectures	given	at	the	Catholic	University	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	April	1973	
entitled	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 (Foucault:	 2000c,	 1-89).	 He	 studies	 the	
mutation	of	the	morphology	of	knowledge	occurring	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	
and	at	the	beginning	of	Classical	Greece:	this	mutation	emerges	through	the	use	
of	the	technique	of	the	inquiry	(the	search	for	knowledge)	as	a	way	of	establishing	
factual	truth	and	introduces	a	divorce	between	the	seen	and	the	said.	The	veracity	
of	facticity	no	longer	relies	upon	the	strict	actuality	of	what	happens	but	upon	
the	 symbolic	 relationship	 between	 what	 happened	 and	 the	 discourse	 of	
knowledge	 which	 treats	 the	 facts	 as	 epistemological	 objects.	 This	 divorce	
coincides	 with	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	 a	 mediation	 between	 truth	 and	
immanence.	
		
It	 is	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 this	 mediation	 that	 this	 chapter	
studies.	Whilst	the	first	section	focuses	on	Agamben’s	and	Foucault’s	diverging	
account	of	biopolitical	jurisdiction,	the	second	section	studies	Foucault’s	account	
of	the	emergence	of	epistemological	truth	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece.	Such	an	
account	 allows	 us	 to	 understand,	 as	 the	 third	 section	 claims,	 that	 it	 is	 the	
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disjunction	between	the	said	and	the	seen	which	provides	a	space	for	the	concept	
of	epistemological	truth	to	function	and	for	knowledge	to	operate	as	a	specific	
technique	or	a	specific	mode	of	relating	to	the	world.		
	
	
1.	Agamben’s	and	Foucault’s	divergent	accounts	of	sovereign	jurisdiction		
	
Agamben’s	and	Foucault’s	accounts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	not	only	differ	in	
relation	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 their	 respective	 accounts	 target.	 Both	 authors	
provide	 an	 account	 of	 the	 type	 of	 jurisdiction	 that	 corresponds	 to	 biopolitical	
modernity:	it	concerns	the	ways	in	which	strict	immanence41	is	made	lawful	by	
the	political	power	that	is	exerted	over	it.	It	is	on	this	very	point	that	contrasting	
both	understandings	of	modern	power	over	life	appears	to	be	the	most	fruitful.	
                                                
41	I	 use	 the	 term	 “immanence”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 immediate	 experience	 of	 individuals,	 to	 their	
existence	understood	as	the	present	moment	in	which	their	actions	take	place.	Foucault	does	not	
conceptualize	 the	 immediacy	of	experience	but	does	mention	 it	during	 the	 last	 lecture	of	The	
Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject	(Foucault:	2006,	486).	Foucault	refers	to	the	immediacy	of	experience	
in	order	to	reject	its	reduction	as	object	of	knowledge	through	which	the	lived	experience	gets	
connected	to	an	a	priori	concept	of	truth	which	accounts	for	it.	The	move	from	strict	immanence	
to	 its	appropriation	as	object	of	knowledge	characterizes	 the	epistemological	 structure	within	
which	the	discourse	of	the	modern	subject	is	taken	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality:	
the	strict	act	of	speech	through	which	the	subject	confesses	his	desires	is	understood	in	relation	
to	the	anthropological	truth	these	desires	reveal.	Similarly,	the	successive	historical	mutations	of	
the	relationship	between	justice	and	truth	Foucault	identifies	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	move	
from	 the	 strict	 immediacy	 and	 immanence	 of	 truth	 (the	 agonistic	 form	 of	 justice	 in	 Archaic	
Greece)	to	a	temporal	disconnection	between	the	act	(the	wrong	committed)	and	its	recognition	
within	the	field	of	anthropological	knowledge.	 It	 is	 the	morphology	of	the	examination	on	the	
basis	of	which	modern	justice	functions	(Foucault:	2000c,	59)	.	What	matters	is	not	merely	the	
wrong	that	has	been	committed	but	 the	epistemological	connection	which	can	be	established	
between	the	act	considered	in	 its	strict	 immanence	and	the	pathological	nature	of	the	wrong-
doer.	 The	 discourse	 of	 truth	 which	 grounds	 this	 discourse	 functions	 as	 a	 transcendental	
recognition	 and	 validation	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 act.	 Therefore,	 I	 have	 chosen	 the	 word	
“immanence”	in	contrast	with	the	concept	of	epistemological	truth	which	functions	as	an	a	priori	
foundation	 of	 experience.	 Confronted	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 words	 conceptualizing	 immediate	
experience	in	Foucault’s	work,	Revel	chose	to	coin	the	word	présentisme	in	her	recent	Foucault	
avec	Merleau-Ponty:	Ontologie,	Politique,	Présentisme	et	Histoire	(Revel:	2015).			
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Whilst	they	both	provide	a	philosophical	reflection	upon	sovereign	jurisdiction,	
they	 reach	 strictly	 opposite	 conclusions.	 A	 proper	 understanding	 of	 Foucault’s	
historicization	of	political	sovereign	power	and	of	the	mutation	of	the	concept	of	
life	it	implies	shows	that	he,	like	Agamben,	grasps	biopolitical	modernity	as	the	
historical	 emergence	 of	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 jurisdiction.	 However,	 as	 I	 will	
demonstrate,	whilst	Agamben	grounds	the	specificity	of	 this	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	
essence	 of	 sovereign	 power	 itself,	 Foucault’s	 work	 provides	 a	 radical	
historicization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 truth,	 knowledge	 and	 life.	 Whilst,	
according	 to	 Agamben,	 it	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 sovereign	 power	 which	 makes	
immanence	lawful,	Foucault	provides	a	historical	account	of	the	way	in	which	the	
disappearance	of	political	sovereign	power	becomes	the	condition	of	possibility	
of	 the	 emergence	 of	 positive	 facticity	 (i.e.	of	 the	 epistemological	 coincidence	
between	 immanence	 and	 truth).	 Understanding	 that	 Foucault’s	 critique	 of	
biopolitical	power	over	life	finds	its	roots	in	a	historical	critique	of	facticity	(i.e.	in	
the	historicization	of	the	relationship	between	truth	and	immanence)	will	then	
lead	 us	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 relevance	 of	 Foucault’s	 post-1976	works	 on	
Greek	 ethics	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 reflection	 upon	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 self	 (i.e.	
understood	as	the	possibility	for	the	self	to	determine	the	rationality	of	its	own	
actions).42	
                                                
42	I	have	chosen	to	call	“sovereignty”	the	self’s	ability	to	determine	its	own	conduct	because	what	
Foucault	 describes	when	 he	 refers	 to	 “self-fashioning”	 is	 the	 ability	 for	 the	 self	 to	 constantly	
determine	and	revalue	the	way	it	lives	its	life.	This	idea	of	self-fashioning	challenges	the	divorce	
between	the	immanence	of	acts	in	the	world	(the	power	of	the	self	to	act)	and	the	anthropological	
truth	which	determines	or	validates	these	acts.	Because	the	self-fashioning	self	exerts	a	form	of	
autonomy	which	implies	the	absence	of	distinction	between	its	power	and	the	knowledge	which	
explain	its	acts,	I	have	chosen	to	call	it	“sovereign”.	In	Foucault’s	works,	the	figures	who	perform	
a	strict	coincidence	between	power	and	truth	are	sovereigns	(kings,	gods	and	Masters	of	Truth)	
and	the	Cynics,	who	value	their	conduct	without	knowledge	or	self-knowledge	are	described	as	
sovereigns	 in	 his	 last	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	Collège	de	 France.	 In	 this	 lecture	 course,	 Foucault	
 100 
	
According	 to	 Agamben,	 it	 is	 the	 paradigm	 of	 the	 concentration	 camp	 which	
defines	 the	specificity	of	biopolitical	 jurisdiction	 in	 its	modern	 form.	He	claims	
that	 it	 is	 this	 paradigm	which	 allows	 the	 sovereign	 to	 suspend	 the	 distinction	
between	law	and	fact.	He	writes:	
The	 sovereign	 no	 longer	 limits	 himself,	 as	 he	 did	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	
Weimar	 constitution,	 to	 deciding	 on	 the	 exception	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
recognizing	 a	 given	 factual	 situation	 (danger	 to	 public	 safety):	 laying	
bare	the	inner	structure	of	the	ban	that	characterizes	his	power,	he	now	
de	facto	produces	the	situation	as	a	consequence	of	his	decision	on	the	
exception.	 This	 is	 why	 in	 the	 camp	 the	 quaestio	 iuris	 is,	 if	 we	 look	
carefully,	no	longer	strictly	distinguishable	from	the	quaestio	facti,	and	
in	this	sense	every	question	concerning	the	legality	or	the	illegality	of	
what	happened	there	simply	makes	no	sense.	The	camp	is	a	hybrid	of	
law	 and	 fact	 in	which	 the	 two	 terms	 have	 become	 indistinguishable.	
(Agamben:	1998,	97)	
	
The	 paradigm	 of	 the	 concentration	 camp	 provides	 the	 example	 of	 a	 situation	
where	the	distinction	entailed	by	the	discrimination	between	the	legal	(quaestio	
iuris)	 and	 the	 alegal	 or	 “bare”	 (quaestio	 facti)	 –	what	 Agamben	 also	 calls	 the	
"norm"	or	nomos	in	opposition	to	"nature"	or	physis	–	is	no	longer	possible.	This	
indistinguishability	emerges,	according	to	him,	as	a	consequence	of	the	sovereign	
intrinsic	 power	 to	 “trace	 […]	 and	 […]	 renew[…]	 the	 threshold	 of	 indistinction	
between	 outside	 and	 inside,	 exclusion	 and	 inclusion,	 nomos	 and	 physis	
(Agamben:	 1998,	 22).	 It	 is	 because	 "the	 state	 of	 exception	 […]	 is	 realised	
normally"	(Agamben:	1998,	97)	or	because	bio-power	corresponds	to	"the	space	
                                                
analyzes	 the	 theme	 of	 “the	 reversal	 of	 the	 sovereign	 life”.	 In	 contrary	 to	 the	 sage	 or	 the	
philosopher	 who	 exert	 their	 sovereignty	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 transcendent	 concept	 of	 truth,	 it	 is	
through	the	performance	of	immanent	acts	that	truth	appears	and	that	the	Cynics	affirm	their	
sovereignty	(Foucault:	2011b,	269-289).	In	each	of	these	examples,	the	theme	of	the	coincidence	
between	power	and	truth	recurs.		
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that	is	opened	when	the	state	of	exception	begins	to	become	the	rule"	(Agamben:	
1998,	96)	that	bare	life	is	exposed	to	death.		
	
However,	 it	 is	 precisely	 when	 Agamben	 defines	 sovereign	 power	 as	 the	
immediate	expression	of	the	law	(i.e.	an	enforcement	without	mediation	where	
the	act	of	speaking	the	law	corresponds	to	its	strict	realization)	that	the	concept	
of	bare	 life	upon	which	his	account	of	 sovereign	power	was	grounded	cannot	
function	any	longer.	Thus,	when	he	takes	the	example	of	Nazi	Germany	and	the	
word	of	the	Führer	as	the	epitome	of	the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body,	he	is	
forced	to	bridge	the	gap	between	law	and	fact	by	claiming	that	the	juridical	rule	
decides	a	fact	which	itself	provides	the	criterion	for	its	application.	He	writes:		
Only	from	this	perspective	does	the	National	Socialist	theory	that	posits	
the	immediate	and	intrinsically	perfect	source	of	law	in	the	word	of	the	
Führer	acquire	its	full	significance.	Just	as	the	word	of	the	Führer	is	not	a	
factual	situation	that	 is	then	transformed	into	a	rule,	but	 is	rather	itself	
rule	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 living	 voice,	 so	 the	 biopolitical	 body	 (in	 its	 twofold	
appearance	as	Jewish	body	and	German	body,	as	life	unworthy	of	being	
lived	and	as	full	life)	is	not	an	inert	biological	presupposition	to	which	the	
rule	refers,	but	at	once	rule	and	criterion	of	its	own	application,	a	juridical	
rule	that	decides	the	fact	that	decides	on	its	application.	(Agamben:	1998,	
98)	
	
With	this	example,	Agamben	reveals	the	 limits	of	his	own	argument:	 it	 is	clear	
that	the	“Jewish	body”	and	the	“German	body”,	whether	he	designates	here	the	
individual	body	or	the	body	of	the	population,	is	no	longer	the	unqualified	life	to	
which	bare	life	supposedly	refers.	It	is,	in	his	own	words,	either	a	“life	unworthy	
of	 being	 lived”	 or	 “a	 full	 life”	 and	 is	 not,	 in	 any	 case,	 “an	 inert	 biological	
presupposition”.	We	see	 that	Agamben	 is	 forced	 to	move	 from	the	concept	of	
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bare	life	to	a	concept	of	life	which,	without	being	clearly	defined,	presupposes	a	
value	superimposed	upon	the	idea	of	bare	life.		
	
Agamben's	failure	to	see	in	the	biopolitical	norm	a	type	of	relationship	between	
law	and	fact	which	disqualifies	the	primacy	of	the	will	of	the	sovereign	prevents	
him	 from	 seeing	 that	 the	 biopolitical	 valuation	 of	 life	 actually	 reveals	 the	
relationship	 between	 knowledge	 and	 life	 which,	 according	 to	 Foucault,	
characterizes	the	modern	episteme.	It	is	indeed	the	way	in	which	the	shift	from	
sovereign	power	to	bio-power	is	described	in	the	last	section	of	the	first	volume	
of	 the	 History	 of	 Sexuality.	 “[T]he	 law	 operates	 more	 and	 more	 as	 a	 norm”	
(Foucault:	1998d,	144)	and	no	longer	comes	from	“a	juridical	rule	derived	from	
sovereignty,	but	[from]	a	discourse	about	a	natural	rule”	(Foucault:	2003b,	38).	It	
is	this	process	of	estrangement	of	the	rule	from	the	power	of	the	sovereign	that,	
for	Foucault,	allows	a	reciprocal	 influence	between	the	truth	expressed	by	the	
norm	and	the	immanence	that	gets	normalized.	In	contrast	to	Agamben,	Foucault	
shows	that	modern	political	power	does	not	presupposes	the	primacy	of	the	will	
of	 the	sovereign	but	 the	 truth	 implied	by	 the	norm	(or	 the	natural	 rule)	as	an	
epistemological	 criterion.	 The	 14th	 January	 1976	 lecture	 from	Society	Must	 Be	
Defended	clearly	exposes	the	historical	shift	according	to	which	the	will	of	 the	
sovereign	 no	 longer	 expresses	 the	 truth	 of	 facticity.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	
presupposition	of	a	natural	truth	found	in	facticity	which	grounds	political	power.	
He	writes:	
What	are	the	rules	of	right	that	power	implements	to	produce	discourses	
of	 truth?	 Or:	 What	 type	 of	 power	 is	 it	 that	 is	 capable	 of	 producing	
discourses	 of	 power	 that	 have,	 in	 a	 society	 like	 ours,	 such	 powerful	
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effects?	What	I	mean	is	this:	In	a	society	such	as	ours	–	or	in	any	society,	
come	to	that	–	multiple	 relations	of	power	traverse,	characterize,	and	
constitute	 the	 social	 body,	 they	 are	 indissociable	 from	 a	 discourse	 of	
truth,	 and	 they	 can	neither	 be	 established	nor	 function	unless	 a	 true	
discourse	 is	 produced,	 accumulated,	 put	 into	 circulation,	 and	 set	 to	
work.	[…]	Power	constantly	asks	questions	and	questions	us;	it	constantly	
investigates	 and	 records;	 it	 institutionalizes	 the	 search	 for	 the	 truth,	
professionalizes	it,	and	rewards	it.	We	have	to	produce	the	truth	in	the	
same	 way,	 really,	 that	 we	 have	 to	 produce	 wealth,	 and	 we	 have	 to	
produce	the	truth	in	order	to	be	able	to	produce	wealth.	In	a	different	
sense,	we	are	also	subject	to	the	truth	in	the	sense	that	truth	lays	down	
the	law:	it	is	the	discourse	of	truth	that	decides,	at	least	in	part;	it	conveys	
and	propels	truth–effects.	After	all,	we	are	judged,	condemned,	forced	
to	 perform	 tasks,	 and	 destined	 to	 live	 and	 die	 in	 certain	 ways	 by	
discourses	 that	 are	 true,	 and	 which	 bring	 with	 them	 specific	power–
effects.	(Foucault:	2003b,	24–25)	
	
The	point	of	Foucault’s	critique	of	biopolitical	power	is	to	argue	that,	even	though	
the	presupposition	of	the	truth	of	the	natural	rule	is	what	replaces	the	will	of	the	
sovereign,	 this	 truth	 is	 not	 a	 metaphysical	 given.	 It	 is	 the	 direct	 historical	
expression	of	power.	There	is	no	distinction	in	kind	between	epistemological	truth	
and	immanent	power.	Consequently,	there	is	no	ontological	distinction	between	
right,	discourses	of	 truth,	and	power.	The	 three	concepts	he	uses	here	do	not	
mark	any	disjunction:	it	is,	according	to	him,	power	that	produces	true	discourses	
that	have	in	return	powerful	effects.	In	other	words,	rules	of	right	and	justice	and	
discourse	of	truth	are	all	instances	of	modes	of	effectuation	of	power.		
	
Truth	is	what	provides	power	with	a	foundation	but	Foucault	makes	really	clear	
that	truth	and	power	are	not	essentially	different.	 It	 is,	on	this	point,	useful	to	
recall	 the	 interview	given	 to	André	Berten	on	7th	May	1981	before	a	 series	of	
lectures	Foucault	was	invited	to	give	at	the	Faculty	of	Criminology	at	the	Catholic	
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University	 of	 Leuwen	 between	 22nd	 April	 and	 20th	 May	 1981. 43		During	 this	
interview,	Foucault	says:	
There	are	powers	that	lack	foundation	and	that	function	very	well,	and	
powers	 that	 seek	 a	 foundation,	 indeed	 find	 a	 foundation,	 and	 then	
ultimately	fail	to	function.	So,	if	you	will,	the	problem	I	asked	myself	was:	
Can’t	we	study	the	way	in	which	power	actually	functions?	When	I	say	
“power”,	it	is	absolutely	not	a	question	of	finding	an	authority	or	some	
sort	 of	 force	 that	 is	 there,	 hidden	 or	 visible	 –	 whichever	 –	 and	 that	
noxiously	radiates	out	through	the	social	body	or	that	fatally	extends	its	
network.	[…]	Power	is	relations.	Power	is	not	a	thing.	It	is	a	relationship	
between	two	individuals,	and	a	relationship	that	allows	one	individual	to	
conduct	the	conduct	of	another	or	to	determine	the	conduct	of	another	
–	 to	 determine	 their	 conduct	 voluntarily	 according	 to	 a	 number	 of	
objectives	that	are	his	own.	 In	other	words,	when	one	examines	what	
power	 is,	 one	 sees	 that	 it	 is	 the	 exercise	of	 something	one	 could	 call	
government,	in	the	broadest	sense	of	the	term.	Society	can	be	governed,	
a	group	can	be	governed,	a	community	can	be	governed,	a	family	can	be	
governed,	someone	can	be	governed.	And	when	I	say	“govern	someone”,	
it	 is	 simply	 in	 the	 sense	of	 determining	 their	 conduct	 on	 the	basis	 of	
strategies,	using	a	certain	number	of	tactics.	(Foucault:	2014b,	239–240)	
	
If,	on	the	one	hand,	power	is	not	a	thing	but	a	mode	of	government,	that	is	the	
establishment	of	a	relation	through	which	one	conducts	someone	else’s	conduct,	
and	 if,	 on	 the	 other,	 “we	 are	 obliged	 to	 produce	 the	 truth	 by	 the	 power	 that	
demands	truth	and	needs	it	in	order	to	function”,	then	truth	is	itself	this	relation	
between	the	governor	and	the	governed.	And	if,	according	to	the	same	logic,	“we	
are	judged,	condemned,	forced	to	perform	tasks	and	destined	to	live	and	die	in	
certain	ways	by	discourses	that	are	true”,	 it	 is	 the	relation	which	power	 is	and	
enforces	 according	 to	 its	 truth	which	 produces	 justice	 and	 compels	 a	 specific	
conduct.	 Instead	 of	 accounting	 for	 modern	 jurisdiction	 as	 the	 immediate	
expression	of	the	will	of	the	sovereign,	Foucault	grounds	it	in	the	presupposition	
                                                
43	This	series	of	lectures,	entitled	Wrong	Doing,	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	Justice)	
has	 been	 recently	 translated	 in	 English	 (Foucault:	 2014b).	 It	 has	 been	 originally	 published	 in	
French	as	Mal	Faire,	Dire	Vrai:	La	Fonction	de	l’Aveu	en	Justice	(Foucault:	2012b).	
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of	the	truth	of	anthropological	nature.	However,	 this	 truth	 is	not,	according	to	
Foucault,	 a	 metaphysical	 concept.	 It	 is	 the	 strict	 expression	 of	 an	 immanent	
power.	 This	 power	 is	 constituted	 by	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 immanent	 relationships	
which	aim	at	conducting	the	subject’s	conduct.	
	
 
2.	Foucault’s	account	of	the	emergence	of	epistemological	truth:	the	
disjunction	of	the	said	and	the	seen	
	
I	argue	that	it	is	an	account	of	the	way	in	which	the	concept	of	truth	acquires	the	
position	of	a	founding	rationality	disconnected	from	immanent	power	that	can	
guide	us	in	understanding	the	shift	from	the	law	as	expression	of	the	will	of	the	
sovereign	to	the	law	derived	from	the	norm.	It	will	allow	us	to	understand	how	
the	concept	of	norm	that	grounds	the	rationality	of	biopolitical	power	proceeds	
from	a	knowledge	postulating	the	existence	of	a	natural	rule	and	no	longer	from	
the	sovereign	decision.	Providing	such	an	account	requires	a	reading	of	Foucault’s	
first	explicit	account	of	the	relationship	between	political	power	and	knowledge.	
This	account	appears	in	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	a	text	that	collects	a	series	
of	lectures	given	at	the	Catholic	University	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	from	21st	to	25th	May	
1973	where	Foucault	defines	the	political	power	preceding	Classical	Greece	as	the	
strict	 coincidence	between	knowledge	and	power.	This	means	 that	power	and	
knowledge	coincided	without	 relying	upon	 the	metaphysical	presupposition	of	
the	concept	of	truth.44	This	coincidence	is	defined	as	the	synthesis	of	power	and	
                                                
44 	This	 definition	 of	 Archaic	 political	 power	 derives	 from	 Georges	 Dumézil’s	 trifunctional	
hypothesis.	In	Mitra–Varuna,	originally	published	in	French	in	1948,	Dumézil	links	the	two	Proto–
Indo–European	entities	Mitra	and	Varuna	to	two	distinct	but	complementary	aspects	of	sovereign	
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the	 esoteric	 knowledge	 of	 the	 sovereign	 that	 realizes	 the	 order	 or	 the	world.	
Foucault	says:	
In	 European	 societies	 of	 the	 Mediterranean	 East,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
second	millennium	and	the	beginning	of	the	first,	political	power	always	
implied	 the	possession	of	 a	 certain	 type	of	 knowledge.	By	 the	 fact	of	
holding	power,	 the	king	and	 those	around	him	held	a	knowledge	 that	
could	not	and	must	not	be	communicated	 to	 the	other	 social	 groups.	
Knowledge	 and	 power	 were	 exactly	 reciprocal,	 correlative,	
superimposed.	 There	 couldn’t	 be	 any	 knowledge	without	 power,	 and	
there	couldn’t	be	any	political	power	without	the	possession	of	a	certain	
special	 knowledge.	 This	 is	 a	 form	 of	 power-knowledge	 that	 Georges	
Dumézil,	 in	 his	 studies	 concerning	 the	 three	 functions,	 has	 isolated,	
showing	 that	 the	 first	 function	 was	 that	 of	 a	 magical	 and	 religious	
political	power.	Knowledge	of	the	gods,	knowledge	of	the	action	that	can	
be	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 us	 by	 the	 gods	 –	 that	 whole	magico-religious	
knowledge	is	present	in	the	political	function.	(Foucault:	2000c,	31)	
	
Foucault	 refers	 to	 a	 form	 of	 political	 power	 existing	 before	 the	 emergence	 of	
philosophical	 thought	which	worked	 according	 to	 an	 intrinsic	 esotericism	 and	
exclusivity.	Knowledge	was,	 in	 this	case,	 the	condition	of	possibility	of	political	
sovereignty.	It	was	not	linked	to	a	positive	reality	that	could	be	learnt	about	and	
read	through	the	observation	of	nature.	This	form	of	knowledge	was	the	privilege	
of	the	few	and	corresponded	to	political	power	itself.		
	
Foucault	does	not	refer	to	an	idea	of	magico-religious	power	arbitrarily:	this	type	
of	 power	 is	 an	 esoteric	 knowledge	 from	a	divine	origin.	 It	 is	 an	 intrinsic	 unity	
between	 power	 and	 the	 knowledge	 of	 truth	 that	 makes	 justice	 possible	 and	
defines	 the	 right	 order	 of	 the	world.	 In	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”,	 Foucault	
locates	the	dismantlement	of	the	unity	between	sovereign	power	and	sovereign	
                                                
power:	Mitra	corresponds	to	the	rational	order	of	this	world	and	Varuna	to	the	violent,	terrible	
and	warlike	power	to	which	men	have	no	access	(Dumézil:	1988,	71-72).	
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knowledge	characterizing	the	Assyrian	empires	at	the	emergence	of	the	Classical	
Greece	society	of	the	fifth	century	BC.	He	says:	
What	occurred	at	the	origin	of	Greek	society,	at	the	origin	of	the	Greek	
age	 of	 the	 fifth	 century,	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 our	 civilization,	 was	 the	
dismantling	of	the	great	unity	of	a	political	power	that	was,	at	the	same	
time,	a	knowledge	–	the	dismantling	of	that	unity	of	a	magico-religious	
power	 which	 existed	 in	 the	 great	 Assyrian	 empires;	 which	 the	 Greek	
tyrants,	impregnated	with	Oriental	civilization,	tried	to	restore	for	their	
own	purpose;	and	which	the	sophists	of	the	sixth	and	fifth	century	still	
used	as	they	could,	in	the	forms	of	lessons	paid	for	in	cash.	We	witness	
that	 long	 decomposition	 during	 the	 five	 or	 six	 centuries	 of	 archaic	
Greece.	And	when	classical	Greece	appeared	[…]	what	had	to	disappear	
for	this	society	to	exist	was	the	union	between	power	and	knowledge.	
(Foucault:	2000c,	31–32)	
	
Foucault	states	his	point	very	clearly:	it	is	the	union	of	knowledge	and	power	that	
disappears	 when	 Classical	 Greece	 emerges.	 More	 precisely,	 it	 is	 the	 very	
coincidence	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge	 in	 an	 act	 that	 realizes	 truth	 which	
disappears	 when	 Classical	 Greece	 emerges.	 The	 emergence	 of	 philosophical	
thought	during	the	fifth	century	B.C.	links	discourse	to	a	truth	that	becomes	the	
object	 of	 philosophical	 reflection	 as	 well	 as	 its	 condition	 of	 possibility.	
Consequently,	the	knowledge	of	the	one	in	power	will	no	longer	be	a	means	of	
pursuing	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 political	 tyrant	 but	 instead	 acquires	 an	 objective	
relationship	to	a	truth	preexisting	its	pursuit.		
	
However,	 the	 problematization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	
knowledge	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 a	mutation	 occurring	 at	 the	 turn	 from	Archaic	 to	
Classical	Greece.	In	Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants,	the	lecture	course	given	at	the	
Collège	 de	 France	 in	 1980,	 the	 coincidence	 between	 political	 power	 and	
knowledge	is	also	at	stake	when	Foucault	examines	the	Roman	Empire.	He	opens	
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the	lecture	course	by	insisting	on	the	link	between	the	figure	of	the	sovereign	and	
the	 possession	 of	 a	 cosmological	 knowledge	 that	 guarantees	 the	 stability	 and	
return	of	a	fixed	order	of	things.	During	the	9th	January	1980	lecture,	he	borrows	
the	example	of	Severe	the	Seventh	from	Don	Cassius:	an	Emperor	who	had	the	
ceiling	of	the	judgment	room	of	his	palace	painted	according	to	the	ordering	of	
the	 stars	 that	 overarched	 his	 birth	 and	 destiny.	 This	 example	 illustrates	 the	
intrinsic	relationship	at	stake	between	the	possibility	of	political	power	and	the	
exclusivity	of	sovereign	knowledge:	it	is	an	ageless	truth	that	speaks,	a	truth	that	
concerned	the	past,	determines	the	future	and	the	decisions	of	 the	sovereign.	
Foucault	says:	
It	was	a	matter	for	him	[Severe	the	Seventh]	of	inscribing	the	particular	
and	accidental	sentences	that	he	pronounced	inside	the	very	system	of	
the	world,	and	of	showing	how	the	logos	that	presides	over	this	world	
order	and	that	presided	at	its	birth,	was	the	same	logos	that	organized,	
founded	and	justified	his	decisions.	What	he	used	to	say	in	a	particular	
circumstance	of	the	world,	what	he	said	 in	a	particular	kairos	 […]	was	
precisely	the	very	order	of	things	as	they	were	fixed	in	the	beyond,	once	
and	for	all.45	(Foucault:	2012a,	3–4)	
	
The	 distinction	 as	 well	 as	 the	 correlation	 Foucault	 establishes	 between	 the	
"particular	circumstance"	or	the	"particular	kairos"	and	the	"order	of	things	as	
they	were	 fixed	 in	 the	beyond"	 clearly	 shows	 that	 the	 logic	 of	 political	 power	
corresponded	 to	 a	 knowledge	 made	 power	 and	 therefore	 repeated	 the	
coincidence	between	political	power	and	knowledge	Foucault	described	in	“Truth	
                                                
45	“Il	 s’agissait	 bien	 sûr	 pour	 lui	 d’inscrire	 les	 sentences	 particulières	 et	 conjoncturelles	 qu’il	
rendait	à	l’intérieur	du	système	même	du	monde,	et	de	montrer	comment	le	logos	qui	présidait	
à	cet	ordre	du	monde	et	qui	avait	présidé	à	sa	naissance,	ce	même	logos	était	celui	qui	organisait,	
fondait	et	justifiait	les	sentences	qu’il	rendait.	Ce	qu’il	disait	dans	une	circonstance	particulière	
du	monde,	 ce	qu’il	 disait	 dans	un	kairos	 particulier	 [...]	 c’était	 précisément	 l’ordre	même	des	
choses	telles	qu’elles	avaient	été	fixées	là–haut,	une	fois	pour	toutes.”	
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and	Juridical	Forms”	in	1973.	The	reference	to	“the	very	order	of	things	as	they	
were	 fixed	 in	 the	beyond”	evokes,	under	a	slightly	different	 form,	 the	magico–
religious	 esoteric	 coincidence	 between	 political	 power	 and	 knowledge	 which	
disappears	with	Classical	Greece.	 It	 is	 “the	 same	 logos”	which	determines	 the	
timeless	order	of	the	world	and	speaks	through	each	of	the	Emperor’s	decision	of	
justice.	 When	 Foucault	 characterizes	 cases	 of	 political	 power	 linked	 to	 the	
expression	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 sovereign,	 even	 when	 considering	 different	
historical	periods,	he	insists	on	the	coincidence	between	discourse	and	the	act	of	
power	itself:	it	is	the	sovereign	logos	which	is	powerful,	true	and	just	all	at	once.	
In	doing	so,	Foucault	shows	that	the	structure	of	political	power	linked	to	political	
sovereignty	prevents	metaphysical	exegesis:	if	the	act	of	justice	and	power	strictly	
corresponds	to	the	esoteric	knowledge	of	the	sovereign	made	power,	truth	is	not	
a	metaphysical	postulate	which	may	be	abstracted	from	the	sovereign	act.		
	
By	joining	sovereign	power	and	knowledge,	Foucault	brings	to	light	a	concept	of	
knowledge	which	does	not	correspond	to	the	use	of	a	tekhne	that	leads	to	the	
discovery	of	truth	but	which	corresponds	instead	to	the	esoteric	privilege	of	the	
kings,	the	oracle,	the	seer	or	the	poet.	What	changes	in	Greece	of	the	fifth	century	
BC,	and	what	Foucault	describes	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	in	1970–1971	
(Foucault:	 2013)	 as	 well	 as	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 in	 1973,	 is	 the	
emergence	of	a	 concept	of	knowledge	which	 results	 from	the	use	of	a	 tekhne	
whose	first	occurrence	appears,	according	to	him,	in	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex.46	
                                                
46	In	his	essay	“Knowingness	and	Abandonment:	An	Oedipus	for	Our	Time”,	Jonathan	Lear	stresses	
that	Sophocles	provides	in	Oedipus	Rex	an	implicit	critique	of	knowledge	as	attitude	towards	the	
world.	 It	 is	 Oedipus’	 insistence	 to	 know	 the	murderer’s	 identity	 which	makes	 him	 unable	 to	
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In	contrast	to	this	coincidence	between	knowledge	and	power,	the	relationship	
between	 power,	 truth	 and	 justice	 at	work	 in	 our	modern	 societies	 is	 put	 into	
question	because	their	coincidence	is	no	longer	synthesised	by	a	political	figure	
performing	truth	in	an	act	of	power.	In	Society	Must	Be	Defended,	when	Foucault	
interrogates	 the	 mechanism	 at	 work	 between	 “rules	 of	 right,	 mechanisms	 of	
power	 [and]	 truth-effects”	or	between	“rules	of	power,	and	the	power	of	 true	
discourses”	(Foucault:	2003b,	25),	he	puts	the	discourse	of	knowledge	and	the	
efficacy	of	power	on	 the	same	 level	of	 immanence	and	challenges	 the	 idea	of	
heterogeneity	 between	 the	 transcendence	 of	 truth	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	
immanence	of	power	on	the	other.	Foucault	does	not	define	sovereign	power	as	
a	metaphysical	foundation	of	politics	(as	Agamben	does)	but	he	sees	in	historical	
forms	of	political	power	preceding	either	Classical	Greece	or	the	Classical	Age	a	
coincidence	of	knowledge	and	power	within	 the	same	act	of	 justice:	an	act	of	
justice	actualizing	a	truth	is	a	strict	expression	of	power.	
	
Ultimately,	what	 Foucault	wants	 to	 describe	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 discrepancy:	
when	knowledge	and	power	no	longer	strictly	coincide	in	an	act	of	justice	–	i.e.	
when	knowledge	and	power	no	longer	perform	truth	together	in	the	space	of	an	
act	–	the	disjunction	of	the	two	is	what	gives	way	to	the	possibility	of	knowledge	
                                                
distance	himself	from	the	risk	of	such	an	enterprise.	Lear	argues	that	the	reduction	of	“reason”	
to	what	he	calls	“knowingness”	is	a	characteristic	made	apparent	but	also	criticized	in	Sophocles’	
text:	“Sophocles	is	offering	a	diagnosis	of	‘knowingness’:	both	a	critique	of	its	thinness	as	a	way	
of	being	in	the	world,	and	an	account	of	how	it	comes	to	take	over	a	culture.	And	insofar	as	this	
‘knowingness’	presents	itself	as	reason,	Oedipus	the	tyrant	becomes	[…]	Oedipus	tyrannized	[…]	
by	what	he	takes	to	be	the	reasonable	movement	of	his	own	mind.”	(Lear:	2006,	195)	
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as	 technique	 of	 investigation	 and	 as	 quest	 for	 a	 truth	 divorced	 from	 the	
immanence	of	an	act	of	power.	Such	a	discrepancy	appears	in	Foucault’s	readings	
of	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex.	A	first	exposition	of	the	problem	can	be	found	in	the	
recent	publication	and	translation	of	Foucault’s	1970–1971	Lectures	on	the	Will	
to	Know.	 The	published	 lectures	 contain	 in	 an	 appendix	 the	 transcription	of	 a	
lecture	given	at	the	State	University	of	New	York,	Buffalo	in	March	1972	and	at	
Cornell	University	in	October.	Entitled	Oedipal	Knowledge,	it	presents	Foucault’s	
reading	 of	 Sophocles’	 tragedy	 through	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 status	 and	 role	 of	
knowledge	 in	 the	 play.	 One	 year	 before	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”,	 Foucault	
shows	that	Oedipus	possesses	a	form	of	knowledge	also	linked	to	political	power	
but	this	time	not	in	terms	of	a	strict	performative	coincidence	(whereby	the	act	
of	power	is	the	act	of	knowledge	and	truth)	but	in	terms	of	lack.	Foucault	reminds	
the	reader	that	it	is	because	Oedipus	managed	to	solve	the	Sphinx’s	riddle	and	to	
save	 the	 city	 of	 Thebes	 that	 he	 was	 enthroned	 and	 thus	 accessed	 political	
power.47	Oedipus	 is	 the	 one	who	 knows	without	 knowing:	 he	 knows	what	 to	
answer	to	the	Sphinx	but	is	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	he	is	the	reason	for	Thebes’	
plight.	It	is	only	through	an	investigation	(i.e.	the	use	of	knowledge	as	tekhne)	that	
Oedipus	will	discover	the	truth	he	ignores.48	Foucault	writes:	
                                                
47	Depending	on	the	text	quoted,	the	spelling	of	the	name	of	this	character	varies.	It	is	sometimes	
called	 la	 Sphinge	 in	 French.	 For	 the	 sake	 of	 consistency,	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	 call	 it	 the	 Sphinx	
throughout	the	course	of	my	argument	and	have	respected	the	spelling	used	in	the	original	texts	
in	the	quotations.		
48	Several	times	throughout	the	play,	Oedipus	will	insist	to	obtain	knowledge	through	confession	
in	order	to	establish	the	truth	and	discover	the	murderer’s	identity.	This	is	especially	noticeable	
when	he	presses	 Tiresias	 and	 Laius’	 servant	 to	 say	what	 they	 know	 (in	 scenes	4	 and	8).	 Both	
instances	reveal	that	Oedipus	needs	the	utterance	of	spoken	words	to	link	the	seen	with	the	said	
and	establish	the	truth	of	facts:	
“TIRESIAS	
[…]	stand	by	your	own	decree	that	you	proclaimed,	
and	from	this	day	do	not	address	these	men,	nor	me	–	
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In	this	unique	and	fragile	position,	the	power	of	Oedipus	is	linked	to	a	
type	of	knowledge	(savoir).	If	he	seized	power	at	Thebes,	or	rather	if	he	
was	given	power,	it	was	because	he	won	the	“knowledge	(connaissance)	
test.”	At	several	points	Oedipus	and	the	Chorus	remind	each	other	that	
the	 bond	 between	 them	 is	 based	 on	 knowledge;	 and	 on	 a	 double	
knowledge	 moreover:	 that	 of	 Oedipus,	 who	 demonstrated	 his	
superiority	by	solving	the	riddle,	and	[that	of]	the	city,	which	was	able	to	
ascertain	 beyond	 doubt	 that	 Oedipus	 knew;	 it	 is	 because	 he	 was	
recognized	“sophos”	and	on	evidence	(basano),	that	he	was	loved	by	the	
city	 […].	This	knowledge	demonstrated	 in	 the	 test	enables	Oedipus	 to	
govern,	and	whenever	he	appears,	exercising	his	power,	it	is	in	the	form	
of	the	one	who	knows:	I	know,	I	have	seen.	In	this	way,	Oedipus	manifests	
independently	his	knowledge	and	his	power.	Oida	 is	the	word	through	
which	he	asserts	himself,	and	which	precisely	is	inscribed	in	his	name.	It	
is	 this	 power-knowledge	 that	 is	 exposed,	 risked,	 endangered	 by	 the	
plague	of	Thebes:	if	the	king	does	not	know	what	is	to	be	done,	if	he	does	
                                                
because	you	are	the	foul	pollutant	in	this	land.	
	
OEDIPUS	
You	have	the	gall	to	stir	this	slander?	
You	can’t	believe	you’ll	get	away	with	this!	
	
TIRESIAS	
I	have	escaped	already.		
I	sustain	the	truth	to	be	my	strength.	
	
OEDIPUS	
Who	did	you	learn	this	from?	Not	from	your	craft,	I	think.	
	
TIRESIAS	
I	learned	from	you:	
You	pressed	words	out	from	me	against	my	will.	
	
[…]	
	
OEDIPUS	(to	his	attendants)	
Quick,	one	of	you	tie	back	his	arms.	
	
OLD	SLAVE	OF	LAIUS	
Why,	why?	What	is	it	you	want	to	know?	
	
OEDIPUS	
First,	did	you	give	this	man	the	child	he	asked	about?	
	
OLD	SLAVE	OF	LAIUS	
I	did	give	him	–	if	only	I	had	died	that	day!	
	
OEDIPUS	
You	will	die	now,	if	you	don’t	tell	me	the	honest	truth.	
	
OLD	SLAVE	OF	LAIUS	
Far	worse	than	that,	if	I	do	speak.”	(Sophocles:	2015,	27,	59-60)	
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not	know	who	is	responsible	for	the	defilement,	if	he	does	not	know	to	
whom	the	purifying	rite	must	be	applied,	then	he	will	be	lost	along	with	
the	city.	But,	precisely,	once	again	he	will	solve	the	riddle,	he	will	discover	
what	one	knew,	and	he	will	lose	his	power.	(Foucault:	2013,	244)	
	
Oedipus’	tragedy	reveals	that	he	precisely	misses	the	knowledge	that	would	allow	
him	to	perform	the	equation	between	truth	and	justice	necessary	to	legitimate	
his	power.	The	truth	Oedipus	knows	at	the	start	of	the	play	allows	him	to	access	
political	 power	 but	 he	 is	 an	 illegitimate	 ruler	 since	 he	 does	 not	 know	 that	 he	
himself	is	the	criminal	he	is	looking	for.	It	is	only	the	conduct	of	an	investigation	
and	a	quest	for	truth	that	will	lead	him	to	see	he	is	not	the	legitimate	ruler.	
	
The	 case	 of	Oedipus	 Rex	 interests	 Foucault	 for	 it	 stands	 at	 a	 point	where	 the	
problematization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	 knowledge	 appears	
vividly	 in	 the	 Greek	 literature	 of	 the	 time.49	Philippe	 Chevallier,	 in	 his	Michel	
                                                
49	Foucault	does	not	limit	himself	to	studying	the	example	of	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex.	In	a	series	
of	lectures	given	at	the	University	of	California	at	Berkeley	in	Autumn	1983,	he	also	develops	the	
antagonistic	relationship	between	divine	truth	and	human	knowledge	 in	Euripides’	Hippolytus,	
The	Bacchae,	Electra,	Ion	and	Orestes.	Foucault	had	already	studied	Euripides’	Ion	a	few	months	
earlier	during	his	12th,	19th	and	26th	 January	1983	 lectures	at	 the	Collège	de	France	 (Foucault:	
2010,	61-148).	In	Autumn	1983,	Foucault	clearly	insists	on	the	fact	that	the	mutual	exclusion	of	
power	and	knowledge	in	Greco-Roman	Antiquity	makes	room	for	the	“parrhesiastic	contract”:	a	
practice	through	which	the	sovereign	will	seek	the	knowledge	he	lacks	and	either	reward	reliable	
testimonies	 or	 punish	 lies.	 This	 “parrhesiastic	 contract”	 corresponds	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	
parrhesia	(which	corresponds	to	saying	what	one	holds	to	be	the	truth)	in	politics.	Foucault	writes:	
“The	‘parrhesiastic	contract’	–	which	became	relatively	important	in	the	political	life	of	rulers	in	
the	Greco-Roman	world	–	consists	in	the	following.	The	sovereign,	the	one	who	has	power	but	
lacks	the	truth,	addresses	himself	to	the	one	who	has	the	truth	but	lacks	power,	and	tells	him:	if	
you	tell	me	the	truth,	no	matter	what	this	truth	turns	out	to	be,	you	won’t	be	punished;	and	those	
who	are	responsible	for	any	injustices	wil	be	punished,	but	not	those	who	speak	the	truth	about	
such	injustices”	(Foucault:	2010,	32).	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex	exemplifies	such	a	relationship.	This	
appears	clearly	when	Oedipus	attempts	to	obtain	a	confession	from	the	old	slave	of	Laius:	
“OEDIPUS	
No,	no,	don’t	threaten	him	[the	old	Corinthian],	old	man:	
It’s	your	words	call	for	threats	far	more	than	his.	
	
OLD	SLAVE	OF	LAIUS	
Why,	mighty	lord?	What	have	I	done	that’s	wrong?	
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Foucault	 et	 le	 Christianisme,	 insists	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 Sophocles’	 tragedy	 as	
disqualification	 of	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 political	 ruler	 which	 synthesizes	 political	
power	and	knowledge	according	to	a	truth	which	remains	his	privilege.	But	more	
specifically,	 Chevallier	 tells	 us	 that	what	 emerges	 is	 a	mistrust	 of	 the	 esoteric	
power	of	the	ruler	which,	instead	of	being	received	as	true	and	just,	appears	to	
men	as	being	tyrannical	because	fateful.	Chevallier	writes:		
The	main	function	of	the	twists	and	turns	of	the	Oedipal	tragedy	is	to	
display	the	failure	of	a	certain	form	of	political	power.	Foucault	identified	
this	form	with	a	precise	historical	figure	which	appeared	in	Greece	in	the	
seventh	and	sixth	centuries	BC:	the	figure	of	the	tyrant,	that	is	to	say	of	
the	man	who	attains	power	not	through	legitimate	ancestry	but	through	
his	 personal	 achievements.	 […]	 Once	 recognized	 as	 a	 tyrant	 like	 any	
other,	Oedipus	can	indeed	be	compared	to	real	kings	and	legislators	such	
as	Kypselos	or	 Solon,	 although	 the	play	 itself,	 through	 its	 prosecution	
speech	against	the	tyrannical	procedures	of	government	by	knowledge,	
heralds	in	its	own	way	Plato’s	Republic.	The	play	thus	partakes	in	this	vast	
movement	 of	 denunciation	 and	 decomposition	 of	 an	 archaic	 Greece	
which	is	the	inheritor	of	the	Assyrian	empires.50	(Chevallier:	2011,	162–
163)	
	
Chevallier’s	depiction	of	the	figure	of	the	tyrant	meets	Foucault’s	definition	of	his	
status.	In	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	Foucault	had	already	characterized	Oedipus	
as	a	tyrant	because	he	is	the	one	who	enforces	his	own	will	without	caring	for	
truth.	In	this	respect,	“the	tyrannical	procedures	of	government	by	knowledge”	
to	which	Chevallier	refers	designate	a	form	of	political	power	that	imposes	its	own	
                                                
OEDIPUS	
Not	answering	the	question	
This	man	asked	about	the	child.”	(Sophocles:	2015,	59)	
50	“les	péripéties	de	la	tragédie	oedipienne	ont	pour	fonction	principale	de	montrer	l’échec	d’une	
certaine	forme	de	pouvoir	politique.	Or,	cette	forme,	Foucault	l’identifie	immédiatement	à	une	
figure	historique	précise,	apparue	en	Grèce	aux	VIIe	et	Vie	siècles	avant	notre	ère	:	celle	du	tyran,	
c’est–à–dire	l’homme	arrive	au	pouvoir	non	par	une	descendance	légitime	mais	par	ses	exploits	
personnels.	 […]	Une	 fois	 reconnu	 tyran	au	meme	titre	qu’un	autre,	Oedipe	peut	en	effet	être	
rapproché	de	rois	ou	législateurs	bien	reels	comme	Kypsélos	ou	Solon;	tandis	que	la	pièce	elle–
même,	dans	son	réquisitoire	contre	les	procédures	tyranniques	de	gouvernement	par	le	savoir,	
anoonce	à	sa	manière	La	République	de	Platon.	La	pièce	participle	ainsi	à	ce	vaste	movement	de	
denunciation	et	de	decomposition	d’une	Grèce	archaique,	héritière	des	empires	assyriens.”	
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ways	without	caring	for	the	right	order	of	justice.	Chevallier	adds	that	it	is	not	only	
Oedipus’	dismissal	that	the	play	describes,	but	a	more	global	rejection	of	political	
power	whose	knowledge	 is	not	accessible	 to	human	 tekhne.	 It,	 is	precisely	 the	
possibility	of	knowledge	as	a	technique	opposed	to	divine	decrees	that	Oedipus	
will	pursue.	It	is	through	the	denunciation	of	the	kind	of	knowledge	that	only	a	
few	can	see	and	speak	that	Oedipus	will	be	led	to	discover	and	see	the	truth	with	
his	own	eyes	and	with	his	own	ability.	The	proximity	between	Sophocles’	text	and	
Plato’s	Republic	lies	in	their	denunciation	of	the	inadequacy	between	knowledge	
and	truth:	the	denunciation	of	a	knowledge	that	would	not	care	for	the	forms	the	
soul	has	seen	and	that	 it	can	rediscover	 through	philosophical	exercise.	 In	 this	
respect,	the	tragedy	of	Oedipus	Rex	is	both	representative	of	the	Archaic	Greek	
truth	performed	in	coincidence	with	an	act	of	power	and	the	of	the	truth	of	the	
philosophical	 inquirer.	Oedipus,	who	is	an	 illegitimate	ruler	at	the	beginning	of	
the	 play	 (like	 the	 tyrant),	 discovers	 his	 identity	 through	 the	 technique	 of	 the	
inquiry.	When	he	discovers	it,	he	cannot	bear	being	both	the	man	of	power	and	
of	knowledge.	Indeed,	because	he	cannot	bear	the	truth,	Oedipus	finally	blinds	
himself.51		
                                                
51	In	the	original	text,	Oedipus’	decision	to	blind	himself	for	he	cannot	stand	to	face	the	truth	is	
told	by	the	Messenger	in	scene	9	and	follows	the	discovery	of	Jocasta’s	suicide.	The	text	develps	
with	 a	 strong	 insistence	 on	 “seeing”	which,	 even	 from	 the	Messenger’s	 perspective,	 is	made	
unbearable:	
[…]	And	there	we	spied	the	woman	hanging	
with	her	neck	noosed	in	a	twisting	cloth.	
He	saw,	and	with	an	awful	roar,	released	the	knot.	
Once	she	was	laid	upon	the	ground,		
what	happened	next	was	unbearable	to	see.	
For	he	extracted	the	long	golden	pins	
which	fixed	her	robes;	and	then	he	lifted	them	
and	stabbed	them	in	the	sockets	of	his	eyes.	
And	as	he	did,	he	cried	that	they	should	see	no	more	
the	sort	of	evils	he	had	suffered	and	had	done,	
but	that	in	future	they	should	stare	in	darkness	
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In	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	we	learn	that	Oedipus’	name	refers	to	the	
Greek	 word	 oida: 52		“Oida	 evokes	 both	 oidano,	 “to	 inflate,	 swell”,	 oidema,	
“swelling”	(Oedipus’	feet),	and	eideo,	eido,	to	see	with	one’s	own	eyes	(Foucault:	
2013,	259).	Oedipus	 is	 the	one	who	seeks	 to	see	 the	 truth	with	his	own	eyes.	
However,	 the	truth	he	will	discover	 is	different	 from	the	one	derived	 from	the	
knowledge	 thanks	 to	 which	 he	 was	 enthroned:	 it	 will	 be	 derived	 from	 an	
investigation	through	which	Oedipus	attempts	to	discover	the	identity	of	Laios’	
murderer	in	order	to	bring	back	justice	to	the	city.53	
	
This	investigation,	conducted	according	to	a	tekhne,	leads	to	the	superimposition	
of	 what	 is	 said	 with	 what	 has	 been	 seen:	 the	 incomplete	 discourse	 of	 the	
characters	speaking	a	part	of	the	truth	in	the	play	(Jocasta,	Tiresias	and	Creon)	
will	meet	the	truth	of	a	visual	witness	(the	peasant)	and	reveal	to	Oedipus	that	
Tiresias,	 the	 blind	 seer	 who	 sees	 the	 full	 truth,	 was	 right.	 Sophocles’	 text	
constitutes,	according	 to	Foucault,	a	 turning	point	 in	 the	 relationship	between	
power	and	knowledge:	Oedipus	acts	as	a	tyrant	because	he	does	not	care	about	
                                                
at	the	ones	that	they	should	not	have	seen,	
and	fail	to	know	those	that	he’d	longed	for.	(Sophocles:	2015,	64-65).	Oedipus	will	not	witness	
the	 consequences	 of	 his	 acts	 but	 he	will	 forever	 reflect	 on	 the	 ones	 he	 has	 committed.	 The	
paradoxical	reference	to	vision	shows	that	Oedipus’	fate	heralded	at	the	beginning	of	the	play	is	
now	complete	and	 that	 it	 is	 the	knowledge	of	Oedipus	as	 the	murderer	of	his	 father	and	 the	
husband	of	his	mother	which	ends	the	inquiry.	From	then	on,	it	is	no	longer	the	observed	truth	
of	facts	which	matters	but	only	the	one	that	has	been	tied	to	the	preceding	fragments	of	discourse	
throughout	the	play.			
52	For	further	development	of	the	analysis	of	Oedipus’	name,	see	footnote	40	(Foucault:	2013,	
244).	
53	Depending	on	the	text	quoted,	the	spelling	of	the	name	of	this	character	differs.	For	the	sake	
of	consistency,	I	have	chosen	to	spell	it	Laios	through	the	course	of	my	argument.	I	have	respected	
the	spelling	used	in	the	original	text	in	the	quotations.	The	name	is	spellt	Laius	in	the	Lectures	on	
the	Will	to	Know	and	in	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex.	
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the	divine	words	that	are	true	and	just	all	at	once.	Following	his	own	will,	Oedipus	
puts	the	divine	oracle	to	the	test	in	order	to	free	himself	from	the	gods’	decrees.	
However,	 the	 originality	 of	 Oedipus’	 quest	 is	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	 a	 specific	
tekhne	which	is	neither	an	attempt	at	solving	a	riddle	(as	it	was	in	the	case	of	the	
Sphinx)	 nor	 a	 hermeneutic	 exercise.	 The	 novelty	 of	 Oedipus’	 tekhne	 is	 that	 it	
precisely	 avoids	 the	 gods’	 justice	 by	 the	 use	 of	 the	 inquiry.	 What	 matters	 is	
therefore	 not	 the	 interpretation	 of	 what	 has	 been	 said	 by	 the	 gods,	 but	 the	
possibility	of	linking	what	is	said	to	be	true	with	what	actually	happened.		
	
The	 use	 of	 this	 technique	modifies	 the	 relationship	 between	men	 and	 tukhe.	
Tukhe	 is	no	 longer	 the	 fate	 conveyed	by	 the	 truth	and	 justice	of	 the	gods	but	
instead	 becomes	 the	 unexpected	 event	 whose	 occurrence	 can	 constitute	 an	
occasion	 to	 change	 the	 course	 of	 things.	 In	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know,	
Foucault	writes:	
We	 can	 see	 that	 the	 tekhne	 of	 Oedipus	 is	 not	 tuned	 to	 knowledge	
(connaissance)	of	the	gods’	hidden	decrees	which	fix	the	destiny	of	men	
in	advance,	but	to	the	discovery	of	what	happened	and	is	happening.	It	
does	not	listen	to	the	words	of	the	gods	which	bind	man	once	and	for	all;	
it	 lends	 attention	 to	 those	 irregularities,	 detours,	 and	 highs	 and	 lows	
which	constitute	Fortune	[Tukhe].	The	knowledge	(savoir)	of	Oedipus	is	
on	 the	 side	 of	 Tukhe.	 This	 proximity	 of	 tekhne-tukhe	 in	 Oedipal	
knowledge	has	a	double	effect:	on	the	one	hand,	it	allows	one	to	give	
credence	only	to	what	has	happened,	not	to	look,	“either	to	the	right	or	
the	left,”	for	what	side	the	prophet’s	birds	are	flying	[…],	to	consider	all	
prediction,	all	pronia	[…]	idle,	and	not	to	see	a	realized	prediction	but	a	
blow	of	Tukhe	in	the	events	that	occur,	like	the	death	of	Polybus	[…].	The	
tekhne	 of	 Oedipus	 allows	 him	 to	 consider	 divine	 oracles,	 “theon	
manteumata”	[…],	as	nothing.	But	on	the	other	hand	to	consider	them	
as	nothing	is	to	be	able	to	escape;	 it	 is	always	possible	to	substitute	a	
different	destiny	for	the	moira	[fate;	G.B]	that	prophets	seem	to	reserve	
for	man	[…].	(Foucault:	2013,	248)	
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What	Foucault	insists	upon	when	he	stresses	the	proximity	between	tekhne	and	
tukhe	is	that	the	case	of	Oedipus	Rex	reveals	a	disjunction	between	justice	and	
knowledge.	 It	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 case	 that	 the	 gods’	 esoteric	 knowledge	 and	
sovereign	power	command	the	King’s	decisions	and	determine	men’s	destiny;	it	
is	Oedipus’	use	of	a	specific	tekhne	that	will	provoke	his	fate.		
	
What	 Foucault	 is	 interested	 in	 is	 precisely	 the	 emergence	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	
tekhne	that	can	be	used	by	men	in	order	to	counterbalance	the	esoteric	divine	
decrees.	The	process	that	will	lead	Oedipus	to	confirm	the	divine	truth	is	a	search	
for	 truth	 that	 no	 longer	 consists	 in	 the	 sovereign	 coincidence	 between	 truth,	
discourse	and	justice	in	one	and	the	same	act	of	power.	On	the	contrary,	Oedipus	
risks	his	power	and	goes	through	the	play	on	the	basis	of	a	disjunction:	it	is	by	
making	 justice	 and	 truth	 coincide	 again	 that	 he	will	 eventually	 lose	 power.	 In	
trying	to	affirm	a	sovereignty	that	bypasses	the	fate	imposed	by	divine	truth,	what	
Oedipus	focuses	on	is	the	possibility	of	putting	the	divine	knowledge	to	the	test	
through	an	enquiry	reuniting	the	seen	and	the	said	(the	truth	of	the	oracle	with	
the	 discourse	 of	 the	 messenger).	 This	 restores	 the	 coincidence	 between	 the	
expressible	 and	 the	 visible	which	 characterized	 the	 divine	 esoteric	 knowledge	
made	 a	 ritual	 act	 of	 power:	 it	 is	 only	when	 the	 identity	 of	 Laios’	murderer	 is	
identified	through	visual	testimony	that	the	truth	will	be	complete.		
	
In	the	preface	to	the	French	edition	of	Sophocles’	tragedies,	Pierre	Vidal-Naquet	
draws	attention	to	the	different	kind	of	knowledge	Oedipus	uses	when	he	resorts	
to	investigating	Laios’	murder.	Vidal-Naquet	insists	on	the	fact	that	the	opposition	
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between	divine	and	human	knowledge	and	their	respective	validity	is	expressed	
by	the	words	of	the	priest	who	recognizes	both	may	be	valid.	This	opposition	is	
further	pursued	by	Oedipus	who	puts	the	truth	of	his	technique	up	against	the	
truth	of	the	seer.	Vidal-Naquet	writes:		
Through	a	frequent	play	on	his	name	(Oidipous)	and	on	the	verb	meaning	
“I	 know”	 (oida),	 Sophocles	 makes	 Oedipus	 the	 one	 who	 knows.	 It	 is	
through	knowledge	and	art	that	he	has	freed	Thebes	from	the	dangerous	
musician,	 the	 Sphinge.	 It	 is	 to	 Oedipus’	 knowledge	 that	 the	 priest	 –	
representative	of	the	people	at	the	beginning	of	the	play	–	appeals:	“It	
matters	little	whether	the	voice	of	a	God	or	a	mortal	teach	it	to	you”.	[…]	
When	Tiresias,	speaking	enigmatically	in	his	turn,	claims	that	“there	lives	
in	him	the	power	of	truth”,	Oedipus	who	puts	the	art	of	the	seer	on	an	
inferior	 level	 than	 his	 own	 knowledge	 replies:	 “And	who	would	 have	
taught	you	the	truth?	It	is	certainly	not	your	art”.54	(Vidal–Naquet:	1973,	
27)	
	
What	 Foucault	 stresses	 and	 Vidal-Naquet	 corroborates	 is	 the	mutation	 of	 the	
meaning	of	knowledge:	 it	no	longer	constitutes	an	immediate	manifestation	of	
power	which	realizes	the	order	of	things,	but	represents	a	specific	technique	or	
art	accessible	to	men.		
	
	During	a	later	lecture	course	given	at	the	Collège	de	France	in	1979-1980,	and	
published	as	Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants,	Foucault	specifies	further	the	nature	
of	this	human	tekhne.	He	shows	that	by	putting	to	the	test	the	words	of	the	oracle,	
Oedipus	will	be	led	to	the	reconstruction	of	truth	in	its	totality,	joining	the	said	
                                                
54	“Par	un	jeu	fréquent	sur	son	nom	(Oidipous)	et	sur	le	verbe	signifiant	“je	sais”	(oida),	Sophocle	
fait	d’Oedipe	celui	qui	sait.	C’est	par	le	savoir	et	par	l’art	qu’il	a	délivré	Thèbes	de	la	redoutable	
musicienne,	la	Sphinge.	C’est	au	savoir	d’Oedipe	que	fait	appel	le	prêtre,	porte–parole	du	peuple	
au	début	de	 la	pièce:	“Que	 la	voix	d’un	Dieu	te	 l’enseigne	ou	qu’un	mortel	 t’en	 instruise,	peu	
importe”.	Quand	Tirésias	parlant	à	son	tour	par	énigme	affirme	que	“vit	en	lui	la	force	du	vrai”,	
Oedipe	qui	met	l’art	du	devin	sur	un	plan	inférieur	à	son	savoir	réplique:	“Et	qui	t’aurait	appris	le	
vrai?	Ce	n’est	certes	pas	ton	art”.	
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(the	discourses	of	different	characters	in	the	play	reporting	what	they	know)	with	
the	seen	(the	testimony	of	the	peasant	who	has	witnessed	the	crime):	
Thus	statistically	there	is	a	set	of	six	halves.	[…]	In	fact,	it	is	a	matter	of	
the	 adjustment	of	 complementary	 fragments	 that	 go	hand-in-hand,	 if	
you	will,	at	each	level,	with	the	totality	of	truth.	You	are	given	the	totality	
of	truth	that	is,	actually,	uttered	by	the	gods	[by	the	oracle	and	Tiresias	
the	 seer].	 This	 totality	 of	 truth	 is,	 if	 not	 completely	 spoken,	 at	 least	
touched	on	by	Oedipus	and	 Jocasta	when	 they	 recall	 their	memories.	
And	finally,	the	totality	of	truth	is	said	again	a	third	time,	by	the	servants	
and	the	slaves.	[…]	The	game	of	these	two	halves	that	come	to	complete	
themselves	between	two	characters	[…],	is	what,	in	Greek,	is	of	course	
called	 the	 σύμβολον:	 this	 figure,	 this	 material	 object,	 this	 piece	 of	
pottery	which	is	broken	in	two	and	possessed	by	two	characters	bound	
to	each	other	by	a	certain	pact.	[…]	Truth	will	therefore	be	obtained	and	
only	be	obtained	through	this	game	of	the	σύμβολον,	of	a	half	or	rather	
of	 a	 fragment	 that	 will	 come	 and	 complete	 another,	 possessed	 by	
someone	who	is	linked	to	the	first	by	a	religious	or	juridical	bond,	or	one	
of	friendship	(Foucault:	2012a,	31–32).55	
	
The	specific	 concept	of	 truth	Foucault	puts	 forward	 in	 this	 text,	which	already	
appears	under	a	similar	form	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	in	“Truth	and	
Juridical	Forms”,	and	in	Wrong–Doing,	Truth–Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	
Justice	relies	on	the	basis	of	a	disjunction	between	the	discourse	of	knowledge	
and	the	facts	to	which	it	corresponds.56	
	
                                                
55 	“On	 a	 donc	 statistiquement	 un	 jeu	 de	 six	 moitiés.	 […]	 En	 fait,	 il	 s’agit	 d’ajustements	 de	
fragments	complémentaires	qui	se	font	deux	par	deux	avec,	si	vous	voulez,	à	chaque	niveau,	la	
totalité	de	la	vérité.	Vous	avez	la	totalité	de	la	totalité	de	la	vérité	qui,	au	fond,	est	dite	par	les	
dieux.	 La	 totalité	est,	 sinon	 tout	à	 fait	dite,	du	moins	comme	touchée	du	doigt	par	Oedipe	et	
Jocaste	lorsqu’ils	rappellent	leurs	souvenirs.	Et	enfin,	la	totalité	de	la	vérité	est	dite	à	nouveau,	
une	trosième	fois,	par	les	serviteurs	et	les	esclaves.	[…]	Le	jeu	de	ces	deux	moitiés	qui	viennent	
s’emboîter	entre	deux	personnages	[…],	c’est	ce	que,	en	Grec,	on	appelle	bien	sûr	le	σύμβολον:	
cette	figure,	cet	objet	matériel,	ce	tesson	de	poterie	qui	est	cassé	en	deux	et	que	possèdent	les	
deux	personnes	qui	ont	lié	entre	elles	un	certain	pacte.	Et	lorsqu’il	faut	authentifier	le	pacte.	[…]	
La	vérité	va	donc	s’obtenir	et	elle	ne	s’obtiendra	que	par	ce	jeu	du	σύμβολον,	d’une	moitié	ou	
plutôt	d’un	fragment	qui	viendra	s’ajuster	à	un	autre,	détenu	par	quelqu’un	qui	est	lié	au	premier	
par	un	lien	religieux,	juridique	ou	d’amitié”.	
56	See	respectively	Foucault:	2013,	229–260,	Foucault:	2000c:	16–32,	Foucault:	2014b:	57–90. 
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The	way	in	which	the	different	parts	of	truth	complete	each	other	throughout	the	
play	 shows	 that	 the	 type	 of	 truthful	 and	 just	 discourse	 it	 relies	 on	 is	 always	
fundamentally	lacking	and	dependent	on	a	symbolic	structure:	the	sumbolon	 is	
this	 fragmented	 object	 whose	 other	 half	 is	 missing.	 In	 the	 same	 fashion,	
Sophocles’	text	shows	that	the	knowledge	of	the	characters	of	the	play,	in	order	
to	be	complete	and	just,	requires	the	visual	testimony	of	the	peasant.57	This	two-
party	distribution	of	truth	recalls	the	principle	thanks	to	which	Oedipus	had	been	
granted	political	power	at	the	beginning	of	the	play:	the	fact	that	the	knowledge	
he	spoke	was	also	acknowledged	and	validated	by	the	city.	Unlike	the	sovereign	
truth	which	 sees	 and	 speaks	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 Foucault	 shows	 that	 the	 truth	
spoken	by	men	relies	on	a	divorce	between	the	seen	and	the	said	and	it	is	only	
the	 overcoming	 of	 this	 divorce	 (i.e.	 the	 reconstitution	 of	 the	 sumbolon)	 that	
legitimates	the	truth	again.	In	the	transcription	of	the	lecture	entitled	“Oedipal	
Knowledge”	found	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	Foucault	explains	how	the	
divine	and	human	knowledge	involved	are	of	a	different	kind.	He	writes:	
[…]	there	is	also	a	displacement	in	the	forms	of	knowledge:	Apollo,	who	
sees	everything	and	speaks	to	his	servants,	was	invoked	first	of	all,	or	his	
blind	seer,	who	listens	to	the	god’s	word	and	sees	in	the	dark.	Listening	
and	looking	whose	power	has	nothing	in	common	with	human	listening	
                                                
57	In	the	original	text,	the	truth	of	facts	is	made	possible	once	the	messenger	states	that	he	has	
seen	Oedipus	discovering	Jocasta’s	dead	body:	
“CHORUS-LEADER	
Poor	soul	–	what	caused	her	death?	
MESSENGER	
She	brought	it	on	herself.	
You’re	spared	the	worst	of	what	was	done,	
because	you	were	not	there	to	see,	
but	I	shall	still	recall	as	best	as	I	can,	
so	you	may	know	of	that	poor	lady’s	sufferings.”	(Sophocles:	2015,	64)	
The	messenger	clearly	insists	on	the	fact	that	he,	unlike	the	chorus,	can	speak	the	truth	because	
he	has	seen	what	happened.	This	 is	one	example	of	how	the	reunion	of	the	seen	and	the	said	
constitutes	the	condition	for	truth	throughout	the	play.	
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and	 looking,	 since	 they	 see	 the	 invisible	 and	 understand	 the	 puzzle.	
Corresponding	to	them	in	the	human	half	are	completely	different	kinds	
of	looking	and	listening:	regarding	the	death	of	Laius,	Jocasta	says	what	
she	has	heard,	and	Oedipus	recounts	what	he	has	seen	with	his	eyes	and	
done	with	his	hands;	in	turn,	the	messenger	from	Corinth	recounts	what	
he	has	seen	and	done;	the	shepherd	of	Thebes,	what	he	has	done	and	
heard.	In	this	half	the	seeing	and	hearing	intertwine	(Jocasta	heard	what	
the	 shepherd	 saw;	 Oedipus	 heard	 what	 the	 messenger	 saw;	 the	
shepherd	heard	what	Jocasta	saw	and	did),	just	as	the	light	and	voice	in	
the	god	and	the	seer	intertwine	(the	god	of	light	makes	his	voice	heard	
by	the	blind	man	who	sees	everything).	(Foucault:	2013,	234)	
	
The	correspondence	between	the	said	and	the	seen,	which	are	heterogeneous	on	
the	human	side,	 is	made	possible	through	the	symbolic	structure	Foucault	has	
described.	 It	 is	 this	 symbolic	 structure	 that	 will	 determine	 the	 shape	 of	 the	
knowledge	that	emerges,	according	to	Foucault,	within	Classical	Greek	thought.	
It	is	a	form	of	knowledge	that	dismantles	the	unity	that	characterized	the	power	
of	 the	 sovereign	 –	 the	 strict	 coincidence	 between	 power	 and	 knowledge	 that	
grants	 possession	 of	 the	 totality	 of	 truth	 to	 either	 the	 gods	 or	 the	 seer.	 This	
dismantling	goes	hand-in-hand	with	the	emergence	of	knowledge	as	tekhne	that	
seeks	the	reunion	of	the	said	and	the	seen,	and	finds	the	positivity	of	facticity	at	
its	basis.	The	investigation	led	by	Oedipus	aims	at	reconstituting	the	veracity	of	
the	facts	which	confirm	the	 identity	of	Laios’	murderer.	However,	the	symbolic	
structure	of	knowledge	and	truth	that	corresponds	to	this	tekhne	 introduces	a	
necessary	 temporalization	 whereas	 the	 power/knowledge	 of	 the	 sovereign	 is	
immediate,	spontaneous	and	true	all	the	time,	it	is	only	with	time	that	knowledge	
as	tekhne	reveals	truth.	In	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	Foucault	describes	
the	knowledge	technique	which	appears	in	Oedipus	Rex	as	a	completion	of	two	
fragments:	
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The	halves	which	come	to	complement	each	other	are	like	the	fragments	
of	 a	 symbol	 whose	 reunited	 totality	 has	 the	 value	 of	 proof	 and	
attestation.	 Oedipus	 is	 a	 “symbolic”	 story,	 a	 story	 of	 circulating	
fragments,	which	pass	from	hand	to	hand	and	the	lost	half	of	which	one	
is	looking	for:	from	Phoebus	to	the	seer,	from	Jocasta	to	Oedipus,	from	
the	messenger	to	the	shepherd	–	so	from	the	gods	to	the	kings	and	from	
the	kings	to	the	slaves.	And	when,	finally,	the	last	slave	leaves	his	hut	
with	the	last	fragment	of	knowledge	still	needed	in	his	hand,	then	the	
“narrative”	half	has	joined	the	“oracle”	half,	the	“incest”	half	has	joined	
the	“murder”	half,	the	“Theban”	half	has	 joined	the	“Corinthian”	half,	
and	 the	 total	 figure	 is	 reconstituted.	 The	 tessera	 has	 been	 reformed	
from	 its	 scattered	 fragments.	 The	 sumbolon	 is	 complete.	 The	 entire	
procedure	of	the	search	has	followed	the	dictates	of	this	mechanism	of	
the	symbol:	examination	and	authentication	of	what	one	has	 in	one’s	
hand,	definition	of	what	is	missing	and	was	of	supreme	importance	to	
know;	 designation	 of	 the	 person	 who	 must	 have	 the	 absent	 and	
complementary	 fragment	 in	his	possession.	This	 is	what	Oedipus	calls	
“making	an	inquiry”.	(Foucault:	2013,	234–235)	
	
We	 learn	 from	 this	 quote	 that	 the	 circularity	 of	 the	 symbolic	 structure	 that	
characterizes	the	new	morphology	of	knowledge	based	upon	the	inquiry	is	both	
a	 completion	 and	 an	 authentication.	 Not	 only	 will	 the	 knowledge	 obtained	
through	the	reunion	of	the	said	and	the	seen	be	complete	knowledge,	but	it	will	
also	be	authentic	knowledge,	knowledge	that	corresponds	to	truth	and	which	is	
no	longer	the	idiosyncratic	truth	of	the	tyrant	or	the	divine	truth	accessible	to	a	
few.		
	
It	is	easy	to	see	how,	according	to	Foucault,	the	type	of	knowledge	and	truth	that	
appears	in	Oedipus	Rex	inaugurates	Platonic	philosophy	and	its	relation	to	truth:	
the	 type	 of	 philosophical	 discourse	 which	 emerges	 with	 Platonism	 seeks	 a	
relationship	between	knowledge	and	the	remembrance	of	the	form	the	soul	has	
seen.	What	 Foucault	 sees	 in	Classical	Greece	 is	 the	emergence	of	 concepts	of	
knowledge	and	truth	which	no	longer	concern	the	power	of	the	divine	or	of	the	
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poets	but	the	use	of	a	tekhne	which	establishes	a	link	between	the	visible	and	the	
expressible	 (between	 what	 has	 happened	 and	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 fact).	
Knowledge	no	longer	corresponds	to	the	very	utterance	of	the	ruler	who	knows	
and	speaks	but	to	the	absent	fact	it	designates.58	
	
Although	 it	 is	 in	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know	and	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	
Forms”	 that	 Foucault	 insists	 on	 this	 mutation	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth,	 the	
mutation	 of	 the	 exercise	 of	 power	 emerging	 with	 Classical	 Greece	 is	 already	
mentioned	in	Foucault’s	inaugural	talk	at	the	Collège	de	France	on	2nd	December	
1970.	He	says:	
For	the	Greek	poets	of	the	sixth	century	BC,	the	true	discourse	(in	the	
strong	and	valorised	sense	of	 the	word),	 the	discourse	which	 inspired	
respect	and	terror,	and	to	which	one	had	to	submit	because	it	ruled,	was	
the	one	pronounced	by	men	who	spoke	as	of	right	and	according	to	the	
required	ritual;	the	discourse	which	dispensed	justice	and	gave	everyone	
his	 share,	 the	 discourse	 which	 in	 prophesying	 the	 future	 not	 only	
announced	what	was	going	 to	happen	but	helped	 to	make	 it	happen,	
carrying	men’s	minds	along	with	it	and	thus	weaving	itself	into	the	fabric	
of	destiny.	Yet	already	a	century	later	the	highest	truth	no	longer	resided	
in	what	discourse	was	or	did,	but	in	what	it	said:	a	day	came	when	truth	
was	displaced	from	the	ritualized,	efficacious	and	just	act	of	enunciation,	
towards	the	utterance	itself,	its	meaning,	its	form,	its	object,	its	relation	
to	 its	 reference.	 Between	 Hesiod	 and	 Plato	 a	 certain	 division	 was	
established,	 separating	 true	 discourse	 from	 false	 discourse:	 a	 new	
                                                
58	In	the	1st	February	1984	lecture	from	the	final	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	de	France,	Foucault	
differentiates	two	different	modes	of	truth-telling,	which	he	calls	“veridiction”	(Foucault:	2011b,	
23):	the	truth	of	the	one	who	teaches,	which	is	related	to	a	knowledge	which	pre-exists	the	act	of	
its	 enunciation	 and	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 parrhesiast.	 Unlike	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 teacher	 or	 of	 the	
technician,	the	truth	of	the	parrhesiast	implies	the	strict	coincidence	between	one’s	actions	and	
the	production	of	 truth	which	correspond	 to	 them.	 It	 is	an	act	made	 truth	 through	which	 the	
individual	defines	an	ethical	conduct	by	himself.	This	form	of	truth-telling	is	linked,	throughout	
this	 lecture	course,	 to	 the	philosophical	practice	of	 the	Cynics	who	produce	 the	 truth	of	 their	
conduct	at	the	very	strict	moment	of	their	actions.	One	can	see	that	the	concepts	of	truth-telling	
and	“veridiction”	Foucault	stresses	link	the	production	of	truth	to	an	immanent	technique	and	
not	to	the	determination	of	a	rationality	to	be	discovered	through	the	use	of	knowledge.	In	this	
sense,	there	is	a	direct	dialogue	between	Foucault’s	first	and	last	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	de	
France.	 Whilst,	 in	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	 Will	 to	 Know,	 Foucault	 analyses	 the	 emergence	 of	
epistemological	truth	as	a	human	technique,	he	provides	in	The	Courage	of	Truth	the	example	of	
ethical	attitudes	which	bring	back	the	concept	of	truth	to	strict	immanent	action.		
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division	because	henceforth	the	true	discourse	is	no	longer	precious	and	
desirable,	since	it	is	no	longer	the	one	linked	to	the	exercise	of	power.	
(Foucault:	1981,	54)		
	
The	 redistribution	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge	 appears	 clearly:	when	 knowledge	
coincided	with	power,	it	is	discourse	as	an	act	that	mattered.	What	mattered	was	
the	efficacy	of	a	discourse	that	was	powerful	in	itself	(the	coincidence	of	what	is	
said	and	seen	by	gods,	the	oracle	or	the	seer).	However,	once	the	divorce	between	
knowledge	and	power	occurs,	it	is	no	longer	the	efficacy	of	the	act	of	enunciation	
or	discourse	in	its	materiality	that	matters.	What	matters	then	is	the	meaning	and	
the	 object	 of	 discourse	 –	 its	 absent	 referent.	 Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 the	 play	
deepens	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 mutation	 of	 sovereign	 power	 by	 adding	 to	 the	
question	 of	 the	 coincidence	 between	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 law	 and	 the	
manifestation	 of	 truth	 the	 idea	 that	 truth	 is	 no	 longer	 conveyed	 by	 the	
coincidence	of	act	and	discourse.	
	
The	concept	of	truth	as	performance	and	coincidence	of	the	said	and	the	seen	(or	
of	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible)	 is	 an	 idea	 Foucault	 borrows	 from	 Marcel	
Détienne’s	analysis	of	the	meaning	of	truth	in	Archaic	Greece.	In	The	Masters	Of	
Truth	in	Archaic	Greece,	Détienne	insists	upon	the	fact	that	the	sung	speech	of	
the	poets	had	the	function	–	amongst	others	–	of	praising	the	sovereign	who	sets	
the	world	 in	 order	 and	 thus	marks	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	kosmos.	
However,	this	sung	speech	is	not	merely	the	reminder	of	a	lost	origin	but	plays	an	
active	part	in	realizing	the	order	of	the	world:	
Hesiod	 does	 appear	 to	 provide	 the	 final	 remaining	 example	 of	 sung	
speech	praising	the	figure	of	the	king,	in	a	society	centered	on	the	type	
of	 sovereignty	 seemingly	 exemplified	 by	 Mycenaean	 civilization.	 In	
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Hesiod's	case,	the	royal	figure	is	simply	represented	by	Zeus.	At	this	level	
the	poet's	function	was	above	all	to	“serve	sovereignty”:	by	reciting	the	
myth	of	emergence,	he	collaborated	directly	in	setting	the	world	in	order.	
(Détienne:	1999,	44–45)	
	
The	last	sentence	of	the	quotation	underlines	the	role	of	the	poet	in	relation	to	a	
logos	whose	efficacy	is	not	divorced	from	the	moment	of	its	enunciation.	When	
the	poet	"[collaborates]	directly	in	setting	the	world	in	order”,	the	sung	speech	is	
efficacious	and	does	not	correspond	to	the	usual	meaning	of	memory:	it	 is	the	
sovereign	logos	made	actual.	Détienne	adds:	
Sung	 speech,	 delivered	 by	 a	 poet	 with	 the	 gift	 of	 second	 sight,	 was	
efficacious	 speech.	 Its	 peculiar	 power	 instituted	 a	 symbolicoreligious	
world	that	was	indeed	reality	itself.	[…]	Traditionally,	the	poet	served	two	
functions:	“to	hymn	the	immortals	and	the	glorious	deeds	of	heroes.”	The	
example	of	Hermes	illustrates	the	former:	“While	he	played	shrilly	on	his	
lyre,	he	lifted	up	his	voice	and	sang.	He	sang	(krainon)	[literally:	through	
his	praise	he	made	real]	the	story	of	the	deathless	gods	and	of	the	dark	
earth,	how	at	the	first	they	came	to	be,	and	how	each	one	received	his	
portion.”	(Détienne:	1999,	43)	
	
It	is	not	by	accident	that	the	Greek	for	the	verb	“sing”	is	krainon,	which	signifies	
an	act	of	power,59	and	means	that	the	sung	speech	is	an	act	establishing	order	
and	justice.	It	is	only	through	the	act	of	singing	that	the	poet	actualizes	its	logos.	
The	poet	 –	one	of	 the	 “Masters	of	 Truth"	described	by	Détienne	–	 shows	 the	
existence	of	a	symbolicoreligious	link	to	a	beyond	which	is	not	of	a	metaphysical	
nature.	 It	 is	the	very	“magicoreligious”	power	Foucault	mentions	in	“Truth	and	
Juridical	Forms”:	a	power	which	coincides	with	an	efficacious	logos	but	which	is	
the	 exclusive	 possession	 of	 gods	 and	 the	 Masters	 of	 Truth.	 Between	 the	
symbolicoreligious	 function	 of	 the	 poet	 who,	 by	 praising	 God,	 makes	 his	
                                                
59	Krainon	comes	from	krinein	which	means	“to	accomplish,	to	fulfill”.	See	Liddell	&	Scott	(1883,	
840).	
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cosmogonic	 power	 come	 true	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 sumbolon	 which	 runs	
through	the	story	of	Oedipus	Rex,	the	nature	of	truth	changes.	In	the	case	of	the	
Masters	 of	 Truth,	 Détienne’s	 reading	 of	 aletheia	 is	 articulated	 around	 the	
question	of	memory	and	forgetfulness:	Détienne	reads	it	as	a	non-forgetfulness	
[a-lethe]	and	it	is	by	actualizing	truth	through	its	speech	that	the	Masters	of	Truth	
prevent	its	oblivion.	In	the	case	of	Foucault’s	reading	of	Oedipus	Rex,	the	question	
of	 truth	 is	 asked	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 parricide	who	 needs	 to	 be	
identified	through	a	correspondence	between	the	vision	of	Tiresias	and	that	of	
the	 peasant	 (the	 visual	witness).	 The	words	 of	 the	 peasant	 and	 the	words	 of	
Tiresias	meet	at	the	point	where	the	identity	of	Oedipus	is	finally	revealed:	the	
testimony	of	the	visual	witness	brings	the	confirmation	of	Oedipus’	parricide.		
	
However,	in	the	case	of	the	poet	praising	the	truth	of	the	kosmos,	“his	privilege	
was	to	enter	into	contact	with	the	other	world,	and	his	memory	granted	him	the	
power	to	‘decipher	the	invisible’”	(Détienne:	1999,	43).	The	poet	–	who	sings	the	
power	of	the	gods	–	possesses	“the	privilege	to	‘devise	and	accomplish’	(noseai	
te	krenai	te):	Apollo	‘realizes	through	his	speech’,	and	Zeus	‘realizes’	everything”	
(Détienne:	 1999,	 71).	 In	Archaic	Greece,	 the	poet	 and	 the	 seer	were	 amongst	
those	able	to	access	the	efficacious	logos	of	gods.	In	contrast	to	this	efficacious	
coincidence	between	knowledge	and	power,	Foucault	interprets	the	practice	of	
inquiry	in	Oedipus	Rex	as	the	direct	consequence	of	the	dismantlement	of	a	form	
of	political	power	which	is	in	fact	a	case	of	sovereignty:	the	ability	to	know	and	
realize	 truth	 in	 one	 and	 the	 same	 act	 becomes	 the	 deployment	 of	 a	 tekhne	
through	 which	 the	 veracity	 of	 a	 fact	 is	 established.	 The	 dismantling	 of	 this	
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coincidence	entails	a	definition	of	truth	as	dissociation	between	the	visible	and	
the	 expressible	 whose	 coincidence	 was	 performed	 by	 sovereigns	 (Masters	 of	
Truths,	kings	and	gods).	The	role	played	by	the	peasant	 in	Sophocles’s	Oedipus	
Rex	precisely	produces	this	form	of	truth:	once	it	is	brought	forward,	his	testimony	
will	reveal	Oedipus’	parricide	and	identity,	both	of	which	become	facts	with	which	
truth	 is	 associated.	 Truth	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 partial	 truth	 spoken	 by	 different	
characters	 throughout	 the	 play	 but	 a	 true	 fact.	 During	 the	 17th	 March	 1791	
lecture,	Foucault	says:	
And	 this	 system	 of	 constraints	 shown	 by	 the	 Oedipus	 fable	 could	 be	
characterized	very	schematically	in	the	following	way:	on	the	one	hand,	
the	political,	juridical,	and	religious	requirement	to	transform	the	event,	
its	 recurrences	 and	 figurations	 over	 time,	 into	 established	 and	
definitively	preserved	facts	in	the	observation	of	witnesses.	Subjecting	
the	event	to	the	form	of	the	observed	fact	is	the	first	aspect	of	Oedipal	
truth.	(Foucault:	2013,	196)	
	
The	subjection	of	the	event	to	the	observed	 fact,	that	 is	the	fact	which	cannot	
change	and	may	be	retrieved	through	memory,	recollection	or	knowledge,	echoes	
Foucault’s	analysis	of	 the	mutation	of	 the	political	power	as	 the	expression	of	
justice.	Whereas	political	power	was	expressed	through	a	sovereign	law	realized	
as	 it	was	spoken,	the	structure	of	the	sumbolon	which	marks	the	specificity	of	
Oedipal	knowledge	severs	the	truth	of	discourse	from	its	expression.	This	makes	
possible	the	move	from	a	judicial	to	an	epistemological	understanding	of	truth:	
both	are	subjected	to	the	transfer	of	the	immediate	sovereign	synthesis	of	power	
and	justice	to	a	mediated	relationship	of	signification.	Foucault	adds:	
The	 transformation	of	 the	 lightning	 flash	of	 the	event	 into	observed	
fact,	 and	 access	 to	 truth	 given	 only	 to	 someone	 who	 respects	 the	
nomos,	are	the	two	great	historical	constraints	that,	since	Greece,	have	
been	imposed	on	the	true	discourse	of	Western	societies,	and	it	is	the	
birth,	 the	 formation	 of	 these	 historical	 constraints	 that	 Oedipus	
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recounts.	 […]	 [W]e	 can	 see	 how	 the	 signifier	 is	 what	 enables	 the	
lightning	flash	of	the	event	to	be	subjected	to	the	yoke	of	the	observed	
fact,	and	what	also	allows	reduction	of	the	requirement	of	distribution	
to	the	purified	knowledge	of	the	law.	The	system	of	the	signifier	is	the	
major	instrumental	element	in	this	Oedipal	constraint;	which	is	why	the	
order	of	the	signifier	has	to	be	overturned.	(Foucault:	2013,	196–197)	
	
Foucault’s	reading	of	the	historical	emergence	of	a	new	way	of	producing	truth	
shares	a	judicial	as	well	as	an	epistemological	dimension.	In	the	Lectures	on	the	
Will	 to	 Know,	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 and	 Truth-Telling:	 The	 Function	 of	
Avowal	in	Justice,	Foucault	keeps	on	interweaving	the	epistemological	search	for	
truth	with	the	idea	of	the	adequate	expression	of	justice.60	The	reason	for	such	
an	interweaving	lies	in	the	contrast	Foucault	draws	between	the	performance	of	
sovereign	justice	through	an	agonistic	relationship	opposing	two	parties	(i.e.	the	
individual	breaching	the	rule	versus	god,	the	Master	of	Truth	or	king	of	justice)	
and	the	expression	of	justice	as	adequacy	with	a	preexisting	truth.61	Within	the	
                                                
60 	Regarding	 the	 question	 of	 the	 coincidence	 between	 justice	 and	 truth,	 Foucault	 is	 greatly	
indebted	towards	Nietzsche’s	account	of	the	relationship	between	truth	and	justice.	As	Nietzsche	
claims	in	the	Gay	Science,	§289:	“a	new	justice	is	needed!”.	This	justice	would	not	be	the	one	of	
“confessors,	conjurors	of	souls,	and	forgivers	of	sins”.	Nietzsche	refers	to	the	creation	of	“many	
news	suns”	which,	like	new	values,	would	challenge	the	overarching	status	of	our	concept	of	truth	
(Nietzsche:	2001,	163).	 Truth	would	 therefore	not	be	associated	 to	a	 transcendental	 criterion	
against	which	experience	would	be	judged,	but	to	an	ethical	practice	or	to	a	perpetual	creation.	
In	this	respect,	Foucault’s	reading	of	Nietzsche’s	will	to	power	differs	from	Heidegger’s.	It	is	clear	
that	Foucault’s	use	of	the	word	“will”	is	a	direct	reference	to	Nietzsche’s	and	corresponds	to	the	
immanence	of	subjective	acts	not	determined	by	scientific	 judgment.	As	 I	 remark	on	page	47,	
Foucault’s	definition	of	the	will	as	“the	pure	act	of	the	subject”	is	that	which	produces	truth.	This	
interpretation	 contradicts	 Heidegger’s	 reading	 of	 Nietzsche’s	 concept	 of	 justice	 according	 to	
which	“[Nietzsche]	invokes	‘justice’	as	a	way	of	thinking	that	arises	from	such	value-estimations”	
(Heidegger:	1991,	143).	According	to	Foucault’s	reading	of	Nietzsche’s	concept	of	justice,	justice	
is	not	a	“value-estimation”	but	the	creation	of	values.	Consequently,	Nietzsche’s	will	to	power	
cannot	 be	 read	 as	 “the	 permanentizing	 of	 Becoming	 into	 presence”	 (Heidegger:	 1991,	 156).	
Rather,	the	will	understood	as	“pure	act	of	the	subject”	is	that	which	allows	becoming.	As	Foucault	
puts	 it:	 “there	can	be	 truth	only	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	other	world	and	 the	other	 life”	 (Foucault:	
2011b,	356).			
61	This	 opposition	 between	 the	 production	 of	 an	 autonomous	 truth	which	 coincides	with	 the	
manifestation	 of	 an	 act	 of	 power	 and	 an	 epistemological	 truth	 reconstructed	 through	 the	
technique	of	investigation	involving	factual	knowledge	is	an	opposition	which	recurs	regularly	in	
Foucault’s	work.	It	is	above	all	thematized	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	(Foucault:	2000c,	1-89)	
and	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	(Foucault:	2013,	71-132,	149-166).	Whilst	Foucault	never	
calls	it	“sovereign	power”	explicitly,	Détienne	refers	to	the	coincidence	of	power	and	knowledge	
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paradigm	 of	 sovereign	 justice,	 the	 right	 order	 of	 things	 is	 either	 enforced	 or	
restored:	 it	 is	 the	 function	 fulfilled	 by	 the	 ritual	 as	 it	 expresses	 the	 proper	
sovereign	 order	 that	 has	 been	 threatened.	 But	 once	 justice	 gets	 linked	 to	 the	
retrieval	of	facts,	the	synthesis	between	truth	and	power	is	no	longer	performed	
autonomously	 by	 the	 sovereign	 but	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 truth	 of	 a	 fact	 that	
confirms	 that	 what	 is	 said	 corresponds	 to	 something	 that	 has	 happened.	 In	
Oedipus	Rex,	the	visual	witness	is	the	one	entitled	to	confirm	the	truthfulness	of	
the	truth	by	doubling	the	actuality	of	his	discourse	to	the	non-actuality	of	a	past	
event.	 It	 is	 only	 once	 the	 peasant	 performs	 the	 joining	 of	 the	 visible	 and	 the	
expressible	that	truth	is	accepted.	Between	Oedipus’	legitimation	as	ruler	by	the	
city	as	a	result	of	his	solving	the	riddle	of	the	Sphinx,	and	Oedipus’	recognition	of	
the	truth	after	the	testimony	of	the	visual	witness,	the	logic	of	validation	of	truth	
has	 changed.	 Truth	 no	 longer	 consists	 in	 the	 private	 knowledge	 of	 one	 (i.e.	
Oedipus	being	able	to	solve	the	riddle	on	his	own)	which	suffices	to	legitimate	the	
truth,	 it	 is	 the	 truth-value	of	 the	 fact	which	 is	 spoken	about	 (the	possibility	of	
confirming	 that	 discourse	 actually	 corresponds	 to	 what	 it	 speaks	 about)	 that	
validates	truth.	In	this	case,	truth	acquires	a	transcendental	position	which	makes	
it	both	possible	and	necessary	to	decide	whether	a	discourse	is	in	itself	true	or	
false,	whether	it	fits	the	symbolic	structure	of	signification	which	establishes	an	
intrinsic	 correspondence	 between	 the	 expressible	 and	 the	 visible	 or	 between	
                                                
as	a	case	of	political	sovereignty.	The	examples	Foucault	uses	are	the	ones	of	emperors,	kings,	or	
of	the	philosophical	figure	of	the	Cynic	who,	in	The	Courage	of	Truth,	exerts	a	“true	sovereignty”	
(Foucault:	2011b,	303).	In	Security,	Territory,	Population,	Foucault	clearly	mentions	that	“the	end	
of	sovereignty	is	circular.	It	refers	back	to	the	exercise	of	sovereignty”	(Foucault:	2009c,	98-99)	
according	 to	 which	 “law	 and	 sovereignty	 where	 absolutely	 united”	 (Foucault:	 2009c,	 99)	
Therefore,	political	but	also	ethical	sovereignty	defines	the	possibility	of	a	coincidence	between	
one’s	logos	and	one’s	acts	or	between	one’s	truth	and	one’s	power.  
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discourse	and	the	observed	fact	 to	which	 it	 refers.	 In	 the	case	of	Oedipus	Rex,	
overturning	the	order	of	the	signifier	means	rediscovering	the	missing	signified.	
Throughout	the	play,	it	is	a	series	of	signifiers	(the	incomplete	knowledge	of	the	
different	characters	as	well	as	the	meaning	of	Oedipus’	name)	which	indicate	a	
missing	signified,	namely	the	murder	that	indicates	Oedipus’	identity.		
	
We	see	that	what	characterizes,	according	to	Foucault,	the	historical	emergence	
of	a	truth	which	relies	upon	the	epistemological	dependence	of	the	expressible	
and	the	visible	(i.e.	the	dependence	between	the	discourse	of	knowledge	and	the	
factual	truth	it	targets)	coincides	with	the	historical	disappearance	of	a	form	of	
political	power	which	was	linked	to	forms	of	sovereignty	(of	gods	and	kings):	it	
implied	 an	 essential	 coincidence	 between	 the	 manifestation	 of	 truth	 and	 its	
actualization	as	act	of	power.	This	disappearance,	which,	according	to	Foucault,	
happens	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Archaic	 Greece,	 is	 of	 crucial	 importance	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 the	 specificity	 of	 biopolitical	 jurisdiction	 because	 it	 recurs	 when	
Foucault	studies	the	emergence	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	in	the	nineteenth	
century.	 This	 time,	 it	 is	 the	 model	 of	 Medieval	 political	 sovereignty	 which	
disappears	after	the	Classical	Age	to	give	rise	to	the	anthropological	knowledge	
which	characterizes	 the	modern	episteme.	The	 law	of	 the	sovereign	no	 longer	
expresses	the	ritualized	order	of	the	world,	it	is	the	rationality	derived	from	the	
knowledge	of	anthropological	nature	which	provides	the	basis	for	an	ordering	of	
the	lives	of	men.	This	shift	also	implies	a	disjunction	between	the	visible	and	the	
expressible.	However,	it	is	this	time	the	sovereignty	of	the	modern	subject	which	
is	compromised:	the	possibility	of	a	strict	coincidence	between	the	production	of	
 132 
subjective	 truth	 and	 subjective	 acts	 is	 always	 already	 preceded	 by	 an	
anthropological	 rationality	which	presupposes	a	 transcendental	 truth	divorced	
from	 the	 immanence	 of	 the	 act.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 will	 explore	 the	
implications	of	Foucault’s	account	of	the	emergence	of	epistemological	truth	at	
the	end	of	Archaic	Greece.	This	emergence	conceals	the	fact	that	the	search	for	
epistemological	truth	corresponds	first	of	all	to	an	immanent	technique	or	to	an	
immanent	 and	 powerful	 act.	 This	 will	 provide	 the	 conceptual	 framework	
necessary	 to	 understand	 how,	 within	 biopolitical	 modernity,	 the	 postulate	 of	
anthropological	 truth	 also	 conceals	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 truth	 of	 anthropological	
nature	 is	 not	 a	 transcendence	 given	prior	 to	 experience.	 It	 is	 based	upon	 the	
postulate	 of	 an	 epistemological	 truth	 which	 exists	 independently	 from	 the	
immanent	existence	of	individuals.		
	
	
3.	Foucault’s	account	of	the	mutation	of	truth	and	justice:	the	sovereign	act	of	
speech	against	the	knowledge	of	nature	
	
The	 juridical	 and	 epistemological	 mutation	 Foucault	 identifies	 in	 his	 study	 of	
Sophocles’	Oedipus	 Rex	 reappears	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 and	 takes	 a	
wider	 dimension.	 In	 the	 1973	 text,	 the	 necessity	 to	 establish	 the	 correct	
relationship	between	the	expressible	and	the	visible	in	order	to	convey	truth	and	
justice	is	linked	to	the	general	movement	which	characterizes	the	passage	from	
the	esoteric	power	of	gods	to	the	knowledge	of	men.	As	Détienne	has	shown,	the	
fact	according	to	which	sovereign	power	performed	a	strict	synthesis	of	power	
 133 
and	truth	(i.e.	the	act	that	expresses	and	actualizes	truth	at	the	same	time)	made	
the	 sovereign	 responsible	 for	 the	 right	 and	 just	 order	 of	 things.	 The	
epistemological	 counterpart	 of	 the	 adequacy	 between	 discourse	 and	 justice,	
instead	of	being	derived	from	the	esoteric	divine	truth,	will	be	derived	from	the	
concept	 of	 nature	whose	 laws	 are	 accessible	 to	 human	 knowledge.	 It	 is	Jean-
Pierre	Vernant,	who	provides	a	clear	account	of	the	process	of	rationalization	of	
the	poetic	myths	by	the	discourse	of	the	philosophers	and	by	the	knowledge	of	
the	 Phusikoi.	 In	 Mythe	 et	 Pensée	 chez	 les	 Grecs,	 Vernant	 insists	 upon	 the	
emergence	of	philosophy	and	the	natural	sciences	in	Classical	Greece	as	a	way	of	
producing	 a	 rational	 knowledge	 which,	 through	 the	 positivity	 of	 discourse,	
replaces	what	the	power	of	the	sovereign	previously	realized:	
In	philosophy,	 [Cornford	writes]	myth	 is	 "rationalized".	But	what	does	
that	mean?	Firstly,	that	it	has	taken	the	form	of	a	problem	formulated	
explicitly.	 The	 myth	 was	 a	 story,	 not	 the	 solution	 to	 a	 problem.	 It	
recounted	the	series	of	decrees	of	the	king	or	of	the	god,	just	as	the	rite	
used	to	imitate	it.	The	problem	was	resolved	before	being	posed.	But,	in	
Greece,	where	with	the	City	new	political	forms	triumph,	the	old	royal	
rituals	 only	 subsist	 as	 vestiges	 whose	 meaning	 has	 been	 lost;	 the	
memory	 of	 the	 king	 as	 creator	 of	 order	 and	maker	 of	 time	 has	 been	
erased.	 […]	 It	 is	 these	 questions	 (genesis	 of	 the	 cosmic	 order	 and	
explanation	 of	 the	meteôra)	 which	 constitute,	 in	 their	 new	 form	 as	
problems,	 the	 matter	 of	 the	 first	 philosophical	 reflection.	 The	
philosopher	 thus	 replaced	 the	 old	 king–magician,	master	 of	 time:	 he	
theorizes	what	the	king	used	to	effectuate.	62	(Vernant:	2006,	379)		
	
                                                
62	“Dans	 la	philosophie,	écrit–il	 [Cornford],	 le	mythe	est	“rationalisé”.	Mais	qu’est–ce	que	cela	
signifie?	D’abord,	qu’il	a	pris	la	forme	d’un	problème	explicitement	formulé.	Le	mythe	était	un	
récit,	non	la	solution	d’un	problème.	Il	racontait	la	série	d’actions	ordonnatrices	du	roi	ou	du	dieu,	
telles	que	le	rite	les	mimait.	Le	problème	se	trouvait	résolu	avant	d’avoir	été	posé.	Mais,	en	Grèce,	
où	triomphent,	avec	la	Cité,	de	nouvelles	formes	politiquezs,	il	ne	subsiste	plus	de	l’ancien	rituel	
royal	que	les	vestiges	dont	le	sens	s’est	perdu	;	le	souvenir	s’est	effacé	du	roi	créateur	de	l’ordre	
et	 faiseur	du	temps	 […].	Ce	sont	ces	questions	 (genèse	de	 l’ordre	cosmique	et	explication	des	
meteôra)	 qui	 constituent,	 dans	 leur	 forme	 nouvelle	 de	 problème,	 la	 matière	 de	 la	 première	
réflexion	philosophique.	 Le	 philosophe	prend	 ainsi	 la	 relève	du	 vieux	 roi–magicien,	maître	 du	
temps:	il	fait	la	théorie	de	ce	que	le	roi,	autrefois,	effectuait.”	
 134 
Vernant	tells	us	that	the	knowledge	of	the	Phusikoi	and	of	the	philosophers	aims	
at	producing	 the	positivity	of	what,	 in	 the	words	of	 the	Masters	of	Truth,	was	
fundamentally	 a	 performance.	 The	 discourse	 which	 replaces	 the	 sovereign	
synthesis	of	power	and	truth	establishes	a	 fundamental	distance	which	affects	
the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 logos	 operates:	 it	 no	 longer	 effectuates	 a	 truth	 which	
disappears	after	its	expression	and	gets	actualized	again	through	the	logic	of	the	
ritual	but	makes	truth	the	condition	of	possibility	of	its	own	expression:	it	is	no	
longer	 the	 sovereign	 who	 produces	 truth	 through	 his	 logos	 but	 truth	 which	
expresses	 its	 sovereignty	 by	 always	 already	 determining	 a	 rationality	 which	
survives	 its	expression.	 In	“Truth	and	 Juridical	Forms”,	Foucault,	who	had	read	
Vernant,	provides	the	same	kind	of	analysis:	the	replacement	of	truth	effectuated	
in	an	act	of	power	by	knowledge	produces	a	disjunction	of	the	expressible	and	
the	 visible.	 This	 disjunction	 works	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 past	 (memory	 and	
recollection),	or	to	the	future	(inquiry).	Foucault	writes:	
[…]	there	was	the	development	of	a	new	type	of	knowledge	–	knowledge	
gained	 through	 witnessing,	 through	 recollection,	 through	 inquiry.	 A	
knowledge	by	inquiry	which	historians	such	as	Herodotus,	a	short	time	
before	 Sophocles,	 naturalists,	 botanists,	 geographers,	 Greek	 travelers,	
would	develop	and	Aristotle	would	totalize	and	make	encyclopedic.	 In	
Greece	there	was,	then,	a	sort	of	great	revolution	which,	through	a	series	
of	political	struggles	and	contestations,	resulted	in	the	elaboration	of	a	
specific	 form	 of	 judicial,	 juridical	 discovery	 of	 truth.	 The	 latter	
constituted	the	mold,	the	model	on	the	basis	of	which	a	series	of	other	
knowledges	 –	 philosophical,	 rhetorical,	 and	 empirical	 –	 were	 able	 to	
develop	and	to	characterize	Greek	thought.	(Foucault:	2000c,	34)	
	
According	to	Foucault,	“the	history	of	the	birth	of	the	inquiry”	through	which	the	
divine	truth	gets	replaced	by	human	knowledge	 is	what	characterizes	the	shift	
from	Archaic	Greece	to	Classical	Greece:	a	shift	which	sees	the	replacement	of	
the	esoteric	divine	truth	performed	in	an	act	of	power	by	a	truth	which,	because	
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it	points	either	towards	the	past	or	towards	the	future,	survives	the	moment	of	
its	 manifestation.	 What	 Foucault	 wants	 to	 prove,	 each	 time	 he	 studies	 the	
replacement	of	the	sovereign	manifestation	of	truth	by	facts	that	can	be	known	
through	inquiry,	is	that	the	settlement	of	a	judicial	conflict	becomes	first	of	all	a	
juridical	matter	which	makes	truth	dependent	on	a	discourse	which	survives	the	
moment	 of	 its	 expression.	 It	 is	 both	 this	 disjunction	 and	 interdependence	
between	the	visible	and	the	expressible	appearing	as	a	direct	consequence	of	the	
mutation	of	truth	that	characterizes	the	birth	of	Classical	Greece	and	marks	the	
opening	of	an	epistemological	concern:	how	is	it	possible	to	determine	that	the	
truth	discovered	through	the	inquiry	is	also	the	just	truth?		
	
This	 is	 the	 reason	why	Vernant,	 in	Oedipe	et	 ses	mythes,	writes	 that	“Oedipus	
leads	both	a	judicial	and	scientific	inquiry,	as	underlined	by	the	repeated	use	of	
the	 verb	 zetein.”63		(Vernant	 &	 Vidal-Naquet:	 2006,	 34).	64		The	 practice	 of	 the	
inquiry	which	retrieves	truth	from	its	absence	through	the	use	of	knowledge	is	a	
movement	 through	 which	 the	 esoteric	 truth	 and	 justice	 of	 gods	 is	 made	 the	
positive	purpose	of	inquiry.	In	The	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	Oedipus	is	the	
first	character	that	Foucault,	inspired	by	Vernant’s	reading,	describes	as	practicing	
zetesis.	But	Oedipus	is	not	the	only	one,	in	the	Foucaultian	corpus,	to	inquire	in	
this	way.	The	term	recurs	in	the	1983-1984	last	lecture	course	The	Government	of	
the	 Self	 and	 Others	 II:	 The	 Courage	 of	 Truth.	 During	 the	 15th	 February	 1984	
                                                
63	“Oedipe	mène	une	enquête,	à	la	fois	judiciaire	et	scientifique,	que	souligne	l’emploi	répété	du	
verbe	zetein.”	
64	Foucault	too	refers	to	the	practice	of	zetesis	(the	inquiry)	again	in	his	last	lecture	course	at	the	
Collège	de	France	in	1983–1984	The	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	II:	The	Courage	of	Truth	
(Foucault:	2011b). 
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lecture,	Foucault	tells	us	that	Socrates	too,	in	the	Apology,	puts	the	Delphic	oracle	
to	the	test	in	order	to	make	sure	that	what	the	god	says	is	true.	Socrates	embarks	
on	an	 inquiry	 (zetesis)	which	will	allow	him	to	verify	the	divine	truth.	Foucault	
writes:	
Socrates’	friend,	Chaerephon,	went	to	ask	the	god	of	Delphi:	What	Greek	
is	 wiser	 than	 Socrates?	 And	 you	 know	 that	 the	 god’s	 answer	 to	 this	
question,	put	not	by	Socrates	but	by	one	of	his	friends,	was:	No	one	is	
wiser	 than	 Socrates.	 Of	 course,	 like	 all	 the	 god’s	 answers,	 this	 is	
enigmatic,	and	the	person	to	whom	the	god	gives	the	answer	is	never	
really	sure	of	understanding	it.	In	fact,	Socrates	does	not	understand	it.	
And	he	wonders,	 like	all	or	almost	all	of	 those	who	have	received	the	
god’s	enigmatic	words.	[…]	What	Socrates	says	in	regard	to	what	he	did	
at	this	point	is	very	interesting.	He	says:	having	been	given	the	answer	to	
Chaerephon’s	question,	and	not	understanding	it,	wondering	what	the	
god	could	really	mean,	I	undertook	a	search.	The	verb	used	is	zetein	(you	
find	the	word	zetesis).	(Foucault:	2011b,	81–82)	
	
Note	24	to	the	lecture	tells	us	that	the	English	translation	of	Socrates’	Apology,	
translates	 zetein	 by	 the	 verb	 “check”:	 “I	 set	 myself	 at	 last	 with	 considerable	
reluctance	to	check	the	truth	of	 it	 in	the	following	way”	(Foucault:	2011b,	94).	
What	this	tells	us	is	that	the	discovery	of	knowledge	through	inquiry	that	Foucault	
describes	 is	 not	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	oracle’s	words	 but	 their	 verification.	
During	the	same	lecture,	Foucault	indeed	adds	that	Socrates	does	not	attempt	to	
decipher	 the	 hidden	meaning	 of	what	 the	 god	 said	 but	 the	 conformity	 of	 his	
words	with	truth.	He	adds:	
The	investigation	Socrates	undertakes	aims	to	find	out	if	the	oracle	told	
the	truth.	Socrates	wants	to	test	what	the	oracle	said.	He	is	anxious	to	
subject	the	oracle	to	verification.	Significantly,	he	uses	a	characteristic	
word	to	designate	the	modality	of	this	search	(zetesis).	This	is	the	word	
elegkhein,	which	means:	to	reproach,	to	object,	to	question,	to	subject	
someone	to	cross–examination,	to	challenge	what	someone	has	said	in	
order	to	find	out	whether	or	not	it	stands	up.	It	is,	in	a	way,	to	dispute	it.	
So	he	will	not	interpret	the	oracle,	but	dispute	it,	subject	it	to	discussion,	
to	challenge,	in	order	to	find	out	if	it	is	true.	(Foucault:	2011b,	82)	
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We	see	that	Foucault	links	the	birth	of	the	inquiry	to	a	change	of	jurisdiction:	not	
only	is	it	possible	for	men	to	know	the	truth,	but	this	truth	must	also	correspond	
to	the	right	expression	of	justice.	It	is	the	reason	why	the	practice	of	the	inquiry	
(which	aims	at	the	reconstitution	of	the	conjunction	between	the	visible	and	the	
expressible)	is	thought	on	the	basis	of	sovereign	unity,	just	and	true	at	the	same	
time,	which	performs	the	right	order	of	things.	The	mutation	of	the	morphology	
of	truth	and	knowledge	at	the	turn	of	Archaic	and	Classical	Greece	shows	that	the	
availability	 of	 a	 natural	 rationality	 produces	 an	 alienation	 of	 the	 ability	 to	
determine	the	truth	which	one	speaks:	since	truth	preexists	the	act	of	speech,	it	
is	 the	 concept	 of	 truth	 and	 the	 knowledge	 leading	 to	 it	 which	 acquires	 a	
transcendental	status.	
	
It	is	on	the	basis	of	such	unity	that	the	law	read	in	nature	must	also	be	the	just	
law	(i.e.	that	knowledge	must	correspond	to	truth).	In	The	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	
Know,	 Foucault	 links	 the	nomoi	 (the	 laws	written	by	men	 in	opposition	 to	 the	
esoteric	 divine	 truth)	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 justice:	 the	 practice	 of	 knowledge	
through	inquiry	aims	at	the	retrieval	of	the	right	and	just	laws	decipherable	in	the	
order	 of	 nature.	 Not	 only	 are	 the	 laws	 which	 govern	 nature	 made	 positive	
knowledge,	they	must	also	correspond	to	the	just	expression	of	truth.	It	is	in	the	
space	of	the	disjunction	between	sovereign	power	and	sovereign	knowledge	that	
Foucault	 locates	 the	 need	 for	 a	 link	 between	 the	 knowledge	 leading	 to	 the	
positive	expression	of	the	law	and	cosmological	justice.	During	the	10	February	
1971	lecture	from	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	Foucault	identifies	a	mutation	
of	the	judicial	practice	associated	to	krinein	(the	sovereign	power,	described	by	
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Détienne,	 which	 realizes	 truth	 and	 justice)	 in	 Hesiod’s	Works	 and	 Days.	 This	
practice	moves	away	from	the	esoteric	efficacy	of	the	oracle	or	of	the	poet	and	
starts	to	correspond	to	the	idea	of	adequate	knowledge	of	nature.	Foucault	tells	
us	that	the	practice	of	krinein	needs	to	be	connected	to	dikaion	which	“rest[s]	on	
a	justice	which	is	[…]	linked	to	the	very	order	of	the	world	(and	not	just	to	the	
anger	of	the	Gods)”	(Foucault:	2013,	107),	Foucault	writes:	
We	have	a	relation	to	it	[dikaion]	in	the	form	of	knowledge.	Justice	is	no	
longer	 ordered	 so	much	 by	 reference	 to	 an	 asserted	 and	 risky	 truth;	
rather	 it	 is	 linked	 to	 a	 truth	we	 know.	 Being	 just	 is	 no	 longer	merely	
applying	the	rules	and	risking	the	truth.	It	is	not	forgetting	to	know	the	
truth;	it	is	not	forgetting	the	truth	we	know.	This	is	why	Hesiod	himself	
can	also	deliver	a	discourse	of	 justice.	Certainly,	he	does	not	deliver	a	
sentence,	 but	 he	 gives	 advice.	 Advice	 to	 kings	 of	 justice,	 advice	 to	 a	
peasant	 like	 Perses.	 He	 can	 tell	 of	 the	 justness	 of	 justice,	 he	 can	
pronounce	sentences	on	sentences,	opinions	on	decisions.	He	can	judge	
the	judges.	Krinein,	suddenly,	no	doubt	at	the	very	moment	of	its	birth,	
acquires	a	breadth	in	which	sententious	poetry,	statement	of	nature,	and	
political	 demand	 are	 not	 yet	 distinguished	 from	 each	 other.	 It	 is	 a	
discourse	 which	 has	 two	 sides	 throughout	 its	 development:	 that	 of	
justice	and	that	of	truth.	Right	at	the	start	of	the	poem,	Hesiod	says	to	
Zeus:	“May	justice	rule	your	decrees!	For	myself,	I	shall	tell	Perses	some	
truths”	(Works	and	Days,	9–10).	[…]	But	a	problem	arises.	What	is	this	
truth	in	the	form	of	knowledge	that	krinein	needs,	on	what	is	it	based?	
Following	 Hesiod,	 but	 also	 his	 successors,	 it	 is	 the	 truth	 of	 days	 and	
dates;	of	favourable	times;	of	the	movements	and	conjuctions	of	stars;	
of	 climates,	 winds,	 and	 seasons:	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 a	 whole	 body	 of	
cosmological	knowledge.	It	 is	also	the	truth	of	the	genesis	of	the	gods	
and	 the	world,	 of	 their	 order	 of	 succession	 and	 precedence,	 of	 their	
organization	 as	 system	 of	 the	 world.	 Theogony.	 Knowledge	 of	 the	
calendar	and	of	 the	origin;	knowledge	of	cycles	and	of	 the	beginning.	
(Foucault:	2013,	110–111)	
	
Diverging	from	Détienne’s	interpretation	of	the	practice	of	krinein	as	effectuation	
of	 the	 cosmological	 order,	 Foucault	 chooses	 to	 link	 it	 to	 the	 question	 of	
knowledge:	 he	 is	 concerned,	 in	 The	 Lectures	 on	 the	 Will	 to	 Know,	 with	 the	
historical	 shift	 from	the	paradigm	of	 sovereign	 truth	and	 justice	 to	 that	of	 the	
knowledge	 of	 nature	 sustained	 by	 an	 already	 existing	 truth.	 According	 to	
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Foucault,	the	mutation	which	occurs	with	the	emergence	of	Classical	Greece	and	
philosophical	 discourse	 is,	 beyond	 the	 disjunction	 of	 sovereign	 power	 and	
sovereign	 knowledge	 he	 explicitly	 refers	 to	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”,	 a	
concern	for	the	ways	in	which	men	have	strived	to	make	the	esoteric	and	fateful	
divine	 logos	 the	words	of	an	 intelligible	description	of	nature.	 In	this	respect,	 I	
agree	with	Arianna	Sforzini	who	defines	the	mutation	of	truth	as	a	“wrenching	of	
the	 power	 of	 truth-telling	 from	 the	 divine	 in	 order	 to	 construct	 and	 found	
procedures	 of	 truth	 detached	 from	 any	 relationship	 to	 the	 transcendence	 of	
gods”	(Sforzini:	2012,	8).65	Even	though	the	divine	truth	is	told	by	men	to	men,	
the	question	of	its	translation	into	the	positive	discourse	of	knowledge	persists:	
on	what	basis	can	the	laws	of	men	translate	the	just	and	right	order	of	things?		
	
It	 is	 Détienne	 who,	 in	 The	 Masters	 of	 Truth	 in	 Archaic	 Greece,	 takes	 care	 to	
distinguish	 two	 kinds	 of	 relationships	 to	 truth	 which	 describe	 two	 ways	 of	
accessing	the	same	knowledge.	Détienne	works	on	the	meaning	of	aletheia	as	a	
negation	of	lethe	(which	he	translates	as	“forgetfulness”)	to	contrast	the	way	in	
which	gods,	the	oracle	or	the	seer	perform	truth	in	opposition	to	the	peasant	who	
accesses	it	through	the	negation	of	forgetfulness	(aletheia),	i.e.	through	the	use	
of	memory.	Détienne	writes:	
In	Works	and	Days,	we	thus	find	a	double	instantiation	of	Aletheia.	[…]	
"truth”	 is	 explicitly	 defined	 as	 a	 "nonforgetfulness"	 of	 the	 poet's	
precepts.	But	no	fundamental	difference	exists	between	these	two	cases	
of	 Aletheia.	 They	 are	 simply	 Aletheia	 considered	 from	 two	 different	
perspectives	 –	 in	 one	 case	 in	 its	 relation	 to	 the	 poet,	 in	 the	 other	 in	
                                                
65	“arrachement	au	divin	du	pouvoir	de	véridiction	afin	de	construire	et	fonder	des	procédures	de	
vérité	qui	se	détachent	de	tout	rapport	à	la	transcendance	des	dieux.”.	Sforzini	gave	this	definition	
in	a	talk	given	at	the	Rencontres	doctorales	du	centre	Michel	Foucault	at	the	IMEC	in	Caen	on	3rd	
May	2012.	This	reference	is	an	unpublished	document.	
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relation	to	the	farmer	who	listens.	The	former	possesses	Aletheia	purely	
through	the	privilege	of	his	poetic	functions;	the	latter	can	only	acquire	
Aletheia	by	exerting	his	memory.	(Détienne:	1999,	50–51)	
	
It	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 “two	 cases	 of	 Aletheia	 […]	 considered	 from	 two	
perspectives”	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 truth	 and	 knowledge	 which	 is	
introduced	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	can	be	understood.	Whereas	the	
sovereign	 realises	 and	expresses	 truth	 through	a	 logos	which	 is	 an	 immediate	
expression	of	power,	men	access	truth	through	the	knowledge	gathered	through	
the	inquiry.	Therefore,	“the	development	of	a	new	type	of	knowledge”	(Foucault:	
2000c,	34)	which	Foucault	describes	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	and	reads	in	
Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex	is	first	of	all	a	new	way	of	accessing	the	truth	whose	direct	
manifestation	has	been	lost	when	the	possibility	of	the	synthesis	between	truth	
and	power	disappeared	 at	 the	 same	 time	as	 the	paradigm	of	Archaic	 political	
sovereignty.	But	what	Foucault	insists	upon	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	is	
the	emergence	with	Hesiod	of	an	equivalence	between	divine	and	human	truth.	
He	writes:	
[…]	it	[the	law]	supposes	an	equivalence	between	the	justice	of	Zeus	and	
the	truth	of	men,	for	if	the	justice	of	men	consists	in	following,	in	its	vein,	
the	truth	of	things	–	the	exact	order	of	the	stars,	of	days	and	seasons,	
this	order	 is	nothing	else	than	the	decree	of	Zeus	and	of	 its	sovereign	
law.	(Foucault:	2013,	112)	
	
The	lectures	of	the	27th	January,	3rd	and	10th	February	1971	are	concerned	with	
the	way	in	which	truth,	instead	of	belonging	to	the	realm	of	the	esoteric	divine	
rule,	historically	becomes	what	the	use	of	knowledge	can	find	in	nature.	The	fact	
that	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 positive	 justice	 of	men	 (the	nomos)	 represents	 an	
attempt	 to	 adjust	 to	 “the	 whole	 body	 of	 cosmological	 knowledge”	 (Foucault:	
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2013,	111)	further	explains	what	Foucault	has	 in	mind	when	he	mentions	“the	
dismantling	of	the	great	unity	of	a	political	power	that	was,	at	the	same	time,	a	
knowledge”	(Foucault:	2000c,	31).	It	is	in	the	17th	February	1971	lecture	from	the	
Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	that	we	find	an	explication	of	this	transformation.	
Foucault	insists	on	the	fact	that	the	emergence	of	positive	law	coincides	with	the	
just	 order	 of	 truth	 and	 nature.	 By	 “positive	 law”	 I	 mean	 the	 expression	 of	 a	
knowable	and	transmissible	law	which,	at	the	same	time	as	it	gains	accessibility	
and	 correspondence	 to	 the	 truth	 of	 phusis,	 loses	 its	 strict	 connection	 to	 the	
materiality	 of	 its	 act	 of	 expression.	 In	 the	 second	 part	 of	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	
Forms”,	it	is	the	same	kind	of	correspondence	Foucault	identifies	when	he	reads	
Oedipus	Rex:		
So	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 entire	Oedipus	 play	 is	 a	 way	 of	 shifting	 the	
enunciation	 of	 the	 truth	 from	 a	 prophetic	 and	 prescriptive	 type	 of	
discourse	 to	 a	 retrospective	 one	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 characterized	 by	
prophecy	but,	 rather,	by	evidence.	This	was	also	a	way	of	 shifting	 the	
luminescence	or,	rather,	the	light	of	the	truth	of	the	prophetic	and	divine	
luminescence	to	the	more	empirical	and	everyday	gaze	of	the	shepherds.	
There	is	a	correspondence	between	the	shepherds	and	the	gods.	They	
say	 the	 same	 thing,	 they	 see	 the	 same	 thing,	 but	 not	with	 the	 same	
language	or	with	 the	same	eyes.	All	 through	 the	 tragedy,	we	see	 that	
same	 truth	 presented	 and	 formulated	 in	 two	 different	 ways,	 with	
different	words	in	a	different	discourse,	with	another	gaze.	[…]	Here	we	
have	 one	 of	 the	 basic	 features	 of	 the	 Oedipus	 tragedy:	 the	
communication	 between	 the	 shepherds	 and	 the	 gods,	 between	 the	
recollection	 of	 men	 and	 the	 divine	 prophecies.	 The	 correspondence	
defines	 the	 tragedy	 and	 establishes	 a	 symbolic	 world	 in	 which	 the	
memory	and	the	discourse	of	men	are	like	an	empirical	margin	around	
the	great	prophecy	of	gods.	(Foucault:	2000c,	23–24)	
	
The	shift	Foucault	stresses	between	the	enunciation	of	truth	from	a	prospective	
discourse	based	on	the	magical	gaze	of	the	prophet	and	a	retrospective	discourse	
based	 on	 evidence	 underlines	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 historical	 configuration	
between	power	and	knowledge.	Knowledge	is	no	longer	linked	to	the	sovereign	
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performance	 of	 an	 act	 of	 justice	 which	 puts	 the	 world	 in	 order	 (as	 Détienne	
demonstrates	 it	 in	The	Masters	of	Truth	 in	Archaic	Greece)	but	 to	a	 true	 logos	
which	is	no	longer	an	identifiable	act	of	enunciation.		
	
What	matters	is	the	way	in	which	the	production	of	truth	as	an	act	of	enunciation	
shifts	 from	 an	 immediate	manifestation	 to	 a	 discourse	 conveying	 a	 truth	 that	
remains	after	its	expression	and	which	can	be	appropriated	through	the	use	of	
knowledge.	 The	 “symbolic	 world”	 is	 described	 by	 Foucault	 as	 the	 “empirical	
margin”	around	the	prophecy	of	gods	since	it	reaches	the	same	truth	not	through	
an	 immediate	gaze	 that	performs	but	 through	 the	 technique	of	enquiry	based	
upon	the	evidence	which	changes	the	nature	of	memory.	It	is	no	longer	the	“non-
forgetfulness”	described	by	Détienne	as	a	divine	prerogative	but	the	memory	of	
men	which	links	the	signification	of	what	is	said	to	the	return	of	a	founding	origin	
and	 to	 the	 endless	 possibility	 of	 retrospection.	 This	 shift	 defines	 a	 new	
relationship	between	knowledge	and	power	 that	 is,	according	 to	Foucault,	 the	
“complex”	epitomized	by	Oedipus	Rex	which	 illustrates	 the	morphology	of	our	
Western	mode	of	 thinking:	 it	 is	a	mode	of	 thinking	which	always	already	 links	
power	 (the	 immanence	of	 an	 act)	 to	 the	possibility	 of	 it	 being	 always	 already	
appropriated	by	knowledge	and	linked	to	truth.	During	the	second	lecture	from	
“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	Foucault	says:	
I	want	to	show	how	the	tragedy	of	Oedipus	[…]	is	representative	and	in	
a	 sense	 the	 founding	 instance	 of	 a	 definite	 type	 of	 relation	 between	
power	and	knowledge	[savoir],	between	political	power	and	knowledge	
[connaissance],	 from	which	 our	 civilization	 is	 not	 yet	 emancipated.	 It	
seems	to	me	that	there	really	is	an	Oedipus	complex	in	our	civilization.	
But	it	does	not	involve	our	unconscious	and	our	desire,	nor	the	relations	
between	desire	and	the	unconscious.	If	there	is	an	Oedipus	complex,	it	
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operates	 not	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 but	 at	 the	 collective	 level;	 not	 in	
connection	 with	 desire	 and	 the	 unconscious	 but	 in	 connection	 with	
power	 and	 knowledge.	 That	 is	 the	 “complex”	 I	 want	 to	 analyze.	
(Foucault:	2000c,	17)	
	
This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault’s	genealogy	of	our	“Western”	concept	of	truth	is	
first	of	 all	 an	attempt	at	 retrieving	 the	power	 relationships	 through	which	 the	
truth	gets	historically	produced:	a	 truth	which	both	marks	and	 is	marked	by	a	
metaphysical	evidence	whose	origin	and	expression	has	been	historically	masked:	
a	production	which	proceeds	 from	the	evidence	and	primacy	of	knowledge	as	
natural	and	spontaneous	human	activity.		
	
As	soon	as	truth	conceals	 the	power	(as	soon	as	the	expression	of	power	gets	
replaced	by	the	concept	of	preexisting	truth	in	and	of	nature),	it	becomes	also	the	
expression	of	a	preexisting	justice	which	replaces	the	sovereign	justice	conveyed	
through	a	ritualized	act	of	power.	The	epistemological	mutation	linked	to	the	birth	
of	the	inquiry	 is	also	a	 juridical	one:	 it	 is	now	the	truth	of	nature	that	will	also	
dictate	the	right	order	of	justice	no	longer	through	an	act	of	sovereign	power	but	
through	the	knowledge	of	truth	decipherable	by	men	in	nature.	In	the	Lectures	
on	 the	 Will	 to	 Know,	 Foucault	 clearly	 insists	 upon	 the	 relationship	 between	
dikaion	(the	order	of	justice)	and	alethes	which	emerges	with	Archaic	Greece.	He	
writes:	
Now	this	is	where	the	Greek	transformation	comes	into	play.	Knowledge	
will	be	separated	from	the	State	apparatus	and	from	the	direct	exercise	
of	power;	it	will	be	detached	from	political	sovereignty	in	its	immediate	
application	 to	 become	 the	 correlative	 of	 the	 just,	 of	 the	 dikaion	 as	
natural,	divine,	and	human	order.	The	knowledge	that	was	the	secret	of	
effective	power	will	become	the	order	of	the	manifest,	measured	world,	
effectuated	 daily	 and	 for	 all	men	 in	 its	 truth.	 And	 the	 truth	 that	was	
memory	 of	 ancestral	 rule,	 challenge,	 and	 accepted	 risk,	 will	 take	 the	
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form	 of	 knowledge	 revealing	 and	 conforming	 to	 the	 order	 of	 things.	
There	were	two	correlative	transformations	therefore:	one	revealing	the	
truth	 as	 knowledge	 of	 things,	 time,	 and	 order,	 and	 the	 other	 shifting	
knowledge	from	the	domain	of	power	to	the	region	of	justice.	[…]	In	its	
foundation,	in	its	first	word,	justice	will	have	to	be	law,	nomos,	the	law	
of	men,	which	will	truly	be	their	insuperable	law	only	if	it	is	in	conformity	
with	the	order	of	the	world.	The	decision	will	have	to	be	right	(juste),	the	
sentence	will	have	to	express	dikaion	and	alethes,	the	just	and	the	true,	
that	 which	 is	 fitted	 to	 the	 order	 of	 the	 world	 and	 things,	 and	which	
restores	 this	 very	 order	when	 it	 has	 been	 disturbed.	 (Foucault:	 2013,	
119–120)	
	
Oedipus’	tragedy	corresponds	to	the	two	transformations	Foucault	describes:	the	
epistemological	and	juridical	meaning	of	the	Greek	zetein.	It	is	not	only	the	case	
that	Oedipus’	investigation	leads	him	to	consider	the	knowledge	of	things	rather	
than	the	words	of	gods,	but	also	that	he,	when	reaching	the	conclusion	of	this	
investigation,	 also	 restores	 the	 just	 order	 of	 things	 and	 discloses	 himself	 as	
illegitimate	 ruler.	 The	 eviction	 of	 the	 tyrant	 from	 power	 corresponds	 to	 the	
eviction	of	a	form	of	power	which	enforces	its	own	rule	regardless	of	the	true	and	
just	order	of	things.	The	central	aspect	of	Oedipus’	tragedy	is	that	it	 is	his	own	
tyrannical	posture	that	will	lead	him	to	move	away	from	the	words	of	gods	and	
see	in	tukhe	the	possibility	of	a	tekhne.	As	Foucault	notes	in	Truth	and	Juridical	
Form:	
[…]	Oedipus	is	the	one	who	attaches	no	importance	to	the	laws	and	who	
replaces	 them	with	 his	whims	 and	 his	 orders.	 He	 says	 this	 in	 so	may	
words.	When	Creon	reproaches	him	for	wanting	to	banish	him,	saying	
that	this	decision	was	not	just,	Oedipus	answers,	“No	matter	if	it’s	just	or	
not,	it	will	have	to	be	obeyed	all	the	same.”	His	will	be	the	law	of	the	city.	
It’s	for	this	reason	that,	when	his	fall	begins,	the	Chorus	of	the	people	
will	reproach	Oedipus	with	having	shown	contempt	for	dike,	for	justice.	
So	 in	 Oedipus	we	 have	 no	 trouble	 recognizing	 a	 figure	 that	 is	 clearly	
defined,	highlighted,	catalogued,	characterized	by	Greek	thought	of	the	
fifth	century	–	the	tyrant.	(Foucault:	2000c,	28)	
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What	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 Oedipus,	 as	 illegitimate	 sovereign,	
enforces	 a	 law	which	 shows	no	 care	 for	dike	 (the	order	of	 justice).	Oedipus	 is	
called	tyrant	because	he	speaks	a	law	which	disrupts	the	intrinsic	correspondence	
between	laws,	truth	and	justice:	his	 logos	does	not	match	the	esoteric	truth	of	
gods	which	is	supposed	to	make	justice	possible.	Chevallier,	in	his	Michel	Foucault	
et	le	Christianisme,	argues	that	the	figure	of	the	tyrant	is	the	one	which	will	be	
opposed	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 philosophy	 and	more	 precisely	 Plato’s	Republic	
through	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 need	 for	 an	 ontological	 adequacy	 between	
experience	and	the	truth	that	the	soul	has	seen	but	forgotten.		
	
The	adequacy	between	discourse	and	truth	produces	an	adequacy	between	the	
said	and	the	seen	(between	philosophical	discourse)	and	the	eternal	truth	that	
the	soul	seeks	to	remember.66	It	is	also	an	adequacy	between	the	said	and	the	
                                                
66	Heidegger,	in	his	essay	Plato’s	Doctrine	of	Truth,	establishes	the	trace	of	the	transformation	of	
truth	from	unconcealment	to	correspondence	in	Plato’s	Allegory	of	the	Cave	(Heidegger:	1998,	
182).	However,	unlike	Heidegger,	Foucault	does	not	locate	the	mutation	of	truth	in	a	move	from	
the	“hiddenness”	to	the	“unhiddenness”	of	Being.	Rather,	he	locates	this	mutation	in	the	move	
from	the	strict	immanence	of	an	act	which	produces	truth	to	an	act	which	is	merely	symbolically	
linked	to	this	truth	by	the	possibility	of	knowledge.	In	other	words,	Foucault	is	not	interested	in	
retrieving	a	more	authentic	ontology	but	in	stressing	the	fact	that	truth	is	nothing	but	a	strictly	
immanent	act	to	which	no	a	priori	epistemological	determination	can	correspond.	Heidegger’s	
and	 Foucault’s	 point	 seem	 similar,	 but	 Foucault	 clearly	 rejects	 the	 idea	 that	 Being’s	
unconcealment	should	be	preserved	or	that	Being	offers	itself	merely	through	Lichtung.	On	the	
contrary,	 Foucault	 refuses	 to	 fall	 back	 upon	 the	 primacy	 of	 Being.	 For	 Foucault,	 there	 is	 no	
authenticity	of	truth	as	such,	it	is	always	the	effectuation	of	a	will	and	a	strict	act	of	power.	As	he	
puts	 it:	 “[i]n	 the	philosophical	 tradition,	what	we	 find	at	 the	heart	of	 the	will-truth	 relation	 is	
freedom.	Truth	is	free	with	regard	to	the	will;	it	does	not	receive	any	of	its	determinations	from	
the	will.	The	will	must	be	free	to	give	access	to	the	truth.	[…]	This	fundamental	freedom,	which	
connects	will	and	truth	to	each	other,	is	formulated:	[…]	in	the	Heideggerian	opening”	(Foucault:	
2013,	 215).	 Foucault’s	 point,	 either	 in	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know	 or	 in	 the	History	 of	
Sexuality:	The	Will	to	Knowledge	is	to	make	will	and	truth	coincide.	Consequently,	there	is	neither	
pure	will	 nor	 pure	 truth.	Quite	 the	 contrary,	 in	 his	 conversation	with	 Farès	 Sassine,	 Foucault	
defines	the	will	as	“the	pure	act	of	the	subject”	[“l’acte	pur	du	sujet”]	(see	reference	p.170):	the	
act	which	 receives	no	other	determination	 than	 its	own	actuality.	 Foucault’s	point	 is	 in	direct	
relation	 with	 Détienne’s	 definition	 of	 aletheia	 in	 The	 Masters	 of	 Truth	 in	 Archaic	 Greece.	
According	to	him,	aletheia	is	not	the	negation	of	Being’s	concealment	but	the	negation	of	oblivion.	
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seen	that	Oedipus	will	perform	throughout	the	play	through	a	displacement	of	
the	power	of	the	gods	who	see,	say	and	perform	all	at	once	to	the	truth	conveyed	
by	the	testimony	of	the	messenger	once	joined	to	the	memory	of	Oedipus	and	
Jocasta.	But	from	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	in	1973	to	Du	Gouvernement	des	
Vivants,	the	lecture	course	given	at	the	Collège	de	France	in	1979–1980,	Foucault	
takes	 care	 to	 further	 distinguish	 the	 two	 distinct	 relationships	 to	 truth	 and	
knowledge	which	 lead	Oedipus	 to	 his	 discovery.	 As	 Chevallier	 notes	 in	Michel	
Foucault	et	le	christianisme:	
[…]	Foucault	firstly	distinguishes	Oedipus’	τέχνη	from	the	ways	of	Creon	
and	Tiresias,	for	the	latter	obey	other	semantic	fields.	He	links	the	former	
to	 the	 verb	 εύρίσκειν,	 which	 means	 “to	 find	 out,	 to	 discover”.	 The	
commentary	then	makes	a	second	distinction,	this	time	within	Oedipus’	
own	ways.	This	distinction	is	made	on	the	basis	of	a	lexical	nuance:	the	
resolution	of	the	Sphinx’s	riddle	is	designated	by	the	substantive	γνώμε,	
without	 any	mention	 of	 the	 verb	 εύρίσκειν.67	(Chevallier:	 2011,	166–
167)	
	
In	 contrary	 to	 gnome	 which	 designates	 opinion,	 Chevallier	 rightly	 stresses	
Foucault’s	specification	of	Oedipus’	tekhne	once	the	latter	endeavours	to	discover	
the	truth	by	himself:	it	is	not	a	truth	proceeding	from	common	belief	nor	from	
the	privileged	art	of	 the	 seer,	 it	 is	 a	 truth	derived	 from	 the	discovery	of	 facts.	
Oedipus’	activity,	linked	to	the	semantic	field	of	zetein	and	euriskein	(“to	check”	
and	“to	discover”),	designates	a	truth	which	is	accessible	to	men’s	praxis.68	It	no	
longer	consists	 in	a	sovereign	synthesis,	where	nothing	is	 left	to	be	checked	or	
                                                
This	negation,	which	corresponds	to	the	privilege	of	political	sovereigns	in	Archaic	Greece,	means	
the	strict	realization	of	truth	in	an	act	of	power	(Détienne:	1999,	26-28,	43,	71).	
67	“[…]	Foucault	distinguee	tout	d’abord	la	τέχνη	d’Oedipe	des	manières	de	faire	de	Créon	et	de	
Tirésias,	car	celles-ci	obéissent	à	d’autres	champs	sémantiques.	 Il	 rattache	alors	cette	τέχνη	au	
verbe	 εύρίσκειν	 ,	 qui	 signifie	 ‘trouver,	 découvrir’.	 Le	 commentaire	 pose	 alors	 une	 deuxième	
distinction,	 à	 l’intérieur	 cette	 fois	 des	 propres	 manières	 de	 faire	 d’Oedipe.	 Il	 appuie	 cette	
distinction	 sur	 une	 nuance	 lexicale:	 la	 resolution	 de	 l’énignme	 du	 Sphinx	 est	 designee	 par	 le	
substantif	εύρίσκειν.”	
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discovered,	but	a	discovery	that	depends	upon	an	inquiring	subject	and	an	object	
to	be	enquired	about.	Truth	has	left	political	power	but	has	joined	“the	order	of	
the	world	and	things”	which	the	retrospective	words	of	the	messenger	recount.		
	
This	is	this	morphology	of	truth	that	emerges	with	Classical	Greece	that	Foucault	
wants	to	stress	–	a	truth	that	lasts	beyond	the	performance	of	sovereignty.	Such	
an	 analysis	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 Oedipus	 Rex	 in	 Du	
Gouvernement	des	Vivants.	Already	 in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	 to	Know	and	 in	
“Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”,	 Foucault	 insisted	 upon	 the	 convergence	 and	 the	
juridical	and	epistemological	mutation	 that	marked	the	emergence	of	Classical	
Greek	thought.	 It	 is	on	this	very	basis	that	the	concept	of	nature	as	the	law	of	
gods	 accessible	 to	men	 is	 characterized	 in	 the	 1970–1971	 text.	During	 the	 3rd	
March	1971	 lecture,	Foucault	tells	us	that	“[nomos]	speaks	as	 if	by	 itself,	 in	 its	
own	name”,	is	“present	in	the	midst	of	everyone	without	having	to	formulate	it”	
but	 is	at	the	same	time	“activated	 in	 logos	 […]	and	 legible	 in	nature”.	Foucault	
writes:	
Inscribed	 in	 stone,	 present	 in	 the	midst	 of	 everyone	 without	 anyone	
having	 to	 formulate	 it,	 nomos	 is	 no	 longer	 uttered	 by	 anyone	 in	
particular,	it	speaks	as	if	by	itself,	in	its	own	name,	the	only	name	it	has,	
the	 historico–mythical	 one	 of	 its	 founder.	 Coming	 from	 the	 attack	 of	
game	of	logos,	of	public	discourse,	of	discussion,	here	too,	it	no	longer	
belongs	to	anyone;	all	may	publicly	appropriate	it,	submit	to	it,	or	modify	
it.	Passed	on	by	pedagogy,	imposed	by	examples	lost	in	the	mists	of	time,	
here	 too,	 it	 does	 not	 belong	 to	 anyone.	 Adapted	 to	 nature,	 it	 comes	
under	its	authority.	[…]	[N]omos	is	detached	from	the	singular	exercise	
of	power	and	particular	event	to	which	thesmos	was	linked.	Nomos	is,	as	
it	were,	always	there,	inscribed	in	stone,	activated	in	logos,	conveyed	by	
the	zeal	of	habits,	and	legible	in	nature.	(Foucault:	2013,	153)	
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What	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 a	 new	 configuration	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 sovereign	
power	 which	 emerges	 with	 Classical	 Greek	 thought	 and	 the	 nomos	 (the	 law	
written	 by	 men)	 opposed	 to	 thesmos	 (the	 law	 of	 gods	 and	 kings	 expressed	
through	 rituals).	 The	 law	of	men	 (nomos)	 corresponds	 to	 the	 law	of	nature,	 it	
always	already	exists	but	 is	at	the	same	time	only	activated	when	spoken.	The	
expression	 of	 nomos	 in	 discourse	 therefore	 corresponds	 to	 a	 positive	
manifestation	of	a	natural	truth	which	always	already	preexists	the	moment	of	
enunciation.	Whereas	the	masters	of	 truth	were	producing	and	expressing	the	
sovereign	law	at	the	same	time,	the	discourse	of	knowledge	effectuates	a	natural	
truth	 which	 precedes	 it.	 This	 analysis	 is	 very	 close	 to	 the	 one	 of	 Oedipus	
discovering	his	own	identity:	the	fact	that	Oedipus	is	able	to	discover	it	through	
investigation	reveals	that	this	truth,	heralded	by	and	confirmed	by	the	messenger,	
both	preexists	its	discovery	but	is	yet	activated	only	when	it	can	be	fully	spoken	
(i.e.	only	when	the	peasant	can	designate	Oedipus	as	the	person	he	saw).	
	
	
4.	Forms	of	justice	as	forms	of	truth:	Foucault’s	“counter-positivism”	
	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 production	 of	 truth	 is	 linked	 to	 juridical	 forms	 brings	 back	
epistemological	truth	and	the	postulate	of	its	transcendental	status,	to	a	strictly	
immanent	act	of	power.	For	Foucault,	“the	history	of	 the	birth	of	 the	 inquiry”	
constitutes	the	emergence	of	a	specific	way	of	defining	and	experiencing	truth	as	
the	 production	 of	 the	 use	 of	 knowledge:	 in	 this	 case,	 truth	 is	 neither	 a	
metaphysical	nor	a	natural	given	but	is	the	immanent	use	of	a	specific	tekhne.	My	
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claim	is	that	Foucault’s	reflection	upon	truth	as	a	consequence	of	knowledge	is	
contrasted	with	the	form	of	truth	that	the	power	of	the	sovereign	manifests	–	a	
truth	which	is	produced	and	appears	in	strict	coincidence	with	an	act	of	power.69	
	
In	 the	 same	 way,	 when	 Foucault	 contrasts	 the	 truth	 emerging	 from	 the	
knowledge	gathered	through	inquiry	with	the	way	judicial	conflicts	were	settled	
within	the	paradigm	of	old	Germanic	law,70	he	insists	on	the	fact	that	disputes	
were	 settled	 through	 a	 test	 or	 an	 ordeal	 (very	much	 as	 they	were	 in	 Archaic	
Greece)	which	proves	truth	without	severing	it	from	its	performance:	
The	 old	 law	 that	 settled	 disputes	 between	 individuals	 in	 Germanic	
societies,	 at	 the	 time	when	 these	 came	 into	 contact	with	 the	Roman	
Empire,	was	in	a	sense	very	close	in	some	of	its	forms	to	archaic	Greek	
law.	It	was	a	law	in	which	the	system	of	inquiry	did	not	exist;	disputes	
between	individuals	were	settled	by	the	testing	game.	(Foucault:	2000c,	
34)		
	
This	test,	which	was,	in	the	case	of	Archaic	Greece,	a	test	of	truth	in	the	face	of	
the	divine,71	is	completely	alien	to	the	idea	of	truth	as	the	object	of	the	pursuit	of	
knowledge.	There	was	nothing	to	be	known	or	discovered	since	the	law	remained	
                                                
69	This	means	that	there	is	no	distinction	in	kind	between	truth	and	the	immanent	power	which	
produces	it.	The	affirmation	according	to	which	power	is	truth	and	truth	is	power	runs	through	
Foucault’s	critique	of	modern	politics.	During	7th	January	1976	lecture,	he	claims	that	“[p]ower	
cannot	be	exercised	unless	a	certain	economy	of	discourses	of	truth	functions	in,	on	the	basis	of,	
and	thanks	to,	that	power.”	(Foucault:	2003a,	24).	However,	my	claim	is	that	Foucault’s	work	of	
historicization	 of	 the	 morphology	 of	 truth	 introduces	 a	 further	 nuance:	 the	 essential	
correspondence	between	truth	and	power	does	not	merely	stress	the	fact	that	knowledge	and	
truth	are	coercive,	but	that	the	expression	of	truth	is	an	immanent	act.	This	specification	permits	
the	withdrawal	of	truth	from	the	metaphysical	and	transcendental	status	it	acquires	in	Classical	
Greece	and	links	its	production	to	a	strictly	immanent	and	historically	identifiable	event.	
70	In	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	Foucault	compares	the	paradigm	of	Germanic	law	(between	the	
fifth	and	the	thirteenth	century	AD)	to	the	way	justice	was	made	in	Archaic	Greece.	The	wrong-
doer	had	 to	accept	 the	need	 to	confront	 sovereign	 justice	 through	a	 test	or	a	battle.	 It	 is	 the	
outcome	of	this	battle	which	would	trigger	the	sovereign	decision	and	not	the	knowledge	of	the	
truth	related	to	the	wrong	committed.	(Foucault:	2000c,	34-38)		
71	For	an	extensive	development	of	this	aspect	of	Archaic	Greek	jurisdiction,	see	the	3rd	March	
1971	lecture	from	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	(Foucault:	2013,	149-166). 
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esoteric.	The	truth,	however,	was	performed	through	an	act	that	opposed	God’s	
order	through	a	concrete	struggle	between	the	wrong-doer	and	the	divine.	This	
manifestation	of	truth	as	a	struggle	–	i.e.	the	idea	according	to	which	truth,	justice	
and	war	belong	to	the	same	fabric	–	is	also	found	in	the	structure	of	old	Germanic	
law.	In	this	case,	justice	and	truth	are	performed	through	the	pursuit	of	the	battle	
initiated	by	the	offender.	Foucault	describes	its	logic	as	follows:	
[…]	once	the	penal	action	was	introduced	–	once	any	individual	declared	
himself	to	be	a	victim	and	called	for	reparation	from	the	other	party	–	
the	judicial	settlement	would	ensue	as	a	kind	of	continuation	of	the	clash	
between	the	individuals.	A	kind	of	private,	individual	war	developed,	and	
the	 penal	 procedure	 was	 merely	 the	 ritualization	 of	 that	 conflict	
between	 individuals.	 Germanic	 law	 did	 not	 assume	 an	 opposition	
between	war	and	justice,	or	an	identity	between	justice	and	peace;	on	
the	 contrary,	 it	 assumed	 that	 law	 was	 a	 special,	 regulated	 way	 of	
conducting	war	between	individuals	and	controlling	acts	of	revenge.	Law	
was	thus	a	regulated	way	of	making	war.	For	example,	when	someone	
was	 killed,	 one	 of	 his	 close	 relatives	 could	 make	 use	 of	 the	 judicial	
practice	of	revenge,	which	meant	not	renouncing	the	possibility	of	killing	
someone,	 normally	 the	murderer.	 Entering	 the	 domain	 of	 law	meant	
killing	the	killer,	but	killing	him	according	to	certain	rules,	certain	forms.	
If	the	killer	had	committed	the	crime	in	such-and-such	manner,	it	would	
be	necessary	to	kill	him	by	cutting	him	into	pieces	or	by	cutting	his	head	
off	and	placing	 it	on	a	 stake	at	 the	entrance	 to	his	house.	These	acts	
would	ritualize	the	gesture	of	revenge	and	characterize	 it	as	a	 judicial	
revenge.	Law,	then,	was	the	ritual	form	of	war.	(Foucault:	2000c,	35)	
	
The	 settlement	 of	 conflicts	 under	 the	Germanic	 law	 recalls	 the	 ritualized	 and	
codified	struggle	between	the	King	and	the	suppliced	Foucault	describes	in	the	
first	chapter	of	Discipline	and	Punish.	In	both	cases,	the	establishment	of	justice	
and	 truth	has	nothing	 to	do	with	 the	 search	 for	 knowledge.	 Truth	and	 justice	
belong	 to	 the	 same	 act	 aiming	 at	 restoring,	 through	 a	 “ritual	 form	 of	war”	 a	
balance	which	has	been	disrupted:	it	does	not	proceed	from	the	neutralization	of	
a	conflict	through	the	attempt	to	discover	what	has	happened	but	rather	from	
the	pursuit	of	this	conflict	until	its	conclusion.	
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Foucault	studies	a	variant	of	this	agonistic	mode	of	manifesting	truth	in	two	texts:	
in	1973	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	and	in	1981	in	Wrong	Doing.	Truth-Telling:	
The	Function	of	Avowal	in	Justice.	In	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	Foucault	depicts	
the	confrontation	between	Antilochus	and	Menelaus	 that	 is	 found	 in	Homer's	
Song	XXIII	from	the	Iliad.	It	constitutes,	according	to	Foucault,	the	first	historical	
evidence	of	a	link	between	the	manifestation	of	truth	and	a	judicial	procedure.	
Foucault	chooses	this	specific	example	 in	order	to	retrieve	a	historical	 form	of	
judicial	practice	that	did	not	rely	on	the	manifestation	of	truth	through	testimony	
and	 the	 recollection	of	what	happened.	 The	witness	did	not	 fulfill	 the	 task	of	
joining	the	visible	to	the	expressible	(by	testifying	that	an	act	has	been	committed	
by	someone)	but	that	of	making	sure	that	the	rules	attributed	to	the	ritual	of	the	
race	are	correctly	followed.	In	this	respect,	the	judicial	practice	found	in	Homer’s	
Song	XXIII	 is	not	of	the	same	kind	as	the	one	found	in	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex.	
The	story	unfolds	as	follows:	a	conflict	emerges	between	two	characters	after	a	
chariot	race	during	the	games	organized	after	the	death	of	Patroclus.72	In	“Truth	
and	Juridical	Forms”,	Foucault	describes	the	function	of	the	race	thus:	
The	games'	organizers	have	placed	a	man	there	to	make	sure	the	rules	
of	the	race	are	followed;	Homer,	without	naming	him	personally,	says	
this	man	is	a	witness,	histor,	one	who	is	there	to	see.	[…]	An	infringement	
occurs	and,	when	Antilochus	arrives	first,	Menelaus	lodges	a	protest	and	
                                                
72	In	the	original	text,	Antilochus’	infringement	of	the	ritual	reads	as	follows	as	follows:	
“Suddenly	brave	Antilochus	saw	up	ahead	
a	place	where	the	road	was	hollowed	out	and	narrow,	
with	a	channel	in	the	ground	where	winter	rains	
had	backed	the	water	up,	washing	out	some	of	the	road	
and	making	all	the	ground	subside.	Menelaus	was	coming	to	the	spot,	leaving	no	space	at	all	
for	a	second	chariot	to	move	along	beside	him.	
[…]	Menelaus	shouted	but	Antilochus	kept	going,	
moving	even	faster	and	laying	on	the	whip,	
as	if	he	hadn’t	heard	[…].”	(Homer:	2006,	516-517)	
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says	 to	 the	 judge,	 or	 to	 the	 jury	 who	 must	 award	 the	 prize,	 that	
Antilochus	 committed	a	 foul.	 […]	Curiously,	 in	 this	 text	by	Homer	 the	
parties	 involved	 do	 not	 call	 upon	 the	 person	 who	 saw,	 the	 famous	
witness	who	was	near	the	turning	post	and	who	should	attest	to	what	
happened.	 He	 is	 not	 called	 to	 testify,	 not	 asked	 a	 single	 question.	
(Foucault:	2000c,	17-18)	
	
What	matters	is	not	the	object	of	knowledge	for	its	own	sake;	it	is	not	knowledge	
in	its	positivity	that	will	determine	truth.	It	is	not,	as	with	Oedipus	Rex,	the	visual	
witness	who	will	settle	the	case	by	bringing	forward	what	the	others	have	not	
seen.	On	the	contrary,	Foucault	tells	us	that	the	case	will	be	settled	by	an	oath	
which	constitutes	a	confrontation	with	Zeus:		
After	Menelaus'	accusation	“You	committed	a	 foul,"	and	Antilochus'	
defence	 “I	 didn't	 commit	 any	 foul”,	 Menelaus	 delivers	 a	 challenge:	
“Come,	lay	your	right	hand	and	swear	by	Zeus	that	you	didn't	commit	
any	foul.”	At	that	moment,	Antilochus,	faced	with	this	challenge,	which	
is	a	test,	declines	to	swear	an	oath	and	thereby	acknowledges	that	he	
committed	the	foul.	(Foucault:	2000c,	18)	
	
The	simple	fact	that	Antilochus	refuses	to	take	up	the	challenge	means	that	he	
refuses	the	confrontation	with	Zeus	because	he	knows	he	has	cheated.	It	is	not	
that	 truth	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 Archaic	 Greece,	 but	 truth	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	
established	through	the	positivity	of	knowledge.	Antilochus	knows	it	(hence	his	
refusal	to	take	up	the	challenge),	Zeus	knows	it	and	the	judicial	procedure	takes	
place	 in	 the	 very	 space	 of	 this	 confrontation	 between	 man	 and	 God.	 The	
possibility	of	truth	is	determined	by	the	act	of	swearing,	not	by	the	postulate	that	
knowledge	can	lead	to	its	discovery.	In	the	same	passage,	Foucault	adds:	
This	is	a	peculiar	way	to	produce	truth,	to	establish	juridical	truth	–	not	
through	the	testimony	of	a	witness	but	through	a	sort	of	testing	game,	
a	 challenge	 hurled	 by	 one	 adversary	 at	 another.	 If	 by	 chance	 he	 had	
accepted	the	risk,	 if	he	had	actually	sworn,	the	responsibility	for	what	
would	 happen,	 the	 final	 uncovering	 of	 the	 truth	 would	 immediately	
devolve	upon	the	gods.	And	it	would	be	Zeus	who,	by	punishing	the	one	
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who	 uttered	 the	 false	 oath	 if	 that	 where	 the	 case,	 would	 have	
manifested	the	truth	with	his	thunderbolt.	(Foucault:	2000c,	18)		
	
If	we	limit	ourselves	to	the	reading	of	this	analysis	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	
we	do	understand	why	this	specific	example	corresponds	to	the	practice	used	in	
Archaic	Greece	 to	 solve	 conflicts	 between	opposed	parties	 through	 a	 form	of	
agonistic	practice,	but	it	is	not	exactly	apparent	why	it	constitutes	the	first	case	
of	a	judicial	practice.	This	difficulty	resides	in	the	fact	that	this	example	provides	
a	case	where	a	certain	type	of	 jurisdiction	meets	another	one.	 If	we	refer	to	a	
later	lecture	published	in	Wrong	Doing.	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	
Justice	where	Foucault	 takes	again	 the	example	of	 the	confrontation	between	
Antilochus	and	Menelaus,	we	see	that	he	completes	his	reading	of	it	by	analyzing	
the	 liturgical	 character	of	 the	 race.	 This	 race	 is	 not	 like	 any	other	 race	where	
opponents	with	diverse	but	unknown	abilities	are	confront	one	another	in	order	
to	 let	a	winner	emerge.	On	the	contrary,	 this	 race	appears	as	 the	display	of	a	
liturgy:	 like	a	 ritual,	 it	 is	organized	 to	 let	 a	 truth,	which	 corresponds	 to	a	pre-
existing	order	of	things,	appear.		
	
Therefore,	the	role	of	the	witness	is	not	to	know	and	remember	what	is	going	to	
happen	in	order	to	provide	a	testimony,	but	to	be	sure	that	the	race	happens	in	
accordance	with	 the	 correct	 rules,	 to	 check	 that	 no	 one	 cheats	 and	 that	 the	
correct	order	of	things,	according	to	which	the	stronger	is	the	stronger	and	the	
first,	 remains	 the	 same.	 In	 short,	 this	 race	 is	 a	 form	of	display	of	measure.	 In	
Wrong-Doing,	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	Justice,	Foucault	notes:	
The	order	is	already	predetermined,	so	what	is	the	function	of	the	race,	
exactly?	The	function	of	the	race	is	nothing	more	than	to	develop,	in	one	
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sense,	and	dramatize	an	order	of	truth	that	is	given	from	the	beginning.	
And	if	the	race	is	so	dramatic,	 it	 is	precisely	because	there	are	people	
who	interfere.	How	do	they	interfere?	By	making	it	such	that	the	truth	
does	not	come	to	light.	This	 is	what	happens	when	Apollo	on	the	one	
side	and	Athena	on	the	other	intervene	by	taking	the	whip	from	one	and	
throwing	the	other	to	the	ground.	They	prevent	the	race	from	fulfilling	
its	true	function,	which	is	to	be	the	visible	ceremony	of	a	truth	that	is	
already	visible.	[…]	Consequently,	far	from	being	a	test	in	which	equal	
individuals	can	distinguish	themselves	so	that	an	unpredictable	winner	
emerges,	the	race	is	nothing	more	than	a	liturgy	of	truth.	Or,	if	you	will,	
to	forge	a	term	–	or	not	exactly	forge	a	term,	because	one	finds	it	already	
in	the	vocabulary	of	late	Greek	–	one	might	employ	the	word	alethurgy.	
That	is,	 it	 is	a	ritual	procedure	for	bringing	forth	alethes:	that	which	is	
true.	And	in	the	case	of	this	race,	understood	as	an	alethurgy	–	a	liturgy	
of	truth	–	all	of	the	various	adventures	will	appear	to	be	tricks,	ploys,	and	
ruses.	(Foucault:	2014b,	38-39)	
	
The	element	which	 Foucault	 adds	 in	 the	 Leuwen	 lecture,	 and	which	does	not	
clearly	appear	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	in	1973,	is	the	concept	of	alethurgy	
he	 coins	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 a	 relation	 between	 the	 idea	 of	 truth	 as	alêthes	
coming	to	the	fore	through	a	liturgy,	hence	a	celebrative	and	ritual	practice.	In	
this	 context,	 the	 role	 of	 the	witness	 is	 to	make	 sure	 the	 ritual	 gets	 correctly	
unfolded	according	to	the	correct	rules.		
	
There	is	a	sense	in	which	Foucault	alters	or	corrects	his	reading	of	this	scene	since	
his	 initial	 uses	of	 it	 in	 the	1970s:	 this	 episode	 from	Homer	 is	 not	 so	much	an	
unpredictable	truth	that	emerges	through	the	struggle	of	the	agôn	but	an	already	
settled	picture	where	this	truth	gets	displayed.	In	this	case,	the	truth	is	known	
without	 being	 formulated	 or	 made	 positive	 in	 discourse:	 it	 is	 known	 by	 the	
participants	of	the	race	who	are	already	ordered	according	to	their	skills	before	
the	race	starts,	it	is	known	by	Antilochus	who	tricks	Menelaus.	Foucault	uses	Louis	
Gernet's	Droit	et	Société	dans	la	Grèce	ancienne	(Gernet:	1999,	17-18)	to	stress	
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the	 judicial	 practice	 to	 which	 the	 ritualized	 setting	 of	 the	 race	 corresponds.	
Foucault	says:		
It	 is	 clear	 then	 that	we	 are	 dealing	with	 a	 scene	 that	 is	 typically	 and	
precisely	judicial	and,	at	the	same	time,	that	has	entirely	the	texture	of	
a	conflict,	an	agôn.	And	I	will	quote	for	you,	in	this	respect,	a	passage	by	
Gernet	 on	 this	 altercation	between	Menelaus	 and	Antilochus,	 from	a	
very	 interesting	and	 important	work,	Droit	et	Société	en	Grèce,	which	
explains:	“The	law	that	begins	to	appear	in	the	scene	between	Menelaus	
and	Antilochus,	 the	 law	 that	 beings	 to	 appear	 in	 this	 scene	 does	 not	
appear	 to	 be	 a	 specialized	 or	 professional	 technique.	 The	 law	 itself	
emanates	from	the	life	of	the	games.	There	is	a	continuity	between	the	
agonistic	customs	and	the	judicial	customs.	The	question	of	competence	
is	 settled	 by	 itself;	 the	 agôn,	 the	 combat,	 the	 milieu	 that	 is	 pre-
established	for	reaching	a	decision	through	competition,	is	also	a	milieu	
favorable	to	reaching	a	decision	by	means	of	a	sentence.”	The	first	point	
to	 keep	 in	 mind	 in	 analyzing	 this	 scene	 is	 therefore	 the	 continuity	
between	the	agôn	and	the	judicial,	between	the	confrontation	through	
competition	and	the	judicial	confrontation.	They	have	the	same	texture.	
(Foucault:	2014b,	37)	
	
If	the	texture	between	the	agôn	and	the	judicial	practice	is	the	same,	it	is	because	
there	is	a	strict	continuity	between	the	confrontation	staged	by	the	games	and	
the	display	of	a	predetermined	and	immutable	order	of	truth.	The	skills	of	the	
competitors	are	known	in	advance	and	it	is	through	a	regulated	and	ritual	agôn	
(which	 Foucault	 calls	alethurgy),	 that	 truth	 is	made	 apparent.	 Truth	 does	 not	
correspond	to	the	positivity	of	a	knowledge	that	needs	to	be	gathered	through	
investigation	 in	order	 to	allow	 the	manifestation	of	 truth	but	 rather	 the	 strict	
manifestation	of	the	truth	that	the	histor	is	supposed	to	guarantee.		
	
When	 Foucault	 uses	 Gernet	 to	 specify	 that	 the	 judicial	 practice	 is	 not	 a	
professional	 technique,	 he	means	 that	 no	 specific	 tekhne	 is	 required	 to	make	
justice	appear:	it	does	not	require	the	fulfillment	of	an	investigation	through	the	
search	for	a	knowledge	that	is	lacking	in	order	to	settle	the	case.	In	this	respect,	
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the	judicial	case	related	in	Homer’s	Song	XXIII	is	clearly	different	from	Sophocles’	
Oedipus	Rex:	it	is	precisely	because	Oedipus	uses	a	tekhne	to	discover	the	truth	
against	what	the	oracle	and	the	seer	manifest	in	an	esoteric	manner	that	he	is	a	
hubristic	tyrant.	Chevallier	clearly	identifies	a	novelty	in	the	analysis	of	Oedipus	
Rex	Foucault	provides	in	the	1979-1980	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	de	France	
(Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants):	
The	only	novelty	introduced	by	the	1980	lecture	in	relation	to	the	Rio	
conferences	 precisely	 concerns	 what	 strictly	 belongs	 to	 Oedipus	 and	
appears	nowhere	else	in	Sophocles’	text.	Yet,	the	question	asked	is	the	
same	as	in	1973:	“what	is	this	thing	called	Oedipal	knowledge?”.	But	the	
Brazilian	answer	was	hasty	on	this	point	or	at	least	incomplete:	at	the	
University	 of	 Rio,	 Foucault	 does	 not	 first	 distinguish	 the	 γνώμε	–	 the	
knowledge	 that	allowed	Oedipus	 to	 solve	 the	 riddle	of	 the	Sphinx’s	–	
from	the	act	of	finding	out	εύρίσκειν	–	which	leads	Oedipus	to	the	slave	
who	has	witness	 the	murder	 through	a	certain	τέχνη.	About	 the	verb	
εύρίσκειν,	Foucault	only	mentions	that	it	is	an	activity	which	is	pursued	
one	one’s	own,	which	allows	him	to	link	at	once	the	use	of	the	term	by	
Sophocles	to	a	procedure	of	“knowledge-power”	having	appeared	at	a	
moment	of	the	Greek	political	history.73	(Chevallier:	2011,	164-165)	
	
In	the	1973	text,	Foucault	tells	us	that	Oedipus	uses	a	certain	tekhne	in	order	to	
find	out	(euriskein)	what	actually	happened.	In	contrast	with	the	expression	of	
truth	 that	 characterizes	 Homer’s	 Song	 XXIII,	 it	 is	 not	 an	 alethurgy	whereby	 a	
predetermined	yet	esoteric	truth	is	staged	and	performed	through	the	liturgy	of	
the	ritual:	the	manifestation	of	truth	is	not	performed	either	through	the	ritual	
or	through	the	confrontation	with	Zeus.	However,	at	the	beginning	of	the	23rd	
                                                
73 	“La	 seule	 nouveauté	 introduite	 par	 le	 cours	 de	 1980	 par	 rapport	 aux	 conférences	 de	 Rio	
concerne	justement	ce	qui	appartient	en	propre	à	Oedipe	et	n’apparaît	nulle	part	ailleurs	dans	le	
texte	de	Sophocle.	La	question	posée	est	pourtant	la	même	qu’en	1973:	“qu’est-ce	que	c’est	que	
ce	 savoir	 oedipien?”.	 Mais	 la	 réponse	 brésilienne	 était	 sur	 ce	 point	 hâtive,	 tout	 du	 moins	
incomplète:	 à	 l’université	 de	 Rio,	 Foucault	 ne	 distingue	 pas	 tout	 d’abord	 la	 γνώμε	 -	 la	
connaissance	 qui	 a	 permis	 à	 Oedipe	 de	 résoudre	 l’énigme	 du	 Sphynx	 -	 de	 l’acte	 de	 trouver	
εύρίσκειν	-	qui	mène	Oedipe	à	l’esclave	ayant	assisté	au	meurtre,	à	travers	une	certaine	τεκνε.	
Au	sujet	du	verbe	εύρίσκειν,	Foucault	se	contente	de	préciser	qu’il	s’agit	d’une	activité	qui	se	fait	
seul	 ;	 caractéristique	 qui	 lui	 permet	 aussitôt	 de	 relier	 l’usage	 du	 terme	 chez	 Sophocle	 à	 une	
certaine	procédure	de	“savoir-pouvoir”	apparue	à	un	moment	de	l’histoire	politique	grecque.”	
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January	1980	 lecture	 from	Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants,	Foucault	still	argues	
that	Oedipus’	quest	for	knowledge	leads	to	a	form	of	alethurgy.	Not	the	divine	
alethurgy	but	the	manifestation	of	truth	through	the	words	of	the	peasant,	the	
visual	witness	who	tells	what	he	has	seen.	From	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	in	
1973	 to	 Du	 Gouvernement	 des	 Vivants	 in	 1980,	 Foucault	 nuances	 and	
complexifies	 the	 “ultra-aggressive	 positivist	 reading	 [l’interprétation	 ultra	
agressivement	positiviste]”	of	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex	he	has	provided.	He	now	
links	the	term	alethurgy	to	the	notion	of	“veridiction	[véridiction]”	and	writes:	
Last	 time,	 I	 tried	 to	 show	 you	 how	 […]	 one	 could	 see	 develop	 in	
Sophocles’	play,	in	a	very	coherent	and	systematic	manner,	two	modes	
of	 truth,	 two	modes	 of	 veridiction,	 two	 ways	 of	 truth-telling,	 what	 I	
would	 call	 two	 kinds	 of	 alethurgy	 which	 answer	 one	 another,	 finally	
adjust	to	one	another	and	fall	back	upon	Oedipus.	These	are	two	forms	
of	alethurgy	which,	both	–	precisely	because	they	fit	together,	adjust	to	
one	 another	 –	 constitute	 the	 good	word,	 the	 right	word,	 the	 “ὀρθόν	
ἔπος”,	which	finally	conveys	the	truth,	truth	itself	as	well	as	the	whole	
truth.	One	of	those	alethurgies,	one	of	those	forms	of	veridiction,	is	the	
veridiction	from	which	nothing	escapes,	the	veridiction	that	dominates	
time,	 which	 speak	 from	 afar	 the	 eternal	 decrees;	 it	 is	 oracular	 and	
religious	 alethurgy.	 And	 then	 there	 is	 another	 truth-telling,	 that	 will	
appear	and	develop	at	the	end	of	the	play,	providing	it	with	a	closure	–	
it	is	the	truth-telling	which	gets	pulled	out	little	by	little,	piece	by	piece,	
element	by	element.	It	is	a	truth-telling	that	obeys	the	form,	the	law	and	
the	constraints	of	memory,	and	it	is	a	truth-telling	which	is	only	declared	
of	 [what	 the	 subject]	 has	 himself	 seen	 with	 his	 own	 eyes.	 Religious	
alethurgy	on	one	 side	which	 legitimates	 itself	 by	 its	 own	name:	 “it	 is	
because	I	am	Loxias’	servant,	says	Tiresias,	that	I	can	say	what	I	say”	–	
[…].	On	the	other	side,	a	judicial	alethurgy	which	legitimates	itself	from	
the	fact	that	one	can	say	“I”,	“myself”,	“I	was	there	myself”,	“I	have	seen	
with	my	own	eyes”	[…].	I	think	we	have	here	an	important	element,	[…]	
the	element	of	the	“I”,	the	element	of	the	“αυτος”,	of	the	“myself”	in	
what	one	could	call	alethurgy,	veridiction	or	the	rites	and	proceedings	of	
veridiction.74	(Foucault:	2012a,	47-48)	
                                                
74	“La	 dernière	 fois,	 j’avais	 essayé	 de	 vous	montrer	 comment	 […]	 on	 voyait	 dans	 la	 pièce	 de	
Sophocle	se	développer,	d’une	façon	très	cohérente	et	systématique,	deux	modes	de	vérité,	deux	
modes	de	véridiction,	deux	façons	de	dire	vrai,	ce	que	j’appellerai	deux	types	d’alèthurgie	qui	se	
répondent,	 s’ajustent,	 finalement	 l’un	 à	 l’autre	 et	 se	 referment	 sur	Oedipe.	 Ce	 sont	 ces	 deux	
fromes	d’alèthurgie	qui,	à	elles	deux	-	et	à	la	condition	précisément	qu’elles	s’emboîtent,	qu’elles	
s’ajustent	[l’une	à]	l’autre	-,	constituent	la	bonne	parole,	la	parole	droite,	l’”	ὀρθόν	ἔπος”,	qui	est	
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The	 specification	 Foucault’s	 reading	 from	 1980	 adds	 allows	 us	 to	 understand	
more	precisely	the	recurrence	of	the	notions	of	alethurgy,	veridiction	and	truth-
telling	 in	Wrong-Doing,	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	 in	 Justice.	Those	
three	notions	are	terms	Foucault	coins	following	the	same	principle:	it	is	enough	
to	decompose	those	three	terms	to	reveal	the	idea	Foucault	is	trying	to	convey.	
Alethurgy	 mixes	 aletheia	 with	 liturgy	 to	 express	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 ritualized	
manifestation	of	truth,	veridiction	(a	term	Foucault	coins	from	the	French	prefix	
“véri”	 found	 in	 “véridique”	 (true,	 truthful)	 and	 “diction”	 (diction,	 elocution)	
means	the	fact	of	telling	what	 is	true	or	putting	truth	 into	words.	 In	the	exact	
same	way,	 “truth-telling”	 refers	 to	 the	 act	 that	 consists	 in	 telling	 the	 truth	or	
manifesting	it	through	discourse.	In	short,	Foucault	reveals	that	whether	the	way	
in	which	truth	appears	in	the	play	comes	from	the	esoteric	divine	truth	or	from	
Oedipus’	quest	 for	knowledge,	 it	 is	always	concluded	by	and	falls	back	upon	a	
mode	of	truth-telling,	a	form	of	alethurgy,	or	a	way	through	which	truth	is	and	
only	is	its	immanent	manifestation	through	an	act.		
	
                                                
finalement	porteur	de	vérité,	la	vérité	elle-même	et	toute	la	vérité.	L’une	de	ces	alèthurgies,	l’une	
de	ces	formes	de	véridiction,	c’est	la	véridiction	à	qui	rien	n’échappe,	la	véridiction	qui	domine	le	
temps,	qui	prononce	de	loin	les	décrets	éternels;	c’est	l’alèthurgie	oraculaire	et	religieuse.	Et	puis,	
il	y	a	un	autre	dire-vrai,	qui	va	apparaître	et	se	développer	à	la	fin	de	la	pièce,	la	bouclant,	c’est	
celui	qui	s’arrache	petit	à	petit,	morceau	par	morceau,	élément	par	élément.	C’est	un	dire-vrai	
qui	obéit	à	 la	 forme,	à	 la	 loi,	et	aux	contraintes	de	 la	mémoire,	et	c’est	un	dire-vrai	qui	ne	se	
prononce	que	sur	ce	[que	le	sujet]	a	vu	lui	même	de	ses	yeux.	Alèthurgie	religieuse,	donc	d’un	
côté,	et	interprétative,	qui	s’autorise	de	la	force	d’un	nom:	“C’est	parce	que	que	suis	le	serviteur	
de	Loxias,	dit	Tirésias,	que	 je	peux	dire	 ce	que	 je	dis”	 -	 […]	Et,	de	 l’autre	côté,	une	alèthurgie	
judiciaire	qui	ne	s’autorise	que	du	fait	de	pouvoir	dire	“je”,	“moi-même”,	“j’étais	là	moi-même”,	
j’ai	vu	moi-même”	[…].	Je	crois	qu’on	a	là	un	élément	important,	[…]	l’élément	du	“je”,	l’élément	
du	“αυτος”,	du	“moi-même”	dans	ce	qu’on	pourrait	appeler	l’alèthurgie	ou	la	véridiction	ou	les	
rites	et	procédures	de	véridiction.”	
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In	the	same	way,	when	Foucault	comments	again	on	Homer’s	Song	XXIII	in	the	
1981	Leuwen	lectures	after	having	already	studied	it	in	1973,	he	shows	that	the	
confrontation	between	Menelaus	and	Antilochus	is	the	first	written	instance	in	
Archaic	Greek	literature	where	the	place	and	the	emphasis	of	the	agôn	shifts.	It	
is	 the	very	 fact	 that	Antilochus	attempts	 to	disrupt	 the	order	of	 the	 ritualized	
truth	which	displaces	the	agôn,	moving	it	onto	the	scene	of	a	judicial	practice.	
This	scene	does	not	merely	rely	on	a	single	agôn	but	on	two	different	struggles.	
The	 race	corresponds	 to	 the	 first	agôn	which	 is	a	codified	and	predetermined	
one.	 Then,	 after	 the	 disruption	 of	 the	 normal	 order	 of	 the	 race,	 Antilochus'	
boldness	leads	him	to	the	second	agôn,	as	a	consequence	of	which	he	will	have	
to	swear	he	did	not	disrupt	the	display	of	the	ritualized	truth.75	In	Wrong-Doing,	
Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	Justice,	Foucault	writes:	
So	how	is	the	truth	restored?	It	is	restored	through	the	particular	episode	
of	the	oath,	or	rather	the	proposition	to	take	an	oath	in	the	ritual	position.	
Antilochus	must	swear	that	he	did	not	hinder	Menelaus’s	horses,	either	
voluntarily	or	by	ruse.	[…]	The	oath	enters	at	this	point	and	is	presented	
as	 a	 judicial	 procedure,	 inasmuch	 as,	 from	 that	 moment	 on,	 from	 the	
moment	 the	oath	 is	demanded,	 there	are	only	 two	possible	outcomes.	
Either	Antilochus	takes	the	oath,	and	in	that	case	Menelaus	is	forced	to	
concede.	But	this	would	mean	that	the	conflict	between	Antilochus	and	
Menelaus	would	be	 transferred	 from	the	human	to	 the	divine	 realm.	 It	
would	be	in	some	way	Zeus	that	Antilochus	would	be	forced	to	confront	
                                                
75	In	the	original	text,	the	passage	telling	Antilochus’	obligation	to	swear	an	oath	reads	thus:	
“[…]	Antilochus,	
come	here,	my	lord,	and,	as	our	customs	state,	
stand	there	before	your	chariot	and	horses,	
holding	that	thin	whip	you	used	before.	
with	your	hand	on	your	horses,	swear	an	oath,	
by	the	god	who	surrounds	and	shakes	the	earth,	
that	you	dind’t	mean	to	block	my	chariot	
with	some	trick.”	(Homer:	2006,	523)	
It	is	interesting	to	notice	that	it	is	the	oath	which	determines	the	nature	of	the	dispute	between	
Antilochus	and	Menelaus.	What	matters	is	not	to	know	whether	Antilochus	did	or	did	not	mean	
to	block	Menelaus’	chariot	but	that	he	accepts	to	swear	this	oath	so	that	the	dispute	is	transferred	
from	the	conflict	between	Antilochus	and	Menelaus	to	the	conflict	between	Antilochus	and	Zeus.	
This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault	claims	that	this	judicial	structure,	because	it	revolves	around	the	
acceptance	or	the	refusal	of	the	oath,	remains	an	agonistic	one.			
 160 
[…].	The	challenge	to	take	the	oath	transfers	the	agôn	from	the	race	to	the	
dispute	between	the	two	partners	and	from	the	dispute	to	a	settlement	
by	oath.	 If	 the	oath	were	 taken,	 the	agôn	would	 remain	a	dispute,	but	
would	be	transferred	from	the	clash	between	Menelaus	and	Antilochus	to	
the	clash	between	Antilochus	and	Zeus.	And	Antilochus	does	not	want	to	
take	this	risk:	the	transfer	of	the	agonistic	structure	from	man	to	the	gods,	
that	 is	 precisely	 what	 Antilochus	 is	 going	 to	 run	 up	 against	 (Foucault:	
2014b,	39-40)	
	
What	Foucault	chooses	to	study	is	the	shift	from	the	agôn	opposing	Antilochus	
to	Menelaus	to	the	one	opposing	Antilochus	to	Zeus	and	argues	that	the	judicial	
settlement	 of	 the	 case	 remains	 an	 agôn	 through	 and	 through.	 In	 the	 same	
fashion,	when	 he	 claims	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 that,	 if	Menelaus	 had	
sworn,	"it	would	be	Zeus	who,	by	punishing	the	one	who	uttered	the	false	oath	
[…],	would	have	manifested	the	truth	with	his	thunderbolt"	(Foucault:	2000c,	18),	
it	clearly	appears	that	the	center	of	the	battle	shifts.	The	shift	from	the	first	agôn	
to	the	second	happens	through	the	emergence	of	what	Foucault	studies	in	the	
1981	Leuwen's	lecture:	the	emergence	of	the	avowal.	However,	the	avowal	which	
appears	 in	Homer’s	 text	 remains	 connected	 to	 the	manifestation	of	 truth	and	
justice	 as	 an	 act.	 Foucault	 shows	 that	 Antilochus’	 refusal	 to	 confront	 Zeus	
constitutes	 a	 form	 of	 avowal	 since	 Antilochus’	 choice	 means	 that	 he	
acknowledges	 he	 has	 breached	 the	 ritualized	 manifestation	 of	 truth	
corresponding	to	the	alethurgy	of	the	race:	
The	role	of	the	race	was	to	ritualize	this	situation	and	this	relationship;	
and	 what	 Antilochus	 did	 –	 and	 is	 now	 renouncing	 –	 was	 to	 try	 to	
extinguish,	 suffocate,	 weaken	Menelaus’s	 brilliance.	 This	 would	 have	
meant	casting	a	shadow	upon	him	–	doing	him	wrong,	as	Menelaus	says	
–	and,	as	a	result,	surpassing	him	in	this	order	of	reality,	which	was	also	
the	order	of	brilliance	and	the	order	of	glory.	The	quasi-avowal	does	not	
consist,	then,	of	admitting	a	fault	before	a	judicial	body	that	demands	to	
know	 what	 actually	 happened.	 Antilochus’s	 quasi-avowal	 consists,	 in	
renouncing	 the	struggle,	 in	 refusing	 to	 take	up	the	new	form	of	agôn	
proposed	by	the	challenge	of	the	oath,	in	declaring	himself	beaten	in	the	
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new	episode	of	the	struggle.	The	avowal	consists	of	allowing	the	truth	
to	manifest	itself	–	a	truth	that	he	had	obstructed	by	his	attitude	during	
the	race.	The	avowal	consists	of	restoring,	within	the	agonistic	structure,	
the	forms	in	which	the	truth	of	their	strengths	was	supposed	to	ritually	
appear.	(Foucault:	2014b,	42)	
	
If	we	compare	Foucault’s	reading	of	Oedipus	Rex	to	his	reading	of	the	Song	XXIII	
from	the	Iliad,	we	see	that	the	avowal	plays	a	completely	different	role	regarding	
the	manifestation	of	truth	than	does	the	testimony	of	the	witness	in	Oedipus	Rex:	
both	texts	illustrate	a	different	kind	of	alethurgy,	veridiction	or	truth-telling.	In	
this	respect,	Foucault’s	analysis	develops	Gernet’s	comment	according	to	which	
the	agôn	 and	 the	 judicial	 practice	 share	 the	 same	 texture.	What	 shifts	 is	 the	
manifestation	 of	 truth	 as	 a	 ritual;	what	 remains	 is	 the	manifestation	 of	 truth	
through	 a	 struggle	 which	 is	 not	 concerned	 with	 gathering	 the	 knowledge	
necessary	to	decide	upon	the	wrong-doer’s	guiltiness	but	with	the	restoration	of	
the	right	order	of	justice.	We	are	still	confronted	with	a	mode	of	veridiction	which	
excludes	the	knowledge	proceeding	from	man’s	investigation	and	prevents	the	
disjunction	between	the	visible	and	the	expressible	at	the	basis	of	the	recollection	
supposed	by	the	quest	for	knowledge	–	the	kind	of	veridiction	which	“gets	pulled	
out	little	by	little,	piece	by	piece,	element	by	element”,	“obeys	the	form,	the	law	
and	the	constraints	of	memory”	and	“which	is	only	declared	of	[what	the	subject]	
has	himself	seen	with	his	own	eyes”	(Foucault:	2012a,	48).	It	is	possible	to	identify	
two	 main	 historical	 forms	 within	 Foucault’s	 more	 global	 analysis	 of	 the	
relationship	between	knowledge,	justice	and	truth.		
	
On	the	one	hand,	when	justice	appears	through	the	manifestation	of	an	agonistic	
struggle,	it	corresponds	to	a	form	of	truth	which	proceeds	from	sovereign	power.	
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This	 manifestation	 of	 truth,	 which	 remains	 in	 its	 fabric	 an	 immanent	
manifestation	of	power,	excludes	the	possibility	of	knowledge	and	the	disjunction	
between	the	visible	and	the	expressible.	On	the	other	hand,	when	truth	appears	
with	the	testimony,	which	works	on	the	basis	of	inquiry	and	recollection,	a	link	
between	the	act	and	the	discourse	which	relates	to	its	occurrence	is	established.	
Once	truth	becomes	the	object	of	a	possible	knowledge,	it	relies	upon	a	judicial	
procedure	that	sees	the	disjunction	of	the	visible	and	the	expressible:	it	refers	to	
a	 fact	severed	 from	the	act,	a	 fact	whose	truth	 is	established	through	 inquiry,	
investigation	 or	 memory.	 The	 fact	 acquires	 a	 positive	 value	 only	 once	 the	
disjunction	 between	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 is	 compensated	 by	 the	
completion	 of	 truth	 through	 the	 testimony,	 hence	 by	 a	 settlement	 of	 the	
relationship	between	a	discourse	and	its	object.	In	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	
Foucault	tells	us	that	the	settlement	of	the	relationship	between	the	said	and	the	
seen	 is	 an	 act	 of	 power	 in	 itself.	 Consequently,	 truth	 conceals	 the	 immanent	
struggle	at	its	origin	as	well	as	the	fact	that	it	remains	a	production	which	is	not	
metaphysically	fixed	but	is	the	result	of	historical	conflicts.	Foucault	writes:	
And	when	classical	Greece	appeared	–	Sophocles	represents	its	starting	
date,	its	sunrise	–	what	had	to	disappear	for	this	society	to	exist	was	the	
union	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge.	 From	 this	 time	 onward,	 the	man	 of	
power	would	be	the	man	of	ignorance.	In	the	end,	what	befell	Oedipus	
was	that,	knowing	too	much,	he	didn’t	know	anything.	[…]	Thus,	beyond	
a	power	that	had	become	monumentally	blind	like	Oedipus,	there	were	
the	shepherds	who	remembered	and	the	prophets	who	spoke	the	truth.	
[…]	 With	 Plato	 there	 began	 a	 great	 Western	 myth:	 that	 there	 is	 an	
antinomy	between	knowledge	and	power.	If	there	is	knowledge,	it	must	
renounce	power.	Where	knowledge	and	science	are	found	in	their	pure	
truth,	there	can	no	longer	be	any	political	power.	This	great	myth	needs	
to	be	dispelled.	 It	 is	 this	myth	which	Nietzsche	began	 to	demolish	by	
showing,	in	the	numerous	texts	already	cited,	that,	behind	all	knowledge	
[savoir],	 behind	 all	 attainment	 of	 knowledge	 [connaissance],	 what	 is	
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involved	 is	 a	 struggle	 for	 power.	 Political	 power	 is	 not	 absent	 from	
knowledge,	it	is	woven	together	with	it.	(Foucault:	2000c,	32)	
	
The	constitution	of	this	knowledge,	which	functions	“through	witnessing,	through	
recollection,	 through	 inquiry”	 reveals	an	 interesting	 choice	of	words:	 Foucault	
reminds	 the	 reader	 both	 of	 his	 analysis	 of	 Sophocles’	Oedipus	 Rex	where	 the	
visual	witness	plays	a	crucial	role	since	he	performs	the	junction	between	what	
the	seer	sees	and	the	partial	testimonies	spoken	by	the	other	characters.	He	also	
refers	to	the	structure	of	Platonic	metaphysics:	it	is	through	recollection	that	the	
soul	sees	the	ideal	forms	it	once	knew.	On	the	whole,	what	Foucault	describes,	
more	than	the	historical	emergence	of	the	mutual	exclusion	between	power	and	
knowledge,	is	an	alteration	of	the	concept	of	truth	itself.	Once	the	coincidence	
between	power	and	truth	gets	undone,	truth	becomes	a	form	of	power	which	
conceals	its	effective	and	constricting	character:	the	ontological	status	it	acquires	
with	 the	 emergence	 of	 philosophy	 in	 the	 Greece	 of	 the	 fifth	 century	 BC	
establishes	a	relationship	between	words	and	things	whose	historical	production	
gets	concealed	because	truth	becomes	the	positivity	one	discovers.		
	
Against	this	ontological	understanding	of	the	truth	that	can	be	reached	through	
knowledge,	Foucault	chooses	to	historicize	knowledge	and	truth	as	production	of	
positivities	in	order	to	prove	that	the	production	of	truth	through	knowledge	is	
intrinsically	an	act	of	power.	 In	this	respect,	Foucault’s	choice	to	compare	and	
contrast	 different	 judicial	 practices	 (according	 to	 an	 agonistic	 and	 ritualistic	
structure	 for	 Archaic	 Greek	 and	 Germanic	 law	 or	 requiring	 the	 production	 of	
knowledge	during	Classical	Greece	and	the	Classical	Age)	also	constitutes	a	way	
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of	linking	knowledge	and	truth	to	specific	historical	forms.	This	is	the	reason	why,	
during	the	2nd	April	1981	lecture,	he	characterizes	his	enterprise	as	a	“counter-
positivism”:	
It	is	in	this	general	framework	that	I	would	situate	–	by	ways	of	essays,	
fragments,	or	other	more	or	less	aborted	attempts	–	what	I	have	tried	
to	develop	in	different	domains.	I	have	not	tried	to	know	whether	the	
discourse	of	psychiatrists	or	that	of	doctors	was	true,	even	though	this	
is	 an	 entirely	 legitimate	 problem.	 I	 did	 not	 try	 to	 determine	 which	
ideology	the	criminologists’	discourse	obeyed	–	even	if	this	too	would	be	
an	 interesting	 problem.	 The	 problem	 that	 I	 wanted	 to	 pose	 was	
different:	it	was	the	task	of	investigating	the	reasons	for	and	the	forms	
of	the	enterprise	of	truth-telling	about	things	such	as	madness,	illness,	
or	crime.	We	often	speak	of	the	recent	domination	of	science	or	of	the	
technical	 uniformity	 of	 the	 modern	 world.	 Let’s	 say	 that	 this	 is	 the	
question	of	“positivism”	in	the	Comtian	sense,	or	perhaps	it	would	be	
better	to	associate	the	name	of	Saint-Simon	to	this	theme.	In	order	to	
situate	my	analysis,	I	would	like	to	evoke	here	a	counter-positivism	that	
is	not	the	opposite	of	positivism	but	rather	its	counterpoint.	It	would	be	
characterized	 by	 astonishment	 before	 the	 very	 ancient	multiplication	
and	 proliferation	 of	 truth-telling,	 and	 the	 dispersal	 of	 regimes	 of	
veridiction	in	societies	such	as	ours.	(Foucault:	2014b,	21)	
	
It	is	exactly	this	mode	of	production	of	truth	(this	truth-telling,	this	alethurgy,	this	
veridiction)	which	Foucault	wants	to	study	when	he	comes	back	to	Sophocles’	
Oedipus	Rex	 during	 the	23rd	 January	1980	 lecture	 from	Du	Gouvernement	des	
Vivants.	The	first	thing	to	note	is	that	in	the	1980	lecture,	Foucault	takes	great	
care	in	underlining	the	fact	that	Oedipus	is	actually	the	only	character	of	the	play	
to	really	use	a	specific	tekhne.	He	writes:	
In	fact,	what	characterizes	the	practice	of	Tiresias,	which	it	does	seem	
that	Oedipus	and	 Jocasta	 refuse	 to	call	τέχνη,	 are	 two	 things	 that	we	
hinted	at	last	time.	On	the	one	hand,	if	Tiresias	tells	the	truth,	this	is	not	
exactly	a	τέχνη	for	the	very	good	reason	that	he	has	a	natural	bond	with	
truth.	He	is	born	with	truth,	truth	is	born	within	him,	truth	grows	like	a	
plant	 in	 his	 body	 or	 like	 another	 body	 in	 his	 own.	 […]	 Hence,	 no	
technique,	since	there	is	co-naturalness	–	or	this	pretension,	in	any	case,	
to	 co-naturalness,	 between	 Tiresias	 and	 truth.	 […]	 Hence,	 you	 have	
Creon,	who	is	a	man	of	σωφρονεῖν,	of	measure,	the	one	who	knows	his	
bounds	and	knows	how	to	respect	them,	and	then	there	is	the	φρονεῖν	
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of	Tiresias,	which	is	a	way	of	diving	within	oneself,	in	one’s	thoughts,	to	
find	the	truth	with	which	he	is	co-natural.	In	relation	to	these,	which	will	
be	Oedipus’	τέχνη?	If	it	was	absolutely	out	of	the	question	to	talk	about	
Creon’s	 τέχνη,	 if	 Tiresias’	 τέχνη	 is	 probably	 not	 a	 τέχνη,	 conversely,	
Oedipus	does	call	himself	a	man	of	τέχνη.	And	the	word	that	recurs	the	
most	in	the	text	to	characterize	Oedipus’	τέχνη	 is	εύρίσκειν,	that	is	to	
say	“to	find	out,	to	discover”.76	(Foucault:	2012a,	54)	
	
This	 tekhne,	 this	 knowledge	 collected	 through	 investigation,	 is	 a	 specific	
technique	Oedipus	uses.	In	the	same	lecture	at	the	Collège	de	France,	Foucault	
adds	–	and	this	is	a	novelty	in	comparison	with	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	–	that	
this	technique	of	knowledge	is	not	of	the	same	kind	as	the	one	who	allowed	him	
to	solve	the	Sphinx’s	riddle.	Facing	the	Sphinx,	Foucault	tells	us	that	Oedipus	used	
“γνώμε”	 which	 is	 “an	 opinion,	 a	 way	 of	 thinking,	 […]	 a	 judgment”	 (Foucault:	
2012a,	 66)	 whereas	 the	 knowledge	 collected	 through	 investigation	 is	 a	
“τεκμαίρεται”	which	involves	“these	elements,	these	signs	and	these	marks	[…]	
designated	by	the	word	τεκμήριον,	that	is	to	say	mark,	clue”	[ces	éléments,	ces	
signes	et	 ses	marques	 […]	désignés	par	 le	mot	 τεκμήριον,	 c’est-à-dire	marque,	
indice].	 Foucault’s	 analysis	 develops	 here	 the	 analysis	 given	 in	 the	 1970-1971	
Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know	and	 the	 one	 he	 repeats	 in	 the	 1973	 “Truth	 and	
Juridical	Forms”	but	the	difference	is	that	the	sumbolon	Foucault	used	to	express	
                                                
76	“En	fait,	ce	qui	caractérise	la	pratique	de	Tiresias,	et	dont	il	semble	bien	que	Oedipe	et	Jocaste	
n’admettent	pas	qu’on	puisse	l’appeler	τέχνη,	ce	sont	deux	choses	qu’on	a	évoquées	d’ailleurs	la	
dernière	 fois.	 D’une	 part,	 si	 Tirésias	 dit	 la	 vérité,	 ce	 n’est	 pas	 exactement	 une	 τέχνη	 pour	
l’excellente	raison	qu’il	a	à	la	vérité,	lui	Tirésias,	un	lien	de	nature.	Il	naît	avec	la	vérité,	la	vérité	
naît	en	lui,	la	vérité	croît	comme	une	plante	à	l’intérieur	de	son	corps	ou	comme	un	autre	corps	
dans	son	corps.	[…]	Donc,	pas	de	technique,	puisqu’il	y	a	cette	connaturalité	-	ou	cette	prétention,	
en	tout	cas,	à	la	connaturalité	-	entre	Tirésias	et	la	vérité.	[…]	Donc,	vous	avez	Créon,	qui	est	un	
homme	du	σωφρονεῖν,	de	la	mesure,	celui	qui	connaît	ses	liens	et	sait	les	respecter,	et	puis	il	y	a	
le	φρονεῖν	de	Tirésias,	qui	est	une	façon	de	se	plonger	à	l’intérieur	de	soi,	dans	ses	pensées,	pour	
y	 trouver	 la	 vérité	 avec	 laquelle	 il	 est	 connaturel.	 Par	 rapport	 à	 cela,	 quelle	 va	 être	 la	 τέχνη	
d’Oedipe?	 S’il	 n’était	 absolument	 pas	 question	 de	 parler	 de	 la	 τέχνη	 de	 Créon,	 si	 la	 τέχνη	 de	
Tirésias	n’est	sans	doute	pas	une	τέχνη,	en	revanche,	là,	Oedipe	se	dit	bien	homme	de	la	τέχνη.	
Et	le	mot	qui	revient	le	plus	fréquemment	dans	le	texte	pour	caractériser	la	τέχνη	d’Oedipe,	c’est	
εύρίσκειν,	c’est-à-dire	‘trouver,	découvrir’.”	
 166 
the	sign,	the	piece	of	knowledge	which	is	lacking	and	needs	to	be	reconstructed,	
becomes	the	 intrinsic	part	of	tekhne	which	 is	also	the	practice	of	 investigation	
through	which	knowledge	is	constituted.	The	specifications	as	well	as	the	lexical	
connections	Foucault	provides	in	Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants	fulfill	at	least	two	
tasks:	 the	 first	one	consists	 in	 insisting	on	the	 fact	 that	 the	use	of	knowledge,	
being	a	specific	tekhne,	is	also	a	practice,	a	use,	an	act	which	cannot	be	covered	
by	the	ontological	truth	of	metaphysical	discourse:	the	tekhne,	the	practice,	the	
act	 remain	 immanently	 first.	 On	 this	 very	 point,	 Revel	 has	 provided	 a	 very	
convincing	 account	 of	 the	 status	 of	 truth	 as	 immanent	 act	 of	 power. 77 	She	
claimed	that	Foucault	dismisses	the	pertinence	of	the	opposition	between	writing	
and	speech.	On	this	point,	the	specifications	added	by	Foucault	in	a	lecture	given	
at	the	University	of	California	in	Berkeley	in	1983	clearly	corroborate	this	point.	
Foucault	says:	
as	you	know	[in	the	Phaedrus],	the	main	problem	is	not	about	the	nature	
of	 the	 opposition	 between	 speech	 and	 writing,	 but	 concerns	 the	
difference	 between	 the	 logos	 which	 speaks	 the	 truth	 and	 the	 logos	
which	is	not	capable	of	such	truth-telling.	(Foucault:	2001c,	21)	
	
The	advent	of	logocentrism	is	not	marked	by	the	transition	from	speech	to	writing	
but	 by	 the	 divorce	 of	 truth	 from	 the	 strict	 practice	 which	 corresponds	 to	 its	
                                                
77 	Revel	 made	 this	 point	 during	 a	 roundtable	 discussion	 organized	 on	 13th	 January	 2012	 at	
Goldsmiths	University	in	London	for	the	publication	of	the	English	translation	of	Foucault’s	last	
lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France.	 This	 resource	 is	 available	 at	
http://www.materialifoucaultiani.org/en/materiali/materiali/63-roundtable-qfoucault-and-the-
courage-of-truthq/195-roundtable-qfoucault-and-the-courage-of-truthq.html	 (accessed	 on	 30th	
July	 2015).	 As	 I	 will	 develop	 it	 in	 the	 first	 section	 of	 chapter	 3,	 I	 claim	 that	 the	 immediate	
manifestation	of	truth	as	immanent	act	in	the	world	is	power.	My	interpretation	does	not	differ	
from	Foucault’s	according	to	which	“power	is	relation”:	the	immanent	act	of	veridiction	through	
which	the	self	manifests	power	is	the	establishment	of	a	relation	towards	the	self	and	the	world	
and	the	self	and	others.	This	point	is	clearly	corroborated	by	Foucault	in	his	last	lecture	course	at	
the	Collège	de	France,	where	the	Cynic	is	“restored	in	true	sovereignty”	(Foucault:	2011b,	303)	as	
he	constantly	redefines	his	ethical	attitude	towards	the	world	by	keeping	on	looking	for	stricter	
immediacy:	he	does	not	subject	his	attitude	to	theoretical	knowledge	and	truth.	
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manifestation.	 The	 point	 does	 not	 concern	 the	 way	 discourse	 is	 spread	 (by	
spoken	or	written	words)	but	its	inclination	towards	a	theoretical	concept	of	truth	
which	gets	divorced	from	the	strict	actuality	of	its	immanent	production.	What	
Foucault	wants	to	stress	is	that	the	act	by	which	truth	is	manifested,	even	when	
it	seems	to	be	the	product	of	knowledge,	remains	first	of	all	an	act	of	veridiction.	
This	act	of	veridiction	corresponds	first	of	all	to	a	specific	attitude	towards	the	
world	which	enacts	truth	without	relying	upon	the	signification	of	discourse	or	
upon	 the	 object	 knowledge	 and	 truth	 target:	 it	 provides	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	
ethical	 attitude	 which	 is	 not	 mediated	 by	 the	 postulate	 of	 a	 transcendental	
rationality	 which	 establishes	 an	 a	 priori	 correspondence	 between	 words	 and	
things.		
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Conclusion	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	examined	how	both	Agamben	and	Foucault,	who	offer	a	
specific	 account	 of	 biopolitical	 jurisdiction,	 reach	 opposite	 conclusions.	 For	
Agamben,	the	specificity	of	modern	biopolitical	power	relies	upon	the	sovereign’s	
ability	to	immediately	enforce	his	law	(and	therefore	exerts	its	deadly	power	on	
bare	life)	through	the	coincidence	of	the	will	of	the	sovereign	with	the	expression	
of	his	law	(which	Agamben	calls	quaestio	iuris	and	quaestio	facti).	For	Foucault,	
biopolitical	power	can	also	be	characterized	by	a	coincidence.	However,	it	is	not	
the	coincidence	between	the	will	of	 the	sovereign	and	the	 law	 it	enforces	but	
between	the	norm	(the	natural	rule)	and	the	lives	which	conform	to	it.	The	point	
of	this	chapter	has	been	to	show	that	the	coincidence	between	the	natural	rule	
and	the	immanence	which	corresponds	to	it	 is	not	an	essential	determination:	
the	coincidence	between	the	natural	rule	and	the	lives	it	describes	proceeds	from	
the	 epistemic	 configuration	 which	 characterizes	 modern	 anthropological	
knowledge.		
	
In	 order	 to	 grasp	 the	 logic	 through	which	 the	 rationality	 expressed	 by	 norms	
appears	to	ontologically	coincide	with	the	immanence	they	describe,	this	chapter	
claims	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 examine	 the	 point	 where	 the	 question	 of	 the	
emergence	of	epistemological	truth	is	treated	in	Foucault’s	work.	It	appears	that	
this	question	is	problematized	by	Foucault	when	he	studies	the	disappearance	of	
the	 political	 power	 which	 characterized	 Archaic	 Greece:	 the	 esoteric	 rule	 of	
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emperors,	oracles	and	gods	 is	progressively	 replaced	by	 the	knowledge	of	 the	
Phusikoi.		
	
As	 the	 third	 section	 claims,	 the	 emergence	 of	 this	 knowledge	 relies	 upon	 an	
epistemological	relationship	to	the	world	which	implies	the	disjunction	between	
the	 seen	 and	 the	 said.	 A	 close	 examination	 of	 the	 sources	 which	 inspired	
Foucault’s	account	of	the	mutation	of	the	concept	of	truth	at	the	end	of	Archaic	
Greece	(Marcel	Détienne	and	Jean-Pierre	Vernant),	reveals	that	the	disjunction	
between	the	seen	and	the	said	also	corresponds	to	the	dismantling	of	a	form	of	
political	sovereign	power:	the	word	of	the	sovereign,	which	is	also	the	expression	
of	 his	 logos,	 no	 longer	 coincides	with	 his	 act	 of	 power.	My	 claim	 is	 that	 this	
dismantlement	 of	 political	 sovereign	 power	 has	 direct	 epistemological	
consequences:	 the	 disjunction	 of	 the	 seen	 and	 the	 said	 postulates	 the	
transcendental	 status	 of	 a	 concept	 of	 truth	 which	 determines	 the	 rationality	
through	which	immanence	is	understood.	Truth	is	no	longer	a	non-mediated	(and	
therefore	 sovereign)	 act	 which	 does	 not	 necessitate	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	
rationality,	it	becomes	that	which	grants	the	validity	of	what	exists	naturally.		
	
It	is	the	ethical	implications	of	this	epistemological	mutation	which	will	allow	us	
to	better	understand	how	the	concept	of	 life	becomes	an	object	of	bio-power	
and	biopolitics.	It	is	the	postulate	of	a	knowable	rationality	which	guarantees	the	
coincidence	between	the	immanent	conducts	of	individuals	and	the	discourses	
of	knowledge	which	found	them	in	truth.	Therefore,	it	is	easy	to	understand	why	
Foucault	needs	to	historicize	the	forms	justice	and	truth	take:	he	aims	at	stressing	
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that	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 any	 rationality	 which	 claims	 to	 offer	 a	 positive	
representation	of	immanent	existence,	there	is	but	strict	power.	The	move	from	
positivity	 to	 its	 formal	 and	 immanent	 condition	 of	 possibility	 will	 allow	 us	 to	
study,	in	the	following	chapter,	the	similarity	of	the	philosophical	gesture	which	
leads	Foucault	to	study	the	“will	to	know”	in	his	first	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	
de	 France	 and	 “the	 will	 to	 knowledge”	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	 History	 of	
Sexuality.	Whilst	the	historical	emergence	of	the	epistemological	truth	of	nature	
conceals	the	immediate	primacy	of	a	will,	it	is	also	the	immediate	primacy	of	a	
will	which	guides	the	knowledge	of	anthropological	nature	when	bio-power	and	
biopolitics	emerge	historically.	
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Chapter	Three:	From	epistemology	to	ethics:	thinking	the	concept	
of	sovereignty	in	relation	to	life	defined	as	bios	
	
	
Introduction	
	
In	 the	 last	 section	 of	 chapter	 2,	 I	 demonstrated	 how	 Foucault’s	 insistence	 on	
modes	 of	 veridiction	 allows	 him	 to	 bring	 back	 the	 concept	 of	 epistemological	
truth	to	a	historical	mutation	of	the	relationship	between	the	self	and	the	world.	
According	to	his	account	of	the	mutation	of	political	power	at	the	end	of	Archaic	
Greece,	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 coincidence	 between	 sovereign	 power	 and	
sovereign	 knowledge	 corresponds	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 epistemological	
knowledge	 and	 truth.	 Knowledge	 and	 truth	 no	 longer	 coincide	 with	 the	
performance	 of	 a	 sovereign	 act	 of	 power	 but	 correspond	 to	 the	 symbolic	
relationship	 between	 the	 said	 and	 the	 seen.	 The	 historical	 emergence	 of	 the	
epistemological	concept	of	truth	 introduces	a	cleavage	between	the	act	which	
performs	truth	and	the	strict	immanence	which	corresponds	to	it.		
	
Foucault’s	 first	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	Collège	de	 France	directly	 addresses	 this	
mutation	of	the	concept	of	truth.	Foucault	questions	the	definition	of	the	desire	
for	 knowledge	 as	 a	 natural	 inclination,	 which	 appears,	 according	 to	 him,	 in	
Aristotle’s	 Metaphysics	 Book	 A.	 In	 Aristotle’s	 text,	 Foucault	 discovers	 the	
emergence	of	a	co-naturalness	between	the	self	and	the	world	taken	as	an	object	
of	knowledge.	Against	Aristotle’s	positing	of	a	natural	disposition	of	man	to	know	
the	world,	Foucault	wants	to	stress	the	fact	that	knowledge	does	not	correspond	
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to	 an	 intrinsic	 disposition	 but	 rather	 to	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 violence.	 The	
movement	 which	 leads	 the	 self	 to	 epistemological	 truth	 through	 the	 use	 of	
knowledge	 does	 not	 fulfill	 a	 natural	 inclination	 but	 rather	 displays	 the	
performance	of	an	act	of	power.		
	
My	argument	is	that	Foucault’s	identification	of	a	strict	act	of	power	at	the	root	
of	the	so-called	natural	disposition	towards	epistemological	knowledge	and	truth	
is	 a	 historical	 shift	 which	 can	 be	 transposed	 to	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	
anthropological	 knowledge	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 The	
postulate	of	a	natural	truth	discoverable	by	the	knowledge	of	man	applies	this	
time	 to	 the	anthropological	 knowledge	of	 the	modern	 subject	which	enquires	
about	the	truth	of	 its	own	nature.	 In	each	case,	Foucault	describes	a	historical	
mutation	 of	 sovereign	 power.	Whereas	 divine	 sovereignty	 used	 to	 perform	 a	
cosmological	 truth	 in	 a	 strict	 act	 of	 power,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 King	 during	 the	
Classical	Age	also	produced	a	truth	which	coincided	with	its	power.	The	historical	
emergence	 of	 anthropological	 knowledge	 associated	 with	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	 works	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 concept	 of	 truth	 which	 grounds	 the	
representation	of	existence	within	the	positivity	of	knowledge.		
	
This	chapter	argues	that	a	symmetry	exists	in	the	way	Foucault	problematizes	the	
“will	 to	know”	and	the	“will	 to	knowledge”	 in	1970	and	1976	(Foucault:	2013,	
Foucault:	 1998d).	 In	 both	 cases,	 he	 diagnoses	 a	 historical	 mutation	 of	 the	
relationship	between	truth	and	the	world.	Whilst,	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece,	
the	 truth	was	 the	 esoteric	 privilege	 of	 the	 gods	 or	 the	Masters	 of	 Truth,	 the	
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knowledge	of	the	phusikoi	that	emerges	in	Classical	Greece	introduces	a	shift	in	
the	relationship	between	power	and	truth.	As	Foucault	claims	in	the	Lectures	on	
the	Will	to	Know,	the	act	of	the	one	in	power,	which	performed	justice	and	truth	
at	the	same	time,	is	replaced	by	the	knowledge	of	men	who	seek	epistemological	
truth.78	Similarly,	 the	postulate	of	 the	epistemological	 truth	of	anthropological	
nature	works	on	the	basis	of	a	divorce	between	the	immanent	acts	of	the	modern	
subject	 and	 the	 rationality	 which	 grounds	 them	 within	 the	 positivity	 of	
knowledge.	Therefore,	I	argue	that	the	dismantling	of	the	coincidence	between	
power	 and	 knowledge	 which	 allows	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
epistemological	truth	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece,	should	be	transposed	to	the	
divorce	Foucault	identifies	between	the	act	or	speech	of	the	modern	subject	and	
the	postulate	of	the	truth	of	his	desires.	In	both	cases,	it	is	the	divorce	between	
an	immanent	act	of	power	(an	act	which	establishes	a	relationship	towards	the	
world	 or	 others)	 and	 the	 truth	 corresponding	 to	 it	 which	 allows	 the	 truth	 of	
nature	to	acquire	a	transcendental	status.	
	
The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 studies	 how	 this	 mutation	 masks	 the	 strict	
immanence	 and	 violence	 which	 characterizes	 the	 historical	 production	 of	
epistemological	truth	and	how	Foucault’s	account	of	the	“will	to	know”	or	“will	
to	truth”	provides	a	way	to	challenge	the	natural	disposition	men	seem	to	show	
for	epistemological	knowledge	and	truth.		
                                                
78	This	aspect	is	developed	during	the	3rd,	10th	and	17th	February	1971	lectures	from	the	Lectures	
on	the	Will	to	Know	(Foucault:	2013,	83-132).	
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The	 second	 section	 applies	 this	 analysis	 to	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 divorce	
between	 the	modern	subject’s	 speech	and	 the	 truth	of	his	desires	 in	order	 to	
prove	that	the	epistemological	paradigm	of	modern	anthropology	corresponds	
to	an	alienation	of	the	subject’s	sovereignty.79	I	claim	that	the	shift	from	political	
sovereignty	to	the	epistemological	 truth	of	nature	which	Foucault	 identifies	at	
both	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	and	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age	introduces	the	
problem	of	the	modern	subject’s	own	sovereignty.	Just	as	the	cosmological	truth	
of	the	world	is	no	longer	actualized	by	the	act	of	power	of	the	sovereign,	the	truth	
of	the	modern	subject	is	irreducibly	severed	from	the	actuality	of	its	acts.	
	
Consequently,	 the	 third	section	of	 this	chapter	examines	 the	 relevance	of	 this	
divorce	 in	 the	 way	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 should	 be	 understood.	
Apprehending	 the	 relationship	between	power	 and	 knowledge	 as	 a	matter	 of	
subjective	alienation	is	paramount	if	we	are	to	grasp	properly	Foucault’s	account	
of	 the	 question	 of	 modern	 governmentality	 as	 a	 determination	 of	 conduct	
(Foucault:	 2014b,	 240).	 Indeed,	 the	 possibility	 of	 determining	 someone	 else’s	
conduct	presupposes	the	question	of	ethical	sovereignty:	a	sovereignty	no	longer	
understood	as	the	political	ability	of	the	sovereign	to	actualize	the	order	of	things	
through	his	or	her	power	but	as	the	ethical	ability	of	the	self	to	determine	and	
criticize	the	rationality	of	its	own	conduct.		
                                                
79	The	concept	of	alienation	is	one	that	Foucault	explicitly	uses	in	chapter	9	of	The	Order	of	Things	
(Foucault:	2001e,	356).	It	refers	to	the	movement	through	which	the	existence	of	man	as	strictly	
immanent	reality	is	incorporated	into	the	field	of	positive	knowledge.	Man’s	own	knowledge	of	
himself	becomes	a	movement	of	estrangement	which	presupposes	an	“obscure	space”	or	“an	
abyssal	 region	 in	 man’s	 nature”	 which	 is	 “both	 exterior	 to	 him	 and	 indispensable	 to	 him”	
(Foucault:	2001e,	356).		
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Finally,	the	last	section	of	this	chapter	proves	that	understanding	the	question	of	
governmentality	as	a	 relationship	between	one’s	power	and	one’s	knowledge,	
which	derives	from	Foucault’s	account	of	the	mutation	of	political	sovereignty,	
provides	a	way	to	clearly	grasp	Foucault’s	understanding	of	life	as	aesthetics	of	
existence	after	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality.	I	examine	how	such	an	
aesthetics	of	existence	corresponds	to	the	ethics	of	self-formation	which	sees	this	
time	 the	 question	 of	 sovereignty	 (the	 question	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
power	and	knowledge)	being	applied	to	the	self’s	own	ethical	formation.	I	explain	
how	the	concept	of	life	associated	with	the	ongoing	critique	of	its	form	is	strictly	
opposed	to	the	concept	of	biological	life	commonly	understood	as	the	natural	or	
animal	life	of	the	individual	or	of	the	species.	
	
	
1.	From	the	naturalness	of	knowledge	to	the	violence	of	truth	 	
	
The	modification	of	the	morphology	of	truth	based	on	the	historical	emergence	
of	 the	 use	 of	 knowledge	 as	 tekhne	 is	 for	 Foucault	 what	 not	 only	 marks	 the	
mutation	of	power	at	the	turn	from	Archaic	to	Classical	Greece,	but	is	what	more	
broadly	defines	the	historical	emergence	of	a	will	to	truth	and	a	will	to	know.	The	
gesture	which	consists	in	identifying	a	will	at	the	origin	of	both	knowledge	and	
truth	 corresponds	 to	 Foucault’s	 attempt	 to	 rid	 truth	 of	 its	 transcendental	
character,	and	instead	tie	it	to	a	specific	historical	technique.	Foucault’s	interest	
in	the	identification	of	the	will	to	knowledge	and	truth	appears	and	reappears	at	
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moments	in	his	work	which	present	the	diagnosis	of	the	historical	dismantlement	
of	political	sovereignty,	that	is,	those	points	when	the	coincidence	of	knowledge	
and	power	as	the	expression	of	the	will	of	the	sovereign	(either	in	the	form	of	
oracular	divine	truth	or	the	sovereign	power	of	the	King)	disappears.	As	Graham	
Burchell	reminds	us:	“The	Will	to	Know”	(La	volonté	de	savoir)	will	in	fact	be	the	
title	of	the	first	volume	of	the	Histoire	de	la	sexualité”	(Foucault:	2013,	1).	80	Thus,	
when	Foucault	examines	the	historical	covering-over	of	the	will	to	knowledge	and	
truth	 by	 a	 concept	 of	 truth	which	 posits	 a	 symbolic	 connection	 between	 the	
visible	and	the	expressible	(i.e.	the	pre-existence	of	a	symbolic	 link	uniting	the	
said	to	the	seen	that	can	be	retrieved	through	the	use	of	knowledge	as	tekhne),	
he	addresses	the	disappearance	of	the	speaking	individual	as	the	initiator	of	an	
immanent	act	of	power	as	well	as	the	covering	up	of	the	irreducible	materiality	
of	discourse.		
	
As	Mathieu	Potte-Bonneville	has	remarked81,	the	“will	to	know”	corresponds	in	
1970-1971	to	the	manifestation	of	a	desire	for	truth.	However,	in	1976	the	“will	
to	 knowledge”	 corresponds	 to	 the	 search	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 desire.	 Such	 an	
inversion,	which	both	complements	and	specifies	Burchell’s	remark,	allows	us	to	
stress	 the	 similarity	between	 the	 two	historical	moments	 Foucault	 chooses	 to	
describe	as	the	replacement	of	a	form	of	political	sovereign	power	by	the	concept	
                                                
80	This	is	a	footnote	opening	the	first	lecture	from	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know.		
81	This	is	a	remark	made	during	a	roundtable	discussion	organised	on	23rd	May	2011	at	the	Paris	
1	Panthéon-Sorbonne	University	after	the	publication	of	the	Leçons	sur	la	Volonté	de	Savoir.	This	
ressource	is	available	at	http://www.materialifoucaultiani.org/en/materiali/materiali/61-tavola-
rotonda-lecons-sur-la-volonte-de-savoir/161-tavola-rotonda-lecons-sur-la-volonte-de-
savoir.html.	It	was	accessed	on	20th	July	2015. 
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of	the	truth	of	nature.	Whereas,	in	1970-1971,	Foucault	describes	the	historical	
replacement	of	the	exoteric	and	powerful	truth	of	gods	by	the	truth	of	nature	
accessible	through	knowledge,	the	1976	text	focuses	on	the	covering	up	of	the	
subject’s	act	of	speech	by	the	natural	truth	his	desires	reveal.		
	
Foucault	 focuses	on	 two	pivotal	 historical	moments	 (the	 turn	 from	Archaic	 to	
Classical	Greece	and	the	turn	from	the	Classical	Age	to	modernity)	characterized	
by	 a	 mutation	 of	 paradigms	 of	 political	 sovereign	 power	 which	 showed	 a	
coincidence	between	sovereign	knowledge	and	sovereign	discourse.	The	divine	
sovereignty	spoken	by	oracles,	 the	seer	or	 the	poets	 (the	Masters	of	Truth)	 in	
Archaic	 Greece	 corresponds	 to	 a	 form	 of	 knowledge	 actualized	 as	 power82 .	
Similarly,	 the	 King,	 during	 the	 Classical	 Age,	 still	 expresses	 a	 knowledge	 of	 a	
divine,	 timeless	 and	 cosmological	 dimension.	 In	 this	 respect,	 power	 and	
knowledge	were	united	through	ritualized	sovereign	justice.	This	recurrence	is	of	
crucial	importance.	In	both	cases,	it	is	the	temporization	introduced	by	the	will	to	
truth	and	the	will	to	knowledge	(where	knowledge	and	power	or	the	visible	and	
                                                
82	As	 I	have	developed	 in	section	3	of	chapter	2,	Détienne	and	Vernant	defined	Archaic	Greek	
political	sovereignty	as	the	coincidence	between	the	sovereign	act	which	expresses	the	law	and	
the	performance	of	 truth	which	coincides	with	 it.	When	Foucault	 studies	 the	mutation	of	 the	
relationship	between	knowledge	and	truth	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	
Forms”,	the	Assyrian	king	is	a	man	of	power	and	knowledge	at	the	same	time.	He	is	a	political	
tyrant	(Foucault:	2000c,	31).	It	is	the	mutation	of	this	form	of	sovereignty	(studied	by	Foucault	in	
his	readings	of	Oedipus	Rex),	which	characterizes	the	shift	from	a	form	of	truth	which	was	power	
to	a	form	of	truth	which	looses	its	violent	or	powerful	character.	Foucault	links	the	dismantling	of	
the	paradigm	of	political	sovereignty	to	the	emergence	of	an	epistemological	mutation.	This	 is	
the	 reason	why	 the	 character	 of	 the	 sophist	 constitutes	 another	 example	 of	 the	 coincidence	
between	truth	and	power.	The	discourse	of	the	sophist,	bypassing	the	postulate	of	an	overarching	
transcendental	truth,	shoes	that	 it	 is	the	materiality	of	discourse	 itself,	as	act	of	power,	which	
produces	immanent	truth.	In	this	respect,	the	mutation	of	political	sovereign	power	at	the	end	of	
the	 Classical	 Age	 produces	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 epistemological	 mutation:	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 the	
coincidence	between	the	sovereign	law	and	the	immediate	truth	it	produces	which	has	an	effect	
on	 the	 world.	 It	 is	 the	 rationality	 of	 anthropology,	 founded	 upon	 the	 postulate	 of	 the	
transcendental	truth	of	nature,	which	defines	the	way	the	world	is	experienced.	
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the	expressible	no	longer	coincide	but	instead	get	brought	back	together)	which	
necessitates	that	nature	(the	nature	of	things	in	the	case	of	Classical	Greece,	the	
nature	 of	man	 in	 the	 case	 of	modernity)	 be	 determined	 by	 a	 transcendental	
concept	of	 truth	 that	 replaces	 the	ephemeral	 character	of	 truth	which	 strictly	
corresponds	to	an	immanent	act	of	power.	It	is	therefore	not	by	accident	that	in	
The	Order	of	Discourse	Foucault	mentions	a	possible	analogy	between	the	will	to	
truth	that	emerges	in	Classical	Greece	and	the	will	to	truth	that	emerges	in	the	
nineteenth	century.	He	says:	
There	is	doubtless	a	will	to	truth	in	the	nineteenth	century	which	differs	
from	the	will	 to	know	characteristic	of	Classical	culture	 in	the	forms	 it	
deploys,	in	the	domains	of	objects	to	which	it	addresses	itself,	and	in	the	
techniques	on	which	it	is	based.	To	go	back	a	little	further:	at	the	turn	of	
the	sixteenth	century	(and	particularly	in	England),	there	appeared	a	will	
to	know	which,	anticipating	its	actual	contents,	sketched	out	schemas	of	
possible,	 observable,	 measurable	 classifiable	 objects;	 a	 will	 to	 know	
which	imposed	on	the	knowing	subject,	and	in	some	sense	prior	to	all	
experience,	a	certain	position,	a	certain	gaze	and	a	certain	function	(to	
see	rather	than	to	read,	to	verify	rather	than	to	make	commentaries	on);	
a	will	to	know	which	was	prescribed	(but	in	a	more	general	manner	than	
by	any	specific	instrument)	by	the	technical	level	where	knowledges	had	
to	be	invested	in	order	to	be	verifiable	and	useful.	It	was	just	as	if,	starting	
from	 the	great	Platonic	division,	 the	will	 to	 truth	had	 its	own	history,	
which	 is	 not	 that	 of	 constraining	 truths:	 the	 history	 of	 the	 range	 of	
objects	 to	 be	 known,	 of	 the	 functions	 and	 positions	 of	 the	 knowing	
subject,	 of	 the	 material,	 technical,	 and	 instrumental	 investments	 of	
knowledge.	(Foucault:	1981,	54-55)	
	
Foucault	uses	the	specificity	of	the	nineteenth	century	will	to	know	in	order	to	
underline	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 object	 that	 this	 knowledge	 targets	which	
characterizes	its	importance.	Instead,	it	is	its	strict	existence	as	immanent	attitude	
towards	 the	 world	 that	 characterizes	 the	 theoretical	 basis	 on	 which	 Foucault	
builds	up	a	critique	of	epistemological	knowledge	and	truth	that	traverses	most	
of	his	historical	investigations.		
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In	this	respect,	Foucault	opens	the	first	lecture,	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	
by	mentioning	that	the	research	he	will	conduct	for	the	following	decade	at	the	
Collège	de	France	constitutes	“fragments	for	a	morphology	of	the	will	to	know”.	
It	is	this	morphology	(i.e.	the	identification	of	a	will	to	knowledge	at	the	basis	of	
our	 attitude	 towards	 the	world83	since	 the	 emergence	 of	 Greek	 philosophical	
thought),	that	allows	Foucault	to	shift	from	truth	as	object	of	knowledge	towards	
truth	as	a	relationship	with	the	world.	This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault	opens	up	
the	first	lecture	from	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	in	the	following	manner:	
THE	WILL	TO	KNOW	is	the	title	I	would	like	to	give	to	this	year’s	lectures.	
To	tell	the	truth,	I	think	I	could	have	given	this	title	to	most	of	the	historical	
analyses	 I	 have	 carried	out	 up	until	 now.	 It	 could	 also	describe	 those	 I	
would	now	like	to	undertake.	 I	 think	all	 these	analyses	–	past	or	still	 to	
come	 –	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 something	 like	 so	 many	 “fragments	 for	 a	
morphology	to	the	will	to	know.”	In	any	case,	in	one	form	or	another,	this	
is	the	theme	that	I	will	try	to	deal	with	in	the	years	to	come.	Sometimes	it	
will	be	taken	up	in	specific	historical	investigations:	how	was	knowledge	
of	economic	processes	established	from	the	sixteenth	to	the	eighteenth	
century;	or	how	was	the	knowledge	of	sexuality	organized	and	deployed	
from	 the	 seventeenth	 to	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 Sometimes,	 and	 no	
doubt	less	often,	it	will	be	examined	directly,	as	such,	and	I	will	try	to	see	
to	what	extent	it	is	possible	to	establish	a	theory	of	the	will	to	know	that	
could	serve	as	the	basis	for	the	historical	analyses	I	have	just	referred	to.	
(Foucault:	2013,	1-2)	
	
                                                
83	This	 immanent	 attitude	 towards	 the	 world,	 which	 is	 at	 once	 epistemological,	 political	 and	
ethical,	is	the	way	in	which	Foucault	defines	the	concept	of	life	as	bios	in	the	lecture	concluding	
The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject.	During	this	lecture,	Foucault	defines	life	(bios)	as	“the	way	in	
which	the	world	immediately	appears	to	us”	(Foucault:	2006,	486).	The	shift	from	the	mediation	
of	epistemological	knowledge	which	determines	the	truth	of	the	subject	in	the	world	towards	the	
definition	 of	 life	 as	 ethical	 conduct	 (which	 bypasses	 the	mediation	 of	 epistemological	 truth),	
corresponds	 to	Foucault’s	 interest	 in	 forms	of	counter-philosophical	practices	when	he	comes	
back	 to	 the	Greeks	 after	 1976	 (considering	 the	 original	 books)	 or	 after	 1978	 (considering	 the	
lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France).	It	is	therefore	easy	to	see	how	the	work	of	historicization	of	
the	 concept	 of	 truth	he	 starts	 in	 the	 1970-1971	 Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know	 constitutes	 the	
epistemological	critique	of	the	relationship	between	truth,	knowledge	and	the	world.	This	critique	
will	recur	and	acquire	a	political	and	ethical	inflexion	from	Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants	to	The	
Courage	of	Truth.	
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Foucault’s	“fragments	for	a	morphology	of	the	will	to	know”	gives	us	a	sense	of	
the	 cohesion	 of	 the	 trajectory	 of	 his	 philosophical	 enterprise:	 retrieving	 the	
morphology	 (i.e.	 insisting	 on	 the	 strict	 form	 as	 a	 way	 to	 stress	 the	de-
ontologization	of	truth)	of	what	he	calls	a	“will	to	know”	at	work	at	the	basis	of	
the	belief	in	a	metaphysical	concept	of	truth,	allows	Foucault	to	perform	the	dis-
implication	of	knowledge	and	truth	and	to	insist	on	the	fact	that	power	(defined	
as	an	immanent	act	in	the	world84)	constitutes	the	only	foundation	there	is	to	the	
world	within	which	individuals	live	and	constitute	themselves	as	subjects.	Even	
though	it	is	true	that	Foucault	never	clearly	defines	this	will	for	its	own	sake,	a	
reference	to	 it	yet	appears	 in	a	conversation	about	the	 Iranian	revolution	with	
Farès	 Sassine	 in	 August	 1979. 85		During	 this	 conversation,	 Foucault	 is	 led	 by	
Sassine	to	define	this	“will”,	and	part	of	the	conversation	develops	this	concept	
as	follows:	
MF:	The	will	is	the	one	who	says:	“I	would	rather	die”.	The	will	is	what	says:	“I	would	
rather	be	a	slave”.	The	will	is	what	says:	“I	want	to	know”,	etc.	…	
FS:	But	what	is	the	difference	here	between	will	and	subjectivity?	
MF:	Oh,	 I	would	 say	 that,	hum,	 the	will	 is	 the	pure	act	of	 the	 subject.	And	 that	 the	
subject	is	what	is	fixed	and	determined	by	an	act	of	will”.86	
                                                
84	When	 I	use	 the	expression	“immanent	act	 in	 the	world”,	 I	also	 refer	 to	a	concept	of	power	
defined	as	a	 relation.	 It	corresponds	to	an	 immanent	act	of	power	which	has	epistemological,	
political	and	ethical	dimensions.	It	changes	the	way	the	world	appears	to	the	self	and	to	others.	
In	this	respect,	the	philosophical	attitude	of	the	Cynic,	studied	by	Foucault	in	1983-1984,	really	
corresponds	 to	 these	 three	dimensions.	The	Cynic	 is	 the	one	who	“change[s]	 the	value	of	 the	
currency”	[parakharaxon	to	nomisma]	(Foucault:	2011b,	240).	Changing	the	value	of	the	currency	
which,	according	to	Foucault,	should	be	understood	in	relation	to	nomos,	means	that	the	Cynic	is	
the	 one	 who	 changes	 the	 value	 of	 the	 laws	 amongst	 men.	 This	 attitude	 corresponds	 to	 an	
epistemological,	political,	and	ethical	re-evaluation:	by	changing	the	value	of	the	laws	(and	not	
merely	the	laws	themselves),	the	Cynic	reveals	that	what	is	commonly	considered	as	important	
or	 valuable	 can	 be	 radically	 overturned	 through	 a	 change	 of	 ethical	 attitude.	 Refusing	 the	
epistemological	value	of	theoretical	truth,	the	Cynic	reveals	that	truth	is	first	of	all	a	condition	of	
a	change	towards	the	way	the	world	appears	to	us.	
85 This	 resource	 available	 at	 http://fares-sassine.blogspot.fr/2014/08/entretien-inedit-avec-
michel-foucault.html	(accessed	on	20th	July	2015).	
86	“MF	:	La	volonté	c’est	celui	qui	dit:	“je	préfère	mourir.”	La	volonté,	c’est	ce	qui	dit	“je	préfère	
être	esclave.”	La	volonté,	c’est	ce	qui	dit:	“je	veux	savoir”,	etc…		
FS	:	Mais	quelle	est	la	différence	ici	entre	volonté	et	subjectivité?		
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Foucault’s	definition	of	the	will	as	“the	pure	act	of	the	subject”	corroborates	my	
point	according	to	which	the	 individual’s	strict	 immanent	act	of	power	 is	what	
defines	 the	 possibility	 of	 his	 sovereignty:	 his	 act	 is	 “pure”	 because	 it	 is	 not	
determined	by	the	rationality	of	an	a	priori	truth	or	knowledge	which	accounts	
for	his	actions.	In	the	same	fashion,	Foucault’s	attempts	to	identify	the	covering	
over	of	a	will	to	truth	and	a	will	to	know	at	certain	historical	periods	where	the	
coincidence	between	act	and	truth	disappears	(either	through	a	sovereign	speech	
no	 longer	 sufficient	 to	 reveal	 the	 truth	 of	 the	world,	 or	 through	 the	 subject’s	
speech	which	gets	linked	to	the	ontological	truth	of	his	nature)	demonstrates	his	
attempt	 to	 stress	 the	 strict	 immanence	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 historically	 varying	
metaphysical	constructions.		
	
In	this	respect,	Foucault’s	debt	to	Nietzsche	is	probably	the	clearest.	It	is	indeed	
around	 1970-1971	 that	 Foucault	 most	 frequently	 focuses	 on	 Nietzsche’s	
disimplication	of	knowledge	and	truth.	In	both	his	essay	“Nietzsche,	Genealogy,	
History”	which	appeared	for	the	first	time	in	Hommage	à	Jean-Hippolyte	in	1971	
and	his	 lecture	on	Nietzsche	given	at	Montreal	McGill	University	 in	April	1971,	
Foucault	 wants	 to	 challenge	 the	 idea	 according	 to	 which	 the	 truth	 acquired	
through	knowledge	is	a	founding	origin.	In	both	texts,	the	idea	of	the	invention	of	
knowledge	 is	 substituted	 for	 a	 metaphysical	 concept	 of	 truth	 that	 would	
determine	the	nature	of	things.	In	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	he	specifically	
insists	on	the	“invention”	of	knowledge	mentioned	by	Nietzsche	in	the	essay	“On	
                                                
MF	:	Oh	je	dirai	que,	euh,	la	volonté	c’est	l’acte	pur	du	sujet.	Et	que	le	sujet	c’est	ce	qui	est	fixé	et	
déterminé	par	un	acte	de	volonté.” 
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Truth	and	Lies	in	an	Extra-Moral	Sense”	(Nietzsche:	1976,	42).	Foucault	says	that	
Erfindung	 is	 “everywhere	 […]	 opposed	 to	 origin.	 But	 it	 is	 not	 a	 synonym	 of	
beginning	(commencement)”	(Foucault:	2013,	203).	It	is	the	kind	of	invention	that	
the	fable	told	by	Nietzsche	illustrates:	it	is	a	fictional	“making-up”,	an	appearance	
which	masks	the	reality	of	things	and	not	a	beginning	which	grounds	their	order.	
The	endnote	on	page	220	in	The	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	tells	us	a	bit	more	
about	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 fable	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 original	 German	 expression	
which	 is	not	exactly	Erfindung	but	das	Erkennen	erfanden:	a	verbal	expression	
that	 could	 be	 translated	 as	 “the	 making-up	 of	 understanding.”	 In	 “Nietzsche,	
Genealogy,	History”,	Foucault	is	even	more	explicit	about	the	fictional	nature	of	
this	invention:	referring	to	The	Twilight	of	the	Idols,	he	compares	it	to	“a	secret	
formula,	 in	 the	 rituals	 of	 black	 magic,	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Schwarzkünstler”	
(Foucault:	 1980,	 141).	 The	 invention	of	 understanding	 is	 therefore	 a	mask,	 an	
artifice	 that	 conceals	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 knowledge,	 which	 in	 Foucault’s	 own	
words,	“is	not	made	for	understanding	[but]	is	made	for	cutting”	(Foucault:	1980,	
154).	Foucault’s	point	is	that	the	invention	of	knowledge	is	an	artifice	that	masks	
the	 immanent	 violence	and	efficiency	of	 its	power:	 the	primacy	of	 knowledge	
leading	to	truth	and	nature	is	precisely	that	which	replaces	the	violence	of	the	
sovereign	who	realised	truth	through	an	act	of	power.		
	
The	non-metaphysical	status	of	truth	as	form	of	power	which	conceals	its	violent	
character	is	a	theme	which	recurs	several	times	in	Foucault’s	writings	of	the	time.	
This	theme	is	already	at	stake	in	the	Order	of	Discourse,	where	Foucault	insists	on	
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the	will	to	truth	that	the	apparent	evidence	of	truth	and	knowledge	conceals.	He	
writes:	
Thus	all	 that	appears	 to	our	eyes	 is	a	 truth	conceived	as	a	 richness,	a	
fecundity,	a	gentle	and	insidiously	universal	force,	and	in	contrast	we	are	
unaware	 of	 the	 will	 to	 truth,	 that	 prodigious	 machinery	 designed	 to	
exclude.	(Foucault:	1980,	56)	
	
The	 idea	 of	 a	 gentle	 and	 universal	 concept	 of	 truth	 covering	 the	will	 (i.e.	 the	
violent	power	that	corresponds	to	it)	reappears	soon	after	in	the	Lectures	on	the	
Will	 to	 Know.	 During	 the	 9th	 December	 1970	 lecture,	 Foucault	 insists	 on	 his	
attempt	 to	 un-root	 truth	 from	 its	 ontological	 evidence	 in	 order	 to	 stress	 the	
violence	of	the	will	which	determines	its	search.	He	writes:	
we	will	have	put	the	game	of	truth	back	in	the	network	of	constraints	
and	 dominations.	 Truth,	 I	 should	 say	 rather,	 the	 system	 of	 truth	 and	
falsity,	will	have	revealed	the	face	it	turned	away	from	us	for	so	long	and	
which	is	that	of	its	violence.	(Foucault:	2013,	4)	
	
The	will	 to	know	appears	 therefore	as	 the	manifestation	of	a	historical	human	
activity	 corresponding	 to	 a	 way	 of	 producing	 truth	 that	 is	 a	 manifestation	 of	
power,	a	power	that	conceals	its	strict	immanence	and	that	acquires	the	status	of	
a	 transcendental	 foundation.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 Foucault	
chooses	to	call	the	object	of	his	historical	investigations	a	“morphology”:	he	wants	
to	inscribe	the	forms	taken	by	the	will	to	truth	in	our	Western	tradition	in	a	strict	
exteriority	 which	 dismantles	 the	 metaphysical	 implication	 between	 truth	 and	
knowledge,	or	 truth	as	 transcendental	 logos	which	precedes	 the	meaning	and	
validity	of	experience.	If	the	truth	targeted	by	the	will	to	know	becomes	a	strict	
historical	 formation,	 it	 loses	 its	metaphysical	ground	and	escapes	the	symbolic	
correspondence	between	discourse	and	its	object.	 	
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Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	 a	 rationality	 determined	 by	
truth	both	at	the	origin	and	as	a	result	of	the	use	of	knowledge	is	what,	at	two	
distinct	 historical	 moments	 where	 political	 sovereign	 power	 disappears,	
characterizes	an	ontological	ordering	according	to	the	concept	of	nature.	In	the	
case	of	the	emergence	of	the	written	law	of	men	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece,	
the	nomos	“speaks	as	if	by	itself,	in	its	own	name”,	is	“always	there”	and	“legible	
in	 nature”	 (Foucault:	 2013,	 153).	 In	 the	 same	 fashion,	 after	 the	 eighteenth	
century,	the	law	“operates	more	and	more	as	a	norm”	(Foucault:	1998d,	144).	It	
is	no	longer	the	expression	of	“the	will	of	the	sovereign”,	but	“a	discourse	about	
the	natural	rule”	whose	theoretical	horizon	is	not	“the	edifice	of	the	law,	but	the	
field	 of	 human	 sciences”	 and	 whose	 “jurisprudence	 […]	 that	 of	 clinical	
knowledge”	(Foucault:	2003b,	38),	and	the	truth	(of	things	in	the	former	case	and	
of	man	in	the	latter	case)	stands	both	at	the	origin	of	knowledge	as	well	as	being	
its	target.	In	both	cases,	the	pervasive	logos	of	truth	establishes	a	symbolic	union	
between	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 which	 produces	 a	 co-naturalness	
between	knowledge	and	things,	a	co-naturalness	which	leads	to	the	impossibility	
of	both	thinking	and	speaking	about	the	exteriority	of	discourse	as	well	as	the	
exteriority	of	truth	as	the	product	of	acts	of	power.	It	is	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	
to	 Know	 that	 Foucault	 explicitly	 formulates	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	 an	
ontological	concept	of	 truth	whose	reality	as	a	strictly	 immanent	act	of	power	
disappears.	During	the	3rd	March	1971	lecture	from	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	
Know,	 Foucault	 stipulates	 that,	 since	 the	 emergence	 of	 philosophy,	 logos	 and	
truth	start	to	constitute	the	same	fabric.	Truth	is	no	longer	an	effect	or	production	
of	the	exteriority	of	discourse	(as	was	the	case	with	the	structure	of	sovereign	
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power	sustaining	Archaic	Greek	jurisdiction).	Instead,	it	becomes	an	expression	
of	the	conformity	with	nature	in	which	logos	intrinsically	partakes.		
	
This	mutation	entails	two	shifts	affecting	the	production	of	truth.	First,	truth	is	
spoken	through	a	logos	that	corresponds	to	the	truth	of	nature.	Second,	this	truth	
of	nature	overtakes	the	boundaries	of	the	act	of	speech	itself:	truth	becomes	its	
own	 condition	of	 possibility	 as	well	 as	 the	 condition	of	 just	 logos.	 Truth	 is	 no	
longer	 the	 effect	 of	 an	 act	 through	which	 an	order	 of	 things	 is	 produced,	 but	
becomes	the	a	priori	condition	to	the	order	of	things	itself.	Foucault	writes:	
–	when	logos	speaks	the	truth	it	is	in	accord	with	the	being	of	nature	
–	when	words	participate	in	being	in	some	way	the	truth	is	taught.	
[…]	 In	 sixth	 century	 thought,	 truth	 was	 the	 general	 effect	 of	 that	
arrangement.	From	the	fifth	century	it	will	be	the	condition.	It	is	because	
one	possesses	the	truth	that	one	has	good	laws,	that	pedagogy	agrees	
with	nature,	that	the	laws	one	[has]	written	are	in	accordance	with	logos,	
and	that	logos	is	in	accordance	with	nature.	(Foucault:	2013,	154-155)	
	
The	identification	of	the	truth	of	nature	as	origin	and	universal	is	an	aspect	that	
Foucault	develops	as	early	as	the	1970-1971	Lectures	on	the	Will	 to	Know	and	
finds	 its	 roots	 in	 the	divorce	of	 the	sovereign	speaker	 from	the	actuality	of	 its	
speech	towards	the	transcendental	concept	of	truth	as	condition	of	possibility	of	
knowledge.	This	divorce	is	explicitly	problematized	slightly	earlier	in	The	Order	of	
Discourse.	 In	this	talk,	the	reference	to	Nietzsche’s	text	On	Truth	and	Lies	in	an	
Extra-Moral	 Sense	 (which	 will	 be	 reused	 again	 in	 the	 “Lecture	 on	 Nietzsche”	
found	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know),	shows	how	the	Western	concept	of	
truth	corresponds	to	a	historical	production	which	masks	an	effective	act.	In	The	
Order	of	Discourse,	Foucault	writes:	
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[…]	a	day	came	when	truth	was	displaced	from	the	ritualized,	efficacious	
and	just	act	of	enunciation,	towards	the	utterance	itself,	its	meaning,	its	
form,	its	object,	its	relation	to	its	reference.	(Foucault:	1981,	54)	
	
As	Foucault’s	analysis	of	Oedipus	Rex	proves,	it	is	precisely	when	the	validity	of	
sovereign	 truth	 as	 efficacious	 utterance	 disappears	 that	 the	 intrinsic	 and	
reciprocal	relationship	between	discourse	and	its	object	(the	said	and	the	seen)	
becomes	 a	 founding	 origin	 and	 the	 criterion	 of	 truth	 and	 justice.	 Behind	 this	
diagnosis	lies	the	Nietzschean	critique	of	the	concept	of	truth	which	Foucault	uses	
in	his	“Lecture	on	Nietzsche”	given	at	Montreal	McGill	University	in	April	1971.	
Foucault	writes:	
[knowledge]	is	not	joined	to	the	structure	of	the	world	as	a	reading,	a	
decipherment,	a	perception,	or	a	self-evidence.	Things	are	not	made	to	
be	seen	or	known.	They	do	not	turn	towards	us	an	intelligible	face	which	
looks	at	us	and	waits	for	our	gaze	to	meet	them.	Things	do	not	have:	
–	a	hidden	meaning	to	be	deciphered	[…].	(Foucault:	2013,	203)	
	
Here,	 we	 see	 that	 Foucault’s	 Nietzschean	 problematization	 of	 the	 primacy	 of	
knowledge	 and	 truth	 challenges	 the	 symbolic	 structure	 of	 interdependence	
between	 the	 said	and	 the	 seen	 that	Oedipus	Rex	 dramatizes.	 The	mutation	of	
truth	which	marks	Classical	Greek	thought	 replaces	 the	sovereign	utterance	of	
truth	by	an	intrinsic	correspondence	between	the	act	by	which	Oedipus	killed	his	
father	and	the	fixation	of	Oedipus’	identity.	The	witness	who	has	seen	Oedipus	
the	murderer	 and	 actualizes	 his	 testimony	 through	 speech	 becomes	 the	 new	
sovereign:	 he	 produces	 an	 ontological	 equivalence	 between	 the	 seen	 and	 the	
said,	between	Oedipus	the	character	and	Oedipus	the	murderer.	But	this	act	of	
sovereign	speech	depends	itself	on	the	preexistence	of	truth:	it	is	this	truth	that	
Oedipus	endeavoured	to	seek	at	the	beginning	of	the	play	and	 it	preexists	the	
peasant’s	final	speech.	It	is	according	to	the	same	symbolic	logic	or	the	same	logic	
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of	 interdependence	 between	 discourse	 and	 its	 object	 that	 the	 laws	 of	 men	
replace	 the	 truth	 of	 gods	when	 the	nomos	emerges.	 In	 “Oedipal	 knowledge”,	
Foucault	indeed	tells	us	that:	
[…]	 This	 system	 of	 constraints	 shown	 by	 the	 Oedipus	 fable	 could	 be	
characterized	very	schematically	in	the	following	way:	[…]	the	political,	
juridical,	 and	 religious	 requirement	 to	 transform	 the	 event,	 its	
recurrences	 and	 figurations	 over	 time,	 into	 established	 and	 definitely	
preserved	facts	in	the	observation	of	witnesses.	Subjecting	the	event	to	
the	form	of	the	observed	fact	is	the	first	aspect	of	Oedipal	truth.	[…]	the	
other	aspect	of	this	Oedipal	system	of	truth	will	be	to	found	the	nomos	
on	 a	 knowledge-virtue	 which	 is	 quite	 simply	 in	 itself	 respect	 for	 the	
nomos.	Truth	will	be	given	only	to	someone	who	respects	the	nomos	and	
will	 arrive	at	 the	 truth	of	 the	nomos	only	on	condition	of	being	pure.	
(Foucault:	2013,	196)	
	
The	interdependence	between	the	just	law	(the	nomos)	and	the	morphology	of	
truth	appearing	 in	Oedipus	Rex	 (the	dependence	of	truth	upon	the	correlation	
between	the	discourse	of	knowledge	and	the	veracity	of	the	fact)	establishes	a	
primacy	of	truth	which	negates	its	own	exteriority	as	immanent	act	of	power.	It	is	
indeed	when	one	follows	the	nomos	that	one	both	expresses	and	reaches	truth.	
Similarly,	it	is	by	following	the	investigation	which	leads	him	to	truth	that	Oedipus	
respects	and	uncovers	his	true	identity.	When	sovereign	power	disappears,	it	is	
its	extrinsic	and	esoteric	position	that	disappears	at	the	same	time.	It	is	because	
the	divine	law	remained	external	and	inaccessible	to	the	knowledge	of	men	that	
it	could	constrain	the	world	under	its	justice	through	an	act	of	power.	The	ritual	
repeats	the	origin:	this	repetition	is	needed	in	order	to	restore	the	right	order	of	
justice.	 But	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 respect	 of	 the	 just	 law	 becomes	 the	 condition	 of	
possibility	of	its	knowledge,	nothing	can	exist	outside	the	scope	of	knowledge	and	
what	can	be	known	(i.e.	what	can	appear	positively)	cannot	not	be	true	(i.e.	 it	
cannot	 be	 an	expression	of	 the	 true	nature	 of	 things).	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	
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Foucault	quotes	Nietzsche’s	Gay	Science	and	its	denunciation	of	what	the	latter	
calls	the	“deification”	of	nature:	
It	[the	world]	does	not	observe	any	law.	Let	us	keep	from	saying	that	law	
exists	in	nature…	When	will	all	these	shadows	of	God	cease	to	confuse	
us?	When	will	we	have	completely	de-deified	nature?87	(Foucault:	2013,	
204)	
	
This	 “deification”	 of	 nature,	 which,	 in	 Foucault’s	 terms,	 corresponds	 to	 the	
substitution	of	the	sovereign	power	of	gods	by	the	human	knowledge,	leads	to	
establish	truth	as	a	metaphysical	foundation	that	negates	the	historical	dimension	
of	truth	as	the	object	of	immanent	practices	and	techniques.	It	is	this	very	idea	
that	Revel	points	out	when	 she	 calls	 the	 concept	of	nature	both	 “the	basis	of	
Western	metaphysics”	and	“the	idea	of	a	foundation	or	of	an	origin”	(Revel:	2014,	
119).	But	what	Revel	does	not	stress	sufficiently	is	that	the	historical	emergence	
of	 the	 concept	 of	 nature	 as	 an	 epistemological	 object	 is,	 in	 Foucault,	 clearly	
inscribed	 within	 the	 problematization	 of	 jurisdiction	 brought	 forward	 by	 the	
dissolution	 of	 sovereign	 power.	 As	 she	 points	 out,	 the	 concept	 of	 nature	 is	
subjected	to	a	double	critique.	She	writes:	
Foucault	began	by	associating	nature	to	the	origin	and	to	the	universal;	
later,	he	associates	nature	to	the	political	strategy	of	biologizing	life	that	
will	be	interpreted	as	one	of	the	characteristics	of	biopolitics	from	the	
nineteenth	century	on.	In	the	first	two	cases,	nature	is	denounced	as	the	
basis	of	Western	metaphysics,	which	is	embodied	first	 in	the	idea	of	a	
foundation	or	of	an	origin,	and	then	in	the	idea	of	a	transcendent	and	
unquestionable	 universal.	 Nature	 is	 what	must	 be	 dissolved	 so	 as	 to	
escape	from	the	metaphysical	illusion.	(Revel:	2014,	119)	
	
On	the	one	hand,	it	is	the	concept	of	the	truth	of	nature	as	origin	that	is	attacked,	
and	this	is	a	critique	which	Foucault	starts	in	the	1970-1971	Lectures	on	the	Will	
                                                
87	Foucault	quotes	Nietzsche’s	Gay	Science,	Book	III,	§109	from	Pierre	Klossowski’s	translation	as	
mentionned	in	The	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	(Foucault,	2013,	220).	
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to	 Know	 and	 repeats	 in	 his	 essay	 “Nietzsche,	 Genealogy,	 History.”	 This	 first	
critique	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 nature	 endeavours	 to	 substitute	 to	 the	 foundation	
provided	by	metaphysical	truth	a	historicity	that	questions	the	meaning	of	origin	
as	foundation	and	replaces	it	by	the	idea	of	historical	event.	This	first	aspect	of	
the	 critique	of	 the	 concept	of	nature	 is	 then	 completed	by	a	 second	one:	 the	
concept	of	human	nature	as	transcendental	universal	that	grounds	the	rationality	
at	the	basis	of	human	sciences.	Even	though	Revel’s	point	is	exact,	one	could	add	
that	the	second	aspect	of	the	Foucauldian	critique	of	nature	finds	its	root	in	the	
first	 one:	 it	 is	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 metaphysical	 concept	 of	 truth	 Foucault	
formulates	 in	 1970-1971	 that	 allows	 the	 rethinking	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	
anthropological	 truth.	 It	 corresponds	 once	 again	 to	 a	 historical	 change	 of	
jurisdiction:	it	is	no	longer	the	discourse	of	the	sovereign	who,	in	a	ritualistic	act	
of	power,	produces	the	truth	of	the	world,	but	the	possibility	of	a	transcendental	
truth	of	nature	that	posits	a	rationality	according	to	which	man	becomes	but	one	
knowable	and	finite	object	amongst	others.	
	
	This	is	the	reason	why,	in	the	course	of	the	9th	December	1970	lecture	from	the	
Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	Foucault	establishes	a	lexical	distinction	between	
two	 types	 of	 knowledge.	 He	 wants	 to	 differentiate	 between	 a	 knowledge	
[connaissance]	 that	 defines	 a	 specific	 technique	 towards	 the	 world	 and	 a	
knowledge	[savoir]	which	concerns	the	domain	of	objects	which	emerge	through	
the	practice	of	 this	 technique.	During	 the	9th	December	1970	 lecture	 from	 the	
Lectures	on	the	will	to	know,	Foucault	establishes	this	distinction	as	such:	
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In	 order	 to	 fix	 the	 vocabulary,	 let	 us	 say	 that	we	will	 call	 knowledge-
connaissance	the	system	that	allows	desire	and	knowledge-savoir	to	be	
given	a	prior	unity,	reciprocal	belonging,	and	co-naturalness.	And	we	will	
call	knowledge-savoir	that	which	we	have	to	drag	from	the	interiority	of	
knowledge-connaissance	 in	 order	 to	 rediscover	 in	 it	 the	 object	 of	 a	
willing,	the	end	of	a	desire,	the	instrument	of	a	domination,	the	stake	of	
a	struggle.	(Foucault:	2013,	17)	
	
It	is,	according	to	Foucault	and	his	reading	of	Aristotle’s	Metaphysics	Book	A,	the	
historical	co-implication	of	desire	and	knowledge	which	establishes	“a	prior	unity,	
reciprocal	belonging,	and	co-naturalness”	between	truth,	desire	and	knowledge	
and	 obliterates	 the	 strict	 reality	 of	 the	will	 as	 a	 strife	 for	 knowledge	 [savoir].	
Foucault’s	point	is	not	to	claim	that	savoir	does	not	exist	but	that	the	desire	of	
the	self	for	it	is	not	a	transcendental	determination	that	characterizes	a	natural	
attitude	 towards	 the	 world.	 The	 retrieval	 of	 the	 will	 from	 the	 interiority	 of	
connaissance	corresponds	to	the	same	gesture	that	consists	in	reducing	the	belief	
of	metaphysical	truth	to	the	strict	immanence	of	a	practice.		
	
We	 see	 that	 Foucault’s	 historicization	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	
technique	which	links	facticity	to	an	a	priori	true	discourse	belongs	to	the	same	
philosophical	project:	retrieving	the	strict	materiality	of	power	at	the	bottom	of	
what	it	historically	produces.	Even	though	it	is	in	the	Lectures	on	the	will	to	know	
that	 the	 definitions	 of	 connaissance	 and	 savoir	 appear	 the	 most	 clearly,	 the	
difference	between	these	two	concepts	had	already	been	thematized	in	1969	in	
The	 Archaeology	 of	 Knowledge.	 A	 footnote	 in	 the	 English	 edition	mentions	 a	
comment	by	Foucault	himself	who	distinguishes	the	two	concepts	in	those	terms:	
By	connaissance	I	mean	the	relation	of	the	subject	to	the	object	and	the	
formal	 rules	 that	 govern	 it.	 Savoir	 refers	 to	 the	 conditions	 that	 are	
necessary	in	a	particular	period	for	this	or	that	type	of	object	to	be	given	
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to	connaissance	and	for	this	or	that	or	that	enunciation	to	be	formulated.	
(Foucault:	2002,	16-17)	
	
Even	 though	 Foucault	 does	 not	 seem	 at	 this	 point	 to	 have	 carried	 out	 the	
genealogical	work	which	 allows	him	 to	define	 connaissance	 as	 precisely	 as	 he	
does	a	year	later	in	his	first	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	de	France,	the	definition	
provided	in	The	Archaeology	of	Knowledge	still	distinguishes	connaissance	as	the	
type	 of	 relationship	 between	 the	 knowing	 subject	 and	 the	 object	 of	 his	
knowledge	 [savoir],	 and	 savoir	 as	 the	 knowledge	 which	 historically	 becomes	
objects	of	connaissance.	Therefore,	archaeology	also	belongs	 to	 the	project	of	
historicization	 and	 dismantlement	 of	 a	 strict	 continuity	 between	 the	 knowing	
subject,	 the	 knowledge	 that	 subject	 acquires	 and	 the	 scientific	 truth	 it	
establishes.	 Instead,	 the	 archaeological	 analysis	 allows	 us	 to	 see	 truth	 and	
knowledge	 emerging	 from	 a	 “discursive	 practice”	 (Foucault:	 2002,	 202).	
Identifying	 a	 discursive	 practice	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth	 already	
corresponds	to	an	attempt	at	retrieving	the	acting	subject	from	the	alienation	of	
its	own	positivity:	 it	 is	neither	a	transcendental	disposition	towards	knowledge	
and	 truth	 which	 allows	 the	 development	 of	 sciences	 but	 the	 emergence	 of	
historical	 “ways	 of	 speaking”	 (Foucault:	 2002,	 213)	 which	 are	 historically	
determined.	 If	 they	 are	 historically	 determined,	 they	 are	 not	 linked	 to	 a	
scientificity	that	would	reveal	their	intrinsic	truth,	but	to	historical	events	that	are	
heterogeneous	from	the	field	of	knowledge	defined	by	science.	Foucault	writes:	
Instead	 of	 exploring	 the	 consciousness/knowledge	
(connaissance)/science	 axis	 (which	 cannot	 escape	 subjectivity),	
archaeology	explores	the	discursive	practice/knowledge	(savoir)/science	
axis.	And	whereas	the	history	of	ideas	finds	the	point	of	balance	of	its	
analysis	in	the	element	of	connaissance	(and	is	thus	forced,	against	its	
will,	 to	encounter	the	transcendental	 interrogation),	archaeology	finds	
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the	point	of	balance	of	its	analysis	in	savoir	–	that	is,	in	a	domain	in	which	
the	subject	is	necessarily	situated	and	dependent,	and	can	never	figure	
as	 titular	 (either	 as	 a	 transcendental	 activity,	 or	 as	 empirical	
consciousness).	(Foucault:	2002,	201-202)	
	
We	see	that	Foucault’s	attempt	to	shift	the	traditional	axis	of	analysis	from	the	
line	that	links	scientific	truth,	knowledge	and	the	knowing	subject	to	one	which	
grounds	 the	 truth	 of	 science	 and	 savoir	 in	 discursive	 practices	 prefigures	 the	
critique	of	the	transcendental	position	of	truth	Foucault	describes	in	the	Lectures	
on	the	will	to	know:	if	connaissance	is	the	element	which	unites	the	traditional	
axis	 (which	 goes	 from	 the	 knowing	 subject	 to	 the	 discovery	 of	 scientific	 truth	
through	the	use	of	knowledge),	then	 it	 is	connaissance	as	 its	own	condition	of	
possibility	which	becomes	problematic	within	a	 strict	historical	perspective.	 In	
this	respect,	we	clearly	see	how	the	dis-implication	of	the	subject,	knowledge	and	
truth	from	the	unity	of	connaissance	performed	during	the	first	two	lectures	from	
the	 Lectures	 on	 the	will	 to	 know	 continues	 the	 project	 of	The	Archaeology	 of	
Knowledge.	 This	 shift,	 which	 consists	 in	 concluding	 that	 the	 knowing	 subject	
naturally	 prone	 to	 discover	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 world	 does	 not	 exist,	 ultimately	
indicates	that	knowledge,	as	power	which	modifies	the	world,	corresponds	to	a	
specific	 practice	 which	 produces	 a	 certain	 violence	 and	 coercion	 towards	 the	
world.	This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault’s	historicization	of	truth	and	knowledge,	
which	starts	in	1970	with	the	Lectures	on	the	will	to	know,	can	be	linked	to	his	last	
two	lecture	courses	from	1982	to	1984:	The	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	I	
and	The	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	II.	The	Courage	of	Truth.	In	these	final	
two	lecture	courses,	Foucault	examines	a	different	kind	of	relationship	between	
the	self,	others	and	the	world	than	the	one	defined	by	the	concept	of	truth	which	
 193 
starts	to	take	over	with	the	emergence	of	knowledge	as	a	technique	which	fixes	
the	relationship	one	establishes	with	the	world.		
	
The	testimony,	which	links	the	visible	truth	of	facticity	to	the	truth	of	discourse,	
replaces	the	agonistic	structure	of	truth	affirmed	through	an	act	of	power.	The	
concept	 of	 epistemological	 truth	 produces	 an	 inversion	 through	 which	 the	
affirmation	 of	 truth	 as	 an	 act	 of	 power	 gets	 replaced	 by	 a	 transcendental	
rationality.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 one	 finds,	 as	 early	 as	 The	 Archaeology	 of	
Knowledge,	 an	 attempt	 to	 disrupt	 the	 apparent	 continuity	 between	 the	
overarching	 rationality	 connecting	 the	 knowing	 subject	 to	 the	 practice	 of	
knowledge	 and	 to	 the	 discovery	 of	 truth.	 Thus,	 when	 Foucault	 addresses	 the	
possibility	of	an	archaeology	of	sexuality	in	the	last	chapter	of	The	Archaeology	
of	Knowledge,	he	clearly	mentions	the	need	for	an	ethical	analysis	which,	instead	
of	merely	identifying	epistemic	mutations,	would	show	how	knowledge	and	truth	
operate	 on	 an	 immanent	 level	 which	 effectively	 modifies	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	world.	 Such	 an	 analysis	would	 show	how	 the	
truths	derived	from	the	subject	are	not	the	natural	expression	of	his	nature	which	
would	show	that	scientific	discoveries	correspond	to	a	natural	unfolding,	but	are	
rather	the	product	of	concrete	relations	of	power	that	have	a	politically	coercive	
or	provocative	effect	on	the	subject’s	 life.	This	corresponds	to	a	concept	of	 life	
defined,	as	Foucault	puts	it	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject,	as	“the	way	the	
world	 immediately	 appears	 to	us”	 (Foucault:	 2006,	 486).	 In	 order	 to	be	made	
possible,	this	“immediate	appearance”	needs	to	reveal	that	the	transcendental	
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character	of	truth	masks	the	immediacy	of	its	power,	violence	and	coercion.	In	
The	Archeology	of	Knowledge,	Foucault	writes:	
Such	 an	 archaeology	would	 show,	 if	 it	 succeeded	 in	 its	 task,	 how	 the	
prohibitions,	 exclusions,	 limitations,	 values,	 freedoms	 and	
transgressions	of	sexuality,	all	its	manifestations,	verbal	or	otherwise,	are	
linked	to	a	particular	discursive	practice.	It	would	reveal,	not	of	course	as	
the	 ultimate	 truth	 of	 sexuality,	 but	 as	 one	 of	 the	 dimensions	 in	
accordance	with	which	one	can	describe	it,	a	certain	‘way	of	speaking’;	
and	one	would	show	how	this	way	of	speaking	is	invested	not	in	scientific	
discourses,	but	in	a	system	of	prohibitions	and	values.	An	analysis	that	
would	be	carried	out	not	in	the	direction	of	the	episteme,	but	in	that	of	
the	ethical.	(Foucault:	2002,	213)	
	
The	ethical	archaeology	Foucault	mentions	here,	would	have	to	show	how	a	“way	
of	speaking”,	which	defines	a	space	within	which	certain	truths	are	historically	
made	acceptable,	does	not	find	its	root	in	the	a	priori	rationality	of	truth	but	in	
the	net	of	 strictly	 immanent	power	 relations.	 The	 “system	of	prohibitions	and	
values”	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 always	 the	 strict	 manifestation	 of	 power	 which	
establishes	and	modifies	relationships	between	individuals	and	the	world.		
	
It	 is	 therefore	 to	 stress	 that	 truth	 and	 knowledge	are	 instances	of	 power	 that	
Foucault	attempts	to	associate	them	with	the	concept	of	will	both	in	1970-1971	
and	 in	 1976:	 it	 means	 that	 the	 foundation	 provided	 by	 truth	 only	 emerges	
historically	and	does	not	possess	a	metaphysical	value.	 In	this	respect,	 it	 is	not	
surprising	to	see	that	Foucault’s	last	lecture	course	(from	1982	to	1984)	also	stress	
the	importance	of	a	concept	of	truth	linked	to	strict	action:	it	is	this	time	not	the	
“will	to	truth”	which	Foucault	describes	but	the	one	of	“courage	of	truth”.	When	
in	1983-1984	he	insists	on	the	attitude	of	the	Cynics	and	uses	the	Greek	notion	of	
parrhesia	 in	 order	 to	 contrast	 it	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 metaphysical	 truth,	 he	
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attempts	to	identify	the	possibility	of	an	attitude	which	entails	a	concept	of	truth	
strictly	linked	to	the	performance	of	an	act	of	speech	which	conveys	its	own	truth	
without	relying	upon	an	a	priori	founding	rationality.	In	a	series	of	lectures	given	
at	the	University	of	California	in	Berkeley	in	1983,	Foucault	defines	parrhesia	as	
such:		
Parrhesiastesthai	means	“to	tell	the	truth”.	But	does	the	parrhesiastes	
say	what	he	thinks	is	true,	or	does	he	say	what	is	really	true?	To	my	mind;	
the	parrhesiastes	says	what	is	true	because	he	knows	that	it	is	true;	and	
he	knows	that	it	is	true	because	it	is	really	true.	The	parrhesiastes	is	not	
only	sincere	and	says	what	is	his	opinion,	but	his	opinion	is	also	the	truth.	
He	says	what	he	knows	to	be	true.	The	second	characteristic	of	parrhesia,	
then,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 always	 an	exact	 coincidence	between	belief	 and	
truth.	(Foucault:	2001c,	14)	
	
We	see	here	that	the	Greek	parrhesia	Foucault	describes	is	a	mode	of	truth-telling	
which	defines	a	specific	relationship	between	act,	knowledge	and	truth.	In	this	
case,	truth	is	not	the	validity	of	facticity	which	is	reached	through	the	reunion	of	
the	visible	and	of	the	expressible	(as	it	starts	to	be	the	case	when	Foucault	studies	
either	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex),	but	is	a	mode	of	veridiction	through	which	the	
power	of	the	act	and	the	affirmation	of	truth	strictly	coincide.	If	the	parrhesiastes	
tells	the	truth,	it	is	not	in	relation	to	a	logos	which	precedes	his	existence	and	will	
survive	it,	but	in	a	strict	correspondence	with	what	he	believes	to	be	true.	In	other	
words,	one	could	say	that	the	parrhesiastes	stands	for	truth	and	enacts	it	through	
his	 power	 to	 speak	 and	 act.	 Therefore,	 the	 structure	 of	 truth-telling	 linked	 to	
parrhesia	disrupts	the	logic	of	the	sumbolon	Foucault	describes	when	he	studies	
the	morphology	of	truth	in	Oedipus	Rex:	there	is	no	possible	distance	between	
the	subject	who	speaks	and	the	truth	targeted	by	this	speech	and	he	is,	in	this	
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sense,	the	true	sovereign88.	The	subject	who	speaks	is	both	the	subject	and	object	
of	enunciation,	he	performs	a	correspondence	between	power	and	knowledge	
that	recalls	the	one	Foucault	describes	 in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	when	he	
mentions	the	structure	of	Archaic	Greek	sovereignty.	During	the	same	lecture	in	
Berkeley,	Foucault	adds:	
If	 we	 distinguish	 between	 the	 speaking	 subject	 (the	 subject	 of	
enunciation)	and	the	grammatical	subject	of	the	enounced,	we	could	say	
that	there	is	also	the	subject	of	the	enunciandum	-	which	refers	to	the	
held	 belief	 or	 opinion	 of	 the	 speaker.	 In	 parrhesia,	 the	 speaker	
emphasizes	the	fact	that	he	is	both	the	subject	of	the	enunciation	and	
the	subject	of	the	enunciandum	-	that	he	himself	 is	the	subject	of	the	
opinion	 to	 which	 he	 refers.	 The	 specific	 “speech	 activity”	 of	 the	
parrhesiastic	enunciation	thus	takes	the	form:	“I	am	the	one	who	thinks	
this	and	that.”	I	use	the	phrase	“speech	activity”	rather	than	John	Searle’s	
“speech	 act”	 (or	 Austin’s	 “performative	 utterance”)	 in	 order	 to	
distinguish	 the	parrhesiastic	 utterance	 and	 its	 commitments	 from	 the	
usual	sorts	of	commitment	which	obtain	between	someone	and	what	he	
or	she	says.	For,	as	we	shall	see,	the	commitment	involved	in	parrhesia	
is	linked	to	a	certain	social	situation,	to	a	difference	of	status	between	
the	 speaker	 and	 his	 audience,	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	parrhesiastes	 says	
something	which	is	dangerous	to	himself	and	thus	involves	a	risk,	and	so	
on.	(Foucault:	2001c,	12-13)	
	
On	top	of	a	strict	coincidence	between	one’s	act	of	speech	and	the	affirmation	of	
one’s	 truth,	 the	parrhesiastic	attitude	 introduces	an	element	of	 risk:	 the	truth-
telling	it	designates	is	not	a	strict	performative	act	whereby	the	words	of	the	one	
who	speaks	relate	to	a	world	whose	order	is	settled	through	the	logic	of	the	ritual:	
parrhesia	is	an	ethical	engagement	which	aims	at	risking	the	existing	relationship	
                                                
88	As	Foucault	claims	 it	 in	The	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	 II:	The	Courage	of	Truth,	 the	
theme	of	the	sovereign	life	is	formulated	in	Seneca’s	Letters	to	Lucilius	and	On	the	Shortness	of	
Life	as	“having	possession	to	oneself”	or	“being	one’s	own	law”	(Foucault:	2011b,	271).	It	is	the	
concept	of	sovereignty	as	self-determination,	which	the	Cynic	pushes	to	the	extreme.	The	Cynic	
not	merely	attempts	to	self-determine	his	own	actions	but	performs	a	“polemical	reversal	of	the	
straight	life,	of	the	life	which	obeys	the	law	(the	nomos)”	(Foucault:	2011b,	244).	This	entails	that	
there	is	no	positive	law	or	principle	which	determines	the	life	of	the	Cynic	prior	to	his	actions:	
they	are	determined	by	the	continuous	attempt	to	change	the	custom	or	the	ways	in	which	one’s	
lives.	The	concept	of	sovereignty	related	to	the	Cynic	life	is	therefore	one	which	puts	all	its	actions	
on	a	level	of	strict	immanence.	It	is	not	determined	by	a	prior	truth	or	knowledge. 
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either	between	the	self	and	himself,	the	self	and	others	or	the	self	and	the	world	
in	order	to	modify	it	and	produce	a	new	truth.	In	this	respect,	the	Cynical	attitude	
corresponds	to	a	philosophical	attitude	which	is	a	strict	poiesis.	This	is	the	reason	
why,	in	The	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	II:	The	Courage	of	Truth,	Foucault	
once	again	uses	the	concept	of	will,	but	this	time	not	in	relation	to	a	knowledge	
and	truth	whose	power	gets	concealed	by	a	 transcendental	 foundation,	but	 in	
relation	 to	a	 risk	 through	which	one	accepts	 to	affirm	one’s	 truth	as	a	way	of	
engaging	with	the	world.	Foucault	writes:	
There	is	another	aspect	which	is	that	of	the	courage	of	truth:	what	type	of	
resolution,	what	type	of	will,	what	type	of	not	only	sacrifice	but	battle	is	
one	able	to	face	in	order	to	arrive	at	the	truth?	This	struggle	for	the	truth	
is	different	from	the	purification	by	which	one	can	arrive	at	the	truth.	It	is	
no	longer	the	analysis	of	purification	for	the	truth,	but	the	analysis	of	the	
will	to	truth	in	its	different	forms,	which	may	be	those	of	curiosity,	battle,	
courage,	resolution	and	endurance.	(Foucault:	2011b,	125)	
	
We	see	that	Foucault	deploys	a	morphology	of	the	will	to	truth	in	order	to	show	
that	truth	becomes	the	product	of	a	varying	attitude	towards	the	world,	hence	
the	consequence	of	an	ethics.	Truth	no	longer	corresponds	to	the	validation	of	an	
objective	knowledge	one	can	seek	through	investigation,	nor	does	it	correspond	
to	 the	 “pure”	 knowledge	 of	 Forms	 sought	 by	 Platonic	 philosophy.	 Rather,	 it	
corresponds	 to	a	 concrete	attitude	 that	dismisses	 the	disjunction	between	act	
and	knowledge:	it	produces	a	truth	in	the	world	through	the	risk	of	an	act	which	
instantiates	this	very	truth.		
	
The	fact	that	Foucault	chooses	to	present	cynicism	as	the	philosophical	attitude	
which	produces	a	radically	different	truth	than	the	one	of	Platonic	philosophy	is	
therefore	not	surprising.	Not	only	were	the	Cynics	seeking	to	act	more	truthfully	
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towards	 simple	 vital	 needs	 through	ongoing	deprivation	of	 useless	 goods,	 but	
they	also	affirmed	the	truth	of	their	 lifestyle	by	taking	the	risk	to	perform	it	 in	
public.	Such	an	attitude	defines	a	way	of	 life	which	both	target	others	and	the	
world	(through	the	immediate	display	of	radical	difference).	Their	truth	did	not	
rely	on	a	constituted	body	of	knowledge	bur	rather	on	an	ongoing	reevaluation	
of	practice.	It	therefore	remained	at	the	level	of	strict	action	or	strict	power.	As	a	
conclusion	to	the	course	context	of	this	lecture	course,	Frédéric	Gros	stresses	that	
Foucault	attempted	to	bring	forward	a	concept	of	truth	defined	as	a	relation	to	
and	affirmation	of	otherness.	Gros	writes:	
[…]	 in	1984,	he	[Foucault]	wants	to	emphasize	that	the	hallmark	of	 the	
true	 is	 otherness:	 that	 which	 makes	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 world	 and	 in	
people’s	 opinions,	 that	 which	 forces	 one	 to	 transform	 one’s	 mode	 of	
being,	that	whose	difference	opens	up	the	perspective	of	an	other	world	
to	 be	 constructed,	 to	 be	 imagined.	 The	 philosopher	 thus	 becomes	
someone	 who,	 through	 the	 courage	 of	 his	 truth-telling,	 makes	 the	
lightning	 flash	 of	 an	 otherness	 vibrate	 through	 his	 life	 and	 speech.	
Foucault	can	thus	write	these	words,	which	he	will	not	have	time	to	utter,	
but	which	are	the	last	he	wrote	on	the	last	page	of	the	manuscript	of	his	
final	lecture:	“What	I	would	like	to	stress	in	conclusion	is	this:	there	is	no	
establishement	of	the	truth	without	an	essential	position	of	otherness;	the	
truth	is	never	the	same;	there	can	be	truth	only	in	the	form	of	the	other	
world	and	the	other	life	(l’autre	monde	et	la	vie	autre)”.	(Foucault:	2011b,	
356)	
	
	We	see	that	the	concept	of	truth	Foucault	associates	with	will	and	courage	strictly	
coincides	with	 an	 ethical	 practice	which	 aims	 at	 transforming	 the	 relationship	
oneself	entertains	with	himself,	others	and	the	world.	It	is	a	concept	of	truth	in	
strict	 relation	 to	 a	 concept	 of	 life	which	 is	 not	 defined	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 a	
truthful	 nature	 (as	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 which	 emerges	 with	 the	 nineteenth	
century)	but	as	an	active	ethical	and	political	practice	which	puts	the	concepts	of	
life	and	world	at	the	same	level,	in	the	same	way	as	Foucault	already	defined	it	at	
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the	end	of	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject.89	This	concept	of	life	understood	as	
bios,	“the	way	in	which	the	world	immediately	appears	to	us”	(Foucault:	2006,	
486),	 entails	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 truth	 associated	 with	 courage	 is	 an	 immanent	
attitude	which	has	an	immediate	power	of	transformation	both	upon	the	self	and	
the	world.	It	cannot	therefore	be	reduced	to	the	truth	of	a	nature.	
	
The	fact	that	the	concepts	of	truth	and	nature	are	reduced	to	strict	and	immanent	
practices	at	the	two	ends	of	the	Foucauldian	critique	(either	regarding	the	critique	
of	the	metaphysical	status	of	truth	at	the	origin	of	knowledge	or	regarding	the	
critique	of	the	concept	of	truth	at	the	basis	of	the	rationality	of	the	understanding	
of	human	life)	shows	that	each	time	Foucault	describes	the	dismantling	of	a	form	
of	sovereignty	(the	political	sovereignty	of	gods,	the	tyrant	or	of	the	King).	It	is	the	
possibility	of	 the	 knowledge	of	 the	 truth	of	nature	which	emerges	 (either	 the	
knowledge	of	the	Phusikoi	which	contrasts	with	the	fateful	power	of	gods	or	the	
knowledge	of	anthropological	nature	which	contrasts	with	the	deadly	power	of	
the	King	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age).	If,	in	The	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	
he	focuses	on	the	natural	determination	of	the	self	as	subject	of	knowledge,	the	
first	volume	to	the	History	of	Sexuality	makes	the	critique	of	the	concept	of	nature	
the	 foundation	 on	 which	 the	 modern	 subject	 becomes	 an	 object	 of	
anthropological	 knowledge.	 In	 both	 cases,	 Foucault	 puts	 into	 question	 the	
                                                
89	It	is	important	to	note	that	“the	other	life”	translates	the	French	phrase	“la	vie	autre”	wich	is	
not	synonymous	with	the	phrase	“l’autre	vie”.	Even	though	“l’autre	vie”	would	also	be	translated	
“the	other	life”	in	English,	it	would	designate	in	French	a	life	beyond	immanence	(and	either	refer	
to	a	transcendent	concept	of	life	or	to	life	after	death),	whereas	the	specific	use	by	Foucault	of	
“la	vie	autre”	shows	that	he	clearly	refers	to	an	immanent	way	of	living	which	gets	transformed	
through	immanent	practice.	
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mutation	of	 the	 relationship	between	knowledge,	 the	 self	 and	 the	world.	 It	 is	
when	the	nature	of	the	world	emerges	as	an	object	of	knowledge	that	the	life	of	
the	 self	 becomes	 no	 longer	 the	 matter	 of	 a	 reflexive	 tekhne	 and	self-
transformation	but	the	occasion	of	the	experience	of	both	the	truth	of	the	self	
and	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 world.	 As	 Foucault	 puts	 it	 in	 the	 last	 lecture	 from	 The	
Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject:	 	
It	seems	to	me	that	we	have	here	the	root	of	the	question	that	has	been	
posed	to	philosophy	in	the	West,	or,	if	you	like,	the	root	of	the	challenge	
of	 Western	 thought	 to	 philosophy	 as	 discourse	 and	 tradition.	 The	
challenge	is	this:	How	can	what	is	given	to	us	as	the	object	of	knowledge	
(savoir)	connected	to	the	mastery	of	tekhne,	at	the	same	time	be	the	site	
where	 the	 truth	of	 the	 subject	we	are	 appears	or	 is	 experienced	and	
fulfilled	with	difficulty?	How	can	the	world,	which	is	given	as	the	object	
of	knowledge	(connaissance)	on	the	basis	of	the	mastery	of	tekhne,	at	
the	same	time	be	the	site	where	the	“self”	as	ethical	 subject	of	 truth	
appears	 and	 is	 experienced?	 If	 this	 really	 is	 the	 problem	 of	Western	
philosophy	 -	 how	 can	 the	 world	 be	 the	 object	 of	 knowledge	
(connaissance)	and	at	the	same	time	the	place	of	the	subject’s	test;	how	
can	 there	 be	 a	 subject	 of	 knowledge	 (connaissance)	 which	 takes	 the	
world	as	object	through	a	tekhne,	and	a	subject	of	self-experience	which	
takes	this	same	world,	but	in	the	radically	different	form	of	the	place	of	
its	test?	[…]	(Foucault:	2006,	487)	 	
	
The	paradox,	which	Foucault	formulates	at	the	very	end	of	The	Hermeneutics	of	
the	Subject,	corresponds	to	the	difficulty	The	Order	of	Things	already	stressed:	
the	 status	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 as	 empirico-transcendental	 doublet	
presupposes	 that	 knowledge	 about	 the	nature	of	man	 can	be	 abstracted	 as	 a	
transcendental	foundation	that	would	ground	the	rationality	of	his	existence	as	
living,	speaking	and	working	subject.	This	means	that	it	would	grant	the	possibility	
for	 the	 subject	 to	 know	 its	 existence	 as	 a	 finite	 positivity	 amongst	 the	 other	
positivities	 which	 characterize	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world.	 My	 claim	 is	 this	
characterization	of	 the	world	as	 the	occasion	of	 the	manifestation	of	both	 the	
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truth	of	the	self	and	the	world	reappears	clearly	when	Foucault	starts	to	study	
the	reciprocal	implications	between	the	concepts	of	norm	and	nature	from	1976	
onwards:	the	norms	correspond	to	the	positive	fixation	of	cases	(defined	by	the	
field	of	human	sciences)	where	the	lives	of	men	and	the	world	coincide	as	both	
objects	of	knowledge	and	test.	It	is	indeed	when	deviant	behaviours	get	mapped	
out	by	apparatuses	of	power	and	knowledge	and	become	identified	as	variations	
around	the	norms	(i.e.	as	types	of	abnormalities)	that	they	become	positive	forms	
of	existence	(and	knowledge)	and	can	therefore	be	integrated	into	specific	power	
strategies.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 reality	 these	 abnormalities	 actualize	 become	
objects	of	the	world	amongst	others	that	manifest	the	truth	of	their	nature	as	
they	take	place.	It	is	paradoxically	when	the	positivity	of	knowledge	is	intrinsically	
linked	to	these	existences	that	a	distancing	from	this	 identification	in	favour	of	
another	 becomes	 impossible:	 the	 coincidence	between	power	 and	 knowledge	
(understood	here	as	the	integration	of	behaviours	into	the	positivism	of	sciences)	
illustrate	in	this	case	an	alienation	of	sovereignty	whereby	the	possibility	of	the	
self-determination	of	one’s	conduct	becomes	impossible.	 	
	
	
2.	From	the	nature	of	things	to	the	nature	of	man:	a	transfer	of	sovereignty	
	
The	 concept	 of	 nature	 appearing	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 dismantlement	 of	
sovereign	power	 is	 problematized	a	 second	 time	 in	 Foucault’s	work.	When	he	
introduces	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 Classical	 power	 of	 the	 King	 to	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	in	the	first	volume	to	the	History	of	Sexuality,	the	truth	spoken	by	the	
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subject	 who	 puts	 his	 sexual	 desires	 into	 words	 through	 the	 mechanism	 of	
confession	coincides	with	a	nature	whose	manifestation	is	fragmented	and	which	
needs	 to	be	 completed	and	acknowledged	 in	order	 to	be	 true.	 In	 the	 chapter	
entitled	“Scientia	Sexualis”,	Foucault	describes	how	the	19th	century	produces	a	
hermeneutics	of	sexual	desires	whose	acknowledgement	rests	on	a	relationship	
between	 the	 one	who	 speaks	 and	 the	 one	who	 listens	 and	who	 validates	 the	
utterance	of	the	speaker.	Foucault	writes:	
If	one	had	to	confess,	this	was	not	merely	because	the	person	to	whom	
one	confessed	had	the	power	to	forgive,	console,	and	direct,	but	because	
the	 work	 of	 producing	 the	 truth	 was	 obliged	 to	 pass	 through	 this	
relationship	if	it	was	to	be	scientifically	validated.	The	truth	did	not	reside	
solely	in	the	subject	who,	by	confessing,	would	reveal	it	wholly	formed.	
It	was	constituted	in	two	stages:	present	but	incomplete,	blind	to	itself,	
in	 the	one	who	spoke,	 it	could	only	 reach	completion	 in	 the	one	who	
assimilated	 and	 recorded	 it.	 It	 was	 the	 latter’s	 function	 to	 verify	 this	
obscure	truth:	the	revelation	of	confession	had	to	be	coupled	with	the	
decipherment	of	what	it	said.	The	one	who	listened	was	not	simply	the	
forgiving	master,	 the	 judge	who	condemned	or	acquitted;	he	was	 the	
master	 of	 truth.	 His	 was	 a	 hermeneutic	 function.	With	 regard	 to	 the	
confession,	his	power	was	not	only	to	demand	it	before	it	was	made,	or	
decide	what	was	to	follow	after	it,	but	also	to	constitute	a	discourse	of	
truth	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 decipherment.	 By	 no	 longer	 making	 the	
confession	a	test,	but	rather	a	sign,	and	by	making	sexuality	something	
to	be	 interpreted,	 the	nineteenth	century	gave	 itself	 the	possibility	of	
causing	 the	 procedures	 of	 confession	 to	 operate	 within	 the	 regular	
formation	of	a	scientific	discourse.	(Foucault:	1998d,	67)	
	
The	 resemblance	 between	 the	 morphology	 of	 truth	 and	 knowledge	 whose	
emergence	Foucault	describes	at	the	turn	of	Archaic	and	Classical	Greece	and	the	
one	 which	 appears	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 is	 striking.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	
production	 of	 truth	 depends	 upon	 an	 alienation	 of	 the	 act	 of	 speech:	 the	
validation	of	the	discourse	of	the	speaker	depends	upon	its	acknowledgement	by	
the	one	who	listens.	The	production	of	truth	no	longer	lies	in	the	act	of	confession	
alone	but	in	the	encounter	of	the	speaker’s	discourse	with	a	more	profound	truth	
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disconnected	 from	 the	 act	 of	 speech:	 the	 logos	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	
rationality	of	scientific	discourse;	a	 logos	which,	by	collecting	the	words	of	the	
one	who	confesses	his	desires,	integrates	the	spoken	words	within	the	symbolism	
of	truth.	The	words	of	the	speaker	no	longer	suffice	on	their	own	to	constitute	a	
truthful	gesture,	they	need	to	be	coupled	with	the	truth	of	a	nature	which	speaks	
truly	only	when	complete.90		
	
I	have	shown	how,	in	the	case	of	Oedipus	Rex,	the	completion	of	truth	depends	
on	the	conjunction	of	the	said	and	the	seen	(when	the	part	of	truth	told	by	the	
kings	 is	 completed	 by	 the	 spoken	 truth	 of	 the	 peasant	 who	 has	 seen	 the	
murderer)	 in	 order	 to	manifest	 a	 truth	which	 acquires	 a	 temporal	 dimension:	
Oedipus’	 identity	 is	no	 longer	 identified	according	to	his	presence	alone	but	 in	
relation	to	a	story	which	encompasses	the	entirety	of	his	life.	The	logic	Foucault	
sees	 in	 the	 confession	 of	 desires	 in	 the	 Victorian	 era	 also	 corresponds	 to	 a	
manifestation	of	truth	which	exists	beyond	the	strict	presence	of	the	speaker	and	
targets	the	nature	of	the	subject.	In	the	same	chapter	of	the	first	volume	of	The	
History	of	Sexuality,	Foucault	indeed	mentions	“the	principle	of	latency	essential	
                                                
90 	The	 question	 of	 the	 replacement	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 act	 by	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
speaker’s	 discourse	 and	 a	 primordial	 logos	which	 grounds	 its	 truth-value	 is	 a	 theme	 Foucault	
comes	 back	 to	 in	 his	 essay	 “A	 Preface	 to	 Transgression”.	 Foucault	 writes	 that:	 “A	 rigorous	
language,	as	it	arises	from	sexuality,	will	not	reveal	the	secret	of	man's	natural	being,	nor	will	it	
express	the	serenity	of	anthropological	truths,	but	rather,	it	will	say	that	he	exists	without	God;	
the	 speech	 given	 to	 sexuality	 is	 contemporaneous,	 both	 in	 time	 and	 in	 structure,	 with	 that	
through	which	we	announced	to	ourselves	that	God	is	dead.”	(Foucault:	1998a,	70).	The	concept	
of	anthropological	truth	acquires	the	transcendental	status	the	figure	of	God	occupied	prior	to	
the	advent	of	modernity:	whereas	the	sovereign	law	used	to	ground	and	realize	a	cosmological	
order,	the	truth	of	the	modern	subject,	split	between	his	discourse	and	the	more	fundamental	
rationality	which	validates	it,	is	what	both	grounds	its	concrete	existence,	legitimates	the	form	it	
takes	and	determines	the	forms	to	come.		
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to	 sexuality”	 which	 hides	 a	 confession	 whose	 truth	 is	 not	 concealed	 by	 the	
speaker	but	“hidden	from	himself”.	Foucault	tells	us	that	the	confession	links	“the	
forcing	of	a	difficult	confession	to	a	scientific	practice”	(Foucault:	1998d,	66).	In	
other	words,	the	scientific	rationality	which	motivates	the	confession	of	sexual	
desires	transforms	the	power	which	violently	demands	the	words	of	the	speaker	
into	the	necessary	manifestation	of	an	essence.	Thus	 it	 is	not	by	accident	that	
Foucault	 calls	 the	 confessor	 a	 “Master	 of	 Truth”	 (Foucault:	 1998d,	 67):	 he	
implicitly	refers	to	Détienne’s	work	on	truth	in	Archaic	Greece	according	to	which	
the	Masters	 of	 Truth	 are	 the	ones	 able	 to	 actualize	 truth	 through	 their	 act	 of	
speech.	 Foucault	 already	 referred	 to	 the	 “Master	of	 Truth”	 in	The	Birth	of	 the	
Clinic	when	he	described	the	totalization	and	registration	of	knowledge	derived	
from	the	plurality	of	events	taking	place	within	the	space	of	the	clinic	under	the	
scientificity	of	modern	medical	rationality.	Foucault	writes:	
Over	 all	 these	 endeavors	 on	 the	 part	 of	 clinical	 thought	 to	 define	 its	
methods	and	scientific	norms	hovers	the	great	myth	of	a	pure	Gaze	that	
would	 be	 pure	 Language:	 a	 speaking	 eye.	 It	 would	 scan	 the	 entire	
hospital	 field,	 taking	 in	 and	 gathering	 together	 each	 of	 the	 singular	
events	 that	occurred	within	 it;	and	as	 it	 saw,	as	 it	 saw	ever	more	and	
more	clearly,	it	would	be	turned	into	speech	that	states	and	teaches;	the	
truth,	which	events,	in	their	repetitions	and	convergence,	would	outline	
under	 its	 gaze,	 would,	 by	 this	 same	 gaze	 and	 in	 the	 same	 order,	 be	
reserved,	in	the	form	of	teaching,	to	those	who	do	not	know	and	have	
not	yet	seen.	The	speaking	eye	would	be	the	servant	of	things	and	the	
master	of	truth.	(Foucault:	2003a,	140-141)	
	
The	 first	 two	 lines	 state	 the	 point	 very	 clearly:	 what	 the	 logos	 of	 scientific	
rationality	makes	possible	is	the	stabilization	of	a	truth	that	grounds	and	validates	
the	 events	 which	 occur	 within	 the	 clinical	 space	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 their	
manifestation	 under	 the	 timeless	 truth	 of	 a	 foundation	 which	 explains	 and	
justifies	 them.	 The	 “pure	Gaze”	which	 is	 “pure	 Language”	 and	 “speaking	 eye”	
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corresponds	 to	 a	 metaphysical	 rationality	 which	 attempts	 to	 fix	 positively	
immanent	events	and	to	turn	them	into	a	sign	or	symptom	of	its	essence,	nature	
and	origin.	That	myth	or	dream	of	the	“pure	Language”	characterizes	the	type	of	
rationality	which	emerges	with	the	advent	of	the	human	sciences:	a	rationality	
whose	 purity	 overcomes	 the	 impermanent	 character	 of	 immanent	materiality	
and	is	transmitted	as	such	through	the	teaching	of	medical	knowledge.	The	logos	
of	nature	becomes	a	metaphysical	foundation	which	replaces	the	truth	expressed	
by	a	transitory	act	of	power	(an	act	of	speech)	or	materiality	not	yet	reduced	to	
truthful	facticity.		
	
In	the	case	of	the	shift	from	Archaic	to	Classical	Greece,	I	have	shown	how	the	
replacement	of	divine	power	by	the	knowledge	of	men	determines	the	possibility	
of	a	factual	truth	of	nature	once	the	ordering	of	the	world	according	to	sovereign	
power	disappears.	In	the	case	of	the	human	sciences,	modernity	defines	an	order	
of	 things	whose	 rationality	 is	no	 longer	granted	by	 the	knowledge	of	 the	King	
which	was,	at	the	same	time,	an	ordering	power.	In	The	Order	of	Things,	Foucault	
tells	 us	 that	 modern	 empiricities	 are	 no	 longer	 organized	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
taxonomy	of	 representation	set	up	 in	accordance	to	a	 fixed	mathesis.	They	no	
longer	correspond	to	a	knowledge	expressing	an	infinite	number	of	things	whose	
coexistence	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 order	 of	 a	 nature	 but	 to	“quasi-
transcendental	fields”	which	are	the	concepts	of	Life,	Labour	and	Language.	These	
“quasi-transcendental	 fields”	 find	 themselves	 ultimately	 united	 by	 the	
“transcendental	field	of	subjectivity”:	it	is	around	the	life,	labour	and	language	of	
the	modern	subject	that	knowledge	and	truth	are	now	organized.	Foucault	writes:	
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We	have	now	advanced	a	long	way	beyond	the	historical	event	we	were	
concerned	with	situating	–	a	long	way	beyond	the	chronological	edges	of	
the	 rift	 that	 divides	 in	 depth	 the	 episteme	 of	 the	Western	 world,	 and	
isolates	 for	 us	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 certain	modern	 manner	 of	 knowing	
empiricities.	This	is	because	the	thought	that	is	contemporaneous	with	us,	
and	 with	 which,	 willy-nilly,	 we	 think,	 is	 still	 largely	 dominated	 by	 the	
impossibility,	brought	to	light	towards	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century,	
of	basing	syntheses	in	the	space	of	representation,	and	by	the	correlative	
obligation	–	simultaneous	but	immediately	divided	against	itself	–	to	open	
up	 the	 transcendental	 field	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 to	 constitute	 inversely,	
beyond	 the	 object,	 what	 are	 for	 us	 the	 ‘quasi-transcendentals’	 of	 Life,	
Labour	and	Language.	(Foucault:	2001e,	272)	
	
The	morphology	of	the	modern	episteme	appears	to	us,	according	to	Foucault,	
because	 of	 the	 impossibility	 of	 performing	 the	 synthesis	 that	 would	 both	
constitute	the	“transcendental	field	of	subjectivity”	and	define	for	modern	man	
the	possibility	of	becoming	the	exhausted	object	of	its	own	knowledge.	Foucault	
tells	us	that	the	quasi-transcendentals	are	“beyond	the	object”:	the	horizon	of	
the	 life,	 labour	 and	 language	 of	 the	modern	 subject,	 understood	 as	 temporal	
fields	of	human	activity	in	an	attempt	to	fix	the	forms	of	its	finitude,	cannot	be	
fully	represented.	The	living,	working,	and	speaking	man	cannot	be	expressed	by	
knowledge	 since	 this	 living,	 working	 and	 speaking	 man	 is	 an	 object	 which	 is	
changed	by	its	own	temporality.		
	
The	fixed	form	of	the	living	man,	grasped	by	the	knowledge	of	human	sciences,	
cannot	but	always	already	be	challenged	by	the	concrete	forms	that	the	ways	he	
lives,	works	and	speaks	take	in	time.	Balibar	has	insisted	upon	the	fact	that	the	
 207 
quasi-transcendentals	introduced	in	The	Order	of	Things	should	be	understood	as	
different	ways	to	name	man’s	finitude	after	Kant.	He	has	said91:	
In	 The	 Order	 of	 Things,	 Foucault	 was	 primarily	 interested	 in	
epistemological	conditions	of	possibility.	Ultimately,	Foucault	said:	there	
is	an	anthropological	discourse	in	late	modernity,	in	the	nineteenth	and	
even	the	twentieth	century,	because	there	are	disciplines	that	consider	
man	as	an	object	of	knowledge	and	because	these	disciplines	transpose	
onto	 the	 plane	 of	 empirical	 knowledge	 the	 question	 formulated	 by	
Kantian	 criticism,	 which	 is	 the	 question	 of	 finitude.	What	 happened,	
quite	 simply,	was	 that	 each	 discipline	 came	 up	with	 a	 new	name	 for	
finitude.	They	called	it	“language”	or	“life”	or	“work.	
	
This	 imbalance	between	 the	concrete	existence	of	man	and	 the	 fixation	of	his	
truth	 by	 modern	 knowledge	 (what	 Balibar	 calls	 “the	 plane	 of	 empirical	
knowledge”)	 amounts	 to	 fixing	 finitude	 into	 concepts	 which	 acquire	 a	 new	
meaning	after	the	eighteenth	century.	Life	is	one	of	those	concepts:	it	designates	
a	horizon	against	which	human	sciences	attempt	to	positively	define	and	provide	
an	ontological	basis	 for	the	concrete	existence	of	men.	As	a	consequence,	 it	 is	
impossible	to	claim,	as	Agamben	does,	that	what	biopower	and	biopolitics	target	
with	 modernity	 is	 bare	 life.	 Rather,	 biopower	 and	 biopolitics	 imply	 a	 natural	
understanding	of	 the	 truth	 intrinsic	 to	 the	essence	of	man.	 It	 is	 a	 truth	which	
corresponds	to	the	“empirico-transcendental	doublet”	Foucault	mentions	in	The	
Order	of	Things:	
Because	he	is	an	empirico-transcendental	doublet,	man	is	also	the	locus	
of	misunderstanding	–	of	misunderstanding	that	constantly	exposes	his	
thought	to	the	risk	of	being	swamped	by	his	own	being,	and	also	enables	
him	to	recover	his	integrity	on	the	basis	of	what	eludes	him.	This	is	why	
transcendental	reflection	in	its	modern	form	does	not,	as	in	Kant,	find	its	
fundamental	necessity	in	the	existence	of	a	science	of	nature	(opposed	
by	the	perpetual	conflicts	and	uncertainties	of	philosophers),	but	in	the	
existence	–	mute,	yet	ready	to	speak,	and	secretly	impregnated	with	a	
                                                
91	This	 is	an	 interview	given	on	26th	November	2012	for	the	website	“Books	&	 Ideas”	after	the	
publication	 of	 his	 2011	 book	 Citoyen	 Sujet	 et	 autres	 essais	 d’anthropologie	 philosophique,	
available	at	http://www.booksandideas.net/Citizen-Balibar.html	(accessed	on	3rd	June	2015).	
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potential	discourse	–	of	that	not-known	from	which	man	is	perpetually	
summoned	towards	self-knowledge.	The	question	is	no	longer:	How	can	
experience	of	nature	give	rise	to	necessary	judgements?	But	rather:	How	
can	man	 think	what	 he	 does	 not	 think,	 inhabit	 as	 though	 by	 a	mute	
occupation	 something	 that	eludes	him,	animate	with	a	 kind	of	 frozen	
movement	 that	 figure	 of	 himself	 that	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 a	 stubborn	
exteriority?	How	can	man	be	that	life	whose	web,	pulsations,	and	buried	
energy	constantly	exceed	the	experience	that	he	is	immediately	given	of	
them?	(Foucault:	2001e,	351-352)	
	
Here,	 Foucault	 clearly	 formulates	 the	 unavoidable	 alienation	 to	 which	 the	
empirico-transcendental	status	man	acquires	with	modernity	leads.	It	is	not	only	
the	case	 that	 the	modern	subject	defines	his	own	nature	by	deciphering	what	
may	be	available	to	his	own	self-enquiry	(as	does	Oedipus,	who,	seeking	the	truth	
of	the	facts	that	have	led	him	to	the	throne,	is	led	to	discover	his	true	identity),	
but	that	this	self-enquiry	rests	on	a	fundamental	void,	a	fundamental	negativity	
which	the	acting	and	speaking	subject	can	never	inhabit	without	the	postulate	of	
a	true	nature	which	both	precedes	and	survives	him.	The	concept	of	life	which	
emerges	in	the	nineteenth	century	necessarily	projects	a	non-existent	figure	of	
exteriority	in	which	the	modern	subject	attempts	to	recognize	his	own	truth.	This	
“stubborn	exteriority”	is	the	basis	which	allows	man	to	represent	himself	to	his	
own	knowledge	and	constitute	his	own	objectivity.	But	Foucault	tells	us	that	the	
existence	of	men	 is	 rather	 a	 “a	web”,	 “pulsations”	 and	 “buried	energy”	which	
remain	 in	excess	of	possible	knowledge	and	 representation.	This	 is	 the	 reason	
why	the	modern	concept	of	“life”	cannot	be	understood	as	a	“bare”	metaphysical	
concept	 but	 proceeds	 from	 several	 historical	 changes	 of	 jurisdiction	 (i.e.	 from	
changes	which	affect	the	relationship	between	power,	truth	and	knowledge).		
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The	scope	of	Foucault’s	work	published	to	date	allows	us	to	identify	the	diagnosis	
of	two	historical	changes	of	jurisdiction	which	obey	the	same	logic:	the	one	which	
affects	the	dissolution	of	Archaic	Greek	political	sovereignty	and	the	one	which	
characterizes	 the	 emergence	 of	 biopower	 and	 biopolitics.	 The	 emergence	 of	
man’s	 knowledge	 of	 nature	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Archaic	 Greece	 corresponds	 to	 the	
dissolution	 of	 the	 sovereign	 unity	 between	 immanent	 acts	 of	 power	 and	 the	
immediate	performance	of	the	truth	of	the	world.	This	first	shift	corresponds	to	
the	definition	of	what	Foucault	calls	“the	will	to	know”	in	1970-1971.	In	the	same	
fashion,	 the	 1976	 “will	 to	 knowledge”	 (the	 subtitle	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	
History	of	Sexuality)	corresponds	to	the	dissolution	of	the	sovereign	power	of	the	
King.	In	each	case,	the	concept	of	nature	and	the	truth	corresponding	to	it	locates	
the	rationality	of	 things	 in	a	timeless	metaphysical	 logos.	Such	a	proximity	has	
been	stressed	but	not	clearly	identified	by	Revel	who	writes:	
Foucault	began	by	associating	nature	to	the	origin	and	to	the	universal;	
later	he	associates	nature	to	the	political	strategy	of	biologizing	life	that	
will	be	interpreted	as	one	of	the	characteristics	of	biopolitics	from	the	
nineteenth	century	on.	In	the	first	two	cases,	nature	is	denounced	as	the	
basis	of	Western	metaphysics,	which	is	embodied	first	 in	the	idea	of	a	
foundation	or	of	an	origin,	and	then	in	the	idea	of	a	transcendent	and	
unquestionable	 universal.	 Nature	 is	 what	must	 be	 dissolved	 so	 as	 to	
escape	from	the	metaphysical	illusion.	(Revel:	2014,	119)	
	
It	is	under	the	light	of	both	the	recurrence	and	variation	of	the	role	played	by	the	
concept	of	nature	at	these	two	moments	of	Foucault’s	thought	that	it	becomes	
possible	to	really	apprehend	the	proximity	between	life	and	death	that	Agamben	
interpreted	as	 a	mark	of	 the	presence	of	 bare	 life	 at	 the	basis	 of	 ancient	 and	
modern	politics.	Instead	of	linking	biopower	and	biopolitics	to	the	metaphysical	
power	of	the	sovereign	over	bare	life,	the	politics	which	endeavours	to	manage	
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life	cannot	but	fix	the	lives	it	takes	as	their	object	in	a	positive	form	of	finitude	
which	limits	the	potential	of	variation	proper	to	concrete	existence.	Just	as	the	
truth	of	nature	discovered	by	the	first	rationalists	in	Archaic	Greece	constituted	a	
positive	formulation	of	the	esoteric	power	of	gods,	the	truth	about	the	nature	of	
man	which	becomes	the	object	of	investigation	targeted	by	modern	medicine	and	
the	human	sciences	attempts	to	fix	positively	the	rationality	of	an	existence	which	
is	yet	to	come.92	Revel	clearly	points	out,	but	fails	to	fully	explicate,	the	proximity	
between	the	idea	of	foundation	and	origin	at	the	basis	of	Western	metaphysics	
and	 the	 unquestionable	 universal	 which	 grounds	 the	 rationality	 of	 modern	
politics	of	life.	In	both	cases,	I	claim	that	the	philosophical	gesture	remains	the	
same	 but	 its	 object	 differs:	 whereas	 the	 critique	 of	 nature	 found	 in	 Foucault	
around	1970	 concerns	 the	 critique	of	 the	possibility	of	 knowing	 the	nature	of	
things	 objectively	 since	 the	 conditions	 of	 our	 epistemological	 understanding	
change	historically,	the	concept	of	human	nature	which	lies	at	the	bottom	of	the	
first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	targets	the	impossibility	of	superimposing	
the	essence	of	man	with	 the	content	of	his	discourse	because	anthropological	
thought	also	constitutes	a	historical	epistemic	determination.		
	
                                                
92	As	Michel	de	Certeau	puts	 it	 in	his	essay	“The	Black	Sun	of	Language”:	“Death	only	appears	
within	 the	 cohesive	web	of	 reason	as	 the	position	of	man	 in	 language,	or	 as	 the	evolution	of	
languages.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 historical	 phenomenon,	 not	 an	 individual	 fact,	 and	 is	 therefore	 not	
localizable.	Neither	is	the	wild	claim	of	an	author	who	would	like	to	burst	through	the	doors	of	
reflexive	 philosophy,	 smash	 the	 languid	 furnishings	 of	 consciousness,	 and	 plant	 his	 black	 flag	
there.	It	is	not	the	end	of	man	that	Foucault	proclaims,	but	of	the	conception	of	man	that	believed	
it	had	solved,	by	means	of	the	positivism	of	the	‘human	sciences’	[…].”	(De	Certeau:	1986,	182).	
In	 those	 terms,	 the	 status	 of	 death	within	 the	modern	episteme	 does	 not	 correspond	 to	 the	
persistence	of	the	power	to	kill	but	to	the	alienation	of	man’s	concrete	existence	by	the	positivism	
of	a	rationality	which	always	already	precedes	and	succeeds	it.		
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However,	what	 is	common	to	both	mutations	 is	 the	 interdependence	between	
the	immanence	of	things	and	the	discourse	which	manifests	their	truth.	At	the	
dawn	 of	 Classical	 Greece,	 when	 the	 political	 sovereignty	 of	 gods	 and	 kings	
disappears,	 it	 is	 the	symbolic	 link	between	what	 is	said	and	seen	which	allows	
truth	to	be	completed	and	validated.	Similarly,	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age,	the	
possibility	 of	 representation	 (i.e.	 of	 the	 correspondence	 between	 words	 and	
things)	no	longer	lies	in	the	exteriority	of	the	sovereign	(the	knowledge	and	power	
of	God	and	the	King),	for	it	is	the	modern	subject	who	occupies	“the	place	of	the	
King”.	In	The	Order	of	Things,	Foucault	writes:	
For	Classical	thought,	man	does	not	occupy	a	place	in	nature	through	the	
intermediary	of	the	regional,	limited,	specific	“nature”	that	is	granted	to	
him,	as	to	all	other	beings,	as	a	birthright.	If	human	nature	is	interwoven	
with	 nature,	 it	 is	 by	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 by	 their	
functioning;	 or	 rather,	 in	 the	 general	 arrangement	 of	 the	 Classical	
episteme,	 nature,	 human	nature,	 and	 their	 relations,	 are	 definite	 and	
predictable	functional	moments.	And	man,	as	a	primary	reality	with	his	
own	density,	as	the	difficult	object	and	sovereign	subject	of	all	possible	
knowledge,	has	no	place	in	it.	The	modern	themes	of	an	individual	who	
lives,	speaks,	and	works	in	accordance	with	the	laws	of	an	economics,	a	
philology,	and	a	biology,	but	who	also,	by	a	sort	of	internal	torsion	and	
overlapping,	has	acquired	the	right,	through	an	interplay	of	those	very	
laws,	to	know	them	and	to	subject	them	to	total	clarification	-	all	these	
themes	so	familiar	to	us	today	and	linked	to	the	existence	of	the	“human	
sciences”	are	excluded	by	Classical	thought:	it	was	not	possible	at	that	
time	that	there	should	arise,	on	the	boundary	of	the	world,	the	strange	
stature	of	a	being	whose	nature	(that	which	determines	it,	contains	it,	
and	has	traversed	it	from	the	beginning	of	time)	is	to	know	nature,	and	
itself,	in	consequence,	as	a	natural	being.	(Foucault:	2001e,	338)	
	
Understanding	the	role	played	by	the	concept	of	nature	at	the	basis	of	bio-power	
and	biopolitics	with	The	Order	of	Things	 in	mind	 lets	us	better	understand	the	
relationship	at	stake	between	the	concept	of	sovereignty	and	the	status	of	life	in	
modern	politics:	it	is	because	sovereignty	gets	transferred	from	the	divine	to	the	
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concept	of	man	that	man	corresponds	to	a	metaphysical	entity	whose	truth,	like	
the	 order	 of	 nature	 for	 the	 Greek	 rationalists,	 must	 function	 as	 an	 originary	
founding	 logos	 which	 repeats	 with	 it	 the	 possibility	 of	 knowledge	 and	
representation.		
	
It	 is	 because	 the	modern	 subject	becomes,	 “the	difficult	 object	 and	 sovereign	
subject	 of	 all	 possible	 knowledge”	 that	 the	 truth	 of	 his	 nature	 replaces	 the	
sovereign	who,	either	 in	Archaic	Greece	or	during	 the	Classical	Age,	made	 the	
correspondence	 between	 words	 and	 things	 possible.	 If	 nineteenth-century	
anthropology	defines	“a	discourse	on	man’s	natural	finitude”	(Foucault:	2001e,	
280),	it	is	because	the	truth	of	his	nature	provides	the	foundation	the	law	of	the	
sovereign	used	to	occupy.	 In	 the	conclusion	of	 the	Birth	of	 the	Clinic,	Foucault	
even	formulates	an	implicit	analogy	between	the	possibility	of	the	truth	of	the	
modern	man	legible	at	the	cost	of	his	disappearance	and	the	return	of	the	law	
which	characterized	the	cosmological	structure	of	political	sovereignty.	He	writes:	
It	will	 no	 doubt	 remain	 a	 decisive	 fact	 about	 our	 culture	 that	 its	 first	
scientific	discourse	concerning	 the	 individual	had	 to	pass	 through	 this	
stage	of	death.	Western	man	could	constitute	himself	in	his	own	eyes	as	
an	object	of	science,	he	grasped	himself	within	this	language,	and	gave	
himself,	 in	 himself	 and	 by	 himself,	 a	 discursive	 existence,	 only	 in	 the	
opening	 created	 by	 his	 own	 elimination:	 from	 the	 experience	 of	
Unreason	was	born	psychology,	the	very	possibility	of	psychology;	from	
the	integration	of	death	into	medical	thought	is	born	a	medicine	that	is	
given	 as	 a	 science	 of	 the	 individual.	 And,	 generally	 speaking,	 the	
experience	of	 individuality	 in	modern	culture	is	bound	up	with	that	of	
death:	from	Holderlin’s	Empedocles	to	Nietzsche’s	Zarathustra,	and	on	
to	 Freudian	 man,	 an	 obstinate	 relation	 to	 death	 prescribes	 to	 the	
universal	 its	 singular	 face,	 and	 lends	 to	 each	 individual	 the	 power	 of	
being	heard	forever;	the	individual	owes	to	death	a	meaning	that	does	
not	cease	with	him.	The	division	that	 it	 traces	and	the	finitude	whose	
mark	it	imposes	link,	paradoxically,	the	universality	of	language	and	the	
precarious,	irreplaceable	form	of	the	individual.	The	sense-perceptible,	
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which	cannot	be	exhausted	by	description,	and	which	so	many	centuries	
have	wished	to	dissipate,	finds	at	least	in	death	the	law	of	its	discourse;	
it	is	death	that	fixes	the	stone	that	we	can	touch,	the	return	of	time,	the	
fine,	innocent	earth	beneath	the	grass	of	words.	In	a	space	articulated	
by	 language,	 it	reveals	the	profusion	of	bodies	and	their	simple	order.	
(Foucault:	2003a,	244)	
	
It	is	the	possibility	of	a	positive	knowledge	of	life	through	the	fixation	of	modern	
man’s	finitude	which	confronts	the	modern	subject	to	the	positivity	of	its	truth.	
The	historical	shift	from	sovereign	power	to	bio-power	places	the	modern	subject	
in	an	ambiguous	position	whereby	the	inscription	of	his	life	within	the	order	of	
knowledge	 both	 prevents	 and	 forces	 his	 disappearance:	 it	 is	 the	 fixity	 of	 the	
representation	 of	 man’s	 life	 through	 man’s	 knowledge,	 in	 which	 bios	 as	 a	
temporal	experience	between	the	self	and	the	world	disappears,	which	acts	as	
the	sovereign	return	of	the	origin	and	“the	law	of	its	discourse”.93		
	
The	 precariousness	 of	 individual	 life	 and	 its	 finitude	 as	 living	 being	 is	
counterbalanced	 by	 the	 “universality	 of	 language”	 which	 survives	 it	 but	 also	
precedes	and	inscribes	it	in	a	posture	of	unavoidable	alienation.	It	is	the	fixation	
of	the	lives	of	men	in	the	order	of	possible	description	that	dismantles	the	unity	
of	the	figure	of	the	sovereign	as	the	origin	and	the	foundation	of	the	order	of	the	
world.	Whereas,	within	the	paradigm	of	Medieval	sovereignty,	the	return	of	time	
was	the	return	of	order	expressed	by	the	sovereign’s	law	and	the	individual	put	
                                                
93	As	Fréderic	Gros	explains	in	his	essay	“Folie	et	finitude:	les	leçons	de	la	psychoanalyse”:	“[t]he	
destiny	of	thought	is	no	longer	to	discover	itself	as	universal	logical	substance,	but	to	question	
mute	 positivities	 in	 which	 it	 must	 recognize	 itself.”	 [“Le	 destin	 de	 la	 pensée	 n’est	 plus	 de	 se	
découvrir	 comme	substance	 logique	universelle,	mais	d’interroger	des	positivités	muettes	dans	
lesquelles	 il	 lui	 faut	 se	 reconnaître”]	 (Gros:	 1997,	 116).	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 knowledge	which	
emerges	with	human	sciences	constitutes	an	attempt	at	providing	a	positive	content	to	men’s	
existence.	However,	the	concept	of	Life	as	positive	form	of	finitude	is	a	mute	positivity.	It	refers	
to	 an	 abstraction	 which	 cannot	 be	 superimposed	 with	 the	 existence	 of	 men	 understood	 as	
concrete	and	lived	experience.		
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to	 death	 an	 affirmation	 of	 the	 sovereign’s	 law	 through	 its	 power	 on	 the	
condemned	body,	death	has	now	come	to	occupy	the	condition	of	possibility	of	
man’s	 finitude	 and	 representation.	 Michael	 Dillon,	 in	 his	 article	 “Specters	 of	
Biopolitics:	Finitude,	Eschaton,	and	Katechon”,	has	had	the	correct	intuition	to	link	
the	question	of	biopolitical	security	to	that	of	modern	finitude.	However,	he	too	
fails	to	recognize	the	specificity	of	the	finitude	which	characterizes	the	modern	
espisteme.	He	writes:	
The	eschaton	remains	a	source	of	civil	as	well	as	religious	strife	today,	
always	 a	 theologico-political	 field	of	 sacrilizing	 formation,	 though	one	
that	 functions	 differently	 now	 because	 the	 modern	 finitudinal	
immanentization	of	the	eschaton,	as	an	open	horizon	of	possibility	rather	
than	 the	 threshold	 of	 everlasting	 life,	 transforms	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
eschaton	and	the	mode	of	(political)	being	instituted	by	it.	Modern	time,	
in	short,	is	no	less	eschatological	than	Christian	time.	But	it	is	different,	
and	 the	 difference	 accounts	 for	 the	 aporetic	 mode	 of	 being	 of	 the	
modern	factically	finitudinal	order	of	things,	and	its	sacralizing	quality,	
not	least	that	of	the	cultic	security	politics	of	the	limit	of	modern	political	
orders	and	the	war	that	such	politics	wages	in	the	holy	name	of	life	of	
the	 modern	 finitudinal	 eschaton.	 […]	 For	 biopolitics	 is	 also	 a	 regime	
speaking	truth	about	the	nature	of	times	through	the	truth	of	the	end	of	
times,	and	the	mode	of	being	required	to	live	in,	live	out,	and	live	up	to	
the	 eschatological	 security	 imperative	 to	 resist,	 at	 whatever	self-
sacrificial	 cost,	 the	end	of	 the	 temporal	order	of	 things.	 (Dillon:	2011,	
783)	
	
Instead	of	articulating	the	question	of	finitude	not	only	with	death	but	with	the	
positivity	of	the	essence	of	man,	he	fails	to	see	that	the	concept	of	death	which	
concerns	us	here	is	not	so	much	linked	to	the	question	of	the	end	of	times	but	to	
the	question	of	positivity	and	negativity,	appearance	and	disappearance	of	the	
modern	subject.		
	
The	 relationship	 between	 positivity	 and	 negativity	 does	 not	 strictly	mean	 the	
possibility	of	the	concrete	death	of	individuals	but	rather	the	alienation	of	their	
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concrete	existence	in	the	fixed	forms	of	knowledge.	This	is	where	the	heritage	of	
Foucault’s	work	on	 the	mutation	of	 jurisdiction	 in	Archaic	Greece	allows	us	 to	
understand	 the	 interplay	 between	 positivity,	 negativity	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	
man’s	finitude	in	modernity.	Whereas	the	divine	law	is	fundamentally	negative	
(both	 exoteric	 and	 limiting),	 the	 law	 of	 nature	 is	 what	 appears	 and	 remains	
through	 the	 use	 of	 knowledge	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 nomos	 in	 Classical	
Greece.	In	the	same	fashion,	whereas	the	law	of	the	King	limits	or	annihilates	the	
life	 of	 his	 subjects	 up	 to	 the	 Classical	 Age,	 the	 truth	 of	 man’s	 nature	 which	
constitutes	his	modern	finitude	lets	the	possibility	of	his	essence	appear	whilst	
his	 lived	 individual	 and	 concrete	 existence	 disappears.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	
Foucault,	 in	 The	 Order	 of	 Things,	 qualifies	 the	 anthropological	 structure	 of	
knowledge	as	fundamentally	“hollow”.	He	writes:	
[H]e	[man],	as	soon	as	he	thinks,	merely	unveils	himself	to	his	own	eyes	
in	the	form	of	a	being	who	is	already,	in	a	necessarily	subjacent	density,	
in	an	irreducible	anteriority,	a	living	being,	an	instrument	of	production,	
a	vehicle	for	words	which	exist	before	him.	All	 these	contents	that	his	
knowledge	reveals	to	him	as	exterior	to	himself,	and	older	than	his	own	
birth,	anticipate	him,	overhang	him	with	all	their	solidity,	and	traverse	
him	as	though	he	were	merely	an	object	of	nature,	a	face	doomed	to	be	
erased	 in	 the	 course	 of	 history.	 Man’s	 finitude	 is	 heralded	 –	 and	
imperiously	 so	–	 in	 the	positivity	of	 knowledge;	we	know	 that	man	 is	
finite,	as	we	know	the	anatomy	of	the	brain,	the	mechanics	of	production	
costs,	 or	 the	 system	 of	 Indo-European	 conjugation;	 or	 rather,	 like	 a	
watermark	running	through	all	these	solid,	positive,	and	full	forms,	we	
perceive	 the	 finitude	and	 limits	 they	 impose,	we	 sense,	 as	 though	on	
their	 blank	 reverse	 sides,	 all	 that	 they	 make	 impossible.	 (Foucault:	
2001e,	342)	
	
The	“irreducible	anteriority”	which	determines	the	individual	and	characterises	
the	finitude	of	man	is	paradoxically	the	condition	of	its	positivity.	It	is	on	the	basis	
of	 the	 same	paradox	 that	 the	 politics	which	 claim	 to	 foster	 life	 also	 carry	 the	
threat	of	death.	Either	 in	the	case	of	totalitarian	racism	(which	relies	upon	the	
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idea	of	the	true	nature	of	man)	or	that	of	the	idea	of	the	normal	man,	it	is	the	
rationality	read	in	men’s	 immanent	existence	which	will	a	posteriori	determine	
the	“irreducible	anteriority”	which	grants	his	nature	and	anticipates	the	lives	to	
come.	It	is	the	securing	of	the	temporal	existence	of	men	in	a	knowledge	which	
survives	them	that	a	sense	of	what	“is	made	impossible”,	to	use	Foucault’s	own	
terminology,	appears.		
	
The	irreducible	difference	between	the	Classical	and	the	modern	episteme	is	that	
the	 transcendence	 of	 the	 sovereign	 is	 transferred	 to	 the	 space	 of	 subjective	
interiority.	It	is	because	the	sovereign	transcendence	which	limited	transgression	
becomes	an	introversion	which	limits	difference	that	the	foundation	of	biopolitics	
cannot	be	an	eschatological	framework	(which	aims	at	the	repetition	of	the	same	
order	 of	 things)	 but	 a	 framework	 of	 normalization	 (which	 seeks	 to	 make	
difference	 coincide	 with	 the	 forms	 of	 what	 is	 already	 defined	 positively).	 If	
biopolitics	remain	both	theologico-political	and	eschatological,	as	Dillon	claims,	it	
is	not	because	the	order	of	things	determined	by	the	transcendence	of	God	has	
simply	been	secularized.	Rather,	it	is	because	the	possibility	of	this	order	of	things	
is	now	determined	by	the	opening	of	the	interiority	of	the	subject	of	knowledge	
who	knows	his	nature	amongst	other	objects	of	experience.	As	Foucault	clearly	
puts	 in	 “A	 Preface	 to	 Transgression”,	 the	 density	 our	 interiority	 acquires	 with	
modernity	carries	the	weight	of	the	death	of	God.	He	writes:	
On	the	day	that	sexuality	began	to	speak	and	to	be	spoken,	language	no	
longer	served	as	a	veil	for	the	infinite;	and	in	the	density	it	acquired	on	
that	day,	we	now	experience	finitude	and	being.	In	its	dark	domain,	we	
now	 encounter	 the	 absence	 of	 God,	 our	 death,	 limits,	 and	 their	
transgression.	(Foucault:	1998a,	85)		
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If	the	anthropological	episteme	retains	a	theologico-political	dimension,	it	is	not	
in	relation	to	a	Christian	understanding	of	the	end	of	times	but	in	relation	to	the	
place	of	the	sovereign	which,	making	justice	and	truth	altogether	possible,	used	
to	ground	and	limit	the	order	of	things.		
	
Gilles	Deleuze	clearly	 identified	Foucault’s	diagnosis	of	 the	replacement	of	 the	
figure	of	God	by	the	concept	of	man.	 In	the	appendix	to	his	Foucault,	Deleuze	
takes	care	to	distinguish	the	Classical	 from	the	modern	episteme	 in	 relation	to	
God	 and	 what	 he	 calls	 “the	 Outside”.	 If	 it	 is	 true	 that	 Deleuze	 emphasizes	 a	
somewhat	vitalist	coherence	that	is	absent	in	Foucault	(since	Foucault	does	not	
himself	claim	that	the	finite	forms	of	finitude	“enter	into	a	relation	with	certain	
very	special	forces	from	the	outside”	(Deleuze:	2006,	124)),	Deleuze’s	reading	is	
nonetheless	enlightening	because	 it	helps	us	understand	why	the	 infinitude	of	
Classical	 representation	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 the	 finite	 knowledge	 of	 man	
without	introducing	an	unavoidable	mismatch	between	concrete	existence	and	
its	fixation	as	knowledge.	Deleuze	writes:	
[…]	in	the	classical	historical	formation,	the	forces	within	man	enter	into	
a	relation	with	forces	from	the	outside	in	such	a	way	that	the	compound	
is	a	God-form,	and	not	at	all	a	Man-form.	This	 is	 the	world	of	 infinite	
representation.	In	the	orders	derived	from	it	we	must	find	the	element	
that	is	not	infinite	in	itself,	but	which	nonetheless	can	be	developed	to	
an	 infinite	degree	and	 consequently	enters	 into	a	 scene,	or	unlimited	
series,	 or	 continuum	 that	 can	 be	 prolonged.	 This	 is	 the	 sign	 of	 the	
classical	 forms	 of	 science	 still	 prevalent	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century:	
‘character’	 for	 living	 beings,	 ‘root’	 for	 languages,	money	 (or	 land)	 for	
wealth.	 Such	 sciences	 are	 general,	 the	 general	 indicating	 an	 order	 of	
infinity.	Thus	there	is	no	biology	in	the	seventeenth	century,	but	there	is	
a	natural	history	that	does	not	form	a	system	without	organizing	itself	in	
series;	there	is	no	political	economy,	but	there	is	an	analysis	of	wealth;	
no	philology	or	linguistics,	but	a	general	grammar.	[…]	What	is	God,	if	not	
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the	universal	 explanation	and	 supreme	unveiling?	The	unfold	 appears	
here	as	a	fundamental	concept,	or	first	aspect	of	an	active	thought	that	
becomes	embodied	in	the	classical	formation.	(Deleuze:	2006,	125-126)	
	
Deleuze	 coins	 the	 concept	 “God-form”	 in	 order	 to	 express	 the	 relationship	
between	 a	 knowing	 subjectivity	 and	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 things	 to	 know	
determined	 by	 God.	 Thus,	 the	 God-form	 describes	 an	 episteme	 which	 makes	
representation	possible:	each	existing	 thing	 is	 knowable	because	 its	existence,	
fixed	and	determined	by	God,	can	be	acknowledged	by	the	knowing	subject.	This	
is	the	reason	why	the	Classical	episteme	is	organized	around	series:	what	matters	
is	not	the	infinite	possibility	of	new	things	 in	their	difference	and	variation	but	
their	 origin	 and	 determination	 by	 the	 subsuming	 genus.	 “Character”,	 “root”,	
“money”	and	“land”	are	also	origins	which	determine	series	of	things	organised	
according	 to	 this	 primordial	 origin:	 it	 is	 the	 characters	 of	 living	 beings	 which	
determine	their	place	within	the	taxonomy	of	natural	history,	 it	 is	 the	roots	of	
words	that	determine	their	place	within	the	taxonomy	of	general	grammar	and	
finally	the	amount	of	wealth	a	land	can	provide	which	determines	the	logic	of	the	
analysis	of	wealth.	In	other	words,	the	God-form	is,	within	the	Classical	episteme,	
the	 foundation	 which	 gives	 to	 things	 their	 place,	 meaning,	 and	 possible	
correspondence	with	words.		
	
Conversely,	when	Deleuze	analyses	modernity	with	what	he	calls	the	“Man-form”,	
the	 primordial	 unfolding	 allowed	 by	 the	 infinity	 of	 God	 becomes	 a	 fold:	 an	
unavoidable	mismatch	caused	by	the	impermanence	of	the	object	of	knowledge	
that	 the	 modern	 living,	 working	 and	 speaking	 man	 is.	 It	 is	 no	 longer	 the	
transcendence	of	God	which	can	be	the	cause	and	origin	for	the	order	of	things	
 219 
but	the	essence	of	modern	man	himself	or	the	fixed	form	of	his	finitude.	However,	
since	the	existence	of	the	living	man	cannot	but	bring	about	the	difference	of	new	
ways	of	living,	the	order	of	knowledge	which	corresponds	to	the	modern	episteme	
cannot	but	be	organised	by	comparison	and	no	longer	by	the	intrinsic	deployment	
of	 series:	 only	 the	 comparison	 can	 account	 for	 the	 variations	which	 existence	
introduces.	This	is	the	reason	why	Deleuze	writes:	
Everywhere	comparisons	replace	the	general	fact	that	was	so	dear	to	the	
seventeenth	 century:	 comparative	 anatomy,	 comparative	 philology,	
comparative	economy.	Everywhere	it	is	the	Fold	which	dominates	now,	
to	follow	Foucault’s	terminology,	and	this	fold	is	the	second	aspect	of	the	
active	 thought	 that	 becomes	 incarnated	 in	 the	 nineteenth-century	
development.	 The	 forces	 within	 man	 fall	 or	 fold	 back	 on	 this	 new	
dimension	of	in-depth	finitude,	which	then	becomes	the	finitude	of	man	
himself.	 The	 fold,	 as	 Foucault	 constantly	 says,	 is	 what	 constitutes	 a	
“thickness”	as	well	as	a	“hollow”.	(Deleuze:	1988,	128)	
	
In	Deleuze’s	 terminology,	 “the	 forces	within	man”	 indicate	 an	existence	which	
precedes	 fixation	 or	 formalisation.	 These	 forces	 (i.e.	 the	 lives	 of	 men)	 then	
become	 forms	of	man’s	 finitude	 fixated	as	 the	 “quasi-transcendentals”	of	 Life,	
Labour	and	Language.	The	impossibility	of	the	fold	or	the	impossible	reduction	of	
those	forces	into	knowledge	is	what	explains	their	“quasi”	character:	they	cannot	
constitute	 pure	 transcendentals	 because	 they	 cannot	 provide	 the	 absolute	
conditions	of	possibility	of	human	experience.	Because	the	lives	of	men	are	first	
of	 all	 a	 matter	 of	 historical	 existence,	 its	 essence	 cannot	 be	 known	 and	
determined	prior	to	experience	itself.		
	
	The	 conclusions	which	 Foucault	 develops	 in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 The	 Order	 of	
Things,	 which	 famously	 ends	 with	 the	 disappearance	 of	 man	 as	 an	
epistemological	 concept	 “like	 a	 face	 drawn	 in	 sand	 at	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 sea”	
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(Foucault:	2001,	422)	 repeat	 the	 lessons	of	 the	commentary	of	Velasquez’	Las	
Meninas	which	opened	the	book:	pure	representation	is	only	possible	once	the	
sovereign	(in	this	case	the	subject	of	representation)	is	himself	not	represented,	
exterior	to	it	and	in	a	position	of	negativity.	This	is	why	an	exhaustive	truth	and	
knowledge	of	modern	man	is	doomed	to	failure:	the	subject	of	knowledge,	in	the	
midst	 of	 other	 empiricities,	 escapes	 the	possibility	 of	 fixed	positivity.	 Foucault	
writes:	
In	the	depth	that	traverses	the	picture,	hollowing	it	into	a	fictitious	recess	
and	projecting	it	forward	in	front	of	itself,	it	is	not	possible	for	the	pure	
felicity	of	the	image	ever	to	present	in	a	full	light	both	the	master	who	is	
representing	and	the	sovereign	who	is	being	represented.	Perhaps	there	
exists,	 in	 the	 painting	 by	 Velasquez,	 the	 representation	 as	 it	were,	 of	
Classical	representation,	and	the	definition	of	the	space	it	opens	up	to	
us.	And,	indeed,	representation	undertakes	to	represent	itself	here	in	all	
its	elements,	with	its	images,	the	eyes	to	which	it	is	offered,	the	faces	it	
makes	visible,	the	gestures	that	call	it	into	being.	But	there,	in	the	midst	
of	 this	 dispersion	 which	 it	 is	 simultaneously	 grouping	 together	 and	
spreading	out	before	us,	 indicated	compellingly	 from	every	side,	 is	an	
essential	 void:	 the	 necessary	 disappearance	 of	 that	 which	 is	 its	
foundation	-	of	the	person	it	resembles	and	the	person	in	whose	eyes	it	
is	only	a	resemblance.	This	very	subject	-	which	is	the	same	-	has	been	
elided.	 And	 representation,	 freed	 finally	 from	 the	 relation	 that	 was	
impeding	it,	can	offer	itself	as	representation	in	its	pure	form.	(Foucault:	
2001e,	18)	
	
It	is	in	the	space	of	the	gap	opened	up	by	the	reciprocal	exclusion	of	“the	master	
who	 is	 representing”	 and	 “the	 sovereign	 who	 is	 being	 represented”	 that	 the	
anthropological	structure	which	characterizes	the	modern	episteme	emerges.	It	
is	when	the	modern	subject	(the	master	who	is	representing)	needs	to	represent	
his	own	finitude	(as	living,	speaking	and	working	being)	 in	order	to	ground	the	
possibility	of	objects	to	know	(when	“the	sovereign	who	 is	being	represented”	
coincides	with	“the	master	who	 is	representing”)	that	the	disjunction	Foucault	
describes	takes	place.		
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In	relation	to	this	mismatch,	my	claim	is	that	the	 lessons	of	Foucault’s	analysis	
regarding	 the	mutation	 of	 knowledge,	 truth	 and	 jurisdiction	 at	 the	 turn	 from	
Archaic	to	Classical	Greece	help	us	understand	the	mutation	of	knowledge,	truth	
and	 jurisdiction	which	affects	 the	shift	 from	Classical	Age	 to	modernity.	 I	have	
previously	detailed	how	the	withdrawal	of	truth	and	knowledge	from	gods	to	men	
at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	did	not	constitute	a	new	truth	but	repeated,	in	its	
exoteric	form,	the	knowledge	of	gods	that	only	the	Masters	of	Truth	were	able	to	
decipher	 and	 perform.	 This	 shift	 does	 not	 strictly	 erase	 the	 exteriority	 which	
marked	the	structure	of	sovereign	truth.	Rather,	 it	transferred	gods’	and	kings’	
power	to	the	primacy	of	an	originary	truth	which	became	accessible	through	the	
symbolism	of	knowledge	Foucault	describes	when	he	reads	Sophocles’	Oedipus	
Rex.	A	close	analysis	of	Foucault’s	description	of	the	structure	of	knowledge	which	
characterizes	the	modern	episteme	reveals	the	same	kind	of	transfer:	truth	is	no	
longer	manifested	within	the	strict	limit	of	en	event	(the	precarious	character	of	
existence)	 but	 gets	 displaced	 to	 a	more	 fundamental	 logos	 which	 the	 clinical	
experience	of	medical	knowledge,	amongst	other	modern	sciences,	attempt	to	
synthesize.	But	 the	 second	part	of	The	Order	of	Things	 tells	us	more	 than	 the	
dissolution	 of	 the	 fugacity	 of	 experience	 into	 the	 stability	 of	 a	 fundamental	
rationality:	 it	 also	 tells	 the	 impossibility	of	 the	 synthesis	of	 an	 anthropological	
truth:	it	is	not	an	anthropological	positivity	which	grounds	the	modern	knowledge	
of	man	but	its	fundamental	precariousness.	As	Foucault	tells	us	in	The	Order	of	
Things	as	well	as	in	the	Birth	of	the	Clinic,	it	is	death	which	allows,	by	contrast,	the	
emergence	of	anthropological	truth.	It	is	when	life	becomes	positive	knowledge,	
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when	 it	 loses	 its	 temporal	 power	 of	 variation,	 that	 it	 conversely	 becomes	
representable.	In	other	words,	the	finitude	of	man	can	only	appear	as	a	negation	
of	capacity	for	change.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	possibility	of	man’s	finitude	and	
the	knowledge	which	corresponds	to	it	is	linked	by	Foucault,	either	in	The	Order	
of	Things	or	in	the	Birth	of	the	Clinic,	to	the	necessity	of	death.	To	use	Foucault’s	
terminology,	 “the	 master	 who	 is	 representing”	 needs	 the	 stillness	 of	 “the	
sovereign	who	is	being	represented”.	In	The	Order	of	Things,	Foucault	writes:	
Homo	 oeconomicus	 is	 not	 the	 human	 being	 who	 represents	 his	 own	
needs	to	himself,	and	the	objects	capable	of	satisfying	them;	he	is	the	
human	beings	who	spends,	wears	out,	and	wastes	his	life	in	evading	the	
imminence	 of	 death.	He	 is	 a	 finite	 being:	 and	 just	 as,	 since	 Kant,	 the	
question	of	finitude	has	become	more	fundamental	than	the	analysis	of	
representations	 (the	 latter	 now	 being	 necessarily	 a	 derivation	 of	 the	
former),	since	Ricardo,	economics	has	rested,	in	a	more	or	less	explicit	
fashion,	upon	an	anthropology	that	attempts	to	assign	concrete	forms	to	
finitude.	Eighteenth-century	economics	stood	in	relation	to	a	mathesis	
as	 to	 a	 general	 science	 of	 all	 possible	 orders;	 nineteenth-century	
economics	will	be	referred	to	an	anthropology	as	to	a	discourse	of	man’s	
natural	finitude.	(Foucault:	2001e,	280)	
	
If	nineteenth-century	economics	constitute	an	aspect	of	man’s	natural	finitude,	it	
is	because	the	finitude	of	man	is	not	what	opposes	the	infinitude	of	God	but	is	
the	mark	of	God’s	absence.	As	Foucault	puts	it	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	
of	 Sexuality,	 confession	 ceases	 to	be	 “a	 test”	and	becomes	 “a	 sign”	 (Foucault:	
1998d,	67).	It	ceases	to	be	the	act	by	which	one	breaches	the	rule	and	opposes	
the	divine	law	and	becomes	the	symptom	of	a	natural	truth.	Finitude	is	not	what	
marks	 the	 limits	 of	 man’s	 actions	 against	 tukhe	 (as	 it	 was	 the	 case	 in	 Greek	
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tragedy)	but	becomes	the	ontological	ground	which	fixes,	determines	and	limits	
the	positivity	of	his	existence94.	
	
This	 is	 why	 the	 form	 of	 finitude	 which	 interests	 us	 most	 (i.e.	 Life	 as	“quasi-
transcendental”),	fixes	the	norms	according	to	which	the	rationality	of	the	living	
man	 can	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 discourse	 of	 knowledge:	 that	 is	 when	 a	
relationship	 of	 signification	 may	 be	 established	 between	 the	 discourse	 of	
knowledge	and	the	immanence	of	facts.	If	with	bio-power,	as	Foucault	puts	it	in	
the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	“the	law	operates	more	and	more	as	
a	norm”	(Foucault,	1998d,	144),	it	is	due	to	the	fact	that	immanent	practices	tend	
to	 be	 incorporated	 into	 positive	 knowledge	 according	 to	 which	 what	 the	
individual	does	 starts	 to	 signify	beyond	 the	 strict	 immanence	of	 the	act.	With	
Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 Oedipus	 Rex	 in	 mind,	 we	 now	 know	 that	 it	 implies	 an	
essential	correspondence	between	the	immanence	of	acts	and	the	positivity	of	a	
discourse	which	forms	a	fixed	essential	truth.	As	Stéphane	Legrand	puts	it	in	Les	
normes	chez	Foucault:	
[…]	 There	 is,	 amongst	 the	 various	 social	 practices	 and	 power	
relationships	 to	 which	 these	 concepts	 are	 applied,	 no	 real	 common	
signified	which	corresponds	to	them;	there	is	on	the	contrary,	circulating	
throughout	 the	 social	 field	 and	 in	 between	 institutions,	 the	 signifiers	
such	 as	 “norm”,	 “normality”,	 “anormality”,	 etc.,	 in	 relation	 to	 which	
                                                
94	The	specific	use	of	the	terms	“sign”	and	“test”	which	describe	confession	in	the	first	volume	of	
the	History	of	Sexuality	is	probably	not	fortuitous.	It	was	already	in	those	terms	that	Foucault,	in	
“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	compared	the	structure	of	Archaic	Greek	justice	to	the	structure	of	
the	modern	penal	system.	In	the	1973	series	of	conferences,	Foucault	goes	through	a	consecutive	
analysis	of	the	relationship	between	justice	and	truth	in	Archaic	Greece,	Germanic	law,	Middle	
Ages	and	modernity.	Whereas	Archaic	Greek	and	Germanic	justice	are	centered	around	the	test	
as	an	act	by	which	the	supposed	wrong-doer	confronts	the	justice	of	gods,	modernity	establishes,	
through	 the	 logic	of	 confession,	a	 correspondence	between	 the	words	of	 the	 speaker	and	his	
pathological	nature.	The	confession	of	the	convict	becomes	the	sign	of	this	pathological	nature	
and	grounds	its	positivity.	(Foucault:	2000c,	1-89),	
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individuals	are	constantly	qualified	and	situated	 […].95	(Legrand:	2007,	
148)	
	
The	signifiers	such	as	“norm”,	“normality”	and	“abnormality”	do	not	refer	to	a	
concrete	signified	which	could	be	isolated:	this	is	a	symptom	of	the	fact	that	the	
life	of	the	modern	subject,	which	has	become	an	epistemological	object,	escapes	
the	fixity	imposed	by	the	structure	of	knowledge.	It	is	because	the	modern	subject	
finds	himself	in	the	position	of	both	the	origin	and	the	object	of	representation	
that	 language	 cannot	 capture	 positively	 a	 reality	 whose	 immanence	 remains	
fundamentally	historical.	As	a	consequence	of	this	impossible	fold,	it	 is	not	the	
concept	of	bare	 life	as	metaphysical	and	political	a	priori	which	can	help	us	to	
understand	the	deadly	logic	of	bio-power	of	biopolitics	but	rather	the	roots	of	a	
jurisdiction	 which	 reduces	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 evanescent	 acts	 and	
transcendental	 rationality:	 the	 sovereign	 subject,	 with	 his	 potential	 of	self-
determination,	is	reduced	to	a	fixed	positivity	whose	logos	exists	without	him.	
	
	
3.	Foucault’s	problematization	of	life	as	an	object	of	governmentality	
	
In	the	previous	chapters,	I	have	explained	why	a	metaphysical	understanding	of	
life	relying	upon	the	concept	of	nature	is	unsuited	to	grasping	the	mutation	of	
jurisdiction	which,	in	Foucault’s	work,	both	characterizes	the	shift	from	Archaic	
                                                
95	“[…]	il	n’existe	pas,	dans	les	différentes	pratiques	sociales	et	relations	de	pouvoir	auxquelles	on	
applique	ces	concepts,	de	signifié	commun	réel	qui	leur	correspnde;	existent	par	contre,	circulant	
d’un	bout	à	l’autre	du	champ	social,	et	entre	les	institutions,	les	signifiants	communs	“norme”,	
“normalité”,	“anormalité”,	etc.,	par	rapport	auxquels	les	individus	sont	en	permanence	qualifiés	
et	situés	[…].” 
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to	 Classical	 Greece	 and	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 Classical	 Age	 to	modernity.	 Unlike	
Agamben,	 I	 do	 not	 claim	 that	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 correspond	 to	 a	
“zoopolitics”.96	In	the	introduction	to	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	
Agamben	claims	that	zoe	constitutes	the	fundamental	basis	of	politics.	From	then	
on,	 the	distinction	Agamben	claims	to	be	able	to	draw	between	a	political	 life	
subjected	 to	 sovereign	 power	 and	 a	 non-political	 life	 expelled	 from	 it	 by	
sovereign	power	can	be	reduced	to	the	distinction	he	makes	between	“life”	and	
“the	good	life”,	which	translate	the	Greek	“zen”	and	“eu	zen”.	It	 is	easy	to	see	
that	whether	political	power	includes	or	excludes	“life”	from	its	grasp,	it	always	
already	deals	with	 the	 fact	of	being	a	 living	being,	which	Agamben	calls	 “bare	
life”.	Eu	zen	therefore	corresponds	to	“the	good	life”	or	the	life	through	which	
man	fulfills	his	political	disposition.	Conversely,	non-political	life	corresponds	to	
this	same	life	without	added	qualification	(i.e.	the	simple	fact	according	to	which	
one	is	a	living	being).	Agamben	writes:	
Placing	biological	life	at	the	center	of	its	calculations,	the	modern	State	
therefore	does	nothing	other	than	bring	to	 light	the	secret	tie	uniting	
power	 and	 bare	 life,	 thereby	 reaffirming	 the	 bond	 (derived	 from	 a	
tenacious	correspondence	between	the	modern	and	the	archaic	which	
one	encounters	 in	 the	most	diverse	spheres)	between	modern	power	
and	the	most	immemorial	of	the	arcana	imperii.	If	this	is	true,	it	will	be	
necessary	to	reconsider	 the	sense	of	 the	Aristotelian	definition	of	 the	
polis	 as	 the	opposition	between	 life	 (zen)	 and	 good	 life	 (eu	 zen).	 The	
opposition	is,	in	fact,	at	the	same	time	an	implication	of	the	first	in	the	
second,	of	bare	life	in	politically	qualified	life.	(Agamben:	1998,	11)	
	
It	 is	clear	that	when	Agamben	chooses	to	ground	his	distinction	between	non-
political	and	political	life	in	the	difference	between	the	Aristotelian	concepts	zen	
                                                
96	As	Derrida	puts	it	in	The	Beast	and	the	Sovereign:	“[...]	Agamben	would	no	doubt	have	
preferred	“zoopolitics”	[to	“biopolitics”]	(Derrida:	2009,	325).	
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and	eu	zen,	he	is	sticking	to	the	Aristotelian	definition	of	man	Foucault	invoked	in	
the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality.	Referring	to	this	definition,	Foucault	
claims	man	remained,	until	modernity,	a	living	being	with	a	political	disposition.	
He	writes:	
For	millennia,	man	remained	what	he	was	for	Aristotle:	a	living	animal	
with	the	additional	capacity	for	a	political	existence;	modern	man	is	an	
animal	whose	politics	places	his	existence	as	a	living	being	in	question	
(Foucault:	1998d,	143)	
	
Instead	of	making	the	extra	disposition	for	politics	the	natural	expression	of	the	
essence	of	man,	Agamben	claims	the	origin	of	such	a	disposition	is	made	possible	
by	 the	 essence	 of	 politics	 itself	 (i.e.	 through	 the	 ontological	 determination	 of	
sovereign	power	which,	by	excluding	bare	life	from	the	sphere	of	right,	ultimately	
includes	 it	 as	 the	 direct	 object	 of	 the	 unrestrained	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign).	
Nevertheless,	what	Agamben	fails	to	understand	is	that	Foucault’s	description	of	
modern	politics	contrasts	with	this	definition:	 it	 is	not	the	ontology	of	political	
sovereignty	 which	 determines	 modern	 political	 power	 over	 life	 but	 modern	
man’s	political	activity	which	takes	his	own	life	as	a	living	being	as	a	natural	object	
which	can	be	known	as	one	thing	among	others.		
	
The	 historical	 torsion	 by	 virtue	 of	which	man	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 his	 own	
knowledge	 corresponds	 to	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	 modern	 episteme	 I	 have	
described	 in	 the	 third	section	of	 the	previous	chapter.	 It	 is	as	 the	 result	of	an	
anthropological	 fold	 that	 modern	 man	 becomes	 an	 empirico-transcendental	
doublet	who	 takes	 his	 own	 existence	 as	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 and	 political	
intervention.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 epistemic	 shift	 Foucault	 targets	 in	 the	 first	
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volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	corresponds	to	the	historical	emergence	of	a	
relationship	between	a	 subject	 and	his	 existence	which	becomes	an	object	of	
knowledge.	This	is	a	relationship	which	Agamben	mentions	without	being	aware	
of	it	when	he	refers	to	“The	Subject	and	Power”,	a	seminar	given	by	Foucault	in	
1982	at	the	University	of	Vermont.	Agamben	claims	to	identify	in	Foucault’s	work	
two	directions	which	conceal	their	common	basis:	the	political	techniques	that	
manage	what	Agamben	calls	the	“natural	life”	of	individuals	and	the	technologies	
of	the	self	according	to	which	the	 individual	binds	himself	 to	his	own	 identity.	
Agamben	writes:	
As	shown	by	a	seminar	held	in	1982	at	the	University	of	Vermont,	in	his	
final	 years	 Foucault	 seemed	 to	 orient	 this	 analysis	 according	 to	 two	
distinct	 directives	 for	 research:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 study	 of	 the	
political	 techniques	 (such	as	 the	science	of	 the	police)	with	which	 the	
State	assumes	and	integrates	the	care	of	the	natural	life	of	individuals	
into	 its	 very	 center;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 examination	 of	 the	
technologies	of	the	self	by	which	processes	of	subjectivization	bring	the	
individual	to	bind	himself	to	his	own	identity	and	consciousness	and,	at	
the	same	time,	to	an	external	power.	(Agamben:	1998,	11)	
	
What	Agamben	fails	to	understand	is	that	both	the	“political	techniques”	which	
target	the	natural	life	of	individuals,	and	the	“technologies	of	the	self”	which	bind	
the	 individual	 to	 his	 identity,	 define	 the	 fixation	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 a	
subject	and	 its	objectification	(between	the	subject	and	his	existence	taken	as	
the	manifestation	of	his	nature	and	between	the	subject	and	his	own	 identity	
taken	 as	 the	manifestation	of	 this	 same	nature).	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 the	 subject	
becomes	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 which	 political	 techniques	 manage:	 this	
objectification	is	performed	on	the	basis	of	the	relationship	between	the	subject	
and	 the	 presupposition	 of	 its	 objective	 nature.	 In	 the	 second	 case,	 it	 is	 the	
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subject’s	perception	of	his	own	identity	which	presupposes	the	postulate	of	this	
objective	nature97.	
	
In	 both	 cases,	 what	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 the	 fixation	 by	 political	 power	 of	 a	
relationship	which	 defines	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 natural	 ontology	 –	 an	 ontology	
which	becomes	the	focal	point	from	which	the	historical	establishment	of	such	a	
relationship	 (which	 is	both	a	political	and	ethical	gesture)	disappears.	 It	 is	 the	
fixation	of	an	ontology	(which	defines	both	the	natural	identity	of	the	subject	and	
the	“natural	life”	he	lives)	which	provides	what	Agamben	needs	in	order	to	coin	
the	concept	of	bare	life.	He	writes:	
If	Foucault	contests	the	traditional	approach	to	the	problem	of	power,	
which	 is	 exclusively	 based	 on	 juridical	 models	 (“What	 legitimates	
power?”)	or	on	institutional	models	(“What	is	the	State?”),	and	if	he	calls	
for	a	“liberation	from	the	theoretical	privilege	of	sovereignty”	in	order	
to	construct	an	analytic	of	power	that	would	not	take	law	as	its	model	
and	code,	then	where,	in	the	body	of	power,	is	the	zone	of	indistinction	
(or,	 at	 least,	 the	 point	 of	 intersection)	 at	 which	 techniques	 of	
individualization	and	totalizing	procedures	converge?	(Agamben:	1998,	
11)	
	
The	 “zone	 of	 indistinction	 […]	 at	 which	 techniques	 of	 individualization	 and	
totalizing	procedures	converge”	is	the	positing	of	a	natural	ontology	both	at	the	
basis	of	people’s	lives	and	of	individual	identities.	The	joint	reading	of	the	turn	
from	Archaic	to	Classical	Greece	and	from	the	Classical	Age	to	modernity	I	have	
undertaken	 here	 has	 revealed	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 ontology	 expressing	
nature	 (either	 the	possibility	of	 a	discourse	expressing	 the	nature	of	 things	 in	
                                                
97	As	Muriel	Combes	claims,	there	is	“a	modality	of	objectivation	of	the	subject	by	itself,	of	auto-
constitution	 as	 subject	 within	 auto-subjecting	 procedures”	 [“une	 modalité	 d’objectivation	 du	
sujet	 par	 lui-même,	 d’autoconstitution	 en	 sujet	 au	 sein	 de	 procedures	 en	 quelque	 sorte	 auto-
asujettissantes.”]	(Combes:	2011,	59).	
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Classical	Greece	or	the	possibility	of	a	discourse	expressing	the	nature	of	man	in	
modernity)	 proceeds	 from	 the	 fixation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 acts	 and	
discourse	through	the	symbolism	Foucault	describes	when	he	reads	Sophocles’	
Oedipus	Rex.	As	Revel	explains,	the	emergence	of	the	concept	of	nature	as	an	
object	 of	men's	 knowledge	 is	 a	 historical	 reality	 which,	 as	 such,	 needs	 to	 be	
analyzed.	She	writes:	
It	is	not	that	nature	in	itself	does	not	exist,	but,	in	his	investigation	of	the	
nineteenth	century,	Foucault	discovers	the	emergence	of	a	new	political	
use	 for	 this	 reference	 to	 the	 natural,	 which	 is	 in	 itself	 absolutely	
nonnatural	 and	 whose	 genealogy	 must	 be	 established.	 (Revel:	 2014,	
120)	
	
But	what	Revel	does	not	mention	is	that	“the	new	political	use	for	this	reference	
to	the	natural”	has	its	basis	in	a	new	mode	of	jurisdiction.	The	concept	of	human	
nature,	which	takes	a	new	form	in	the	nineteenth	century,	produces	an	overlap	
between	the	act	of	power	which	determines	a	specific	relationship	to	an	object	
and	 an	 ontological	 discourse	 which	 determines	 the	 true	 discourse	 about	 this	
object:	 it	 thus	masks	 the	 fundamental	 heterogeneity	which	makes	 it	 a	 power	
relationship.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 political	 modernity	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 both	
"political	techniques	[…]	with	which	the	State	assumes	and	integrates	the	care	of	
the	 natural	 life	 of	 individuals"	 as	 well	 as	 "technologies	 of	 the	 self	 by	 which	
processes	 of	 subjectivization	 bring	 the	 individual	 to	 bind	 himself	 to	 his	 own	
identity"	(Agamben:	1998,	11).		
	
I	 claim	 that	 what	 political	 modernity	 prevents	 with	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	
ontological	bond	between	the	immanent	actuality	of	existence	and	the	discourse	
which	conveys	its	truth	is	a	distance	which	determines	the	possibility	of	an	ethical	
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and	political	relationship	between	the	subject	and	his	own	existence.	Such	a	claim	
allows	us	to	see	how	the	second	and	third	volumes	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	do	
not	constitute	a	“return”	to	the	question	of	subjectivity	but	rather	an	expansion	
of	the	epistemological	and	political	questions	which	started	to	interest	Foucault	
in	1970:	it	is	clear	that	Foucault's	later	work	on	Classical	Greece	as	well	as	his	last	
series	of	lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France	attempt	to	retrieve	the	possibility	of	
an	ethical	problematization	of	the	relationship	between	the	self	and	the	world	
which	concerns	the	problem	of	governmentality	rather	than	strict	subjectivity.	As	
Foucault	puts	it	in	a	conversation	with	André	Berten	at	the	Catholic	University	of	
Leuwen	on	7th	May	1981:	
[…]	when	one	examines	what	power	is,	one	sees	that	it	is	the	exercise	of	
something	one	could	call	government,	in	the	broadest	sense	of	the	term.	
Society	can	be	governed,	a	group	can	be	governed,	a	community	can	be	
governed,	 a	 family	 can	be	 governed,	 someone	 can	be	 governed.	And	
when	I	say	“govern	someone”,	it	is	simply	in	the	sense	of	determining	
their	 conduct	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 strategies,	 using	 a	 certain	 number	 of	
tactics.	 So,	 if	 you	 will,	 it	 is	 governmentality	 in	 the	 broadest	 sense,	
understood	 as	 a	 set	 of	 relations	 of	 power	 and	 techniques	 that	 allow	
these	power	relations	to	be	exercised	–	this	is	what	I	tried	to	study.	How	
have	we	governed	the	mad?	How	did	we	pose	the	problem	of	governing	
the	 sick?	 And	 once	 again,	 I	 put	 the	word	 “government”	 in	 quotation	
marks,	giving	it	at	once	a	vast	and	rich	meaning	–	how	did	we	govern	the	
sick;	what	was	done	with	them;	what	status	did	we	give	them;	where	did	
we	put	 them,	 in	what	system	of	 treatment,	of	surveillance	as	well,	of	
care-taking,	of	philanthropy,	in	what	economic	field	was	care	brought	to	
the	sick…	I	 think	that	all	of	 this	should	be	explored.	 (Foucault:	2014b,	
240)		
	
It	 is	 the	 question	 or	 governmentality,	 studied	 as	 early	 as	 Security,	 Territory,	
Population	and	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics	that	unites	Foucault’s	work	from	the	last	
period.	During	the	first	lecture	of	The	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	he	provides	a	definition	
of	governmentality	which	heralds	the	one	he	will	give	in	1981.	He	says:	
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In	fact,	this	year	I	would	like	to	continue	with	what	I	began	to	talk	about	
last	year,	that	is	to	say,	to	retrace	the	history	of	what	could	be	called	the	
art	of	government.	You	recall	the	strict	sense	in	which	I	understood	“art	
of	 government”,	 since	 in	 using	 the	 word	 “to	 govern”	 I	 left	 out	 the	
thousand	and	one	different	modalities	and	possible	ways	that	exist	for	
guiding	 men,	 directing	 their	 conduct,	 constraining	 their	 actions	 and	
reactions,	and	so	on.	Thus	I	left	to	one	side	all	that	is	usually	understood,	
and	that	for	a	long	time	was	understood,	as	the	government	of	children,	
of	families,	of	a	household,	of	souls,	of	communities,	and	so	forth.	I	only	
considered,	 and	 again	 this	 year	will	 only	 consider	 the	 government	 of	
men	insofar	as	it	appears	as	the	exercise	of	political	sovereignty.	[…]	I	
wanted	to	study	the	art	of	governing,	that	is	to	say,	the	reasoned	way	of	
governing	best	and,	at	 the	same	 time,	 reflection	on	 the	best	possible	
way	 of	 governing.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 grasp	 the	 level	 of	
reflection	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 government	 and	 on	 the	 practice	 of	
government.	In	a	sense,	I	wanted	to	study	government’s	consciousness	
of	 itself,	 if	 you	 like,	 although	 I	 don’t	 like	 the	 term	 “self-awareness	
(conscience	de	soi)”	and	will	not	use	it,	because	I	would	rather	say	that	I	
have	tried,	and	would	like	to	try	again	this	year	to	grasp	the	way	in	which	
this	practice	that	consists	in	governing	was	conceptualized	both	within	
and	 outside	 government,	 and	 anyway	 as	 close	 as	 possible	 to	
governmental	practice.	I	would	like	to	try	to	determine	the	way	in	which	
the	 domain	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 government,	with	 its	 different	 objects,	
general	rules,	and	overall	objectives,	was	established	so	as	to	govern	in	
the	 best	 possible	 way.	 In	 short,	 we	 could	 call	 this	 the	 study	 of	
rationalization	 of	 governmental	 practice	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	
sovereignty.	(Foucault:	2008b,	2)		
	
Both	 definitions	 agree	 upon	 the	 fact	 that	 governmentality	 concerns	 the	
determination	or	direction	of	the	conduct	of	men.	In	the	definition	provided	in	
The	 Birth	 of	 Biopolitics,	 Foucault	 adds	 that	 he	 did	 not	 plan	 to	 look	 at	 the	
successive	forms	that	governmentality	has	taken	in	history	but	rather	the	way	in	
which	the	“best	possible	way	of	governing”	has	been	determined,	that	is	to	say	
the	 way	 in	 which	 governmentality	 has	 been	 developed	 as	 an	 art	 and	 as	 a	
rationalized	practice.	Both	definitions	also	end	with	a	widening	of	the	object	of	
governmental	practice.	In	Leuwen,	Foucault	says	that	governing	must	be	given	“a	
vast	and	rich	meaning”	and	concerns	“	a	set	of	relations	of	power	and	techniques	
that	allow	these	power	relations	to	be	exercised”	 (Foucault:	2014b,	240).	Two	
 232 
years	 earlier,	 he	was	 claiming	 to	 try	 and	 “grasp	 the	 level	 of	 reflection	 in	 the	
practice	 of	 government	 and	 on	 the	 practice	 of	 government”	 that	 “was	
conceptualized	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 government”	 (Foucault:	 2008b,	 2).	
Governmentality	therefore	corresponds	to	a	rational	art,	an	art	conducting	the	
way	in	which	men	conduct	their	lives.	Since	this	constitutes	a	rational	practice,	it	
means	that	it	can	be	known,	formalized,	institutionalized	and	reflected	upon.	In	
other	words,	biopolitics	deals	with	the	historical	emergence	of	the	rationalization	
of	the	art	by	which	men	conduct	their	lives.		
	
It	defines	a	concept	of	life	which	does	not	correspond	to	an	ontological	nature	
but	 to	a	practice	 taken	within	 sets	of	power	 relationships	defining	 techniques	
which	take	part	in	directing	this	practice.	What	Security,	Territory,	Population	and	
The	Birth	of	Biopolitics	focus	on	is	the	historical	formation	of	the	“rationalization	
of	 governmental	 practice	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	 sovereignty”	 (Foucault:	
2008b,	2),	that	is	to	say	the	historical	confrontation,	from	the	sixteenth	century	
onwards,	of	the	power	of	the	sovereign	with	a	reality	which	is	without	an	a	priori	
rationale	determining	its	form	–	namely,	the	way	in	which	people	conduct	their	
lives.	 The	 confrontation	 of	 these	 two	 heterogeneous	 elements	 (i.e.	 the	 law	
known,	performed	and	actualized	by	the	sovereign	and	the	conduct	of	the	lives	
of	men	whose	formalization	happens	a	posteriori)	is	another	way	of	expressing	
the	 decline	 of	 sovereign	 power	 Foucault	 mentions	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	
History	of	Sexuality.	 If,	with	bio-power,	“the	law	operates	more	and	more	as	a	
norm”	(Foucault:	1998d,	144),	it	is	because	the	norm	constitutes	an	object	whose	
primordial	immanence	always	already	precedes	its	rational	formalization.	This	is	
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something	about	which	Pierre	Macherey	has	insisted	in	his	essay	“La	raison	et	les	
normes”	when	he	writes:	
[…]	 the	 reason	 from	which	norms	receive	 their	 legitimacy	 is	not	a	pure	
reason,	which	as	such	 is	disengaged	 from	any	relation	with	experience,	
but	 a	 reason	affected	by	 the	 conditions	of	 experience	 the	unfolding	of	
which	it	only	supports	inasmuch	as	it	is	itself	supported	by	the	dynamics	
of	this	unfolding	from	which	it	gets	its	effective	power:	this	is	not	a	reason	
which	falls	from	on	high,	but	a	reason	which	comes	from	below	insofar	as	
it	 appears	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 course	 of	 things	with	which	 it	 tends	 to	
confound	itself.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	sort	of	obligation	that	norms	
require	 is	 completely	 different	 from	 the	 one	 called	 for	 by	 laws,	 which	
modifies	entirely	the	regime	of	rationality	from	which	the	former	and	the	
latter	proceed98.	(Macherey:	2011)		
	
Macherey’s	 thesis,	 according	 to	 which	 norms	 proceed	 from	 “a	 reason	 which	
comes	from	below”,	refers	to	Foucault’s	point	from	the	first	volume	of	the	History	
of	Sexuality	according	to	which	“power	comes	from	below”:	
Power	 comes	 from	 below,	 that	 is,	 there	 is	 no	 binary	 and	 all-
encompassing	opposition	between	rules	and	ruled	at	the	root	of	power	
relations,	and	serving	as	a	general	matrix	–	no	such	duality	extending	
from	the	top	down	and	reacting	on	more	and	more	limited	groups	to	the	
very	 depths	 of	 the	 social	 body.	 One	 must	 suppose	 rather	 that	 the	
manifold	relationships	of	force	that	take	shape	and	come	into	play	in	the	
machinery	 of	 production,	 in	 families,	 limited	 groups,	 and	 institutions,	
are	the	basis	for	wide-ranging	effects	of	cleavage	that	run	through	the	
social	body	as	a	whole.	(Foucault:	1998d,	94)	
	
If	“power	comes	from	below”,	it	means	that	the	sovereign	law	which	is	above	all	
concerned	 with	 the	 defense	 of	 a	 territory	 and	 of	 a	 people	 is	 fundamentally	
heterogenous	to	the	logic	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics:	it	is	no	longer	concerned	
                                                
98	“[…]	 la	 raison	dont	 les	normes	 tirent	 leur	 légitimité	n’est	pas	une	 raison	pure,	 comme	 telle	
désengagée	de	 tout	 rapport	 avec	 l’expérience,	mais	une	 raison	affectée	par	 les	 conditions	de	
l’expérience	dont	elle	ne	prend	en	charle	le	déroulement	qu’en	étant	elle-même	prise	en	charle	
par	la	dynamique	de	ce	déroulement	d’où	elle	tire	sa	puisssance	effective	:	ce	n’est	pas	une	raison	
qui	tombe	d’en	haut	mais	une	raison	qui	vient	d’en	bas,	dans	la	mesure	où	elle	paraît	sourdre	du	
cours	des	choses	avec	 lequel	elle	tend	à	se	confondre.	C’est	pourquoi	 le	type	d’obligation	que	
requièrent	les	normes	est	complètement	différent	de	celui	appelé	par	les	lois,	ce	qui	modifie	de	
fond	 en	 comble	 le	 régime	 de	 rationalité	 dont	 relèvent	 les	 unes	 et	 les	 autres.”	 This	 essay	 is	
available	at:	http://philolarge.hypotheses.org/1183	(accessed	on	18th	June	2015).	
 234 
with	the	return	of	the	same	order	of	things	but	rather	with	the	knowledge	of	their	
nature.	Foucault	wants	to	dismantle	the	political	rationality	that	places	sovereign	
power	in	the	position	of	a	transcendent	entity	which	is	able	to	both	prescribe	or	
forbid	in	accordance	to	the	true	and	just	order	of	things.	Quite	the	contrary,	the	
logic	of	bio-power	reveals	strictly	immanent	relations	of	power	whose	apparent	
objectives	seem	to	reveal	a	rationality.		
	
However,	as	Foucault	puts	 it,	“[p]ower	relations	are	both	 intentional	and	non-
subjective”	(Foucault:	1998d,	94):	they	are	the	objects	of	tactics	and	strategies	
but	do	not	come	from	a	rationality	which	would	be	external	to	their	immanent	
functioning.	Foucault	is	quite	insistent	about	using	the	word	“function”:	he	writes	
that	“power	functions	in	a	society”	but	is	also	what	“makes	it	function”	(Foucault:	
1998d,	95).	The	fact	that	power	is	a	relationship	which	both	functions	and	makes	
other	 power	 relationships	 function	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 only	 relationships	 of	
power	which	influence	each	other.	This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault	adds	that	“one	
is	 always	 ‘inside’	 power,	 there	 is	 no	 ‘escaping’	 it”	 (Foucault:	 1998d,	 95).	 But	
Foucault’s	 rejection	 of	 a	 conception	 of	 power	 which	 posits	 the	 primacy	 of	 a	
sovereign	 rationality	 needs	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 its	 epistemological	 and	 ethical	
consequences:	not	only	is	it	the	case	that	the	concrete	existence	of	men	(i.e.	the	
immanent	existence	of	individuals	understood	as	relations	with	others	and	the	
world)	cannot	be	fully	known,	understood	or	rationalized	a	priori,	but	it	is	also	
the	 case	 that	 the	 impossible	 correspondence	 between	 an	 ontological	
determination	of	the	conduct	of	individuals	and	their	immanent	existence	makes	
life	 a	 matter	 of	 aesthetics	 or	 style	 whose	 strict	 immanence	 overcomes	 the	
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dichotomy	and	intrinsic	relationship	between	form	and	meaning,	symptom	and	
nature,	power	and	knowledge	or	discourse	and	truth.		
	
The	 epistemological	 and	 ethical	 implications	 of	 refusing	 a	 metaphysical	
understanding	 of	 life	 have	 been	 clearly	 identified	 in	 Foucault’s	 work	 by	
Macherey,	 who	 sees	 in	 the	 irreducibility	 of	 the	 immanence	 of	 existence	 to	
rational	 knowledge	 the	mark	 of	 an	 unavoidable	mismatch	 between	 the	 truth	
sought	 and	 spoken	by	 the	discourses	of	 human	 sciences	 and	 the	existence	of	
men.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 in	 the	 essays	 “Pour	 une	 histoire	 naturelle	 des	
normes”	and	“De	Canguilhem	à	Canguilhem	en	passant	par	Foucault”,	Macherey	
identifies	a	proximity	between	the	theme	of	the	empirico-transcendental	doublet	
inherited	from	The	Order	of	Things,	the	meaning	of	death	within	the	formation	
of	the	clinical	knowledge	derived	from	anatomo-pathology	and	the	question	of	
aesthetics	of	existence	developed	in	the	second	and	third	volumes	of	the	History	
of	Sexuality.	Macherey	writes:	
We	 thus	 see	 how	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 norm,	 in	 the	 relationship	 it	
maintains	 with	 society	 and	 the	 subject,	 also	 refers	 to	 the	 distinction	
between	the	two	possible	forms	of	knowledge	stressed	in	The	Order	of	
Things:	 the	 one	 of	 an	 abstract	 grid	 of	 rationality,	 hanging	 over	 the	
domain	of	 the	objects	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 “represent”	by	 framing	 them	
with	its	own	categories;	and	the	one	of	a	knowledge	which	represents	
itself	as	being	incorporated	within	the	constitution	of	its	object,	which	is	
then	no	longer	its	“object”,	but	also	its	subject,	a	knowledge	whose	form	
par	excellence	is	given	by	human	sciences.99	(Macherey:	2009,	72-73)	
	
                                                
99	“Nous	voyons	ainsi	comment	la	problématique	de	la	norme,	dans	le	rapport	qu’elle	entretient	
avec	la	société	et	avec	le	sujet,	renvoie	également	à	la	distinction	entre	les	deux	formes	possibles	
de	la	connaissance	mises	en	évidence	dans	Les	Mots	et	les	Choses:	celle	d’une	grille	abstraite	de	
rationalité,	 surplombant	 le	 domaine	 des	 objets	 qu’elle	 est	 censée	 “représenter”	 en	 les	
renfermant	 dans	 ses	 propres	 cadres;	 et	 celle	 d’un	 savoir	 qui	 se	 présente	 comme	 étant	 au	
contraire	incorporé	à	la	constitution	de	son	objet,	qui	n’est	plus	seulement	dès	lors	son	“objet”,	
mais	aussi	son	sujet,	savoir	dont	la	forme	par	excellence	est	donnée	par	les	sciences	humaines”. 
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Here,	the	“two	possible	forms	of	knowledge”	Macherey	refers	to	correspond	to	
the	paradoxical	position	of	the	modern	subject	who	finds	himself	both	subject	
and	object	of	his	own	knowledge.	These	two	possible	forms	of	knowledge	actually	
refer	 to	 one	 and	 the	 same	 epistemic	 configuration	 according	 to	 which	 the	
rationality	of	knowledge	and	truth	constitutes	a	truth	which	precedes	the	strict	
immanence	 of	 the	 subject’s	 existence	 and	 ultimately	 determines	 its	 validity.	
Rather	 than	 “two	 possible	 forms	 of	 knowledge”,	 it	 is	 one	 and	 the	 same	
morphology	of	knowledge	which	acquires	its	positivity	from	the	primacy	of	the	
immanence	 of	 the	 objects	 it	 takes	 into	 account:	 the	 lives	 of	 individuals	 as	
existences	 subject	 to	 change.	 Such	 a	 predetermination	 of	 experience	 by	 an	
originary	logos	which	constitutes	its	validity	and	possible	recognition	is	especially	
pregnant	in	the	development	of	anatomo-pathology	in	the	nineteenth	century.	
Commenting	on	the	Birth	of	the	Clinic,	Macherey	sees	that	the	rationality	of	the	
clinical	experience	is	made	possible	by	the	encounter	of	the	“said”	and	the	“seen”	
which	overcomes	 the	 immanent	 experience	of	 the	doctor	 and	patient.	 In	 this	
context,	 what	 is	 seen	 by	 the	 doctor	 and	 said	 by	 the	 patient	 partake	 in	 a	
knowledge	 validated	 by	 the	 precedence	 of	 a	 transcendental	 truth	 which	
constitutes	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	 clinical	 experience.	 Macherey	
writes:	
One	sees	that	the	game	of	the	“said”	and	the	“seen”	through	which	such	
an	 “experience”	 is	 constituted	 passes	 beyond	 the	 sick	 and	 the	 doctor	
himself,	in	order	to	realise	this	a	priori	historical	form	which	anticipates	
the	concrete	lived	experience	of	the	disease	by	imposing	its	own	models	
of	recognition.100	(Macherey:	2009,	104)	
                                                
100	“On	voit	que	le	jeu	du	“dit”	et	du	“vu”	à	travers	lequel	se	noue	une	telle	“expérience”	passe	
par-dessus	le	malade	et	 le	médecin	lui-même,	pour	réaliser	cette	forme	historique	a	priori	qui	
anticipe	 sur	 le	 vécu	 concret	 de	 la	 maladie	 en	 lui	 imposant	 ses	 propres	 modèles	 de	
reconnaissance.”	
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The	 reference	 to	 the	 symbolic	 complementarity	 of	 the	 “said”	 and	 the	 “seen”	
resolved	in	an	a	priori	logos	constitutes	an	echo	of	the	morphology	of	knowledge	
and	 truth	 Foucault	 sees	 emerging	 in	 Sophocles’	 Oedipus	 Rex:	 the	 parts	 of	
knowledge	the	characters	bring	forward	partake	in	a	primordial	truth	once	the	
discourse	of	knowledge	is	completed	by	the	visual	testimony	of	the	messenger.	
Both	cases	reveal	the	same	logic	of	alienation	through	which	the	immanence	of	
acts	is	dissolved	in	the	precedence	of	a	truth	which	nobody	any	longer	speaks	on	
his	own	and	by	oneself:	the	sovereignty	of	the	speaker	is	replaced	by	the	originary	
position	of	a	truth	which	enlightens	experience	a	priori.		
	
Presence	does	not	suffice	to	affirm	its	own	truth:	it	is	rather	in	the	replacement	
of	immanent	acts	by	a	transcendental	logos	that	light	is	cast	upon	the	meaning	
of	the	objects	of	experience.	With	modernity,	death	ceases	to	be	what	negatively	
marks	the	finitude	of	the	lives	of	men	through	the	agonistic	encounter	with	the	
infinitude	of	God:	it	becomes	the	condition	of	a	positive	finitude	which	sheds	light	
upon	the	immanent	existence	of	men.	This	is	the	reason	why	Macherey	adds:	
With	 the	 conditions	 which	 make	 the	 clinical	 experience	 possible,	
death,	and	with	 it	 life	 too,	ceases	 to	be	an	ontological	or	existential	
absolute	and	simultaneously	acquires	an	epistemological	dimension.	
As	 paradoxical	 as	 it	 seems,	 it	 [death]	 “sheds	 light”	 upon	 life. 101	
(Macherey:	2009,	106)	
	
If	I	agree	with	Macherey	about	the	diagnosis	of	a	change	affecting	the	meaning	
of	death	with	modernity,	I	do	not	see	a	strict	opposition	between	the	historical	
                                                
101	“Dans	les	conditions	qui	rendent	possible	l’expérience	clinique,	la	mort,	et	avec	elle	aussi	la	
vie,	 cesse	 d’être	 un	 absolu	 ontologique	 ou	 existentiel,	 et	 simultanément	 elle	 acquiert	 une	
dimension	épistémologique.	Si	paradoxal	que	cela	puisse	paraître,	elle	“éclaire”	la	vie.” 
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emergence	of	the	epistemological	status	of	death	and	its	position	as	ontological	
absolute.	Rather,	 it	 is	when	death	starts	 to	be	 thought	as	man’s	 finitude	 (and	
constitutes	at	the	same	time	an	ontological	determination),	that	it	becomes	the	
point	from	which	life	is	positively	seen,	grasped	and	understood.		
	
In	truth,	it	is	more	exact	to	claim	that	it	is	the	positive	determination	of	man’s	
finitude	which	constitutes	his	own	absolute:	it	becomes	a	seemingly	ahistorical	
origin	 from	 which	 the	 meaning	 of	 existence	 is	 derived.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
modern	episteme	 redefines	 the	relationship	between	negativity	and	positivity:	
the	sovereign	law,	fundamentally	negative	through	the	deadly	expression	of	the	
limit	of	the	order	of	things	(what	Foucault,	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	
Sexuality,	 calls	 the	 sovereign	 “Right	 of	 Death”),	 becomes	 an	 ontological	
relationship	 between	 the	 subject’s	 existence	 and	 the	 positive	 fixation	 of	 its	
positive	knowledge.	Death	is	no	longer	the	point	where	the	sovereign	negativity	
which	marks	the	possibility	of	the	return	of	the	law	grounding	the	order	of	things,	
it	is	the	condition	thanks	to	which	the	positivity	of	life	as	epistemological	concept	
appears	 when	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 subject,	 understood	 as	 an	 immanent	
relationship	 towards	others	and	 the	world,	disappears.	This	 is	 the	 reason	why	
clinical	knowledge,	derived	from	the	symbolic	encounter	of	the	seen	and	the	said,	
annihilates	 the	 problem	 of	 life	 as	 immanent	 existence	 and	 yet	 prevents	 the	
disappearance	of	life	as	a	positive	concept:	the	rationality	of	life,	grounded	upon	
an	a	priori	knowledge	and	truth	which	survive	the	individual	existence	of	men,	
both	 constitutes	 and	 overcomes	 finitude.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 penultimate	
paragraph	of	the	Birth	of	the	Clinic	cannot	express	better	the	specificity	of	the	
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modern	status	of	death	whereby	the	subjective	experience	is	both	sacrificed	and	
saved	by	anthropological	knowledge.	Foucault	writes:	
This	experience,	which	began	in	the	eighteenth	century,	and	from	which	
we	 have	 not	 yet	 escaped,	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 a	 return	 to	 the	 forms	 of	
finitude	 in	 which	 death	 is	 no	 doubt	 the	 most	 menacing,	 but	 also	 the	
fullest.	 Hölderlin’s	 Empedocles,	 reaching,	 by	 voluntary	 steps,	 the	 very	
edge	 of	 Etna,	 is	 the	 death	 of	 the	 last	 mediator	 between	mortals	 and	
Olympus,	the	end	of	the	infinite	on	earth,	the	flame	returning	to	its	native	
fire,	 leaving	 as	 its	 sole	 remaining	 trace	 that	which	 had	 precisely	 to	 be	
abolished	by	this	death:	the	beautiful,	enclosed	form	of	individuality;	after	
Empedocles,	 the	 world	 is	 placed	 under	 the	 sign	 of	 finitude,	 in	 that	
irreconcilable,	intermediate	state	in	which	reigns	the	Law,	the	harsh	law	
of	 the	 limit;	 the	destiny	of	 individuality	will	be	to	appear	always	 in	 the	
objectivity	that	manifests	and	conceals	it,	that	denies	it	and	yet	forms	its	
basis:	‘here,	too,	the	subjective	and	the	objective	exchange	faces’.	In	what	
at	first	sight	might	seem	a	very	strange	way,	the	movement	that	sustained	
lyricism	in	the	nineteenth	century	was	one	and	the	same	as	that	by	which	
man	obtained	positive	knowledge	of	himself;	but	it	is	surprising	that	the	
figures	 of	 knowledge	 and	 those	 of	 language	 should	 obey	 the	 same	
profound	law,	and	that	the	irruption	of	finitude	should	dominate,	in	the	
same	 way,	 this	 relation	 of	 man	 to	 death,	 which,	 in	 the	 first	 case,	
authorizes	a	 scientific	discourse	 in	 a	 rational	 form,	and,	 in	 the	 second,	
opens	up	the	source	of	a	language	that	unfold	endlessly	in	the	void	left	by	
the	absence	of	gods?	(Foucault:	2003a,	245)		
	
Foucault	uses	Hölderlin’s	The	Death	of	Empedocles	to	refer	to	a	specific	type	of	
relationship	 to	 finitude	 which	 was	 ultimately	 tragic:	 it	 is	 when	 Empedocles	
attempts	to	overcome	his	human	condition	and	prove	he	is	a	god	that	he	commits	
suicide.	His	death,	the	mark	of	a	negative	finitude,	shows	the	clash	between	the	
immanence	 of	 men	 who	 cannot	 overcome	 their	 mortal	 condition	 and	 the	
transcendence	of	gods	who	determine	it.	At	the	very	end	of	the	Birth	of	the	Clinic,	
Hölderlin’s	Death	of	Empedocles	 tells	us	that	the	type	of	 finitude	which	marks	
pre-Classsical	Greek	tragedy	opposes	the	life	of	men	to	the	infinity	of	the	divine.	
According	to	Foucault,	Hölderlin’s	text	marks	the	end	of	mode	of	thinking	which	
expressed	finitude	as	a	tragic	attempt	to	oppose	tukhe	(the	move	by	which	the	
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individual	attempts	to	overcome	his	mortal	fate)	and	the	beginning	of	a	mode	of	
thinking	 which	 sees	 in	 the	 forms	 taken	 by	 finitude	 the	 attempt	 to	 ascribe	 a	
positive	 form	 to	 the	 finite	 and	 allow	 its	 return	 as	 metaphysical	 and	
epistemological	origin.	It	is	when	individual	existence	ceases	that	the	objectivity	
of	 life	 appears	 as	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth	 which	 paradoxically	
legitimates	 types	 of	 existence	 to	 come.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	
normativity	constitutive	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	constitutes	the	a	posteriori	
fixation,	in	the	domain	of	knowledge,	of	existences	which	become	the	objects	of	
political	 strategies:	 the	 scientific	normality	 (hence	 the	 identification	of	normal	
and	abnormal	 conducts)	 constitutes	an	attempt	at	 imposing	a	positive	 (hence	
representable)	 understanding	 upon	 modes	 of	 existence	 escaping	 a	 priori	
prediction.		
	
Within	 this	 framework,	 the	 logic	 of	 norms	 corresponds	 to	 a	 mode	 of	
governmentality	 which	 deals	 with	 the	 negative	 and	 turns	 it	 into	 predictable	
positivity:	 it	 is	 a	matter	 of	making	 actual,	 in	 relation	 to	 truth	 and	 knowledge,	
immanent	conducts	which	acquire	a	“quasi-transcendental”	possibility	since	they	
are	the	basis	from	which	the	meaning	of	lives	(understood	as	individual	existence)	
is	 derived	 a	 posteriori.	 The	 intricate	 relationship	 between	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	(that	is	between	the	logic	of	disciplines	and	normalization	or	between	
anatomo-politics	and	biopolitics	of	the	population)	is	never	really	clear-cut	and	
Foucault	interweaves	the	two	concepts.	The	question	of	normalization	offers	a	
way	to	extend	the	problem	of	disciplinarity	thematised	in	Discipline	and	Punish:	
from	1976	onwards,	Foucault	 is	 interested	in	understanding	how,	as	he	puts	it	
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already	 in	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Birth	 of	 the	 Clinic,	 “the	 subjective	 and	 the	
objective	exchange	faces”	(Foucault:	2003a,	245).	Therefore,	the	concept	of	norm	
will	serve	as	a	way	of	naming	the	alienation	of	individual	lives	into	the	objectivity	
of	knowledge.	But	the	specificity	of	 this	objectivity	 is	 that	 it	 reciprocates	a	so-
called	immanent	and	natural	understanding	of	life	(which	goes	from	individuality	
to	more	general	biological	phenomena	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	population).	
Therefore,	both	the	singular	and	the	objective	find	their	common	rationality	in	
an	epistemological	concept	which	presents	the	peculiarity	of	always	depending	
upon	 an	 immanent	 manifestation	 which	 actualizes	 the	 discourse	 of	 truth	
attached	to	it.	This	is	the	reason	why	Legrand	sees	in	the	normalizing	power	of	
modern	society	that	which	absorbs	within	the	same	knowledge	very	different	life	
experiences	and	that	which	at	the	same	time	determines	and	validates	potential	
variations.	He	writes:	
[S]ociety	 […]	 is	 that	which	at	 the	 same	 time	 "makes	 comparable	 and	
isomorphic	 all	 the	 forms	 of	 deviation	 from	 the	 most	 heterogeneous	
norms	and	draws	the	virtual	paths,	from	institutions	to	institutions,	for	
the	possible	deviants.102	(Legrand:	2007,	144)	
	
Legrand's	 comparison	 between	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 deviations	 and	 their	
possible	integration	into	"virtual	paths"	is	a	mark	of	the	logic	of	alienation	which	
characterizes	the	anthropological	fold	which	puts	modern	man	in	the	position	of	
an	empirico-transcendental	doublet:	from	the	individual	to	population,	it	is	the	
sovereign	potentiality	 for	spontaneous	deviation	which	the	a	priori	position	of	
truth	and	knowledge	applied	to	life	always	already	covers.	This	is	the	reason	why	
                                                
102	“la	société	[…]	est	ce	qui	à	la	fois	rend	comparables	et	isomorphes	toutes	les	formes	d’écart	
par	rapport	aux	normes	 les	plus	hétérogènes	et	dessine	 les	parcours	virtuels,	d’institutions	en	
institutions,	pour	les	déviants	possibles.”	
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the	specificity	of	 the	concept	of	norm	 is	 to	perform	the	 junction	between	the	
singularity	of	disciplined	bodies	and	the	scheme	of	the	population.	As	Foucault	
puts	it	in	his	17th	March	1976	lecture:	
In	more	general	terms	still,	we	can	say	that	there	is	one	element	that	will	
circulate	between	the	disciplinary	and	the	regulatory,	which	will	also	be	
applied	 to	 body	 and	 population	 alike,	 which	 will	 make	 it	 possible	 to	
control	both	the	disciplinary	order	of	the	body	and	the	aleatory	events	
that	 occur	 in	 the	 biological	 multiplicity.	 The	 element	 that	 circulates	
between	the	two	is	the	norm.	The	norm	is	something	that	can	be	applied	
to	both	a	body	one	wishes	to	discipline	and	a	population	one	wishes	to	
regularize.	 The	 normalizing	 society	 is	 therefore	 not,	 under	 these	
conditions,	a	sort	of	generalized	disciplinary	society	whose	disciplinary	
institutions	 have	 swarmed	 and	 finally	 taken	 over	 everything	 –	 that,	 I	
think,	 is	 no	 more	 than	 a	 first	 and	 inadequate	 interpretation	 of	 a	
normalizing	 society.	 The	 normalizing	 society	 is	 a	 society	 in	which	 the	
norm	 of	 discipline	 and	 the	 norm	 of	 regulation	 intersect	 along	 an	
orthogonal	articulation.	To	say	that	power	took	possession	of	life	in	the	
nineteenth	 century,	 is	 to	 say	 that	 it	 has,	 thanks	 to	 the	 play	 of	
technologies	 of	 discipline	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 technologies	 of	
regulation	on	the	other,	succeeded	in	covering	the	whole	surface	that	
lies	 between	 the	 organic	 and	 the	 biological,	 between	 body	 and	
population.	(Foucault:	2003b,	252-253)	
	
The	“orthogonal	articulation”	through	which	"power	took	possession	of	life	in	the	
nineteenth	century”	shows	that	the	concept	of	norm	is	another	way	of	describing	
the	a	priori	position	of	the	concept	of	human	nature	at	the	basis	of	the	modern	
episteme.	 Because	 it	 precedes	 immanent	 acts	 which	 it	 determines	 as	 always	
latent,	this	concept	makes	possible	the	categorization	of	behaviours	yet	to	take	
place	whilst	seeing	in	their	actualization	the	confirmation	of	their	epistemological	
validity.	The	concept	of	population	refers	 to	an	ongoing	process	 rather	 than	a	
strictly	 achieved	 and	 finite	 reality.	 It	 is	 the	 reason	 why,	 as	 Foucault	 puts	 it,	
biopolitics	deals	with	"a	population	one	wishes	to	regularize".	The	concepts	of	
"regularization"	 and	 "normalization"	 refer	 to	 an	unfinished	process	whose	 so-
called	"natural"	manifestation	makes	it	possible	to	bring	it	back	into	the	positive	
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field	 of	 truth	 and	 knowledge.	 The	 orthogonal	 junction	 Foucault	 mentions	 in	
Society	 Must	 Be	 Defended	 deals	 with	 the	 verticality	 of	 metaphysical	
determination	(whereas	immanence	corresponds	to	its	ontological	truth)	and	the	
horizontality	proper	to	the	temporality	of	life	(whereby	the	variation	occurring	in	
time	is	always	already	ontologically	linked	to	a	natural	predetermination	which	
constitutes	its	meaning).		
	
Such	 a	 reading	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 not	 see	 a	 strong	 proximity	 between	 the	
emergence	 of	 a	 symbolic	 order	 of	 truth	 in	 Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 Sophocles'	
Oedipus	Rex	and	the	logic	of	normalization	which	always	already	permits	bringing	
back	strict	immanence	into	the	rationality	of	an	a	priori	logos.	Both	morphologies	
of	truth	operate	on	the	divorce	and	yet	reciprocal	dependence	of	the	seen	and	
the	 said.	 Whereas	 the	 final	 discovery	 of	 truth	 in	 the	 play	 links	 the	 truth	 of	
Oedipus'	identity	to	the	confession	of	the	messenger	who	links	his	testimony	to	
what	he	has	seen,	the	logic	of	normalization	overcomes	the	strict	framework	of	
actuality.	With	biopolitics,	what	matters	 is	not	so	much	the	 truth-value	of	 the	
event	 as	 such	 but	 rather	 all	 the	 potentialities	 the	 manifestation	 of	 a	 nature	
signifies	 and	heralds.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 in	Security,	 Territory,	 Population,	
Foucault	defines	the	logic	of	modern	governmentality	as	one	which	breaks	away	
from	the	one	of	law	and	disciplinarity.	Foucault	writes:	
We	could	even	say	that	the	 law	works	 in	the	 imaginary,	since	the	 law	
imagines	and	can	only	formulate	all	the	things	that	could	and	must	not	
be	done	by	imagining	them.	It	imagines	the	negative.	Discipline	works	in	
a	sphere	that	 is,	as	 it	were,	complementary	to	reality.	Man	 is	wicked,	
bad,	 and	 has	 evil	 thoughts	 and	 inclinations,	 etcetera.	 So,	 within	 the	
disciplinary	 space	 a	 complementary	 sphere	 of	 prescriptions	 and	
obligations	is	constituted	that	is	all	the	more	artificial	and	constraining	
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as	 the	nature	of	 reality	 is	 tenacious	and	difficult	 to	overcome.	 Finally	
security,	unlike	the	law	that	works	in	the	imaginary	and	discipline	that	
works	in	a	sphere	complementary	to	reality,	tries	to	work	within	reality,	
by	getting	the	components	of	reality	to	work	in	relation	to	each	other,	
thanks	to	and	through	a	series	of	analyses	and	specific	arrangements.	
So,	 I	 think	we	arrive	at	 this	 idea	 that	 is	essential	 for	 the	 thought	and	
organization	of	modern	political	societies:	that	the	task	of	politics	is	not	
to	 see	 to	 the	 establishment	within	men's	 behavior	 of	 the	 set	 of	 laws	
imposed	 by	God	 or	 necessitated	 by	men's	 evil	 nature.	 Politics	 has	 to	
work	 in	the	element	of	a	reality	 that	the	physiocrats	called,	precisely,	
physics,	when	they	said	that	economics	is	a	physics.	When	they	say	this,	
they	 are	 not	 aiming	 so	 much	 at	 materiality	 in	 the,	 if	 you	 like,	 post-
Hegelian	 sense	 of	 the	 word	 "matter",	 but	 are	 actually	 aiming	 at	 the	
reality	that	is	the	only	datum	on	which	politics	must	act	and	with	which	
it	must	act.	Only	ever	situating	oneself	 in	this	 interplay	of	reality	with	
itself	 is,	 I	 think,	what	the	physiocrats,	the	economists,	and	eighteenth	
century	political	thought	understood	when	it	said	that	we	remain	in	the	
domain	of	physics,	and	that	to	act	in	the	political	domain	is	still	to	act	in	
the	domain	of	nature.	(Foucault:	2009c,	69-70)	
	
It	is	not	the	fact	that	immanence	needs	to	be	completed	by	the	knowledge	of	the	
virtual	that	matters	in	the	way	in	which	the	liberalism	of	the	physiocrats	thinks	
modern	political	theory.	The	said	(the	knowledge	of	human	nature)	is	not	a	mere	
virtuality	that	the	seen	(the	actuality	of	a	fact)	would	finally	come	to	confirm	and	
validate.	Rather,	the	interplay	between	the	said	and	the	seen	(or	between	the	
expressible	and	the	visible)	constitutes	a	reality	whose	intrinsic	compound	nature	
(i.e.	 the	 heterogeneity	 between	 the	 said	 and	 the	 seen,	 words	 and	 things	 or	
knowledge	 and	 power)	 is	 concealed.	 The	 example	 of	 the	 physiocrats	 clearly	
reveals	that	the	structure	of	the	anthropological	fold	(and	already	the	structure	
of	knowledge	and	truth	which	emerges	with	Classical	Greece)	makes	it	impossible	
to	grasp	 the	 fundamental	heterogeneity	between	words	and	 things.	But	what	
bio-power	adds	to	the	obliteration	of	this	heterogeneity	is	the	fact	that,	with	the	
nineteenth	 century,	man	becomes	 an	object	 of	 knowledge	 amongst	 others:	 if	
man	becomes	a	knowable	things	amongst	all	other	knowable	things	in	the	world,	
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his	life	also	becomes	a	mere	object	of	knowledge	whose	immanent	manifestation	
carries	at	the	same	time	the	manifestation	of	its	positivity	and	truth.103	Therefore,	
if	it	is	true	that	the	logic	of	security	comes	after	the	description	of	disciplinarity	
in	the	course	of	Foucault’s	work	and	that	the	former	seems	to	excavate	the	gap	
between	actuality	and	potentiality,	it	is	not	so	much	the	predictability	of	life	as	
natural	phenomenon	which	characterizes	the	logic	of	modern	governmentality	
but	 rather	 the	 simultaneous	 reconstitution	 and	 alienation	 of	 the	 question	 of	
sovereignty:	 the	 coincidence	 of	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 (i.e.	 the	
coincidence	 between	 sovereign	 power	 and	 sovereign	 knowledge),	 which	
characterized	the	performative	power	of	the	sovereign	finds	a	counterpart	in	the	
modern	 concept	 of	 nature	whose	 “interplay	with	 itself”	makes	 the	 knowable	
always	 already	 achieved	 and	 the	 achieved	 always	 already	 knowable:	 the	
coincidence	between	human	nature	and	its	simultaneous	intelligibility	prevents	
an	ethical	reflection	or	political	critique	aiming	at	problematizing	life	as	a	praxis	
questioning	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 self	 and	 others	 or	 the	 self	 and	 the	
world.	
	
                                                
103	Contrary	to	Daniel	Zamora’s	argument	in	his	recent	Foucault,	 les	exclus	et	 le	dépérissement	
neoliberal	 de	 l’Etat,	 I	 do	 not	 claim	 that	 Foucault	 saw	 in	 neoliberal	 politics	 the	 overcoming	 of	
normativity	and	a	possible	emancipation	of	the	subject.	According	to	Zamora,	“homo	economicus	
is	an	agent	whose	rational	calculations	are	the	only	object	of	interest,	his	choices	are	not	judged	
from	 a	moral	 standpoint	 but	merely	 understood	 through	 the	 scope	 of	 its	 interest.”	 [“L’homo	
economicus	est	un	agent	dont	seuls	les	calculs	rationnels	intéressent,	ses	choix	ne	sont	donc	as	
jugés	d’un	point	 de	 vue	moral	mais	 simplement	 compris	 au	 travers	 de	 son	 intérêt.”]	 (Zamora:	
2014,	 110).	 This	 claim	 is	 a	 complete	 misreading	 of	 the	 Foucauldian	 thesis	 on	 neoliberalism.	
Indeed,	normativity	does	not	operate	as	the	application	of	transcendent	moral	categories	upon	
the	concrete	lives	of	individuals.	It	is	rather	from	the	concrete	lives	of	individuals	that	behaviours	
and	so-called	“moral”	tendencies	are	interpreted	as	an	immediate	manifestation	of	nature.		
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In	this	respect,	it	is	no	surprise	that	the	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	the	1978-1979	lecture	
course	at	the	Collège	de	France,	seems	to	focus	on	the	question	of	liberalism	and	
neo-liberalism	rather	than	on	the	question	of	biopolitics	itself.	As	Foucault	begins	
to	demonstrate	in	Security,	Territory,	Population,	the	question	of	liberalism	and	
the	 politics	 of	 laisser-faire	 is	 actually	 at	 the	 very	 centre	 of	 the	 biopolitical	
question:	what	this	political	framework	obliterates	is	the	fact	that	facticity	itself	
is	a	historical	construct	and	that	the	laisser-faire	as	manifestation	of	a	truth	which	
is	 both	 immanent	 and	 transcendental	 or	 “quasi-transcendental”	 (both	 an	
immediate	manifestation	and	a	condition	of	possibility)	can	only	emerge	once	the	
transcendence	of	truth	(in	the	position	of	the	sovereign	God	or	King)	has	been	
brought	back	to	the	spontaneous	meaning	of	 immanence.	Therefore,	 I	believe	
that	 the	political	 task	which	corresponds	 to	biopolitical	modernity	 is,	 as	Revel	
puts	 it	 in	 Foucault	 avec	 Merleau-Ponty:	 Ontologie,	 Politique,	 Présentime	 et	
Histoire,	not	to	forget	that:	
[…]	meaning	[…]	is	diacritical	–	that	is	to	say	[…]	that	meaning	does	not	
spring	 from	 simple	 elements,	 but	 always	 from	 the	 background	 of	
complex	 establishments	 of	 relationships	 between	 heterogeneous	
elements	 –,	 […]	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 meaning	 production,	 one	 finds	 a	
fundamental	 “negativity”,	 that	 consequently	 does	 not	 mean	 that	
language	is	affected	by	a	lack	of	being	or	by	a	finitude	that	would	limit	
its	power	[puissance].	On	the	contrary,	this	negativity	takes	the	form	of	
an	oxymoron:	since	 it	allows	emergence,	 it	 is	 in	some	way	and	rather	
surprisingly	a	positive	negativity	which	produces	something	where	there	
was	nothing	–	since	before	composing,	through	their	arbitrary	gathering	
[assemblage],	 the	double	“difference”	which	grounds	 the	sign	and,	 in	
between	the	gap	between	signs,	meaning	all	at	the	same	time,	none	of	
terms	put	together	had	an	intrinsic	value.104	(Revel:	2015,	166)	
                                                
104	“[…]	[le]	sens	[…]	est	diacritique	–	c’est-à-dire	[...]	que	le	sens	surgit	non	pas	à	partir	d’éléments	
simples,	mais	toujours	sur	fond	de	mise	en	rapport	complexe	d’éléments	hétérogènes	–,	[…]	à	la	
base	de	la	production	de	sens,	on	peut	trouver	une	‘négativité’	fondamentale,	cela	ne	signifie	pas	
par	conséquence	que	le	langage	soit	marqué	par	un	manque	d’être	ou	par	une	finitude	qui	en	
limiterait	 la	 puissance.	 Bien	 au	 contraire,	 cette	 négativité	 présente	 la	 forme	 d’un	 oxymore:	
puisqu’elle	 permet	 le	 surgissement,	 c’est	 en	 quelque	 sorte,	 et	 de	 manière	 étonnante,	 une	
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The	 “diacritical”	 dimension	 of	 meaning,	 applied	 by	 Revel	 to	 the	 relationship	
between	 signifiers	 and	 signified,	 is	 in	 Foucault	 not	merely	 an	 epistemological	
concern.	It	constitutes,	in	my	view,	the	fundamental	heterogeneity	between	the	
self	and	the	world	which	must	remain	at	the	basis	of	life	defined	by	Foucault	as	a	
relationship	between	the	self	and	the	world	–	a	relationship	which	constitutes	the	
condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 what	 he	 calls	 techne	 tou	 biou	 in	 1983	 (Dreyfus	 &	
Rabinow:	1983,	234-235)	or	parrhesia	in	his	last	two	lecture	courses	at	the	Collège	
de	France	between	1982	and	1984	(The	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	I	and	
The	Courage	of	Truth:	the	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	II).		
	
The	fundamental	heterogeneity	between	one’s	life	as	a	conduct	and	its	meaning	
is	the	necessary	relationship	towards	the	self,	others	and	the	world	which	allows	
a	 position	 of	 both	 sovereign	 exteriority	 and	 immanence	 towards	 one’s	 life	 as	
conduct	and	which	provides	the	possibility	of	a	life’s	ethics.	Once	again,	it	is	no	
surprise	to	find	that	the	last	two	volumes	of	the	History	of	Sexuality,	which	came	
after	Foucault’s	introduction	of	the	concepts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	in	the	
books	published	during	his	life	(excluding	the	publication	of	Foucault’s	lectures	at	
the	Collège	de	France)	problematize	life	as	a	praxis	making	possible	a	“care	of	the	
self”	and	a	“use	of	pleasures”:	both	problematizations	require	the	position	of	a	
self	able	to	reflect	upon	the	direction	of	one’s	actions	as	immanent	and	practical	
ethical	 work.	 In	 this	 respect,	 I	 agree	 with	 Macherey	 who	 identifies	 a	 direct	
                                                
négativité	positive,	qui	produit	quelque	chose	là	où	il	n’y	avait	rien	–	puisque	avant	de	composer	
par	leur	assemblage	arbitraire	la	double	‘différence’	qui	fonde	tout	à	la	fois	le	signe,	et	dans	l’écart	
entre	les	signes,	le	sens,	aucun	des	termes	mis	en	rapport	n’avait	de	valeur	intrinsèque.”	
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relationship	between	the	decomposition	of	clinical	experience	which	reveals	the	
historical	contingency	of	the	structure	which	makes	it	possible	and	the	necessity	
of	 an	 “art	 of	 living”	 [art	 de	 vivre]	 (Macherey:	 2009,	 106)	 which	 allows	 the	
deontologization	 of	 the	 correspondence	 between	 one’s	 acts	 and	 the	
manifestation	of	one’s	own	nature.	Macherey	writes:	
And	 one	 could	 see	 here	 the	 sketch	 of	 what,	 in	 his	 last	 writings,	 M.	
Foucault	will	call	an	“aesthetics	of	existence”,	in	order	to	explain	how	one	
can	defy	the	norms	by	playing	with	them,	that	is	to	say	by	involving	and	
opening	up	the	leeway	their	mismatch	[jeu]	makes	possible.	This	art	of	
living	supposes,	from	the	one	who	practices	it,	that	he	knows	himself	as	
mortal	and	that	he	learns	to	die.105	(Macherey:	2009,	107)	
	
In	this	text,	Macherey	draws	an	interesting	link	between	the	meaning	that	death	
acquires	 with	 modern	 clinical	 experience	 and	 the	 meaning	 of	 “aesthetics	 of	
existence”	which	Foucault	develops	in	the	last	volumes	of	the	History	of	Sexuality:	
“learning	to	die”	corresponds	to	an	ethical	attitude	which	puts	oneself	in	a	critical	
position	 towards	 one’s	 own	 life	 (or	 towards	 one’s	 own	 conduct).	 If	 clinical	
experience	finds	in	the	positivity	of	death	the	rules	that	cast	meaning	upon	the	
life	of	man	taken	as	object	of	knowledge,	taking	the	risk	to	die	means	taking	the	
risk	 to	 question	 the	 rules	 which	 govern	 one’s	 life.	 Such	 a	 perpetual	 ethical	
questioning,	which	 Foucault	will	 emphasize	 very	 strongly	when	he	 studies	 the	
case	 of	 Cynical	 parrhesia	 in	 his	 last	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France),	
appears	as	the	necessary	condition	of	ethical	sovereignty.106		
                                                
105	“Et	on	pourrait	voir	 ici	 l’esquisse	de	ce	que,	dans	ses	derniers	écrits,	M.	Foucault	appellera	
“esthétique	de	 l’existence”,	 en	 vue	de	 faire	 comprendre	 comment	on	 se	 joue	des	normes	en	
jouant	avec	elles,	c’est-à-dire	en	les	faisant	fonctionner,	et	en	ouvrant	du	même	coup	la	marge	
d’initiative	que	libère	leur	“jeu”.	Cet	art	de	vivre	suppose,	de	la	part	de	celui	qui	l’exerce,	qu’il	se	
sache	mortel	et	qu’il	apprenne	à	mourir	[…].”	
106 	As	 Gros	 explains	 in	 his	 essay	 “La	 parrhêsia	 chez	 Foucault”:	 “[t]he	 Cynics	 structure	 their	
existence	according	to	the	natural	law,	in	the	sense	that	the	life	of	animals	provides	them	with	a	
model.	Finally,	the	Cynical	life	is	a	still	and	sovereign	life:	their	empire	is	absolute”	[“les	cyniques	
structurent	leur	existence	selon	la	loi	naturelle,	au	sens	où	la	vie	des	bêtes	leur	sert	de	modèle.	
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Paradoxically,	 it	 is	 the	 perpetual	 questioning	 of	 one’s	 identity	 which	 holds	
together	both	the	possibility	of	the	coincidence	between	one’s	actions	and	rules	
(between	one’s	power	and	one’s	“knowledge”)	and	a	critical	deontologization	of	
such	a	coincidence:	if	the	relationship	of	the	self	to	itself	is	both	maintained	and	
questioned,	it	is	the	possibility	of	life	as	style	and	aesthetics	rather	than	as	natural	
manifestation	 which	 is	 preserved.	 Potte-Bonneville	 reminds	 us,	 in	 his	 essay	
“Disparaître”,	that	aisthesis	means	“sensation”	in	Greek	(Potte-Bonneville:	2012,	
154),	 which	 guarantees	 a	 perpetual	 dialogue	 within	 immanence	 itself	 as	 a	
possibility	of	ongoing	formation.	As	Potte-Bonneville	puts	it,	it	allows:	
[a]	[s]ensation	which	can	additionally	be	directly	political	[…].	To	put	it	
differently,	if	one	must	work	at	becoming	imperceptible,	it	is	because	the	
imperceptibility	 of	 movement	 is	 the	 condition	 of	 a	 perception	
authentically	restored.107	(Potte-Bonneville:	2012,	154-155)	
	
Potte-Bonneville	 stresses	 here	 the	 link	 between	 Foucault’s	 epistemological,	
political	and	ethical	concerns:	“becoming	imperceptible”,	hence	seeing	that	life	
understood	as	ethical	formation	escapes	ontological	exegesis,	is	what	restores	the	
possibility	of	living	as	both	an	ethical	and	political	project:	this	project	puts	the	
necessity	of	questioning	practices	 in	order	to	stress	the	possibility	of	deviation	
which	preserves	life	as	work	of	critique	and	valuation	towards	the	self	and	the	
world.	 If	 this	 allows	 “a	 perception	 authentically	 restored”,	 it	 is	 because	 the	
possibility	 of	 revaluing	 ethical	 and	 political	 conducts	 of	 the	 self	 and	 others	
                                                
Enfin,	 la	vie	cynique	est	une	vie	 immobile	et	souveraine:	 leur	empire	est	absolu.”]	 (Gros:	2002,	
165).	
107	“Sensation	qui	peut	d’ailleurs	être	directement	politique	[…]	Autrement	dit	encore,	s’il	 faut	
travailler	 à	 devenir	 imperceptible,	 c’est	 que	 l’imperceptibilité	 du	mouvement	 est	 la	 condition	
d’une	perception	redevenue	véritablement	telle.”	
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ultimately	 deontologize	 power	 relationships	 and	 shows	 that	 power	 and	
knowledge,	 if	 always	 reciprocally	 dependent,	 also	 maintain	 a	 fundamental	
heterogeneity:	 as	 Foucault	 shows	 in	 his	 first	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	
France,	knowledge	constitutes	a	historical	relationship	between	the	self	and	the	
world	which	conceals	the	immediacy	of	power	relationships.	
	
	
4.	Foucault’s	problematization	of	bios	as	an	aesthetics	of	existence	 	
	
It	 is	 in	 Subjectivité	 et	 Vérité,	 the	 1980-1981	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	
France,	that	the	definition	of	the	concept	of	 life	as	a	relationship	between	the	
self,	others	and	the	world	is	identified.	In	the	14th	January	1981	lecture,	Foucault	
specifically	 links	 the	 Greek	 bios	 to	 three	 Greek	 concepts	 which	 define	 the	
economy	of	the	arts	of	living	in	Classical	Greece:	mathesis,	askêsis	and	meletè.	
These	 three	 concepts	 problematize	 in	 turn	 the	 specific	 relationship	 the	 self	
establishes	towards	itself,	the	world	and	others.	Foucault	writes:	
Relationship	to	others,	teaching:	this	is	what	was	called	mathêsis	in	the	
Greek	vocabulary	of	the	arts	of	living.	Relationship	to	truth,	that	is	to	say,	
permanent	reflection	and	repetition	of	what	has	been	taught	and	what	
must	 be	 considered	 as	 true,	 it	 is	 what	 the	 Greeks	 called	 meletè	
(meditation,	reflection	upon).	And	finally,	this	work	of	trial,	of	successive	
and	 progressive	 attempts	 to	 see	where	 one	 stands	 and	whether	 one	
progresses	well,	it	is	this	very	dimension	that	the	Greeks	called	askêsis	
(asceticism).	Mathêsis,	meletè,	askêsis,	 these	are	 three	elements	 that	
you	will	find	[in	the	arts	of	living].	[…]	In	fact	the	Greeks	[…]	have	a	word	
that	designates	very	precisely	that	with	which	these	arts	of	conducting	
oneself	must	 be	 concerned.	 It	 is	 the	word	bios.	 You	 know	 that,	 for	 a	
Greek,	 there	are	 two	verbs	–	 that	we	 translate	by	one	and	 the	 same	
word:	 “to	 live”.	 You	 have	 the	 verb	 zên,	 which	 means:	 to	 have	 the	
property	of	living,	the	quality	of	being	alive.	Animals	indeed	live	in	this	
sense	of	zen.	And	you	have	the	word	bioûn,	which	means:	to	spend	one’s	
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life	and	which	refers	to	the	way	one	lives	this	life,	the	way	one	conducts	
it,	leads	it,	the	way	it	can	be	called	happy	or	unhappy.	Bios	is	something	
that	can	be	good	or	bad,	whereas	the	life	that	one	leads	because	one	is	
a	living	being	is	only	given	to	you	by	nature.	Bios	is	the	life	that	can	be	
qualified,	life	with	its	accidents,	it	necessities,	but	it	is	also	the	life	that	
one	can	shape	by	oneself,	decide	upon	it	by	oneself.108	(Foucault:	2014a,	
35-36)	
	
We	see	here	that	life	defined	as	bios	corresponds	to	a	series	of	practices	which	
partake	in	defining	a	relationship	towards	the	self,	others	and	the	world:	the	life	
so	designated	can	be	shaped	and	decided	upon:	it	is	"qualified".	The	Foucauldian	
definition	of	bios	corresponds	therefore	to	the	conceptual	distinction	which	was,	
according	to	Agamben,	missing	from	his	work	and	which	the	former	called	eu	zen:	
the	fact	that	the	individual	may	live	a	“qualified”	life,	either	good	or	bad.	Unlike	
zoe,	which	describes,	as	Foucault	puts	it,	the	life	"only	given	to	you	by	nature",	
bios	designates	the	life	over	which	one	can	exert	an	ethical	mastery.	This	mastery	
finds	itself	inscribed	within	a	practice	towards	the	world	that	entails	a	reflection	
on	the	attitude	one	has	towards	oneself	and	others.	Mathêsis	and	Meletè	(the	
relationship	 towards	 others	 proper	 to	 teaching	 and	 the	 relationship	 towards	
oneself	founded	on	a	practice	of	reflection	upon	one’s	own	attitude)	both	imply	
                                                
108	“Rapport	aux	autres,	enseignement:	c’est	ce	que,	dans	le	vocabulaire	grec	des	arts	de	vivre,	
on	 appelait	 la	mathêsis.	 Rapport	 à	 la	 vérité,	 c’est-à-dire:	 réflexion	 permanente	 et	 sans	 cesse	
reprise	de	ce	qu’on	a	eisengné	et	de	ce	que	l’on	doit	considérer	comme	vrai,	c’est	ce	que	les	Grecs	
appelaient	 la	meletê	 (la	 méditation,	 la	 réflexion	 sur).	 Et	 enfin	 ce	 travail	 d’épreuve,	 d’essais	
successifs,	progressifs,	pour	voir	où	on	en	est	et	si	on	progresse	bien,	c’est	cette	dimension-là	que	
les	Grecs	appelaient	l’askesis	(l’ascèse).	Mathêsis,	meletê,	askesis,	ce	sont	trois	éléments	que	vous	
allez	 trouver	 [dans	 les	 arts	 de	 vivre].	 […]	 En	 fait	 les	 Grecs	 […]	 ont	 un	 mot	 qui	 désigne	 très	
spécifiquement	ce	sur	quoi	doivent	porter	ces	arts	de	se	conduire.	C’est	le	mot	bios.	Vous	savez	
que,	pour	un	Grec,	il	ya	deux	verbes	-	que	nous	traduisons	par	un	seul	et	meme	mot:	“vivre”.	Vous	
avez	le	verbe	zên,	qui	veut	dire	:	avoir	la	propriété	de	vivre,	la	qualité	d’être	vivant.	Les	animaux	
effectivement	vivent,	en	ce	sens	de	zên.	Puis	vous	avez	le	mot	bioûn,	qui	veut	dire:	passer	sa	vie,	
et	qui	se	rapporte	à	la	manière	de	vivre	cette	vie,	la	manière	de	la	mener,	de	la	conduire,	la	façon	
dont	elle	peut	être	qualifiée	d’heureuse	ou	de	malheureuse.	Le	bios,	c’est	quelque	chose	qui	peut	
être	bon	ou	mauvais,	alors	que	la	vie	que	l’on	mène	parce	que	l’on	est	un	être	vivant,	vous	est	
donnée	simplement	par	la	nature.	Le	bios,	c’est	la	vie	qualifiable,	la	vie	avec	ses	accidents,	avec	
ses	nécessités,	mais	c’est	aussi	la	vie	telle	qu’on	peut	la	faire	soi-même,	la	décider	soi-même.”	
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an	existence	which	does	not	rely	upon	the	positivity	and	validity	of	an	objective	
form	 of	 knowledge	 or	 natural	 truth	 but	 upon	 a	 practice	 which	 implies	 a	
relationship	towards	alterity	–	either	the	alterity	of	the	ethical	self	upon	which	
one	reflects,	or	the	alterity	of	other	individuals.	This	practice	towards	oneself	and	
others	 is	 completed	 by	 the	 third	 dimension	 of	 the	 arts	 of	 existence	 (askêsis),	
which	requires	a	retrospective	evaluation	of	one's	progress.	The	concept	of	bios	
Foucault	 considers	 when	 he	 studies	 the	 arts	 of	 living	 in	 Ancient	 Greece	
corresponds	to	the	ethical	and	political	life	one	leads	in	a	relationship	to	oneself	
and	to	others	and	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	animal	life	designated	by	the	verb	
zên.	Bios	refers	to	a	relationship	to	oneself	and	others	which	finds	itself	inscribed	
within	a	practice	which	leads	to	its	own	transformation	and	shapes	the	way	in	
which	the	world	appears	to	one:	it	corresponds	to	an	art	of	governing	oneself.		
	
The	ambiguous	modern	meaning	of	the	prefix	“bio”	is	stressed	by	Foucault	during	
the	 same	 lecture,	as	he	attempts	 to	 insist	on	 the	proximity	between	bios	 and	
these	arts	of	living	which	make	life	the	occasion	of	a	practice	of	self-fashioning.	
This	practice	of	self-fashioning	is	what	he	calls,	in	a	1983	interview	with	Dreyfus	
&	Rabinow,	a	“techne	tou	biou”	(Dreyfus	&	Rabinow:	1983,	234-235).	He	insists	
on	 the	 fact	 that	 “biotechnics”	could	 translate	 these	arts	of	 living	 (tekhnai	peri	
bion),	 except	 that	 the	 term	 “biotechnics”	 itself	 connotes	 the	 techniques	 of	
modern	 biology	 and	 its	 scientific	 understanding	 of	 life	 as	 object	 of	
epistemological	 positivism.	 Rather,	 he	 suggests	 the	 term	 “biopoetics”	 which	
borrows	 from	 the	Greek	poiesis	 the	meaning	of	 a	 craft	 concerning	 the	 critical	
relationship	of	oneself	towards	the	way	one	conducts	one’s	life.	Foucault	writes:	
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One	could	of	course	say	that	these	arts	of	living	(tekhnai	peri	bion)	are	
precisely	 biotechnics.	 But	 of	 course,	 the	 word	 couldn’t	 really	 be	
employed,	 for	 the	 meaning	 given	 to	 it	 nowadays	 leads	 us	 towards	
something	 completely	different.	 So	much	 so	 that	 instead	of	 the	 term	
biotechnics,	I	would	rather	use,	in	order	to	designate	what	is	in	question	
in	 these	 arts	 of	 living,	 the	 expression:	 technique	 of	 the	 self	 –	 or	
technology	 of	 the	 self,	 as	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 all	 those	 practices	 are	
procedures	 that	 are	 reflected	 upon,	 elaborated,	 systematized	 and	
taught	 to	 individuals	 so	 that	 they	 can,	 through	 the	 administration	 of	
their	own	lives,	through	the	control	and	transformation	of	the	self	by	the	
self,	attain	a	certain	mode	of	being109.	(Foucault:	2014a,	37)	
	
A	footnote	on	the	same	page	tells	us	that	the	manuscript	of	the	course	contains	
the	following	specifications:	
“Biopoetics”	would	be	justified	as	it	is	indeed	about	a	sort	of	personal	
fabrication	of	one’s	own	life	[…]	One	could	pursue	the	problem	of	sexual	
conduct	in	this	way:	biopoetics	where	it	 is	a	matter	of	the	aesthetico-
moral	conduct	of	individual	existence;	biopolitics	where	it	is	a	matter	of	
the	normalization	of	 sexual	 conducts	according	 to	what	 is	 considered	
politically	to	be	the	needs	of	a	population.110	(Foucault:	2014a,	37)		
	
In	order	to	avoid	misunderstanding,	Foucault	chooses	to	abandon	the	term	“life”	
but	 keep	 the	 concept	 of	 technique	 that	 one	 applies	 to	 one’s	 existence.	 The	
specification	he	adds	in	Subjectivité	et	Vérité	tells	us	more	about	what	has	often	
been	identified	in	the	secondary	literature	on	Foucault’s	final	published	work,	as	
a	“return	to	the	self”.111		
                                                
109	“On	pourrait	bien	sûr	dire	que	ces	arts	de	vivre	(teknai	peri	bion)	sont	très	exactement	des	
biotechniques.	Mais	évidemment	le	mot	ne	pourrait	guère	être	employé,	car	le	sens	qu’on	lui	a	
donné	maintenant	nous	déplace	vers	tout	autre	chose.	De	telle	sorte	que	j’aimerais	mieux,	pour	
désigner	 ce	 qui	 est	 en	 question	 dans	 ces	 arts	 de	 vivre,	 plutôt	 que	 le	 terme	 de	 biotechnique	
employer	l’expression:	technique	de	soi	-	ou	technologie	du	soi	puisqu’il	s’agit,	dans	toutes	ces	
pratiques,	de	procédures	 réfléchies,	élaborées,	 systématisées	qu’on	enseigne	aux	 individus	de	
manière	[à	ce]	qu’ils	puissent,	par	la	gestion	de	leur	propre	vie,	le	contrôle	et	la	transformation	
de	soi	par	soi,	atteindre	à	un	certain	mode	d’être.”	
110	“‘Biopoétique	se	justifierait	parce	qu’il	s’agit	bien	d’une	sorte	de	fabrication	personnelle	de	sa	
propre	vie	[…].	On	pourrait	suivre	le	problème	de	la	conduite	sexuelle	:	la	biopoétique	où	il	s’agit	
de	 la	 conduite	 esthético-morale	 de	 l’existence	 individuelle;	 la	 biopolitique	 où	 il	 s’agit	 de	 la	
normalisation	des	conduites	sexuelles	en	fonction	de	ce	qui	est	considéré	politiquement	comme	
exigence	d’une	population.” 
111	As	Paul	Veyne	puts	it	in	Foucault:	his	Thought,	his	Character,	Foucault’s	works	from	the	last	
period	of	his	life	had	been	first	understood	as	a	moralizing	approach	to	subjective	existence.	He	
writes:	“[t]his	theory	of	the	self	working	on	the	self	delighted	many	people,	who	thought	that	
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If	Foucault’s	last	work	on	Classical	Greek	ethics	constitutes	a	“return	to	the	self”,	
it	is	precisely	to	avoid	the	misunderstanding	entailed	by	the	common	use	of	the	
word	“life”.	The	“technics	of	the	self”	insist	on	the	possibility	of	an	ethical	praxis	
that	takes	self-conduct	as	an	object	of	poiesis	and	this	is	where	the	question	of	
government	of	 the	 self	 appears:	 this	 conduct	 is	never	 reduced	 to	a	 finite	 and	
positive	object	but	implies	a	necessary	position	of	critical	exteriority	which	makes	
possible	the	problematization	of	the	relationship	of	the	self	to	 itself,	to	others	
and	 to	 the	 world. 112 	The	 maintenance	 of	 such	 a	 relationship	 avoids	 the	
ontological	reductionism	of	the	self	to	a	subject	who	manifests	the	truth	of	his	
nature.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 expression	 “aesthetics	 of	 the	 self”	
should	be	understood	as	a	designation	of	the	conditions	according	to	which	our	
life	(i.e.	the	relationship	between	the	self	and	the	world)	appears	to	the	self.	By	
challenging	 the	 metaphysical	 understanding	 of	 the	 subject	 sought	 by	 human	
sciences,	 Foucault	 attempts	 to	 disrupt	 both	 the	 intrinsic	 relationship	 it	
establishes	between	the	essence	of	life	(the	truth	of	human	nature)	and	the	form	
it	concretely	takes:	if	the	conduct	of	men	does	not	reveal	the	expression	of	an	
intrinsic	nature	but	 rather	 the	strict	manifestation	of	power	 relationships	 that	
change	 historically,	 life	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 the	 manifestation	 of	 a	 nature	
                                                
Foucault	was	providing	us	with	a	morality	for	our	epoch.	Of	course,	as	soon	as	it	is	a	matter	of	
morality,	many	people	do	 sit	 up	and	 take	notice.	But	was	 that	 really	what	 Foucault	 originally	
meant?	Was	he	playing	 the	guru?”	 (Veyne:	2010,	105).	As	 I	 explain	 in	 this	 section,	 Foucault’s	
reflection	upon	the	possibility	of	an	aesthetics	of	existence	has	nothing	to	do	with	an	attempt	to	
moralize	the	life	of	the	subject.	Rather,	it	concerns	the	self’s	ability	to	problematize	its	existence	
as	a	perpetual	formation	far	from	any	transcendent	or	moralizing	principle.	
112	As	Jorge	Dávila	claims	in	his	essay	“Ethique	de	la	Parole	et	Jeu	de	la	Vérité”:	“[t]he	practice	of	
truth,	truth-telling,	as	attitude,	as	philosophical	êthos	which	is	at	the	same	time	the	game	and	the	
concern	 of	 truth,	 is	 the	 ethical	 foundation	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 freedom	 as	 an	 historico-critical	
experience	 of	 bios.”	 [“La	 pratique	 de	 la	 vérité,	 le	 dire	 vrai,	 comme	 attitude,	 comme	 êthos	
philosophique	qui	est	en	même	temps	 jeu	et	enjeu	de	 la	vérité,	est	 le	 fondement	éthique	de	 la	
pratique	de	la	liberté	comme	expérience	historico-critique	du	bios”]	(Dávila:	2003,	206).	
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(either	of	the	world	or	of	subjects	within	this	world)	but	as	what	constitutes	the	
conditions	according	to	which	both	the	subject	and	the	world	determine	each	
other	reciprocally.	
	
This	is	the	reason	why,	if	we	consider	the	whole	of	Foucault’s	work,	the	concept	
of	sovereignty,	which	corresponds	to	the	strict	coincidence	between	power	and	
knowledge	(i.e.	to	the	immanence	of	things	and	their	possible	representation),	
should	not	only	be	understood	in	political	terms	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age	
and	the	emergence	of	bio-power.	It	is	already	challenged	with	the	mutation	of	
the	morphology	of	truth	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	and	this	challenge	is	at	once	
epistemological,	political	and	ethical.	Not	only	is	it	the	case	that	divine	sovereign	
power	 is	 replaced	by	 the	 rationalized	 knowledge	and	 truth	of	nature,	but	 the	
ethical	practice	through	which	the	self	questions	its	relationship	towards	the	self	
and	others113	also	gets	reduced	to	the	philosophical	search	for	the	truth	of	things.	
At	the	root	of	this	search	for	truth,	Foucault	identifies	the	historical	emergence	
of	 knowledge	 as	 a	 technique	 (which	 he	 describes	 in	 his	 various	 reading	 of	
Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex)	but	also	the	emergence,	with	Aristotle,	of	the	practice	
of	knowledge	as	men's	natural	disposition.	This	natural	disposition,	defined	by	
Foucault	during	the	16th	December	1970	lecture	from	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	
Know	(Foucault:	2013:	22-30),	places	the	knowing	subject	in	a	metaphysical	and	
ontological	 relationship	 towards	 the	 truth	of	 the	world:	 the	 knowledge	which	
                                                
113	This	relationship	corresponds,	as	Foucault	puts	it	during	the	1981	interview	with	André	Berten,	
to	the	political	question	of	government	(Foucault:	2014b,	240).	
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leads	 to	 truth	becomes	the	only	valid	mode	of	apprehending	 the	world	which	
constitutes	a	metaphysical	reality	which	precedes	the	existence	of	the	self.	
	
A	way	of	describing	Foucault’s	philosophical	gesture	is	as	an	attempt	to	challenge	
the	a	priori	divorce	between	ontology	and	praxis	or	between	the	immanence	of	
things	and	the	meaning	of	things	conveyed	by	discourse.	This	is	the	reason	why,	
at	 the	end	of	The	Hermeneutics	of	 the	Subject,	Foucault	 is	 lead	 to	nuance	 the	
concept	 of	 bios	 introduced	 in	 Subjectivité	 et	 Vérité.	 As	 he	 concludes	 the	 24th	
March	1982	lecture,	Foucault	calls	bios	“the	way	in	which	the	world	immediately	
appears	to	us”.	He	writes:	
That	 bios,	 that	 life	 –	 by	 which	 I	 mean	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 world	
immediately	 appears	 to	 us	 in	 the	 course	 of	 our	 existence	 –	 is	 a	 test	
should	be	understood	 in	 two	senses.	Test	 in	 the	sense	of	experience,	
that	 is	 to	say	the	world	 is	 recognized	as	being	that	through	which	we	
experience	 ourselves,	 through	 which	 we	 know	 ourselves,	 discover	
ourselves,	and	reveal	ourselves	to	ourselves.	And	then,	test	in	the	sense	
that	this	world,	this	bios,	 is	also	an	exercise,	that	is	to	say	that	on	the	
basis	of	which,	through	which,	 in	spite	of	or	thanks	to	which	we	form	
ourselves,	transform	ourselves,	advance	towards	an	aim	or	salvation,	or	
head	towards	our	own	perfection.	(Foucault:	2006,	486)	
	
From	then	on,	the	concepts	of	life	and	world	are	superimposed	and	designate	the	
reality	through	which	one	can	both	know	and	transform	oneself:	it	is	the	occasion	
of	a	poiesis	which	brings	together	the	notions	of	epimeleia	heautou	(the	care	of	
the	self)	and	gnothi	seauton	(the	knowledge	of	the	self	by	the	self).	The	tension	
between	these	two	aspects	concerns	Foucault	both	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	
Subject	and	in	The	Government	of	the	Self	and	Others	II:	The	Courage	of	Truth.	In	
both	texts,	Foucault	will	attempt	to	prove	that	the	emergence	of	philosophical	
thought	 corresponds	 to	 a	 covering	 of	 the	 epimeleia	 heautou	 by	 the	 gnothi	
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seauton	through	a	reading	of	Plato’s	Alcibiades.	Foucault	wants	to	show	that	the	
political	 initiation	of	Alcibiades,	 through	which	he	 should	 transform	himself	 in	
order	 to	 be	 ready	 for	 political	 life,	 is	 turned	 by	 Socrates	 into	 the	 ontological	
search	for	the	truth	of	the	self	and	the	soul.	Foucault	writes:	
[…]	we	can	say	that	in	this	text	[Plato’s	Alcibiades]	[…],	as	soon	as	the	
space	of	the	care	of	the	self	is	opened	up	and	the	self	is	defined	as	the	
soul,	the	entire	space	thus	opened	up	is	taken	over	by	the	principle	of	
“know	yourself”.	We	can	say	that	there	is	a	forced	takeover	by	the	gnothi	
seauton	in	the	space	opened	up	by	the	care	of	the	self.	[…]	Actually,	what	
I	would	like	to	say	(and	we	have	a	superb	example	of	it	here)	is	that	the	
gnothi	seauton	(“know	yourself”)	an	the	epimeleia	heautou	(care	of	the	
self)	 are	 entangled.	 Throughout	 the	 text	 you	 can	 see	 two	 things	
entangled:	by	 reminding	him	 that	he	would	do	well	 to	 take	a	 look	at	
himself,	 Alcibiades	 is	 led	 to	 say:	 “Yes,	 it	 is	 true,	 I	 should	 care	 about	
myself”;	then,	when	Socrates	has	laid	down	this	principle	and	Alcibiades	
has	accepted	it,	[the	problem]	is	posed	anew:	“We	must	know	this	self	
we	must	take	care	of”;	and	then	now,	a	third	time,	when	we	consider	
what	 caring	 consist	 in,	 we	 find	 again	 the	 gnothi	 seauton.	 There	 is	 a	
dynamic	entanglement,	a	reciprocal	call	for	the	gnothi	seauton	and	for	
the	epimeleia	heautou	(knowledge	of	the	self	and	care	of	the	self).	This	
tangle,	this	reciprocal	appeal,	is,	I	think,	typical	of	Plato.	We	find	it	again	
throughout	 the	 history	 of	 Greek,	 Hellenistic,	 and	 Roman	 thought,	
obviously	with	different	balances	and	relations,	with	different	emphases	
on	one	or	the	other,	and	with	a	different	distribution	of	the	moments	of	
self-knowledge	and	care	of	the	self	in	the	various	systems	of	thoughts	
encountered.	But	it	is	this	tangle	that	is	important,	I	believe,	and	neither	
of	the	two	elements	should	be	neglected	to	the	advantage	of	the	other.	
(Foucault:	2006,	68-69)	
	
The	tension	Foucault	stresses	between	epimeleia	heautou	and	gnothi	seauton	is	
a	tension	which	opposes	the	relationship	of	the	self	as	subject	of	his	own	conduct	
(which	is	a	question	of	poiesis)	and	the	question	of	the	relationship	of	the	self	
towards	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 world.	 The	 movement	 Foucault’s	 sees	 in	 Plato’s	
Alcibiades	transforms	the	question	of	an	ethopoietic	practice	into	an	ontological	
one:	the	question	of	the	way	in	which	the	self	conducts	and	transforms	itself	in	
the	world	(which	is,	as	Foucault	tells	us,	the	question	of	life	as	bios)	becomes	the	
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question	of	the	true	relationship	towards	the	soul	which	in	return	allows	a	true	
relationship	towards	truth.		
	
We	see	that	Foucault	problematizes	once	again	the	question	of	the	relationship	
between	 power	 and	 knowledge	which	 is	 first	 put	 into	 question	 in	 “Truth	 and	
Juridical	Forms”	when	Foucault	described	the	dismantling	of	political	sovereign	
power	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece.	It	is	because	the	question	of	the	relationship	
of	the	self	towards	his	own	conduct	escapes	ontological	determination	that	it	can	
be	superimposed	to	Foucault’s	understanding	of	power:	the	self	does	not	reflect	
upon	the	meaning	of	his	actions,	their	relation	to	truth	or	the	nature	they	reveal,	
it	does	not	take	them	as	an	object	of	hermeneutic	interpretation.	In	other	words,	
there	is	no	separation	between	the	immanence	of	the	self’s	existence	(the	seen)	
and	a	knowledge	implying	the	postulate	of	a	nature	accounting	for	its	actions	(the	
said).	 When	 Foucault	 studies	 the	 spiritual	 schools	 succeeding	 Platonism	 and	
preceding	 Christianity	 in	 Ancient	 Greece	 and	 Rome	 (mainly	 Stoicism	 and	
Epicureanism),	he	 focuses	on	the	 fact	 that	 these	schools	offered	a	contrasting	
problematization	of	the	relationship	between	care	and	knowledge.	According	to	
him,	 this	 relationship	 was	 not	 one	 of	 the	 overlapping	 of	 gnothi	 seauton	 by	
epimeleia	 eauthou,	 but	 of	 the	 subordination	 of	 knowledge	 in	 favour	 of	 an	
ethopoiesis	(i.e.	in	favour	of	the	care	of	the	self).	As	Foucault	puts	it:	
The	Greeks	had	a	very	interesting	word,	which	can	be	found	in	Plutarch	
as	well	as	in	Denys	of	Halicarnassus.	It	exists	in	the	form	of	a	noun,	verb,	
and	adjective.	 It	 is	 the	expression,	or	 series	of	expressions,	of	words:	
ethopoiein,	 ethopoiia,	 ethopoios.	 Ethopoiein	 means	 making	 ethos,	
producing	ethos,	changing,	transforming	ethos,	the	individual’s	way	of	
being,	his	mode	of	existence.	Ethopoios	is	something	that	possesses	the	
quality	 of	 transforming	 an	 individual’s	 mode	 of	 being.	 […]	 Knowing,	
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knowledge	of	something,	is	useful	when	it	has	a	form	and	functions	in	
such	a	way	that	it	can	produce	ethos.	And	a	knowledge	(connaissance)	
of	the	world	is	perfectly	useful:	it	(as	well	as	knowledge	of	others	and	
knowledge	of	 the	 gods)	 can	produce	ethos.	 And	 it	 is	 this	 that	marks,	
forms,	 and	 characterizes	 what	 knowledge	 useful	 to	 man	 must	 be.	
(Foucault:	2006,	237)		
	
We	clearly	see	that	for	the	schools	of	thought	Foucault	describes,	the	knowledge	
of	the	truth	of	the	self	does	not	serve	the	knowledge	of	the	truth	of	the	world	
through	a	logic	which	severs	the	immanence	of	acts	and	the	truth	that	is	sought:	
the	knowledge	of	the	world	serves	the	transformation	of	the	self	through	a	logic	
of	coincidence	between	the	tekhne	through	which	one	knows	the	world	and	the	
tekhne	through	which	one	knows	oneself:	in	this	case,	the	self	attempts	to	exert	
sovereignty	 and	mastery	 towards	 his	bios	 as	 there	 is	 no	 divorce	 between	 his	
actions	and	his	knowledge:	both	serve	a	practice	of	transformation	of	both	the	
self	and	the	world	and	not	of	revelation	or	representation	of	their	nature.	
	
Foucault’s	reflection	upon	the	mutation	of	 jurisdiction	introduced	in	the	1970-
1971	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	and	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	in	1973	finds	
its	ethical	counterpart	when	he	problematizes	the	concept	of	life	as	bios	both	in	
Subjectivité	et	Vérité	and	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject.	The	disjunction	of	
the	 coincidence	 between	 power	 and	 knowledge	 he	 describes	 in	 “Truth	 and	
Juridical	Forms”,	which	corresponds	to	the	expression	of	truth	shifting	from	the	
sovereign	 act	 of	 its	 expression	 to	 the	 divorce	 between	 the	 said	 and	 the	 seen	
described	 in	 his	 reading	 of	 Sophocles’	 Oedipus	 Rex,	 can	 be	 linked	 to	 the	
overtaking	of	epimeleia	heautou	by	gnothi	seauton:	the	way	one	experiences	and	
transforms	one’s	way	of	life	relies	on	the	knowledge	one	has	of	oneself,	of	others	
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and	 of	 the	 world.	 However,	 this	 knowledge	 does	 not	 define	 a	 determination	
which	seeks	to	establish	the	nature	of	the	self	or	 its	relation	to	truth,	but	one	
which	allows	the	establishment	of	a	relationship	between	the	self	and	itself.	In	
this	 case	 the	 self,	 made	 aware	 of	 the	 way	 it	 lives	 its	 life,	 can	 be	 led	 to	 live	
differently.	What	Foucault	claims	to	 identify,	between	Platonic	philosophy	and	
Christianity,	is	an	alternative	way	of	thinking	and	problematizing	the	relationship	
between	 the	 self,	 bios	 and	 the	world	which	 occurs	 in	 Cynicism,	 Stoicism	 and	
Epicureanism.	 For	 example,	 Foucault	 describes	 Stoic	 philosophy	 as	 a	 way	 of	
establishing	 a	 “sagittal”	 relationship	 to	 oneself:	 a	 vertical	 relationship	 which	
allows	to	question	one’s	way	of	living	through	a	distance	which	does	not	separate	
the	self	from	its	representation	but	allows	to	put	the	knowledge	inherited	from	
such	a	perspective	back	into	ethical	and	political	practice.114	Foucault	writes:	
Whereas	 the	 Platonic	movement	 consisted	 in	 turning	 away	 from	 this	
world	 in	order	 to	 look	 towards	another	–	even	 if	 souls,	who,	 through	
recollection,	have	rediscovered	and	savoured	the	reality	they	have	seen,	
are	led	more	by	force	than	by	their	own	will	back	to	this	world	in	order	
to	 govern	 it	 -	 the	 Stoic	 movement	 defined	 by	 Seneca	 is	 completely	
different.	It	involves	a	sort	of	stepping	back	from	the	point	we	occupy.	
This	 liberation	 enables	 us	 to	 reach	 the	 highest	 region	 of	 the	 world	
without,	 as	 it	were,	 ever	 losing	ourselves	 form	 sight	 and	without	 the	
world	to	which	we	belong	ever	being	out	of	sight.	We	reach	the	point	
from	which	God	himself	sees	the	world	and,	without	our	ever	actually	
turning	away	from	this	world,	we	see	the	world	to	which	we	belong	and	
consequently	can	see	ourselves	within	this	world.	[…]	Reaching	this	point	
enables	us	to	dismiss	and	exclude	all	the	false	values	and	all	the	false	
dealings	in	which	we	are	caught	up,	to	gauge	what	we	really	are	on	the	
                                                
114	Seneca’s	Letter	XXVII	is	a	good	example	of	a	philosophical	guidance	which	applies	not	only	to	
the	person	the	philosopher	 is	 talking	 to	 (the	reader)	but	equally	 to	 the	narrator	himself.	Both	
characters,	belonging	to	a	common	world,	must	apply	the	Stoic	principles	to	themselves	as	well	
as	share	them	with	others:	“So	you’re	giving	me	advice,	are	you?	you	say.	‘Have	you	already	given	
yourself	advice,	then?	Have	you	already	put	yourself	straight?	Is	that	how	you	come	to	have	time	
for	reforming	other	people?’	No,	I’m	not	so	shameless	as	to	set	about	treating	people	when	I’m	
sick	myself.	I’m	talking	to	you	as	if	I	were	lying	in	the	same	hospital	ward,	about	the	illness	we’re	
both	suffering	from,	and	passing	on	some	remedies.	So	listen	to	me	as	if	I	were	speaking	to	myself.	
I’m	allowing	you	access	to	my	inmost	self,	calling	you	in	to	advise	me	as	I	have	things	out	with	
myself.”	(Seneca:	1969,	72-73)	
 261 
earth,	and	to	take	the	measure	of	our	existence	–	of	this	existence	that	
is	just	a	point	in	space	and	time	–	and	of	our	smallness.	(Foucault:	2006,	
276-277)	
	
We	see	that	 the	Stoics	use	 the	knowledge	of	 the	world	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	
reflect,	at	the	same	time,	upon	the	life	of	the	self	within	this	world.	As	Foucault	
puts	 it,	 this	point	of	view	is	the	perspective	“from	which	God	himself	sees	the	
world”:	 it	 is	 a	 sovereign	point	 of	 view	 that	 allows	 a	 knowledge	 that	 does	 not	
target	 the	 nature	 of	 things	 but	 produces	 a	 perspective	 that	 inscribes	 the	 self	
within	the	world	in	which	he	lives.	Such	a	grasping	allows	this	self	to	re-evaluate	
its	practices,	and	the	distinction	between	truth	and	falsity	is	not	established	in	
relationship	to	a	metaphysical	determination	but	to	the	possibility	of	a	poiesis	
through	which	 the	 self	 takes	 its	bios	 (i.e.	 its	 existence	within	 the	world)	 as	 a	
matter	of	ongoing	formation.		
	
In	 his	 last	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France,	 Foucault	 draws	 a	 similar	
conclusion	when	he	looks	carefully	at	the	case	of	the	Cynics.	According	to	him,	
Cynicism	constitutes	another	alternative	way	of	problematizing	the	relationship	
between	the	self,	others	and	the	world.	More	specifically,	the	Cynic	is	presented	
as	 the	 true	sovereign	who,	because	he	denounces	 the	 intrinsic	 facticity	of	 the	
practices	men	hold	for	true	values	everywhere	he	goes,	he	also	performs	that	
sagittal	 perspective	 upon	men’s	 existence	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 permanent	
critique.	During	the	21st	March	1984	lecture,	Foucault	writes:	
The	 Cynic,	 who	 was	 only	 a	 king	 of	 poverty,	 and	 a	 hidden	 and	
unrecognized	 king,	 now	 appears	 as	 someone	who	 exercises	 the	 true	
function	of	politeuestha,	the	true	function	of	the	politeai,	understood	in	
the	true	sense	of	the	term,	that	politeia	where	it	is	not	just	a	question	of	
war	and	peace,	of	duties,	taxes,	and	revenues	in	a	city,	but	of	happiness	
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and	misfortune,	the	freedom	and	slavery	of	the	whole	of	humankind.	As	
a	result	the	Cynic	is	associated	with	the	government	of	the	universe.	The	
politeuesthai	 is	no	longer	that	of	the	cities	and	States,	 it	 is	that	of	the	
whole	 world.	 Epictetus	 evokes	 the	 Cynic’s	 hard	 daily	 round,	 which,	
through	all	his	asceticism,	deprivations,	and	suffering	has	led	him	to	call	
out	to	men	and	to	help	them	wherever	they	are.	And,	in	the	evening	of	
this	heavy	day’s	work,	which	is	the	Cynic’s	life,	well,	Epictetus	says,	he	
may	 sleep	 with	 a	 pure	 heart,	 knowing	 that	 “all	 his	 thoughts	 are	 the	
thoughts	of	a	friend	and	servant	of	the	gods,	of	one	who	takes	part	in	
the	government	of	Zeus.”	(Foucault:	2011b,	302-303)		
	
Here,	Foucault	stresses	even	more	strongly	the	connection	between	the	ethical	
life	of	the	Cynic,	who	produces	an	ongoing	self-reflection	upon	the	conduct	of	his	
own	existence	and	the	definition	of	politics.	What	the	critical	attitude	of	the	Cynic	
targets	is	the	politeia	as	a	whole,	which	is	another	way	of	naming	bios	as	“the	
way	the	world	immediately	appears	to	us”	(Foucault:	2006,	486):	it	is	the	constant	
re-evaluation	of	the	Cynic’s	way	of	 life	by	himself	which	produces	at	the	same	
time	an	 immediate	 living	example.	The	Cynic	displays	a	 life	which	 immanently	
produces	a	concrete	effect	upon	the	lives	of	others	and	the	world	understood	as	
the	common	reality	which	everyone	shares.115	In	this	respect,	the	purpose	of	the	
Stoics	 and	 of	 the	 Cynics	 represents	 a	 way	 of	 reconstituting	 the	 paradigm	 of	
                                                
115	The	 examples	 showing	Diogenes	 of	 Sinope	 adopting	 a	 shocking	 behaviour	which	 bypasses	
theoretical	 systems	 are	 numerous,	 even	 though	 Diogenes	 of	 Sinope	 has	 never	 produced	 any	
written	work.	Several	of	these	anecdotes	were	brought	to	our	knowledge	by	Diogenes	Laertius	
who,	 in	The	Lives	and	Opinions	of	Eminent	Philosophers	 (Laertius:	1853),	provides	the	greatest	
number	of	anecdotes	concerning	Diogenes	of	Sinope’s	lifestyle.	His	main	habit	was	to	behave	in	
a	shocking	manner	in	order	to	show	that	men	had	no	reason	to	live	in	more	elaborate	ways	than	
animals.	This	is	the	reason	why	he	was	often	witnessed	eating	and	having	sex	in	public.	Laertius	
writes:	"He	was	in	the	habit	of	doing	everything	in	public,	whether	in	respect	of	Venus	or	Ceres	;	
and	he	used	to	put	his	conclusions	in	this	way	to	people:	‘If	there	is	nothing	absurd	in	dining,	then	
it	is	not	absurd	to	dine	in	the	market-place.	But	it	is	not	absurd	to	dine,	therefore	it	is	not	absurd	
to	 dine	 in	 the	market-place	 .’”	 But	 the	 reduction	 of	 Diogenes	 of	 Sinope’s	 lifestyle	 to	 utmost	
simplicity	 did	 not	 only	 concern	 basic	 animal	 needs.	 It	 also	 applied	 to	 the	 refusal	 of	 everyday	
objects	without	which	 each	 and	 everyone	 could	 still	 survive.	On	 this	 topic,	 Laertius	 tells	 that	
Diogenes	was	once	 inspired	by	the	simplicity	of	a	child.	He	writes:	“On	one	occasion	he	saw	a	
child	drinking	out	of	its	hands,	and	so	he	threw	away	the	cup	which	belonged	to	his	wallet,	saying,	
‘That	child	has	beaten	me	in	simplicity.’	He	also	threw	away	his	spoon,	after	seeing	a	boy,	when	
he	had	broken	his	vessel,	take	up	his	lentils	with	a	crust	of	bread.”	(Laertius:	1853,	230)	
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political	sovereignty	Foucault	was	describing	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece.	Not	
only	was	the	word	of	the	sovereign	a	power	which	had	an	immediate	effect	upon	
the	meaning	 of	 the	world	 and	 the	 order	 of	 things	 but	 it	 also	 produced	 truth	
through	 the	 actualization	 of	 the	 past,	 present	 and	 future.	 This	 truth	 is	 not	 a	
relationship	to	the	hidden	nature	of	things	but	a	performance	which	reduces	it	
to	the	moment	of	its	expression	as	immediate	ordering	of	the	world.	This	is	the	
reason	why	the	examples	of	counter-philosophical	practices	Foucault	chooses	to	
study	 show	 the	 same	 concern	 for	 an	 immediate	 and	 immanent	 critique	 of	
existence.	 Between	 the	 philosophical	 attitude	 of	 the	 Stoics	 who	 attempt	 to	
reduce	the	succession	of	human	endeavours	to	the	“‘punctualizing’	[of]	ourselves	
in	 the	 general	 system	 of	 the	 universe”	 which	 constitutes	 a	 “liberation	 really	
brought	 about	 by	 the	 gaze	we	 cast	 over	 the	 entire	 system	 of	 natural	 things”	
(Foucault:	 2006,	 278)	 and	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 Cynic	 who	 is	 “a	 functionary	 of	
humanity	 in	general”	and	“[…]	a	 functionary	of	ethical	universality”	 (Foucault:	
2011b,	301-302),	the	same	ethico-political	concern	appears.		
	
Foucault	 describes	 the	 possibility	 of	 maintaining	 a	 poietic	 relationship	 to	 the	
world	(and	therefore	to	life)	which	does	not	produce	its	positive	alienation	and	
objectivation	(as	it	happens	when	the	knowledge	sought	by	the	subject	becomes	
the	object	of	a	tekhne	aiming	at	a	truth	which	symbolically	links	the	expressible	
and	 the	 visible:	when	 the	 truth	of	 the	modern	 subject’s	 nature	 is	 sought	 in	 a	
hermeneutic	relationship	to	his	discourse).	When	Foucault	defines	the	concept	
of	governmentality	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject,	he	refers	to	the	alienation	
that	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 subjectivity	 entails:	 when	 the	 poietic	
 264 
relationship	 the	 self	 establishes	 with	 itself	 is	 replaced	 by	 the	 search	 for	 a	
discourse	 which	 establishes	 a	 connection	 to	 a	 truth	 distant	 from	 immanent	
action,	it	is	the	active	subject	which	gets	replaced	by	its	objectivation	within	the	
field	 of	 knowledge	 and	 representation.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why,	 in	 The	
Hermeneutics	 of	 the	 Subject,	 Foucault	 discreetly	 refers	 to	 the	 structure	 of	
anthropological	knowledge	which	constitutes	the	living	subject	as	a	positive	and	
knowable	object	whose	truth	emerges	through	the	“quasi-transcendental”	forms	
of	his	finitude	(i.e.	the	“quasi-transcendental”	fields	of	positivity	that	Labour,	Life	
and	Language	constitute	in	chapter	eight	of	The	Order	of	Things).	During	the	17th	
February	1982	lecture,	he	says:	
[…]	the	question	I	ask	myself	is	this:	How	was	the	question	of	the	truth	of	
the	 subject	 constituted	 through	 the	 set	 of	 phenomena	 and	 historical	
processes	 we	 call	 our	 “culture”?	 How,	 why,	 and	 at	 what	 cost	 did	 we	
undertake	to	hold	a	true	discourse	on	the	subject:	on	the	subject	we	are	
not,	in	the	case	of	the	mad	or	delinquent	subject;	on	the	subject	we	are	in	
general,	inasmuch	as	we	speak,	work	and	live;	and	on	the	subject	we	are	
directly	and	individually,	in	the	particular	case	of	sexuality?	I	have	tried	to	
address	 this	 question	 of	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 subject	 in	
these	 three	 major	 forms,	 perhaps	 with	 blameworthy	 stubbornness.	
(Foucault:	2006,	253)	
	
Foucault	 claims	 to	have	asked	 the	question	of	 the	constitution	of	 the	 truth	of	
subjectivity	under	three	different	forms.	These	three	forms	have	in	common	the	
designation	of	the	objectivity	derived	from	the	knowledge	of	the	modern	subject	
within	 the	 anthropological	 mode	 of	 thinking	 proper	 to	 modernity	 since	 the	
beginning	of	 the	nineteenth	century:	 the	mad,	 the	delinquent	and	the	subject	
speaking	the	truth	of	his	nature	through	the	confession	his	sexual	desires	stand	
as	forms	of	objectivation	of	subjectivity	that	have	interested	Foucault	in	History	
of	Madness	and	Discipline	and	Punish.	In	the	same	way,	the	subject	that	speaks,	
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works	 and	 lives	 provides	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 objectivation	 of	 life	 through	 the	
positivity	 of	 finitude	 defined	 by	 the	 anthropological	 structure	 of	 modern	
knowledge.	In	each	case,	Foucault	describes	an	alienation:	the	subject	which	is	
grasped	by	the	truth	and	knowledge	produced	by	its	own	objectivation	is	either	
“the	subject	we	are	not”,	“the	subject	we	are	in	general”	or	the	essence	of	the	
subject	 revealed	 by	 the	 confession	 of	 his	 desires.	 In	 each	 case,	 it	 refers	 to	 a	
subjectivity	which	does	not	correspond	to	the	individual	affirming	truth	through	
the	strict	immanence	of	acts	but	a	truth	always	already	taken	within	the	game	of	
the	 symbolism	 introduced	 by	 the	 disjunction	 between	 the	 visible	 and	 the	
expressible:	 the	mad,	 the	 delinquent	 and	 the	 desiring	 subjects	 are	 defined	 in	
relation	to	a	rationality	which	provides	of	way	of	predicting	future	actions.	
	
Therefore,	If	I	agree	with	Revel’s	claim	that	the	critique	of	the	concept	of	nature	
regarding	 the	 “political	 strategy	 of	 biologizing	 life”	 does	 not	 strictly	 speaking	
appear	at	the	same	time	as	the	critique	of	the	concept	of	nature	found	“at	the	
basis	of	Western	metaphysics”,	 I	 claim	 that	both	 critiques	 are	 related	as	 they	
target	the	subordination	of	the	immanence	of	acts	to	the	rationality	of	a	 logos	
which	posits	the	concept	of	truth	at	the	transcendental	origin	of	the	meaning	of	
things.	 In	 the	 case	 of	Oedipus	 Rex,	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 the	 truth	 of	 Oedipus’	
identity	relied	on	the	symbolic	reunion	of	the	discourse	of	knowledge	(the	said)	
and	the	strict	immanence	of	facts	(the	seen).	In	the	same	fashion,	when	Foucault	
describes	the	historical	emergence	of	the	nomos	derived	from	the	law	of	nature	
discovered	by	men	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece,	he	shows	how	the	divine	rule	
expressed	through	confrontation	gets	replaced	by	a	rule	which	is	“always	there”	
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and	 “legible	 in	 nature”	 (Foucault:	 2013,	 153).	 In	 this	 case,	 even	 when	 the	
rationality	of	this	natural	logos	is	not	formulated	positively,	it	is	always	already	
available	 and	 constitutes	 the	 horizon	 of	 possibility	 of	 human	 knowledge.	 As	
Foucault	puts	it,	discourse	constitutes	the	activation	of	the	nomos	through	the	
immanence	of	the	speech	act.	Similarly,	during	his	1981	series	of	lectures	at	the	
Catholic	University	of	Leuwen,	Foucault	shows	how	the	avowal	of	the	subject	who	
speaks	is	an	act	that	is	no	longer	self-sufficient	when	it	comes	to	affirming	truth.	
Although	 the	 avowal	 still	 actualizes	 truth,	 it	 does	 so	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 split	
between	the	validity	of	the	truth	of	facts	(the	seen)	and	the	speech-act	of	the	
subject	who	actualizes	it	(the	said).	During	the	inaugural	lecture	on	2nd	April	1981,	
Foucault	 insists	 on	 the	 truth	 that	 pre-exists	 the	 speech-act	 but	 is	 yet	 only	
actualized	through	it.	He	takes	the	case	of	the	psychiatrist	Leuret	who,	in	a	work	
concerning	the	moral	treatment	of	madness,	describes	the	procedure	he	uses	to	
bring	his	patient	to	the	avowal	of	their	illness.	Foucault	writes:	
[Avowal]	 is	 a	 sort	 of	 engagement,	 but	 an	 engagement	 of	 a	 particular	
type.	It	does	not	obligate	one	to	do	such	and	such	a	thing.	It	implies	that	
he	who	speaks	promises	to	be	what	he	affirms	himself	to	be,	precisely	
because	he	is	just	that.	There	is	an	inherent	redundancy	in	avowal	that	
appears	clearly,	for	example,	when	we	avow	our	love	for	someone.	If	it	
were	merely	a	question	of	observing	a	de	facto	situation,	the	“I	love	you”	
would	 be	 a	 pure	 and	 simple	 affirmation.	 If	 it	 were	 a	 question	 of	
promising	 one’s	 love,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 promise	 or	 a	 vow	 that	 could	 be	
sincere	 or	 not,	 but	 it	 could	 be	 neither	 true	 nor	 false.	 But	 when	 the	
sentence	“I	love	you”	functions	as	an	avowal,	it	is	because	one	passes	
from	the	realm	of	the	unspoken	to	the	realm	of	the	spoken	by	voluntarily	
constituting	oneself	as	a	 lover	through	the	affirmation	that	one	loves.	
One	who	avows	a	crime,	in	a	sense,	commits	to	being	the	author	of	the	
crime.	By	that	I	mean	he	not	only	accepts	the	responsibility,	but	he	also	
establishes	this	acceptance	on	the	fact	that	he	did	commit	the	crime.	In	
an	avowal,	he	who	speaks	obligates	himself	to	being	the	one	who	did	
such	 and	 such	 a	 thing,	who	 feels	 such	 and	 such	 a	 sentiment;	 and	he	
obligates	himself	because	it	is	true.	[…]	[The	patient]	says	what	he	had	
not	wanted	to	say,	but	in	saying	it,	he	gives	himself	over	to	the	power	
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the	doctor	sought	to	exercise	over	him.	He	accepts	it.	He	submits	it.	This	
is,	moreover,	what	the	doctor	understands	and	seeks,	who	then	takes	
immediate	advantage	of	 it	 to	 say:	 “So	now	you	will	obey	me”.	 In	 the	
strict	 sense,	 avowal	 can	 only	 exist	 within	 a	 power	 relation	 and	 the	
avowal	enables	 the	exercise	of	 that	power	relation	over	 the	one	who	
avows.	(Foucault:	2014b,	16-17)		
	
Foucault	stresses	the	fact	that	in	order	to	become	the	truth,	the	speech-act	must	
perform	 a	 kind	 of	 “redundancy”:	 the	 speaker	 does	 not	 only	 provide	 the	
description	of	a	true	fact,	he	also	establishes	a	fixed	relationship	towards	himself	
which	 constitutes	 him	 as	 a	 mad	 person:	 he	 becomes	 this	 sovereign	 who	
recognizes	himself	as	an	object.	But	this	sovereign	recognition	is	an	ambiguous	
one,	 since	 it	 both	 carries	 the	 coincidence	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge	 (the	
immediate	effectivity	of	the	sovereign	who	actualizes	truth	through	speech)	but	
also	gives	it	away.	The	subject	who	avows	his	madness	constitutes	himself	as	mad	
not	on	the	basis	of	an	immediate	performance,	but	on	a	symbolic	reunion	of	the	
said	and	the	seen.	The	said	(the	speech-act)	is	actual	but	the	seen	(the	fact	of	the	
speaker	being	mad)	cannot	be	grasped	through	immediate	description:	it	refers	
to	an	abstract	nature	whose	truth	is	recognized	both	by	the	patient	and	by	the	
doctor.	Therefore,	 it	 is	easy	to	see	that	both	concepts	of	nature	(the	one	that	
emerges	 with	 Classical	 Greece,	 and	 the	 other	 that	 emerges	 with	 modernity)	
operate	 according	 to	 a	 similar	 alienation	 of	 sovereignty.	 Just	 as	 the	 exoteric	
words	of	gods	do	not	suffice	to	provide	a	truth	which	becomes	read	through	the	
knowledge	of	 the	nature	of	 things,	 the	speech-act	of	 the	patient	 is	 true	 if	 it	 is	
based	upon	a	redundancy	which	posits	his	pre-existence	as	an	object	determined	
by	 the	 truth	 of	 his	 nature.	 The	 problematic	 juxtaposition	 of	 two	 different	
concepts	 of	 truth	 (i.e.	 the	 immediate	 and	 sovereign	 manifestation	 of	 truth	
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through	an	act	versus	a	discourse	dependent	upon	a	transcendental	rationality)	
is	 a	 tension	 Foucault	 refers	 to	 in	 The	 Hermeneutics	 of	 the	 Subject	 when	 he	
problematizes	the	question	of	governmentality	as	a	relationship	between	the	self	
and	 the	 self.	 It	 is	 indeed	 only	 by	 maintaining	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 critical	
relationship	of	the	self	over	its	own	actions	that	the	alienation	of	the	immanence	
of	power	(defined	as	mere	actions)	is	avoided	by	a	truth	that	introduces	a	divorce	
between	the	visible	and	the	expressible.	He	writes:	
If	we	take	the	question	of	power,	of	political	power,	situating	it	in	the	
more	 general	 question	 of	 governmentality	 understood	 as	 a	 strategic	
field	of	power	relations	in	the	broadest	and	not	merely	political	sense	of	
the	term,	if	we	understand	by	governmentality	a	strategic	field	of	power	
relations	in	their	mobility,	transformability,	and	reversibility,	then	I	do	
not	think	that	reflection	on	this	notion	of	governmentality	cannot	avoid	
passing	through,	theoretically	and	practically,	the	element	of	a	subject	
defined	by	the	relationship	of	self	to	self.	Although	the	theory	of	political	
power	 as	 an	 institution	usually	 refers	 to	 a	 juridical	 conception	of	 the	
subject	of	right,	 it	seems	to	me	that	the	analysis	of	governmentality	–	
that	is	to	say,	of	power	as	a	set	of	reversible	relationships	–	must	refer	
to	 an	 ethics	 of	 the	 subject	 defined	by	 the	 relationship	 of	 self	 to	 self.	
Quite	simply,	this	means	that	in	the	type	of	analysis	I	have	been	trying	
to	 advance	 for	 some	 time	 you	 can	 see	 that	 power	 relations,	
governmentality,	 the	 government	 of	 the	 self	 and	 of	 others,	 and	 the	
relationship	of	self	to	self	constitute	a	chain,	a	thread,	and	I	think	it	 is	
around	those	notions	that	we	should	be	able	to	connect	together	the	
question	of	politics	and	the	question	of	ethics.	(Foucault:	2006,	252)	
	
What	 is	 found	at	the	basis	of	Foucault’s	analysis	of	governmentality	(which	he	
defined	 in	his	 interview	with	André	Berten	as	“a	set	of	relations	of	power	and	
techniques	that	allow	these	power	relations	to	be	exercised”	(Foucault:	2014b,	
240)	is	that	the	immanent	exercise	of	power	relations	is	the	fundamental	reality	
which	determines	the	way	in	which	lives	are	determined.	Therefore,	letting	the	
possibility	of	a	power	relationship	of	the	self	over	itself	appear	is	what	turns	the	
question	 of	 political	 governmentality	 into	 the	 one	 of	 ethical	 governmentality:	
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once	the	truth	of	subjectivity	appears	for	what	it	is	(i.e.	as	power	relations	leading	
to	the	performance	of	immanent	acts),	the	transcendence	of	truth	appears	as	an	
a	posteriori	product	of	those	power	relations.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	question	
of	governmentality,	which	corresponds	to	the	question	of	the	government	of	life	
in	the	broadest	sense,	is	at	the	same	time	a	political	and	ethical	concern.	My	claim	
is	 that	 it	 is	 also	 an	 epistemological	 one	 as	 we	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 the	
movement	 through	which	 the	modern	subject	becomes	 the	object	of	his	own	
knowledge	is	the	condition	for	the	fixation	of	the	critical	relationship	between	
the	self	and	itself	into	the	ontological	or	natural	relationship	between	the	acting	
subject	and	the	truth	of	his	discourse.		
	
It	 is	 precisely	 this	 question	 of	 life	 as	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	poiesis	 that	 Foucault	
addresses	 in	 the	 last	 two	volumes	of	 the	History	of	Sexuality.	 It	 is	what	makes	
possible	a	relationship	towards	oneself	which	is	not	grounded	upon	a	subjective	
truth	(which	the	hermeneutics	of	the	desires	seeks	to	bring	to	light)	but	a	poiesis	
which	breaks	away	from	the	hermeneutic	dimension	proper	to	the	concept	desire	
(as	 the	 subtitle	 of	 the	 second	 volume	 of	 the	History	 of	 Sexuality.	 The	 Use	 of	
Pleasures	tells	us).	It	is	in	those	terms	that	Foucault	defines,	in	an	interview	given	
to	Dreyfus	and	Rabinow	at	 the	University	of	Berkeley	 in	April	1983,	 the	Greek	
notion	of	“techne	tou	biou”:	
One	of	the	numerous	points	where	I	was	wrong	in	that	book	[The	History	
of	Sexuality.	The	Will	to	Knowledge]	was	what	I	said	about	this	ars	erotica.	
I	should	have	opposed	our	science	of	sex	to	a	contrasting	practice	in	our	
own	culture.	The	Greeks	and	Romans	did	not	have	any	ars	erotica	to	be	
compared	with	the	Chinese	ars	erotica	(or	at	least	it	was	not	something	
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very	 important	 in	their	culture).	They	had	a	techne116	tou	biou	 in	which	
the	economy	of	pleasure	played	a	very	large	role.	In	this	“art	of	life”	the	
notion	of	exercising	a	perfect	mastery	over	oneself	soon	became	the	main	
issue.	 And	 the	 Christian	 hermeneutics	 of	 the	 self	 constituted	 a	 new	
elaboration	of	 this	techne.	 […]	What	 I	want	to	show	 is	 that	the	general	
Greek	problem	was	not	the	techne	of	the	self,	it	was	the	techne	of	life,	the	
techne	tou	biou,	how	to	live.	 It’s	quite	clear	from	Socrates	to	Seneca	or	
Pliny,	 for	 instance,	 that	 they	 didn’t	 worry	 about	 the	 afterlife,	 what	
happened	after	death,	or	whether	God	exists	or	not.	That	was	not	really	a	
great	problem	for	them;	the	problem	was	which	techne	do	I	have	to	use	
in	order	to	live	as	well	as	I	ought	to	live.	And	I	think	that	one	of	the	main	
evolutions	in	ancient	culture	has	been	that	this	techne	tou	biou	became	
more	and	more	a	techne	of	the	self.	A	Greek	citizen	of	the	fifth	or	fourth	
century	would	have	felt	that	this	techne	for	life	was	to	take	care	of	the	city,	
of	his	companions.	But	for	Seneca,	for	instance,	the	problem	was	to	take	
care	of	himself.	(Dreyfus	&	Rabinow:	1983,	234-235)	
	
If	here	Foucault	nuances	the	importance	of	an	ars	erotica	in	constrast	to	a	tekhne	
tou	biou,	it	is	because	his	point	ultimately	concerns	the	possibility	according	to	
which	 the	 self	 might	 establish	 and	 problematize	 both	 an	 ethical	 and	 political	
relationship	between	itself,	others	and	the	world.		
	
The	 possibility	 of	 such	 a	 relationship,	 which	 implies	 a	 necessary	 distancing	
between	 the	 self	 and	 the	 world	 is	 what	 guarantees	 the	 possibility	 of	 ethical	
sovereignty:	it	is	because	the	self	questions	its	conducts	in	relation	to	others	that	
it	holds	together	but	still	distinguishes	the	relationship	between	acts,	knowledge	
or	 truth.	 As	 Foucault	 explains	 during	 the	 24th	 March	 1982	 lecture	 from	 The	
Hermeneutics	 of	 the	 Subject,	 the	 problem	 which	 the	 Western	 philosophical	
tradition	poses	is	the	one	of	the	tension	between	the	relationship	to	the	world	as	
a	 test	 and	 the	 apprehension	 of	 the	 same	 world	 through	 the	 technique	 of	
                                                
116	Throughout	the	course	of	my	argument,	I	have	chosen	to	spell	the	Greek	word	τεκνη	“tekhne”.	
However,	it	is	spelt	techne	in	the	published	edition	of	this	text	and	I’ve	chosen	to	stay	faithful	to	
it	in	this	case.	
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knowledge.	 The	 lack	 of	 lexical	 rigor	 which	 seems	 to	 characterize	 Foucault’s	
hesitation	between	the	expression	“technique	of	the	self”	and	“technique	of	life”	
is	not	the	sign	of	an	inconsistency	in	his	own	argumentation.	Foucault	wants	to	
stress	that	the	matter	of	Greek	ethical	conduct	was,	in	its	pre-philosophical	form,	
the	question	of	life	as	adequate	self-reflection	and	fashioning:	this	constitutes	the	
“technique	of	 life”	Foucault	called	“technique	of	the	self”	[technique	du	soi]	 in	
Subjectivité	et	Vérité	in	1981.		
	
Pierre	 Hadot	 questioned	 the	 possibility	 of	 talking	 about	 style	 or	 form	 since,	
according	to	him,	pre-philosophical	Greek	thinkers	were	already	concerned	about	
the	place	and	status	of	their	existence	towards	a	greater	cosmological	order	or	a	
sense	of	transcendence.	Hadot	writes:	
In	this	work	of	the	self	towards	oneself,	in	this	exercise	of	the	self,	I	also	
recognize	as	far	as	I	am	concerned	an	essential	aspect	of	philosophical	
life:	 philosophy	 is	 an	 art	 of	 living,	 a	 style	 of	 living	which	 engages	 the	
whole	of	existence.	However,	I	would	hesitate	to	speak,	as	M.	Foucault	
does,	of	“aesthetics	of	existence”	regarding	Antiquity	as	well	as	regarding	
the	 task	of	 the	philosopher	 in	general.	M.	Foucault,	as	we	have	seen,	
understands	this	expression	in	the	sense	that	our	own	life	is	the	work	we	
have	to	do.	[…]	In	fact,	what	these	philosophers	of	Antiquity	are	looking	
for	 is	not	primarily	beauty	(kalon),	but	the	good	(agathon)	 […].	This	 is	
why,	instead	of	speaking	about	“culture	of	the	self”,	one	should	rather	
speak	about	transformation,	transfiguration,	“overcoming	of	oneself”.	In	
order	to	describe	this	state,	one	cannot	avoid	the	term	“wisdom”	which,	
it	seems	to	me,	appears	only	rarely	if	ever	in	M.	Foucault.	Wisdom	is	the	
state	 which	 the	 philosopher	might	 never	 reach	 but	 towards	 which	 it	
tends,	trying	hard	to	transform	himself	in	order	to	overcome	himself.	It	
is	 a	mode	 of	 existence	 characterized	 by	 three	 essential	 features:	 the	
peace	of	the	soul	(ataraxia),	the	interior	freedom	(autarkeia)	and	(apart	
from	 the	 Skeptics)	 cosmic	 awareness,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 the	
acknowledgement	of	belonging	to	the	human	and	cosmic	Whole,	a	sort	
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of	dilatation,	transfiguration	of	the	self	which	achieves	the	greatness	of	
soul	(megalopsuchia).117	(Hadot:	2002,	308-309)		
	
However,	what	Hadot	fails	to	see	is	that	what	Foucault	targets,	when	he	hesitates	
between	“technique	of	the	self”	and	“technique	of	life”	in	order	to	characterize	
the	ethical	work	through	which	the	self	problematizes	his	relationship	towards	
itself,	others	and	the	world	is	not	so	much	the	strict	relationship	between	the	self	
and	 the	 transcendence	 of	 truth	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 with	Western	 philosophical	
thought	there	emerges	the	domination	of	a	form	of	subjectivity	which	fixes	the	
relationship	between	the	bios	of	the	self	and	the	truth	of	the	world.	During	the	
last	lecture	of	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject,	Foucault	insists	upon	the	tension:	
If	 the	 form	 of	 objectivity	 peculiar	 to	Western	 thought	 was	 therefore	
constituted	when,	at	the	dusk	of	thought,	the	world	was	considered	and	
manipulated	by	a	tekhne,	then	I	think	we	can	say	this:	that	the	form	of	
subjectivity	peculiar	to	Western	thought,	if	we	ask	what	this	form	is	in	its	
very	foundation,	was	constituted	by	a	movement	that	was	the	reverse	of	
this.	It	was	constituted	when	the	bios	ceased	being	what	it	had	been	for	
so	 long	 in	Greek	thought,	namely	the	correlate	of	a	tekhne;	when	the	
bios	(life)	ceased	being	the	correlate	of	a	tekhne	to	become	instead	the	
form	of	a	test	of	the	self.	(Foucault:	2006,	486)	
	
Foucault	describes	the	emergence	of	Western	subjectivity	as	an	inversion	of	the	
movement	 through	which	 the	knowledge	of	 the	world	and	nature	 supposedly	
                                                
117	“Dans	ce	travail	de	soi	sur	soi,	dans	cet	exercice	de	soi,	je	reconnais	également,	pour	ma	part,	
un	aspect	essentiel	de	la	vie	philosophique:	la	philosophie	est	un	art	de	vivre,	un	style	de	vie	qui	
engage	 toute	 l’existence.	 Toutefois,	 j’hésiterais	 à	 parler	 avec	 M.	 Foucault	 d’’esthétique	 de	
l’existence’,	aussi	bien	à	propos	de	 l’Antiquité,	que	de	 la	tpache	du	philosophe	en	général.	M.	
Foucault,	nous	l’avons	vu,	entend	cette	expression	au	sens	où	notre	propre	vie	est	l’oeuvre	que	
nous	avons	à	 faire.	 […]	En	fait,	ce	que	 les	philosophes	de	 l’Antiquité	recherchent,	ce	n’est	pas	
premièrement	la	beauté	(kalon),	mais	le	bien	(agathon)	[…]	C’est	pourquoi,	au	lieu	de	parler	de	
“culture	de	soi”,	il	vaudrait	mieux	parler	de	transformation,	de	transfiguration,	de	“dépassement	
de	soi”.	Pour	décrire	cet	état,	on	ne	peut	éluder	le	terme	“sagesse”	qui,	me	semble-t-il,	n’apparaît	
que	 rarement,	 sinon	 jamais,	 chez	M.	 Foucault.	 La	 sagesse	 est	 l’état	 auquel	 le	 philosophe	 ne	
parviendra	 jamais,	 mais	 auquel	 il	 tend,	 en	 s’efforçant	 de	 se	 transformer	 lui-même	 pour	 se	
dépasser.	Il	s’agit	d’un	mode	d’existence	qui	est	caractérisé	par	trois	aspects	essentiels:	la	paix	de	
l’âme	 (ataraxia),	 la	 liberté	 intérieure	 (autarkeia)	 et	 (sauf	 pour	 les	 sceptiques)	 la	 conscience	
cosmique,	 c’est-à-dire	 la	prise	de	 conscience	de	 l’appartenance	au	Tout	humain	et	 cosmique,	
sorte	de	dilatation,	de	transfiguration	du	moi	qui	réalise	la	grandeur	d’âme	(megalopsuchia).”	
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emerged.	If	Western	objectivity	emerged	when	the	world	became	subjected	to	
the	 use	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	 tekhne,	 the	 emergence	 of	 Western	 subjectivity	
corresponded	conversely	 to	 the	moment	where	 life	ceased	to	be	 thought	as	a	
problematized	 relationship	 between	 the	 self	 and	 the	 world	 (as	 a	 tekhne)	 to	
become	the	occasion	through	which	the	self	started	to	manifest	the	truth	of	its	
own	nature.	But	 life	understood	as	bios,	 thought	as	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 self	
exerts	a	certain	tekhne	over	itself	to	produce	self-formation	and	transformation	
requires	the	possibility	for	the	self	to	challenge	its	own	truth.	It	is	through	its	own	
disappearance	 implied	by	 its	 own	 self-critique	 that	 the	 self	 is	 able	 to	 keep	on	
determining	the	form	of	its	bios	as	the	occasion	of	a	problematized	relationship	
both	towards	itself	and	the	world.		
	
Such	 a	 technical	 relationship	 challenges	 the	 evidence	 of	 a	 knowledge	 that	
manifests	truth	and	replaces	it	by	what	truth	and	knowledge	are:	the	products	of	
the	use	of	a	specific	technique	at	a	point	of	history.	By	putting	what	Foucault	tells	
us	 about	 the	 emergence	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth	 (i.e.	 the	 emergence	 of	
objectivity)	in	Archaic	Greece	in	the	Lectures	on	the	will	to	know	and	“Truth	and	
Juridical	Forms”	in	relation	to	what	he	tells	us	about	the	emergence	of	subjectivity	
in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject,	it	appears	that	the	movement	through	which	
knowledge	is	divorced	from	strict	power	corresponds	to	the	moment	where	life	
as	bios	ceases	to	be	problematized	as	the	place	of	relationship	of	the	self	towards	
the	self,	others	and	the	world.	It	is	because	the	possibility	of	such	a	relationship	
requires	us	 to	dismantle	 the	primacy	of	knowledge	and	 truth	as	expression	of	
ontological	foundations	(of	the	nature	of	the	world	and	of	the	subject)	to	let	the	
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reality	of	power	relationships	appear	in	their	strict	immanence:	the	visibility	of	
such	 an	 immanence	 is	 what	 allows	 us	 to	 characterize	 a	 technique	 not	 as	 the	
expression	of	an	ontological	given	but	as	the	manifestation	of	an	immanent	and	
historical	act	of	poiesis.	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	examined	how	Foucault’s	attempt	to	historicize	the	concept	
of	 epistemological	 truth	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 postulate	 of	
anthropological	truth	which	emerges	in	the	nineteenth	century.	Both	concepts	of	
truth	presuppose	the	transcendental	position	of	a	logos	divorced	from	the	strict	
immanence	of	 the	act	which	produces	truth.	Therefore,	what	 I	have	examined	
within	the	scope	of	Foucault’s	work	is	the	cause	of	a	recurrence:	the	recurrence	
of	the	phrase	“the	will	to	know”	(or	“the	will	to	knowledge”)	in	the	titles	of	both	
Foucault’s	 first	 lecture	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France	 in	 1970-1971	 and	 of	 the	 first	
volume	of	 the	History	of	Sexuality.	 I	have	proven	 that	 this	 recurrence	shows	a	
symmetry	in	Foucault’s	critique	of	Western	philosophy	and	Western	subjectivity.	
Even	though	the	concept	of	anthropological	truth	which	emerges	with	modernity	
belongs	 to	another	historical	period	 than	 the	concept	of	epistemological	 truth	
which	appears	with	Classical	Greece,	I	have	shown	that	the	methodology	behind	
Foucault’s	critique	remains	the	same.	His	attempt	to	identify	a	“will”	at	the	very	
bottom	of	both	concepts	deprives	them	of	their	foundational	and	transcendental	
character.		
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In	this	respect,	I	have	exposed	how	strongly	Foucault	is	indebted	to	Nietzsche	and	
his	 critique	 of	 the	 concepts	 of	 nature	 and	 origin.	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 that	
Foucault’s	use	of	the	word	“will”	corresponds	to	an	attempt	to	reach	the	pure	act	
of	the	subject	destitute	of	transcendental	or	metaphysical	determinations.	Such	
a	methodological	use	of	the	“will”	allows	Foucault	to	claim	that	there	is	nothing	
but	power	at	the	bottom	of	our	historical	and	epistemological	constructions.	On	
top	of	that	claim,	 I	have	argued	that	the	primacy	of	power	should	not	only	be	
understood	to	target	a	critique	of	knowledge	but	should	also	be	used	to	put	into	
perspective	 the	possibility	and	 limits	of	anthropological	knowledge.	This	 is	 the	
reason	why	 the	 1976	 “will	 to	 knowledge”	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 counterpart	 of	 the	
1970-1971	“will	to	know”.	The	historical	shift	through	which	the	modern	subject	
gets	caught	up	as	object	of	its	own	knowledge	with	the	emergence	of	modernity	
can	 and	 must	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 epistemological	 knowledge	
historically	appears	as	a	critique	of	 the	sovereign	power	of	gods	at	 the	end	of	
Archaic	 Greek.	 The	 political	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign,	 which	 coincides	 with	 its	
determination	of	the	truth,	gets	replaced	by	a	concept	of	truth	accessible	to	the	
knowledge	of	men.	Similarly,	the	knowledge	of	man	by	men	(the	anthropological	
structure	 of	 knowledge)	 is	 made	 possible	 through	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	
transcendence	of	political	sovereign	power.		
	
This	 in	 turn	 entails	 that	 the	 epistemological	 construct	 to	 which	 the	 modern	
subject	 corresponds	 still	 realizes	 in	 abstraction	 what	 the	 sovereign	 used	 to	
perform:	the	actualization	of	truth	through	the	coincidence	between	speech	and	
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knowledge.	And	it	explains	why	the	figure	of	the	modern	subject	remains	captive	
within	 the	 space	 of	 an	 irreducible	 alienation:	 the	 so-called	modern	 liberation	
which	 makes	 his	 desires	 positive	 also	 inscribes	 them	 into	 the	 field	 of	
epistemological	 positivity.	 The	 sovereign	 coincidence	 between	 power	 and	
knowledge,	which	made	cosmological	representation	possible,	can	therefore	be	
transposed	to	the	coincidence	between	the	act	of	speech	and	the	knowledge	of	
desires	which	the	sovereign	position	of	anthropological	truth	performs.		
	
However,	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 anthropological	
representation	through	the	reconstitution	of	the	coincidence	between	power	and	
knowledge	relies	upon	a	concept	of	 life	whose	epistemological	status	makes	 it	
coincide	with	a	natural	fact.	This	is	the	reason	why	I	have	shown	that	a	proper	
study	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 in	 Foucault’s	 late	 work	 makes	 it	
coincide	with	 the	 concern	 for	 an	 ethics	 and	 an	 aesthetics	 of	 the	 self	which	 is	
incompatible	with	the	postulate	of	a	founding	anthropological	truth.	What	has	
appeared	to	be	even	more	striking	is	that	the	philosophical	figures	(the	Stoics	and	
the	Cynics)	Foucault	refers	to	in	order	to	illustrate	the	possibility	of	such	ethics	
also	 take	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 (as	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	
knowledge)	on	an	ethical	level.	Whilst	the	Stoics	advocate	a	sagittal	perspective	
over	one’s	own	existence	in	order	to	become	the	judge	of	the	rationality	which	
governs	 one’s	 own	 life,	 the	 Cynics	 are	 the	 one	 who	 strictly	 reject	 theoretical	
knowledge	in	favour	of	a	philosophical	practice	which	produces	a	never-ending	
revaluation	of	one’s	own	practice.	Whilst	the	Stoics	inscribe	the	rationality	which	
govern	their	conduct	within	a	primordial	praxis,	the	Cynics	live	their	lives	on	the	
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strict	 level	of	power:	 they	 constantly	establish	a	new	 relationship	 towards	 the	
world	and	towards	others	which	is	not	epistemological.	
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Conclusion	
	
	
This	thesis	has	examined	Foucault’s	account	of	the	question	of	power	over	life	
from	a	novel	angle.	Instead	of	accepting	the	concept	of	biological	life	it	implies	
without	questioning	 its	historical	 implications	 (as	numerous	 commentators	do	
nowadays),	 this	 study	 has	 attempted	 to	 read	 carefully	 what	 Foucault	 tells	 us	
when	he	introduces	the	concepts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	at	the	end	of	the	
first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality.	Its	original	motivation	has	been	to	answer	
the	 following	 question:	 which	 evolution	 does	 the	 modern	 concept	 of	 life	
undertake	 so	 that	 it	 allows,	 for	 its	 own	 sake,	 the	 paradox	 of	 genocide?	 The	
answer	has	been	found	where	few	commentators	have	been	willing	to	look	for	
it:	in	the	way	modern	political	power	incorporates	the	existence	of	men	into	the	
field	of	scientific	knowledge.		
	
Instead	of	 looking	at	 the	way	bio-power	and	biopolitics	operate,	which	would	
have	led	us	to	study	the	precise	mechanisms	according	to	which	norms	function	
in	our	society,	I	have	chosen	to	characterize	political	modernity	by	focusing	on	
what	 Foucault	 contrasts	 it	with:	 the	power	of	 the	 sovereign	which	disappears	
historically	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age.	Not	only	has	this	approach	led	me	to	
radically	 differentiate	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 modern	 political	 power	 from	
Agamben’s,	but	it	has	also	allowed	me	to	demonstrate	that	although	the	figure	
of	the	political	sovereign	which	puts	his	subjects	to	death	disappears,	the	theme	
of	 sovereignty	 persists	 within	 Foucault’s	 philosophical	 enterprise.	 Indeed,	 the	
 279 
historical	emergence	of	anthropological	knowledge,	described	by	Foucault	in	The	
Order	of	Things,	tells	us	that	the	modern	subject	now	occupies	the	place	of	the	
King:	it	is	around	the	concept	of	man	that	modern	empiricities	are	thought	and	
known.	I	have	chosen	to	take	this	claim	seriously	and	to	give	it	an	epistemological	
value	instead	of	seeing	in	it	nothing	more	than	a	metaphor.		
	
When	Foucault	tells	us	that	Classical	language	links	together	“representation	and	
being”	(Foucault:	2001e,	339),	the	implication	is	that	it	locates	the	possibility	of	
the	synthesis	of	representation	(i.e.	a	possible	correspondence	between	words	
and	 things),	 within	 a	 transcendent	 external	 figure	 (God).	 However,	 with	 the	
advent	 of	 modernity,	 it	 is	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 sovereign,	 responsible	 for	 the	
coherence	 between	 things	 and	 their	 representation	 in	 language,	 which	
disappears.	In	other	words,	Foucault	tells	us	that	the	modern	subject	emerges	as	
an	 object	 of	 positive	 knowledge	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 synthesis	 of	
representation	performed	by	the	exteriority	of	an	external	transcendent	figure.	
This	is	the	reason	why	the	modern	concept	of	man	is	the	product	of	an	irreducible	
alienation:	what	is	described	by	anthropological	knowledge	is	not	the	concrete	
individual	but	an	epistemological	construction	which	grounds	the	possibility	of	its	
own	 representation	within	 the	 field	 of	 anthropological	 knowledge.	 This	 is	 the	
reason	why	the	concept	of	the	norm,	which	grounds	the	rationality	of	bio-power	
and	biopolitics,	presupposes	the	existence	of	a	natural	rule.	This	natural	rule	is	
what	allows	the	correspondence	between	the	existence	of	men	and	its	validity	
within	the	field	of	knowledge	and	representation.	
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In	order	to	trace,	within	Foucault’s	body	of	work,	the	origin	of	the	analysis	of	this	
alienation,	I	have	been	led	to	provide	an	account	of	the	emergence	of	life	as	an	
object	 of	 knowledge.	 Since	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 biological	 is	 historicized	 by	
Foucault,	 it	 could	 not	 be	 used	 as	 a	 satisfying	 conceptual	 basis	 and	 claim	 that	
biological	life	simply	becomes	the	object	of	the	human	sciences.	Rather,	I	had	to	
examine	the	move	through	which	the	lives	of	men,	understood	in	the	sense	of	
the	strict	immanence	of	their	existence,	became	an	object	of	positive	knowledge.	
In	other	words,	I	had	to	give	an	account	of	the	epistemological	mutation	which	
provided	 the	existence	of	man	a	place	as	object	of	 knowledge	amongst	other	
objects.	
	
Therefore,	it	is	the	move	from	the	immediacy	of	immanence	to	its	representation	
as	 object	 of	 knowledge	 which	 needed	 to	 be	 examined.	 Since	 the	 concept	 of	
biological	 life	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 satisfying	 starting	 point,	 the	 origin	 of	 this	
mutation	 had	 to	 be	 identified	 before	 the	 introduction	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	 within	 Foucault’s	 work.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	 Will	 to	 Know,	
Foucault’s	 1970-1971	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France,	 that	 Foucault	
studies	for	the	first	time	the	historical	emergence	of	epistemological	truth.	His	
analysis,	 prolonged	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 in	 1973,	 sees	 the	 historical	
emergence	of	epistemological	knowledge	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	when	the	
political	paradigm	of	the	Assyrian	empire	disappears.	Foucault’s	account,	inspired	
by	 Détienne’s	 and	 Vernant’s	 analyses	 of	 the	mutation	 of	 truth	 at	 the	 end	 of	
Archaic	 Greece,	 describes	 the	 mutation	 from	 a	 pre-epistemological	 to	 an	
epistemological	concept	of	truth.	Whereas	the	power	of	sovereigns	actualized	an	
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exoteric	knowledge	which	coincided	with	 it,	 the	emergence	of	epistemological	
truth	 corresponds	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 knowledge	 as	 tekhne.	 It	 is	 facticity	
understood	 as	 the	 disjunction	 between	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 which	
characterizes	the	morphology	of	epistemological	truth.		
	
Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 epistemological	 truth	 is	more	 than	 a	
punctual	 historical	 and	 philosophical	 analysis.	 This	 thesis	 has	 shown	 that	 it	
constitutes	 the	 framework	 within	 which	 Foucault	 inscribes	 his	 genealogy	 of	
Western	 subjectivity.	 It	 is	 indeed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 “will	 to	 know”	which	 gets	
obliterated	by	the	primacy	of	knowledge	and	ontological	truth	that	the	“will	to	
knowledge”	appears	later	in	Foucault’s	work:	this	“will	to	knowledge”,	just	like	
the	 “will	 to	 know”,	 describes	 an	 attitude	 towards	 the	 world	 which	 	 seeks	 in	
objects	(either	the	objects	of	nature	discovered	through	knowledge	or	subjects	
become	natural	objects)	the	expression	of	an	a	priori	rationality.	 It	 is	this	 logic	
which	allows	to	understand	how	the	modern	subject,	whose	natural	inclinations	
and	desires	speak	in	spite	of	himself	in	his	discourses	or	acts,	historically	becomes	
the	 immanent	manifestation	 of	 a	 natural	 phenomenon.	 Consequently,	 I	 have	
reached	the	conclusion	that	bio-power	and	biopolitics,	which	operate	within	the	
field	of	anthropological	knowledge,	deal	with	a	broader	object	than	the	postulate	
of	 biological	 life.	 The	 concept	of	 life	 it	 targets	 becomes	 a	positive	 abstraction	
which	loses	contact	with	the	reality	of	existence.	
	
Consequently,	the	critique	of	the	emergence	of	epistemological	thought	Foucault	
provides	in	1970-1971	needs	to	be	understood,	like	two	sides	of	the	same	coin,	
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at	the	same	time	as	a	critique	of	objectivity	and	subjectivity.	Indeed,	the	concept	
of	 subjectivity	 implies	 that	 the	 agent	 (the	 acting	 subject)	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	
constituted	as	object.	This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault’s	analyses	of	the	historical	
emergence	of	epistemological	knowledge	and	anthropological	knowledge	ask	in	
turn	the	question	of	the	possibility	of	sovereignty.	This	sovereignty	is	no	longer	
simply	the	existence	of	the	political	sovereign	but	the	possibility	for	an	individual	
to	be	the	sovereign	of	his	or	her	own	life	(i.e.	the	possibility	to	determine	his	or	
her	own	actions	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	not	brought	back	to	the	rationality	of	
knowledge).		
	
In	 other	 words,	 this	 thesis	 discovered	 that	 the	 anthropological	 alienation	
occurring	 with	 modernity	 is	 only	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 decline	 of	 an	 ethical	
relation	 which	 gets	 dissipated	 through	 the	 course	 of	 the	 history	 of	 Western	
subjectivity.	It	corresponds	to	the	possibility	of	thinking	life	in	other	ways	than	
the	natural	and	temporal	expression	of	an	essential	substance	(which	runs	from	
the	 traditional	 concept	 of	 subjectivity	 to	 the	 one	 of	 biological	 life).	 When	
Foucault,	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject	as	well	as	in	The	Government	of	the	
Self	and	Others	II:	The	Courage	of	Truth	thinks	about	life	as	different	modalities	
of	bios	(the	bios	kunikos	as	a	radical	form	of	bios	alethes118),	he	does	not	refer	to	
an	intrinsic	relationship	between	one’s	action	and	a	transcendental	concept	of	
truth	(as	Platonic	philosophy	or	the	postulate	of	anthropological	nature	 imply)	
but	to	life	understood	as	a	series	of	immanent	acts	which	have	no	hermeneutic	
                                                
118 	This	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which,	 in	 his	 last	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France,	 Foucault	
understands	the	Cynical	life	as	the	true	life	(Foucault:	2011b,	231-249).			
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value.	If	the	Stoics	or	the	Cynics	reflect	upon	their	lives,	it	is	not	to	extract	from	it	
a	meaning	derived	 from	a	primordial	 logos	but	 to	keep	on	 shaping	 it	 in	other	
ways.		
	
This	thesis	has	identified	that	a	genuine	critique	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	had	
to	 imply	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 “natural”	 or	 “biological	 life”	 as	 an	
unquestioned	 correspondence	 between	 the	 immanence	 of	 existence	 and	 its	
possible	representation	within	the	field	of	scientific	knowledge.	This	leads	us	to	
ask	the	question,	within	the	scope	of	a	work	to	come,	what	Foucault	meant	when,	
during	a	conference	given	at	the	Société	Française	de	Philosophie	on	27th	March	
1978,	he	 claimed	 that	 critique	was	 “[the	art]	of	not	being	quite	 so	governed”	
(Foucault:	 1997,	 47).	 “Not	 being	 quite	 so	 governed”	 [“ne	 pas	 être	 tellement	
gouverné”119]	does	not	refer	to	an	anarchic	refusal	of	political	power.	Rather,	it	
calls	 for	the	possibility,	through	the	 inversion	of	the	 logic	of	connaissance	 into	
critical	savoir,	of	not	being	governed	in	this	way.		In	other	words,	it	refers	to	what	
the	Foucauldian	genealogy	has	endeavoured	to	accomplish	since	its	beginnings:	
to	examine,	throughout	history,	how	men,	without	being	aware	of	it,	have	been	
led	to	think	and	live	differently.	
	 	
                                                
119	Commentators	have,	until	now,	 largely	overlooked	 the	meaning	of	 this	phrase.	The	French	
word	tellement	does	not	merely	refer	to	the	idea	of	an	excess	of	political	power.	It	also	refers	to	
the	way	in	which	this	power	is	exerted.		
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